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Lecture 14: Public Key Infrastructure. David Evans http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans. CS588: Security and Privacy University of Virginia Computer Science. Using RSA to Encrypt. Use 1024-bit modulus (RSA recommends >= 768) Encrypt 1M file 1024 1024-bit messages - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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David Evanshttp://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans
CS588: Security and PrivacyUniversity of VirginiaComputer Science
Lecture 14:Public Key Infrastructure
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Using RSA to Encrypt• Use 1024-bit modulus (RSA recommends >=
768)• Encrypt 1M file
– 1024 1024-bit messages– To calculate Me requires log2e 1024-bit modular
multiplies
• Why does no one use RSA like this?– About 100-1000 times slower than DES– Need to be careful not to encrypt particular Ms– Can speed up encryption by choosing e that is an
easy number to multiply by (e.g., 3 or 216 + 1)– But, decryption must use non-easy d (~1024 bits)
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Alternatives• Use RSA to establish a shared secret
key for symmetric cipher (DES, RC6, ...)– Lose external authentication, non-
repudiation properties of public-key cryptosystems
• Sign (encrypt with private key) a hash of the message– A short block that is associated with the
message
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RSA Paper
“The need for a courier between every pair of users has thus been replaced by the requirement for a single secure meeting between each user and the public file manager when the user joins the system.”
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Key Management
Public keys only useful if you know:
1. The public key matches the entity you think it does (and no one else).
2. The entity is trustworthy.
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Approach 1: Public Announcement
• Publish public keys in a public forum– USENET groups– Append to email messages– New York Time classifieds
• Easy for rogue to pretend to be someone else
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Approach 2: Public Directory
• Trusted authority maintains directory mapping names to public keys
• Entities register public keys with authority in some secure way
• Authority publishes directory– Print using watermarked paper, special
fonts, etc.– Allow secure electronic access
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Can we avoid needing an on-line directory?
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CertificatesLoren Kohnfelder, MIT 4th year thesis project, 1978: Towards a Practical Public-key Cryptosystem
“Public-key communication works best when the encryption functions can reliably be shared among the communicants (by direct contact if possible). Yet when such a reliable exchange of functions is impossible the next best thing is to trust a third party. Diffie and Hellman introduce a central authority known as the Public File… Each individual has a name in the system by which he is referenced in the Public File. Once two communicants have gotten each other’s keys from the Public File then can securely communicate. The Public File digitally signs all of its transmission so that enemy impersonation of the Public File is precluded.”
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Certificates
TrustMe.com
Alice Bob
{ alice@alice.org, KUA }
CA = EKRTrustMe[“alice@alice.org”, KUA]
{ bob@bob.com, KUB}
CB = EKRTrustMe[“bob@bob.com”, KUB]
CB
CA
Use anything like this?
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Data encrypted using secret key exchanged using some public keyassociated with some certificate.
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SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
Simplified TLS Handshake ProtocolClient Server
Hello
KRCA[Server Identity, KUS]
Check Certificate using KUCA
Pick random K KUS[K]Find K using KRS
Secure channel using KTextbook, Section 12.5
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Certificates
VarySign
Alice Bob
{ alice@alice.org, KUA }
CA = EKRTrustMe[“alice@alice.org”, KUA]
{ bob@bob.com, KUB}
CB = EKRTrustMe[“bob@bob.com”, KUB]
CB
CA
How does TrustMe.com decide whether to provide Certificate?
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VarySign
Alice Bob
{ alice@alice.org, KUA }
CA = EKRTrustMe[“alice@alice.org”, KUA]
{ bob@bob.com, KUB}
CB = EKRTrustMe[“bob@bob.com”, KUB]
CB
CA
Verifying Identities
$$$$
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With over half a million businesses authenticated, VeriSign follows a rigorous and independently audited authentication process. All involved VeriSign employees pass stringent background checks, and each authentication is split between multiple individuals. We maintain physically secure facilities, including biometric screening on entry.
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VeriSign’s Certificate Classes
• “Secure Site” SSL Certificate– Supports 40-bit session key– Proves: you are communicating with
someone willing to pay VeriSign $598 (or with ~$1000 to break a 40-bit key)
– Except they have a free 14-day trial (but it uses a different Trial CA key)
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“Secure Site Pro” Certificate
• $995 per year• “true 128-bit key”
“128-bit encryption offers 288 times as many possible combinations as 40-bit encryption. That’s over a trillion times a trillion times stronger.”trillion = 1012 trillion * trillion = 1024
Verisign’s marketing claim could be: “trillion times a trillion times a trillion times a trillion times a trillion times a trillion times a trillion times ten thousand (in Britain it is a trillions time a trillion times a trillion times a trillion times a billion times a thousand) times stronger” (but that would sound even sillier!)
• Businesses authentication: “out-of-band” communication, records
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VarySign.com
Alice Bob
{ alice@alice.org, KUA }
CA = EKRTrustMe[“alice@alice.org”, cert id, expiration time, KUA]
CA
Limiting The Damage
Checks expiration time > now
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Revoking Certificates
VarySign.com
Alice Bob
{ alice@alice.org, KUA }
CA
CA
Send me the CRL
<certid, Date Revoked><certid, Date Revoked><certid, Date Revoked>…
EKRTrustMe[CRL]
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Revoked!
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Certificate Questions
• How do participants acquire the authority’s public key?
• If authority’s private key is compromised, everything is vulnerable!– Keep the key locked up well
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Problems with Certificates• Depends on a certificate authority
– Needs to be a big, trusted entity– Needs to make money (or be publically
funded)
• Need to acquire a certificate– Makes anonymity difficult– Requires handshaking
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PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)• Keyring: list of public keys, signed by
owner’s private keyAlice’s keyring:
EKRAlice (<“bob@bob.com”, KUBob>,
<“cathy@sharky.com”, KUCathy>)• Exchanging Keyrings (Web of Trust)
– Complete Trust: I trust Alice’s keyring (add the public key pairings to my own keyring)
– Partial Trust: I sort of trust Alice, but require confirmation from someone else too (I need to get EKRCathy
(<“bob@bob.com”, KUBob>) before trusting KUBob
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Avoiding Certificates
• What if your identity (e.g., your email address) is your public key?
• Is it possible to do this with RSA?Do you want your email address to be a 200-digit “random” number?
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Identity Based Encryption
• [Shamir 1984], [Boneh & Franklin 2003]
public-key = identityprivate-key = F(master-key, identity)
The owner of the master-key is the new authority. Must be careful who it gives private keys to.
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Key-Generating Service• Holds master-key• Participants request private keys from
KGS• Sends s to KGS, requests corresponding
private key• KGS authenticates requestor• If valid, computes F(master-key, s) and sends
over secure channel
• How does the trust given to the KGS compare to that given to CA in SSL?
KGS can decrypt all messages! With certificates, certificate owner still has her own private key. But, CA can impersonate anyone by generating a
certificate with a choosen public-key.
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Shamir’s IBE Signature Scheme
• Setup: done by KGS– Select p, q large primes– N = pq
– Choose e relatively prime to (N) (p-1)(q-1)
– Choose d satisfying ed 1 mod (N)
– Choose h a cryptographic hash function
• Publish N, e and h to all participants• Keep d secret master-key
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Shamir’s Signatures• Generating a private key
privatekey(ID) = IDd mod N
– Can only be done by KGS (d is master secret)
• Signing a message M with identity ID– Obtain g = privatekey(ID) from KGS– Choose random r less than N – Compute signature (s, t):
t = re mod N
s = g rh(t || M) mod NWarning: book typesetting is off and wrong range for h!
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Verifying a Signature• KGS produced g = IDd mod N
• Recipient knows ID and M, system parameters e and N
t = re mod N
s = g rh(t || M) mod N
• Verify (ID, s, t, M)
se = ID th(t || M) mod N
(IDd rh(t || M))e mod N IDderh(t || M)e mod N ID reh(t || M) mod N ID th(t || M) mod N
What does non-forgability of a Shamir IBE signature rely on?
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Identity-Based Encryption
• Shamir’s scheme – signatures only, not encryption
• Boneh & Franklin, 2001– First practical and provably secure IBE
scheme– Builds on elliptic curves
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Issues in IBE• Complete trust in KGS
– With Boneh & Franklin’s system can use secret sharing techniques to divide this trust among multiple entities
– Could you do this with Shamir’s IBE signatures?
• Revocation– Can include expiration times in identities– But no way to revoke granted private keys
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Charge
• Read Chapter 13 in the book• Look at the certificate chains when
you browse the web– Find a certificate with a trust chain more
than two levels deep
• Update your browser CRLs: when were they last updated?