EuroPKI Antonio Lioy Politecnico di Torino Dip. Automatica e Informatica

EuroPKIEuroPKI

Antonio Lioy

< lioy @ polito.it >

Politecnico di Torino

Dip. Automatica e Informatica

secureWeb

securee-mail

secureremoteaccess

secureVPN

secureDNS

X.509certificate

The Copernican revolution

Win2000security

secureboot

no viruses& Trojan horses

IPsecurity

role-basedsecurity

The actual (Ptolemaic) poor situation

pwd (ISP)

POPweb

login

pwd (univ.)

DBMSSSH (univ.)

loginfiletransfer

PKI (X)

S/MIMEweb

What is EuroPKI?

EuroPKI is a spontaneous aggregation of certification authorities that share the vision of setting-up a pan-European PKI to support the deployment of effective interoperable network security techniques.

EuroPKI is a spontaneous aggregation of certification authorities that share the vision of setting-up a pan-European PKI to support the deployment of effective interoperable network security techniques.

Background

ICE-TEL project (1997-1998) ICE-CAR project (1999-2000) various national projects (1996-2000)

since January 1, 2000: EuroPKI

EuroPKI

EuroPKI TLCA

Politecnico diTorino CA

City ofRome CA

people servers

EETIC CA

EuroPKISlovenia

EuroPKIItaly

EuroPKIAustria

Costituency

root + AT (IAIK) IE (TCD) IT (POLITO)

Italian tree, with 4 City Halls integration with the Italian identity chip-card

SI (IJS) Slovenian tree

UK (UCL)

Prospective partners

there have been talks within the TERENA PKI-coord task force

expressions of interest from: Surfnet (NL) Rediris (ES) Thessaloniki Univ. (GR) Garr (IT)

Why a hierarchy?

it’s the only solution that works now for most applications (especially COTS)

EuroPKI might move to other schemas (e.g., cross-certification, bridge) if and when applications will be available

EuroPKI services

EuroPKI is not “selling” services although it provides: certification revocation publication data and cert validation

aggregation point for: competence centre coordination

Certification

X.509v3 certificates

global CP (Certification Policy)

local CPS (Certification Practice Statement)

Certification policy

current draft: 28 pages based on RFC-2527 (with extensions)

basic idea: be as little restrictive as possible to allow

anybody to join ... ... while retaining a level of security

useful for practical applications

Strong CP requirements

personal identification of the subject

secure management of the CA

periodic publication of CRL

Applications supported

Web: SSL/TLS signed applets

SSL-based applications: telnet, FTP, SMTP, POP, IMAP, ...

e-mail and secure documents: S/MIME, PKCS-7, CMS, …

IPsec (also on routers via SCEP) (looking into secure DNS)

Publication

certificates and CRLs

Web servers: for humans

directory server: for applications LDAP (local) directories X.500 (global) directory X.521 schema

Revocation CRL (Certificate Revocation List)

cumulative list of revoked certificates issued periodically updated as needed

OCSP (On-Line Certificate Status Protocol): “is this cert valid now?” unknown, valid, invalid

Time-stamping

proof of data existence at a given date IETF-PKIX-TSP-draft-14 TSP server (Win32, Unix) TSP client (cmd-line, GUI only for Win32)

TSP server

OCSP

OCSP server (Unix, Win32) automatic CRL collection from several Cas OCSP library + cmd-line client (Unix, NT)

OCSPserver

CRL

CRLOCSP(embedded)

client

SSL-telnet, SSL-ftp

SSL channel server authentication client authentication can supplement or

replace passwords server for Unix and Win32 (FTP only) client for Unix (cmd-line) and Win32 (GUI)

SSL-x serverSSL-x client LDAP, OCSP

Authentication or authorization?

most of the problems are trust-related often this is due to the wrong and

unnecessary coupling of authentication with authorization

we need to cut this node: authenticate only once and globally authorization on a local basis, with local

control

Attributes / roles / permissions …

where shouldI put additional

infos relatedto a certificate?

in a directory, orin an attribute certificatein a directory, orin an attribute certificate

inside the certificate, in orderto keep all data togetherinside the certificate, in orderto keep all data together

Next steps

European digital signature law: qualified certificates voluntary accreditation

support for other EC projects: NASTEC (PKI-based secure IS; PKI at least

for Poland and Romania) TESI (CDSA-based security middleware)

On-going technical work

cleanly separate authentication and authorization (local file, LDAP, AC, …)

DNS as a repository, DNSsec automatic policy negotiation (L3 … L7):

policy description (XML-based language) policy negotiation (ISPP) policy compliance (enforcement gateway)

integration with Win2000: LDAP IPsec DNSsec

Future

I have a dream ...

... a pan-europeanopen and public PKIto enable network security

who is interested?

EuroPKI?