Extended validation SSL March 2007 Tim Moses (chair, CA / Browser Forum)

Extended validation SSLMarch 2007Tim Moses (chair, CA / Browser Forum)

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Overview

• Browser security

• Site authentication

• The history of SSL

• Extended validation in the browser

• Extended validation certificates

• Not a silver bullet

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There’s a problem with the WebGartner reports …

• From mid-2005 until mid-2006, about 15 million Americans were victims of fraud that stemmed from identity theft– an increase of more than 50 percent from the estimated 9.9 million in 2003

• The average loss of funds in a case of identity theft was $3,257 in 2006– up from $1,408 in 2005

• An average of 61 percent of funds were recovered, in 2006– Down from 87 percent in 2005

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New Phishing Sites

Morgan Keegan/UBS Jul 2006

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Web vulnerabilities

Malicious code

HTTP proxy caching

Cross-site scripting

Man-in-the-middle

Site impersonation

ISP eavesdro

pping

DNS caching

Local are

a eavesdropping

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First-party accreditation

• Self-signed SSL certificate– Trust dialog– Help-desk calls

• Security toolbar

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Browser toolbars

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Third-party accreditation

• SSL certificates

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The early years (mid 90s)

• Threats to the Web– Site defacement– ISP eavesdropping

• Netscape developed SSL

• Simple trust indicators– Look for the golden key or padlock to check that you are safe

• Computer-literate users

• URL that reflects the name of the organization

• Common issuing practices– VeriSign Class 3

• Although …– There were no strict criteria for the use and management of

roots in browsers

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Mid-life (2000 – 2001)

• ABA1 developed PKI Assessment Guidelines

• Audit profession recognized a need for criteria

• AICPA2 & CICA3

• Audit criteria “WebTrust for CAs”

• Similar standard in Europe : ETSI4 TS 101 456

• Adopted by Microsoft as a requirement for including roots in Windows

– Other browser suppliers followed Microsoft’s lead

• But …– There were serious omissions– Do not specify what identifying information has to be included in a certificate– Or how to validate that that information is correct– Users supposed review CPS 1 American Bar Association

2 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants3Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants4 European Telecommunication Standards Institute

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The SSL certificate marketplace

Rigour (= cost, delay, inconvenience)

Price

GoDaddy

GeoTrust

VeriSign

Entrust

Other CAs: Comodo, CyberTrust, DigiCert, Ipsca, Notaris, QuoVadis, Trustis, XRamp

All certificatescause the lockto display

Domain-validatecertificates

Organizationally-validatedcertificates

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Trust indicators

Yellow address bar

Golden padlock

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Evidence of a problem

• Domain-validated SSL certificates have been issued to phishing sites

• User confusion– Does the golden

padlock mean I’m secure?

– Does SSL provide authentication or just confidentiality?

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CA / Browser Forum (2005)

• Major CAs and browser suppliers got together

• Formed the CA / Browser Forum

• Objective – Improve trustworthiness of the Web

• Project to develop certificate issuance guidelines for new browser trust indicators

• Microsoft has adopted an interim draft of the CABForum guidelines as the criteria for inclusion in their root embedding program

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IE7 Phishing filter and EV SSL

Phishing, Suspected phishing, HTTP, HTTPS, EV

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IE7 UI details

Green address bar

Golden padlock

Assumed name, registered name and country

alternating withthe issuer’s name

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Opera 9

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The SSL Marketplace - after EV (two points of view)

Very high threshold Moderate threshold

Conventional SSL Conventional SSLEV SSL EV SSL

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EV certificate

• Identified by …– Particular certificate policy identifier

• Verified contents …– Registered name

• e.g. ACE Aviation Holdings Inc– Assumed name

• e.g. Air Canada– Domain name

• e.g. www.aircanada.com– Place of business address– Jurisdiction of incorporation– Registration number

Note: The CA must also retain verified name and contact details for the applicant

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Verification requirements

• Legal existence– Government registry

• Operational existence– Trade accounts– Bank letter– Legal opinion– Accountant’s letter

• Physical existence– Trade accounts– Site visits

• Domain name– WHOIS– Practical demonstration

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Other requirements

• Revocation– Browsers will check for revocation by default, using OCSP, once “stapling”

becomes widely available

• Identification and authentication of requestor/approver

• Verification of authority of requestor/approver

• Warranty by CA to subscribers, users and browser suppliers

• Errors and omissions insurance

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It’s no good if users don’t check!

• EV sites place this graphic on their publicity material, including the Web site

• The message isn’t ‘if you see green you are safe’• It just reminds the user to check the site identity in the

location bar

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It’s not foolproof – picture-in-picture

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Conclusion

• Browser security has significant shortcomings

• EV SSL represents a dramatic improvement

• It isn’t foolproof

• User awareness remains a critical issue

• Initial marketplace reaction appears positive

For more information:- http://www.cabforum.org/