Financial Factors in Business...

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Financial Factors in Business Fluctuationsby M. Gertler and R.G. Hubbard

Professor Kevin D. Salyer

UC Davis

May 2009

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 1 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom

2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Summary of Gertler and Hubbard article

Modern Macroeconomic Theory separates Business Cycle componentsinto 3 broad categories

1 Impulse Mechanisms - initial shocks that hit the economy

1 Demand shocks: war expenditures, investment boom2 Supply Shocks: oil price shocks, productivity improvements.

2 Ampli�cation Mechanisms - endogenous response that increases e¤ectof initial shock.

3 Propagation Mechanisms - endogenous response that cause e¤ects ofshock to have dynamic e¤ects.

1 Financial Sector may be an important contributor to both ampli�cationand propagation.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 2 / 8

Some Excerpts from the G & H article

At a more formal level, recent research in macroeconomics- boththeoretical and empirical-has resurrected the idea that capital marketimperfections may be signi�cant factors in business volatility bymaking new progress in characterizing the mechanisms.

Over the last decade, much of the e¤ort in macroeconomics hasinvolved developing models of business �uctuations in which thestructural relationships are explicit outcomes of rational economicbehavior. The centerpiece is the "real business cycle" paradigm,developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982).

First, �nancial factors are completely absent. Because all marketsfunction perfectly in the competitive equilibrium growth model, theModigliani-Miller theorem applies; �nancial structure is bothirrelevant and indeterminate.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 3 / 8

Some Excerpts from the G & H article

This latter feature has motivated a new stage of research aimed atenriching the endogenous component of the propagation mechanism.The common objective is to rationalize and test theories that canexplain how relatively small exogenous shocks can produce large�uctuations in output.

A third (research avenue), which we consider here, is to explore theimplications of certain capital market imperfections.

To this extent, it borrows heavily from the economics of informationand incentives to explicitly motivate frictions in capital markets and,correspondingly, a meaningful role for �nancial structure in realeconomic activity.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 4 / 8

Excerpts continued

The new work stresses two basic avenues in which �nancial factorsmay contribute to investment volatility. Each presumes a settingwhere informational asymmetries between borrowers and lendersintroduce incentive problems in �nancial relationships.

1 The �rst involves the �rm�s internal net worth, which becomes acritical determinant of the terms under which it can borrow in thistype of environment.

2 The second main avenue stressed involves the supply of intermediarycredit, particularly business loans supplied by commercial banks.Underlying this channel is the idea that certain classes of borrowersmay �nd it prohibitively expensive to obtain �nancing by directlyissuing securities on the open market. Financial intermediaries helpovercome this friction by exploiting scale economies in the evaluationand monitoring of borrowers.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 5 / 8

Excerpts continued

The new work stresses two basic avenues in which �nancial factorsmay contribute to investment volatility. Each presumes a settingwhere informational asymmetries between borrowers and lendersintroduce incentive problems in �nancial relationships.

1 The �rst involves the �rm�s internal net worth, which becomes acritical determinant of the terms under which it can borrow in thistype of environment.

2 The second main avenue stressed involves the supply of intermediarycredit, particularly business loans supplied by commercial banks.Underlying this channel is the idea that certain classes of borrowersmay �nd it prohibitively expensive to obtain �nancing by directlyissuing securities on the open market. Financial intermediaries helpovercome this friction by exploiting scale economies in the evaluationand monitoring of borrowers.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 5 / 8

Excerpts continued

The new work stresses two basic avenues in which �nancial factorsmay contribute to investment volatility. Each presumes a settingwhere informational asymmetries between borrowers and lendersintroduce incentive problems in �nancial relationships.

1 The �rst involves the �rm�s internal net worth, which becomes acritical determinant of the terms under which it can borrow in thistype of environment.

2 The second main avenue stressed involves the supply of intermediarycredit, particularly business loans supplied by commercial banks.Underlying this channel is the idea that certain classes of borrowersmay �nd it prohibitively expensive to obtain �nancing by directlyissuing securities on the open market. Financial intermediaries helpovercome this friction by exploiting scale economies in the evaluationand monitoring of borrowers.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 5 / 8

Excerpts continued

Theoretical models which motivate these types of real-�nancialmechanisms from �rst principles are now in abundance. The mainchallenge remaining is to quantify their importance. This task is at anearly stage.

Overall, the theme that emerges from this initial empirical work isthat �nancial factors are important to the behavior of small, growing�rms, at least relative to large, mature �rms.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 6 / 8

Excerpts continued

Theoretical models which motivate these types of real-�nancialmechanisms from �rst principles are now in abundance. The mainchallenge remaining is to quantify their importance. This task is at anearly stage.

Overall, the theme that emerges from this initial empirical work isthat �nancial factors are important to the behavior of small, growing�rms, at least relative to large, mature �rms.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 6 / 8

Model Highlights

Partial Equilibrium model of investment

Two types of capital: Hard Capital and Soft Capital. Soft capitalincreases the probability of high productivity.

Soft Capital investment can not be observed - entrepreneurs haveincentive to use for their own purposes.

Lenders structure payments to induce entrepreneurs to invest in softcapital.

Introduces a new type of constraint: the Incentive Compatibleconstraint.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 7 / 8

Model Highlights

Partial Equilibrium model of investment

Two types of capital: Hard Capital and Soft Capital. Soft capitalincreases the probability of high productivity.

Soft Capital investment can not be observed - entrepreneurs haveincentive to use for their own purposes.

Lenders structure payments to induce entrepreneurs to invest in softcapital.

Introduces a new type of constraint: the Incentive Compatibleconstraint.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 7 / 8

Model Highlights

Partial Equilibrium model of investment

Two types of capital: Hard Capital and Soft Capital. Soft capitalincreases the probability of high productivity.

Soft Capital investment can not be observed - entrepreneurs haveincentive to use for their own purposes.

Lenders structure payments to induce entrepreneurs to invest in softcapital.

Introduces a new type of constraint: the Incentive Compatibleconstraint.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 7 / 8

Model Highlights

Partial Equilibrium model of investment

Two types of capital: Hard Capital and Soft Capital. Soft capitalincreases the probability of high productivity.

Soft Capital investment can not be observed - entrepreneurs haveincentive to use for their own purposes.

Lenders structure payments to induce entrepreneurs to invest in softcapital.

Introduces a new type of constraint: the Incentive Compatibleconstraint.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 7 / 8

Model Highlights

Partial Equilibrium model of investment

Two types of capital: Hard Capital and Soft Capital. Soft capitalincreases the probability of high productivity.

Soft Capital investment can not be observed - entrepreneurs haveincentive to use for their own purposes.

Lenders structure payments to induce entrepreneurs to invest in softcapital.

Introduces a new type of constraint: the Incentive Compatibleconstraint.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 7 / 8

Model Highlights

Three Main Conclusions

1 Net worth plays a critical role in the amount of lending - entrepreneurhas more at risk in case of bad outcome.

2 Increase in interest rates lowers investment - worsens the incentiveproblem and reduces the value of collateralizable assets.

3 Investment �uctuations may exhibit asymmetries: downturns aresharper than expansions due to changes in net worth.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 8 / 8

Model Highlights

Three Main Conclusions1 Net worth plays a critical role in the amount of lending - entrepreneurhas more at risk in case of bad outcome.

2 Increase in interest rates lowers investment - worsens the incentiveproblem and reduces the value of collateralizable assets.

3 Investment �uctuations may exhibit asymmetries: downturns aresharper than expansions due to changes in net worth.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 8 / 8

Model Highlights

Three Main Conclusions1 Net worth plays a critical role in the amount of lending - entrepreneurhas more at risk in case of bad outcome.

2 Increase in interest rates lowers investment - worsens the incentiveproblem and reduces the value of collateralizable assets.

3 Investment �uctuations may exhibit asymmetries: downturns aresharper than expansions due to changes in net worth.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 8 / 8

Model Highlights

Three Main Conclusions1 Net worth plays a critical role in the amount of lending - entrepreneurhas more at risk in case of bad outcome.

2 Increase in interest rates lowers investment - worsens the incentiveproblem and reduces the value of collateralizable assets.

3 Investment �uctuations may exhibit asymmetries: downturns aresharper than expansions due to changes in net worth.

Professor Kevin D. Salyer (UC Davis) Gertler and Hubbard article 05/09 8 / 8