CS 134 Winter 2018 LECTURE 15 Privacy and Anonymitysconce.ics.uci.edu/134-W18/slides/LEC15.pdf ·...

LECTURE 15 Privacy and Anonymity

CS 134 Winter 2018

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Privacy

• Privacy and Society •  Basic individual right & desire •  Also relevant to corporations & government

agencies •  Recently increased awareness

•  But, public’s perception of privacy is fickle

• Privacy and Technology in Recent Years •  >>Information disclosed on the Internet •  >>Handling and transfer of sensitive

information •  <<Privacy and accountability

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(Image from geekologie.com)

Privacy on Public Networks

•  TheInternetisdesignedasapublicnetwork•  AnyoneonyourLAN(wiredorwireless)canseeyourtraffic•  Networkroutersseealltrafficthatpassesthroughthem

• Routinginformationispublic•  IPpacketheadersidentifysourceanddestinationaddresses•  Apassiveobservercaneasilyfigureoutwhoistalkingtowhom

•  Encryption(e.g.,SSLorIPSec)doesnothideidentities•  Encryptionhidespayload,notrouting+addressinginformation•  EvenIP-levelencryption(tunnel-modeIPsec/ESP)revealsIPaddressesofIPsecgateways

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Applications of Anonymity (1)

• Privacy• Hideonlinetransactions,Webbrowsing,etc.fromintrusivegovernments,marketers,archival/searchentities(e.g.,Google)aswellasfromcriminalsandsnoops

• UntraceableElectronicMail•  Corporatewhistle-blowers•  Politicaldissidentsinoppressivesocieties•  Sociallysensitivecommunications(onlineAAorSTDmeeting)•  Confidentialbusinessnegotiations

• LawEnforcementandIntelligence•  Stingoperationsandhoneypots•  Secretcommunicationsonapublicnetwork

•  Informers,secretagents,etc.4

Applications of Anonymity (2)

• Digital/ElectronicCash•  Electroniccurrencywithpropertiesofpapermoney(onlinepurchasesunlinkabletobuyer’sidentity)

• AnonymousElectronicVoting

• Censorship-ResistantPublishing

• Crypto-Anarchy•  “Somepeoplesaythat“anarchywon'twork.”That'snotanargumentagainstanarchy;that'sanargumentagainstwork.”–BobBlackJ

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Applications of Anonymity (3)

• Porn

• HumanTrafficking

•  Libel

• Disinformation=FakeNews/Propaganda

•  SaleofIllegalSubstances(e.g.,SilkRoad)

•  TaxAvoidance(viaUntraceablePayments)

•  IncitementtoCriminalActivity(e.g.,Murder,Rioting,Genocide,Terrorism)6

What is Anonymity?

• Anonymity:inabilitytoidentifysomeonewithinasetofsubjects(sizevaries)•  DifferentfromPRIVACY–righttobeleftalone•  Tobeanonymous,needtohideyouractivitiesamongsimilaractivitiesbyothers•  Onecannotbeanonymousalone!

•  Bigdifferencebetweenanonymityandconfidentiality

• Unlinkability:separationofactionandidentityperformingthataction•  Forexample,senderandhisemailarenomorerelatedafterobservingcommunicationthantheywerebefore

• Unobservability:inabilitytotellwhetheracertainactiontookplace•  veryhardtoachieve

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Attacks on Anonymity

• PassiveTrafficAnalysis•  Inferfromnetworktrafficwhoistalkingtowhom•  Tohideyourtraffic,mustcarryotherpeople’straffic!

• ActiveTrafficAnalysis•  Injectpacketsorputatimingsignatureonapacketflow

• CompromiseofNetworkNodes(suchasRouters)•  Notobviouswhichnodeshavebeencompromised

•  Attackermaybepassivelyloggingtraffic•  Donotfullytrustanyindividualnode

•  Assumethatsomefractionofnodesisgood,butdonotknowwhich

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Chaum’s Mix (David Chaum, ca. 1980-1981)

•  Earliestproposalforanonymousemail:•  DavidChaum,“Untraceableelectronicmail,returnaddresses,anddigitalpseudonyms”,CommunicationsoftheACM,February1981.

• Public-keycrypto+trustedre-mailer(Mix)•  Untrustedcommunicationmedium•  Public-keysusedaspersistentpseudonyms

• ModernanonymitysystemsuseMixasthebasicbuildingblock

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Before spam, people thought anonymous email was a good idea J

Basic Mix Design

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A

C

D

E

B

Mix

{r1,{r0,M}pk(B),B}pk(mix) {r0,M}pk(B),B

{r2,{r3,M’}pk(E),E}pk(mix)

{r4,{r5,M’’}pk(B),B}pk(mix)

{r5,M’’}pk(B),B

{r3,M’}pk(E),E

Adversary knows all senders and all receivers, but cannot link a sent message with a received message

Anonymous Return Addresses

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A

B MIX

{r1,{r0,M}pk(B),B}pk(mix) {r0,M}pk(B),B

M includes {K1,A}pk(mix’), K2 where K2 is a fresh public key and MIX’ is possibly different from MIX

Response MIX’

{K1,A}pk(mix’), {r2,M’}K2 A,{{r2,M’}K2}K1

Secrecy without authentication (good for an online confession service J)

Mix Cascade

• Messagesaresentthroughasequenceofmixes•  Canalsoformanarbitrarynetworkofmixes(“mixnet”)

•  Somemixesmaybecontrolledbyattacker,butevenasinglegoodmixguaranteessomeanonymity

• Padandbuffertraffictofoilcorrelationattacks12

Disadvantages of Basic Mixnets

• Public-keyencryptionanddecryptionateachmixarecomputationallyexpensive

• Basicmixnetshavehighlatency•  Okforemail,butnotforanonymousWebbrowsing

• Challenge:low-latencyanonymitynetwork•  Usepublic-keycryptographytoestablisha“circuit”withpairwisesymmetrickeysbetweenhopsonthecircuit

•  Thenusesymmetricdecryptionandre-encryptiontomovedatamessagesalongtheestablishedcircuits

•  Eachnodebehaveslikeamix;anonymityispreservedevenifsomenodesarecompromised

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Another Idea: Randomized Routing

• Hidesourcesbyroutingmessagesrandomly•  Populartechnique:Crowds,Freenet,Onionrouting

• Routersdonotknowiftheapparentsourceofamessageisthetruesenderoranotherrouter

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Onion Routing

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R R4

R1 R2

R

R R3

Bob

R

R

R

•  Sender chooses a random sequence of routers •  Some routers are honest, some are not •  Sender controls path length

Alice

[Reed, Syverson, Goldschlag 1997]

Route Establishment

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R4

R1

R2 R3 Bob Alice

{R2,k1}pk(R1),{ }k1 {R3,k2}pk(R2),{ }k2

{R4,k3}pk(R3),{ }k3 {B,k4}pk(R4),{ }k4

{M}pk(B)

•  Routing info for each link encrypted with router’s public key •  Each router learns only the identity of the next router

The Onion Router (Tor)

•  Second-generationonionroutingnetwork•  http://tor.eff.org•  Specificallydesignedforlow-latencyanonymousInternetcommunications(e.g.,Webbrowsing)

•  RunningsinceOctober2003

• Hundredsofnodesonallcontinents

•  1.5millionusersasof2016

•  “Easy-to-use”clientproxy•  Freelyavailable,canuseitforanonymousbrowsing•  Availableforsmartphonesandtabletstoo

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Tor Circuit Setup (1)

• ClientproxyestablishesasymmetricsessionkeyandcircuitwithOnionRouter#1

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Tor Circuit Setup (2)

• ClientproxyextendsthecircuitbyestablishingasymmetricsessionkeywithOnionRouter#2

•  TunnelthroughOnionRouter#1

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Tor Circuit Setup (3)

• ClientproxyextendsthecircuitbyestablishingasymmetricsessionkeywithOnionRouter#3

•  TunnelthroughOnionRouters#1and#2

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Using a Tor Circuit

• ClientapplicationsconnectandcommunicateovertheestablishedTorcircuit(alsotomultipledst-s)

•  Datagramsaredecryptedandre-encryptedateachlink

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Tor Management Issues

• Manyapplicationscanshareonecircuit•  MultipleTCPstreamsoveroneanonymousconnection

•  Torrouterdonotneedrootprivileges•  Encouragespeopletosetuptheirownrouters•  Moreparticipants=betteranonymityforeveryone

• Directoryservers•  Maintainlistsofactiveonionrouters,theirlocations,currentpublickeys,etc.•  Controlhownewroutersjointhenetwork

•  “Sybilattack”:attackercreatesalargenumberofrouters•  Directoryservers’keysshipwithTorcode

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Location Hidden Servers

• Goal:deployaserverontheInternetthatanyonecanconnecttowithoutknowingwhereitisorwhorunsit

• Accessiblefromanywhere

• Resistanttocensorship

• Cansurviveafull-blownDoSattack

• Resistanttophysicalattack•  Cannotfindthephysicalserver!

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Creating a Location Hidden Server

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Server creates circuits to “introduction points”

Server gives intro points’ descriptors and addresses to service lookup directory

Client obtains service descriptor and intro point address from directory

Using a Location Hidden Server

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Client creates a circuit to a “rendezvous point”

Client sends address of the rendezvous point and any authorization, if needed, to server through intro point

If server chooses to talk to client, connect to rendezvous point

Rendezvous point matches the circuits from client & server

Deployed Anonymity Systems

•  FreeHavenprojecthasanexcellentbibliographyonanonymity•  http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib

•  Tor(http://tor.eff.org)•  Overlaycircuit-basedanonymitynetwork•  Bestforlow-latencyapplicationssuchasanonymousWebbrowsing

• Mixminion(http://www.mixminion.net)•  Networkofmixes•  Bestforhigh-latencyapplicationssuchasanonymousemail

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Dining Cryptographers

• Howtomakeamessagepublic,butinaperfectlyuntraceablemanner•  DavidChaum.“Thediningcryptographersproblem:unconditionalsenderandrecipientuntraceability.”JournalofCryptology,1988.

• Guaranteesinformation-theoreticanonymityformessagesenders•  VERYstrongformofanonymity:defeatsadversarywhohasunlimitedcomputationalpower

• Difficulttomakepractical•  IngroupofsizeN,needNrandombitstosend1bit

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Three-Person DC Protocol

•  Threecryptographersarehavingdinner.

•  EitherNSAispayingforthedinner,oroneofthemispaying,butwishestoremainanonymous.

1.  Eachdinerflipsacoinandshowsittohisleftneighbor.

•  Everydinerseestwocoins:hisownandhisrightneighbor’s

2.  Eachdinerannounceswhetherthetwocoinsarethesame.Ifheisthepayer,helies(saystheopposite).

3.  IFNumberof“same”=1or3⇒NSAispayingIFNumberof“same”=0or2⇒oneofthemispaying

•  Butanon-payercannottellwhichoftheothertwoispaying!28

Non-Payer’s View: Same Coins

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?

“same” “different”

payer payer

?

“same” “different”

Without knowing the coin toss between the other two, non-payer cannot tell which of them is lying

Non-Payer’s View: Different Coins

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?

“same” “same”

payer payer

?

“same” “same”

Without knowing the coin toss between the other two, non-payer cannot tell which of them is lying

Super-posed Sending

•  ThisideageneralizestoanygroupofsizeN

•  Foreachbitofthemessage,everyusergenerates1randombitandsendsittoONEneighbor

•  Everyuserlearns2bits(hisownandhisneighbor’s)

•  EachuserannouncesownbitXORneighbor’sbit

•  SenderannouncesownbitXORneighbor’sbitXORmessagebit

• XORallannouncements=messagebit•  Everyrandomlygeneratedbitoccursinthissumtwice(andiscanceledbyXOR),messagebitoccursonce

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