Decentralized Trust Management security1.win.tue.nl/~zannon e/teaching/dtm09-10.html

Decentralized Trust Management

security1.win.tue.nl/~zannone/teaching/dtm09-10.html

Course Organization

Introduction

AC, DTM topics based on research papersNext week: Discretionary Access Control

Website: List of TopicsPapers to read

security1.win.tue.nl/~zannone/teaching/dtm09-10.html

The need for Data Protection Confidential data

Databases with essential business information

Private data EHR, RFID, OVchip, `Slimme meter’

Risks & Threats. News headlines: Justice demanded pictures ov-chipcard travelers Laptop with data 109.000 persons stolen Data hacked vacancy website used for phishing ...

The need for Trust

Decision on interaction with other entity:Value to give to information in this lecture.Give access to a resource.

Incomplete information Is the information correct, state-of-the-art?How will the resource be used?

Trust Management

Establishing trust in the digital world

Truster Trustee

Gives Trust Subjective, perceived probability

Claims/Shows Trustworthiness

Trust me I’m a

doctor

Controlling access to resources Who is trusted to do what with a resource

Subject, Action, Object

I’m BobBob May

Park

Access Control MatrixPolicy:

Students may read grade list and read and run submitPaper

Teacher may read and write grade list and submitPaper

So we are done ?

User GradeList SubmitPaper

Jerry rw rw

Joris r rx

Tim r rx

Controlling access to resources Enforcement, Implementation

Maintenance, Consistency Captures intended policy (how to check?) Dynamicity; Rights not constant

Specification, Policies Authority on the resource; Who decides?

Decentralized systems, Delegation. Conditions, Obligation, Purpose

Privacy Anonymity, attribute based AC

CENSORED

Access Control Lists

Enforcement & Maintenance

User GradeList SubmitPaper

Jerry rw rw

Joris r rx

Tim r rx

User SubmitPaper

Jerry rw

Joris rx

Tim rx

Role base access control(1)

Role (Similar to `group’) Teacher Student

Assign access rights to Roles and Roles to users Added Indirection makes for easier maintenance

Role GradeList

Teacher rw

Student r

Role Users

Teacher Jerry

Student Joris, Tim

1) RBAC treated in more detail in a later lecture.

Role dependency (Role Hierarchies)

Staff

Prof Lecturer

Scientific Financial

...

Legal

...

Staff may Enter BuildingStaff rights also granted to Professors

Decentralized AC

Different authorities at different locationsUT admin does not control TU/e resources

Different Hierarchies for different locations In NL PhD student is subrole of Employee in US PhD student is subrole of Student

Access control for distributed resources?TU/e student list, US student discount.

Delegation Define your roles based on roles of other users:

Jerry.StudentsInMyClass = EducationOffice.RegisteredStudents2IS25

Trust Management Issue: I trust education office to define registered student

role In turn education office may trust registration office

EducationOffice.RegisteredStudents2IS25 = RegistrationOffice.Student and WebServer.subscribed2IS25

Towards Rule based TM Can specify `trust rules’

Link roles in different HierarchiesDifficulty: Naming Conventions

e.g. AIO – PhD student

More fine grained control Different Roles for different users/locations

Jerry.StudentsInMyClassSandro.StudentsInMyClassEducationOffice.RegisteredStudents2IF34

Why trust?

Trust needed for cooperation Cannot control behaviour of other people/systems

Base of trust Own experience and experience of others Regulations Technical measures (see also next slide) Taking a risk (risk vs benefit analysis when possible)

`Good’ behaviour slowly enforces/builds trust `Bad’ behaviour quickly lowers trust

Why Trust (Cont.) ?

Trusting remote computationTrusted computing platform

Hardware chip base chain of trust – chip checks signatures of programs to ensure they are not altered, can do essential computation steps.

Smartcards protect information, applications from device holder

Trust Management

Main TM classes Rule based TM

E.g. based on Regulations Trusted parties can be exactly determined trust ~ formal relationship

Reputation based TM E.g. when based on behaviour, recommendations trust ~ subjective probability `correct’ behaviour

Trust me I’m a

doctor

Rule Based Trust Management

Example systemsRole based trust management (RT)SDKI/SPKI…

Example scenarioStudent at accredited university gets discount

Shop.Discount ← AccBody.Univ.Student

AccBody.Univ ← TUe

TUe.Student ← Alice

Rule Based Trust Management

Distributed, Open Each participant is authority, issues credentials Participants can join, leave

Delegation entrust credentials of others

Binary User either fully trusted or not trusted

Static trust level No change based on actions of the user

Reputation System Example E-bay transaction feedback system

Eigentrust: More advanced combination

Reputation Systems Scenario

Joint ordering to get bulk discount More participants = more savings Do have to show up when the book arrives Allow friends to join & recommend others

Alice joinsBob does not join but recommends CharlieCharlie does not join but recommends Dave...

Reputation Based TM

Main properties Distributed, Open

Each participant is an authority Issues its own recommendations/feedback.

Delegation Place trust in the recommendations of others.

Multilevel and dynamic trust level level of trust actions influences the level of trust

Common features TM classes

Combine info from different sources trust sources providing information

Openness; Anyone can join or leave the system issue credentials/recommendations

Other participants decide on their value

Differences TM classes Role of risk:

In rule based systems certificates state factsReputation systems include intrinsic risk;

reputation does not give any guarantees.

(“ In het verleden behaalde resultaten geven geen garantie voor de toekomst ”)

Yes / No verses numerical. Reputation changes with actions;

level of trust is dynamic.

Back to specification of access rights

AC matrix snapshot for single location TM meant to link locations

Policies to capture `rules’ Rules underlie the permissions in AC matrixDerive, Update, Maintain permissionsE.g. Logic in access control

Logic in Access Control

Express AC rules with logical formulas:Rights expressed by predicates:

may-access(p,o,r):

principle p has access right r to object o

Basic rules can also be expressed: may-access(p,o,Wr) → may-access(p,o,Rd)

write access implies read access

Different ways to generalize this principle

Logic in Access Control (2)

Complications of distributed systems Often used construct: `SAYS’

for stating requests for delegation, e.g. p says may-access(q,o,r)

p says may-access(q,o,r)=>( may-access(p,o,r) => may-access(q,o,r))

Expressing the intended policy

AC matrix not expressive enough e.g. no rules

Just add anything you can think of ?

Limit on expressiveness Illustrate with Take-grant model

Take-Grant model

Directed graph represents AC matrix. Edge Role -- Object labeled with right (e.g. read/write)

Delegation rights added Edge between Roles: can take/may grant rights

Changes in response to delegation actions Rules for changing graph

Take-Grant Model example

File

R,W

Alice Bobt

File

R,W

Alice Bobt

R,W

Example of an application of the Take-rule; Bob takes Alice’s read/write permission

Safety problem

Can subject obtain a right? Given delegation rules, initial permissions: can a given permission can be granted ?

Decidable in linear time if delegation rules fixed to Take-grant model [Jone76].

Undecidable in general (details next week) Not possible to create algorithm

Takes as input set of rules and starting configuration Always stops with the correct decision. (Equivalent to the Turing halting problem.)

Implications Undecidability of safety shows limits; AC policy language cannot be too expressive

Efficiently decide whether uses have a right Check safety properties before granting right Complexity in understanding

Difficulty: find AC specification mechanism

simple to understand effectively computable sufficiently expressive

Implementation: Certificates Proof that you are a member of a role

Student card issued by registration office

More generally: Binding of properties to an identity (public key) signed by the cerfitication authority (i.e. issuer of the role student).

Proof that a role is defined in a given way Education office can issue a single certificate stating

EducationOffice.RegisteredStudents2IF34 = RegistrationOffice.Student and WebServer.subscribed2IF34

rather than given a different certificate to each student

Using Certificates

Use a chain of certificates to proof role membershipStudent card to proof studentconfirmation from webserver to show

registeredcertificate of education office to show

registration policy (Automatic) Chain discovery can be difficult

who stores certificateswhere to look for certificates

PKI & certificate systems PKI

Public key cryptosystem, e.g. RSA Certificate links public key to identity. Trust based on authority that signs

Trusted roots predefined in web browser trust by numbers (PGP)

examples of PKI/certificate based systems: X.509 – Certificates bind a public key to a name(string) SPKI: PKI with focus on authorization (rather than

authentication), binding properties directly to public keys Kerberos: Single sign on system; the user gets a `ticket’ for use

of a service. Ticket is a form of certificate PGP: Often used for encryption and signing of email. No central

CAs for distribution of public keys.

Conclusions Basics of decentralized trust management

Distributed access control Delegation control

Remaining Lectures treat Access Control Privacy Policies Rule based Trust Management Reputation Systems Applications of TM Systems

Please check papers, info at: security1.win.tue.nl/~zannone/teaching/dtm09-10.html

Recommended Reading

Decentralized Trust Management, M. Blaze et al. the PolicyMaker trust management system.comparison with X.509 and PGP.

Formal Models for Computer Security, C. LandwehrOverview of classical data security notions and

systems

The End