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Countering Paramilitary & Organised Criminal Influence on YouthA ReviewDuncan Morrow & Jonny Byrne March 2020
Full Report
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Contents
1.BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................................................................................................3
1.1INTRODUCTIONANDRATIONALE.........................................................................................................................................................................3
1.2‘TACKLINGPARAMILITARISM’INNORTHERNIRELANDANDYOUTHWORK......................................................................................................................6
1.3METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................................................................................9
2.YOUNGPEOPLE,‘GANGS’ANDTHE‘RADICALISATION’PROCESS:AREVIEWOFTHEORYANDPRACTICE....................................................10
2.1:YOUNGPEOPLE,‘GANGS’AND‘RADICALISATION’:AREVIEWOFTHELITERATURE.........................................................................................................11
2.2YOUNGPEOPLEAND‘RADICALISATION’...............................................................................................................................................................16
2.3COMPARINGMODELSOFYOUTHWORKINTERVENTION...........................................................................................................................................22
2.4SUMMARISINGTHEAPPROACHESANDMETHODS..................................................................................................................................................43
2.5THE‘FIT’OFINTERNATIONALMODELSTONORTHERNIRELAND?................................................................................................................................47
2.6:EMERGENTTHEMESFROMTHEINTERNATIONALFIELD............................................................................................................................................52
3.TACKLINGPARAMILITARISMINNORTHERNIRELAND................................................................................................................................57
3.1DEFININGPARAMILITARISMINNORTHERNIRELAND...............................................................................................................................................57
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3.3ATTITUDESTOVIOLENCEANDARMEDGROUPSINCOMMUNITIESINNORTHERNIRELAND.................................................................................................67
3.4THEPRESSURESONYOUNGPEOPLEINCOMMUNITIESINNORTHERNIRELANDWITHAPARAMILITARYPRESENCE....................................................................73
3.5ISTACKLINGPARAMILITARISMAROLEFORYOUTHWORK?.......................................................................................................................................76
3.6YOUTHWORKWHEREPARAMILITARISMISACONTINUINGREALITYINCOMMUNITIES......................................................................................................85
3.7EVOLVINGYOUTHWORKPRACTICETOADDRESSPARAMILITARISMINCOMMUNITIES.......................................................................................................88
3.8COLLABORATIVECOMMUNITYYOUTHWORKFORTACKLINGPARAMILITARISM...............................................................................................................95
3.9CHALLENGESFORYOUTHWORKINADDRESSINGISSUESARISINGFROMPARAMILITARISM.................................................................................................99
3.10MEASURINGSUCCESS?...............................................................................................................................................................................103
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................................................................................113
TableofTables
Table1:Summarytableofapproachesandinterventionmethodsadoptedbyallprojects...................................................................................45
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1.Background
InJune2019,ateamatUlsterUniversitywascommissionedbytheCorrymeelaCommunityonbehalfoftheEducationAuthoritytoconduct
researchonthethemeofyoungpeople,youthworkandtacklingparamilitarisminNorthernIreland.Thespecifictaskswere:
• Toresearch/maptheeffectiveandinnovativetheories/practiceof10–12internationalnon-governmentalorganisations(INGOs)and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)workingwith youth and actively countering factors that create risk vulnerability, and/or
susceptibilityrelatedtoparamilitarism,organisedgangsorcriminality.
• ToenhancetheCPDmodelbyintegratingandtestingtherelevanceofinternationalframeworksandassociatedtoolsthatsupport
thetechnicalskills,capacityandwell-beingoffront-lineworkers.
Thegoalwastoproduceresearchthatcouldshapedebateonthe futureofyouthwork interventiontosupport theTacklingParamilitarism
programme.Thechosenmethodwastoreviewliteratureonbestpracticeacrossanumberofinternationalmodelsofinterventionwithyoung
peopleaffectedbyviolencebyarmedgroupsofvarioussorts,andtoconductfieldresearchinNorthernIreland.Havinganalysedtheresults,
thegoalwas todevelop findingsbasedon the researchanddisseminate those findings througha final report, through thepublicationofa
policybrieftoinformpracticeandthroughaninvitedroundtableofrelevantstakeholders.
1.1IntroductionandRationale
AccordingtotheUnitedNations’(UN)MissingPeacereport:
In2016,anestimated408millionyouth(aged15–29)residedinsettingsaffectedbyarmedconflictororganisedviolence.This
meansthatatleastoneinfouryoungpeopleisaffectedbyviolenceorarmedconflictinsomeway.Estimatesofdirectconflict
deathsin2015suggestthatmorethan90percentofallcasualties involvedyoungmales.However,conflict,crimeandother
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formsofviolenceimpactyoungpeople’slivesinmorewaysthanmortality.Whileitoftengoesunrecorded,youngpeoplesuffer
from a wide range of short-, medium- and long-term effects ranging from repeated victimization to psychological trauma,
identity-baseddiscriminationandsocialandeconomicexclusion(UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblySecurityCouncil,2018:5).
TheUNalsoacknowledgedthatwhileyoungpeopleaccountforthemajorityofthoseengagedinextremistviolence,onlya‘minuteproportion’
of the youth population is involved in violence. This bringswith it a risk that the focus of policy is placed too easily on the prevention of
extremismandnotenoughontheimportanceofengagingwithyoungpeople.Atitsmostextreme,thishasinvolvedlabellingyoungpeopleas
‘criminals’or‘terrorists’,tothedetrimentofyouthparticipationinpoliticalandsociallife.Asaresult,resourcesaremisallocatedfromservices
thatarenecessarytoaddressthedriversofviolencetowardsanoverlypunitiveapproach,whichmaybelesseffectiveandmorecostlythan
preventativemeasures.Thus:
The political urgency for Governments to respond to the threat of global terrorism has contributed to a discourse inwhich
sweeping characterisations of youth as fundamentally at risk of ‘violent extremism’ have produced unnuanced, counter-
productivepolicy responses.The ‘policypanic’… is furtheralienatingyoungpeople… Insteadofofferingproactiveprevention
approachestoviolentconflict,itriskscementingyoungpeopleintheseroles,givingthemasensethattherearenoalternative
pathwaysavailabletothem(UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblySecurityCouncil,2018:7).
TheUNthereforedrewattentiontothenecessityofensuringnotonlythatviolentextremismwas‘tackled’butthatalternativepathwayswere
developedwithanemphasisonparticipation,economicpotential,educationanddealingwithinjusticeandhumanrights.Thisentailsashift
fromsecurityresponsestoaviolencepreventionapproach,buildingupresilienceandbasedonpartnershipwithyoungpeopleandyouth-led
organisations,andrequiresinvestmentinandinclusionofyoungpeople,aswellasaddressingsecurityconcerns.
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Youth work necessarily starts from this perspective in its engagement with violent extremism. In principle, all youth work in the area of
peacebuildingisguidedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution2250onYouth,PeaceandSecurity(December2015),whichcommitsallsignatories,
includingtheUK,toyouthparticipation indecision-makingprocesses,theprotectionofyoungpeople’s livesandhumanrights,promotinga
cultureoftoleranceand interculturaldialogue,engagingyoungpeople indevelopingpeacebuildingstrategiesand investing inyoungpeople
affectedbyarmedconflictthroughemployment,educationandpromotingacultureofpeace.Aboveall,theresolutionmakesclearthatthe
contributionofyouthworkinpeacebuildingisspecific,determinedbyitsfocusonthewell-beingandrightsofyoungpeopleratherthanonthe
political,securityorpolicingaspectsofpeacebuilding.
Thetaskofyouthworkistoaddressextremismfromthestartingpointofcommitmenttothewell-beingofeveryyoungperson.Inrelationto
youthengagementinrelationtoparamilitarybehaviour,thisisimportant:youthworkcannotbepartof‘stopping’asecurityproblemdefined
as young people’s involvement with paramilitarism without reframing that contribution within a commitment to the well-being of young
people. Inotherwords,theproblemisthechallengeofviolence,whichmustbeaddressedthroughallmeansnecessaryratherthan ‘young
people’.Thisisnotaquestionofco-optingyouthworktosecurity,butofachievingsecurityforallthroughyouthworkmethods.
This change in perspective raises a number of critical questions, which frame this research report into youth work practice to reduce
paramilitarism. Inthe first instance,anypolicytotackleparamilitaryviolenceandorganisationthatdoesnotengageyoungpeople,asboth
participantsandvictims,isunlikelytobesuccessful.Inaddition,theroleofyouthworkistocontributetothatgoalfromtheperspectiveofthe
toolsitoffers:howcanyouthworkersandyouthworkasaprofessionpreventandreducetheimpactofviolenceonyoungpeople,andreduce
marginalisationandexclusionasaconsequence?
Thereisnodoubtthat,inNorthernIreland,youngpeopleinsomepartsofthecommunityremaindisproportionatelyatriskofbeingdrawninto
organised violence and crime. The persistence of this circumstance some 20 years after a formal peace agreement (the 1998 Belfast
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Agreement) has therefore increasingly asked questions of how youthwork practice can evolve to address the potential for harm, to both
victimsandperpetrators.
1.2‘TacklingParamilitarism’inNorthernIrelandandyouthwork
ViolentextremismhasbeenpartofpoliticallandscapeofNorthernIrelandfordecades,drawingondeeply-rootedtraditionsofresistanceand
communitydefencethatpredatethelanguageofviolentextremismbydecadesandevencenturies.However,foralmost30yearsafter1969,
violencebyorganisedandarmedgroupsbecamenormalisedinthesensethatitwaspartoftheeverydayrealityofNorthernIrelandlifewitha
distinctandpersistentrelationshipwithsocialandeconomicmarginalisation,ageandgender.Overwhelmingly,directparticipationinviolent
conflictwasdominatedbyyoungmalesfromdistrictswithevidenceofpersistentmultipledeprivationintheagegroupidentifiedbytheUNas
‘youngpeople’ (15–29).However, therewasadegreeofpolitical tolerationacross thewholecommunity forviolenceexercised forpolitical
purposes,andthedefinitionofsuchviolenceaseither‘criminal’or‘extreme’wascontested.
By 1998, it was acknowledged by the governments of both the UK and Ireland that violence could not be eliminated by counter-security
measures alone. Instead, the governments sponsored a comprehensive political approach, which bore fruit in the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreementof1998.TheAgreementdirectlyaddressedthequestionofviolenceandorganisationalcontinuity,explicitlydenyinganyfurther
formal or informal political legitimacy for violence and committing all signatories to ‘explicitly peaceful and democratic means’ for the
resolution of disputes. In addition, the Agreement established an international process for the disarmament and disbandment of all
paramilitarygroupsandfortheearlyreleaseofprisonerseschewingpoliticalviolence.
Inpractice,thishasturnedouttobeapoliticallyandpracticallyfraught,contentiousanddifficulttask.TheAgreementitselfwasnotuniversally
acceptedas the finalwordonpoliticaldivision inNorthern Ireland. IrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)disarmamentwasverifiedafteradecadeof
tortuousinternationalnegotiations,andonlythenwasitpossibletoestablishadevolvedpower-sharingsystemofgovernmentforNorthern
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IrelandandaPolicingBoardendorsedbyallpoliticalparties.However,althoughmuchreduced,anddespitepoliticalconsensus,violenceby
armedgroupshascontinuedtobearealityatcommunitylevelinsomeareas.Ontherepublicanside,groupsopposedtothepeaceprocess
(dissident republicans) continued to claim legitimacy to attackpoliceofficers, andother security personnel remainedunder explicit threat.
Among loyalists, therewas ongoing evidence of recruitment, local activity and participation in intimidation, rioting and other public order
activities. Instability in the power-sharing Executive resulted in many periods of uncertainty and tension, requiring inter-party talks and
interventionfromthegovernmentsoftheUKandIreland.Addedtothis,organisationshavecontinuedtohaveallegedinvolvementincriminal
behaviour, includingattacksonyoungpeopleorothersaccusedofanti-socialbehaviourandforcedevictionofpeople fromtheirhomes. In
September2015,theExecutivewaseffectivelysuspendedfollowingtheshootingofKevinMcGuiganinBelfast,allegedlybyanelementofthe
ProvisionalIRA.AstheIRAhadbeenofficiallydisbandedin2007,anewspotlightwasturnedonthefailuretoendthecultureofparamilitarism
incommunitiesacrossNorthernIreland.
The‘TacklingParamilitarism’programmeemergedfromtheinter-party‘FreshStart’Agreement,whichtookplaceasaresultoftheseevents.
Critically,anduniquely,theprogrammereceivedthefullendorsementofpoliticalpartiesacrosstheExecutivepriortothethree-yearcollapse
of the Northern Ireland political system in January 2017. The risks for and by young peoplewere included as one of 42measures of the
programme.UnderMeasureA4, theEducationAuthorityplacedanOutreachWorker ineachof theeightmostvulnerable ‘Communities in
Transition’acrossNorthernIreland,withaviewtopreventingyoungpeoplefromjoiningparamilitaryorganisations.AccordingtotheExecutive
Action Plan that accompanied the programme: ‘TheOutreachWorkers aim to build relationshipswith youngpeoplewhodonot currently
engage with the youth services and who could be considered as being at higher risk of involvement in paramilitary activity; they deliver
programmesandsupportthatdeveloptheyoungpeople’sresilienceandawarenessofriskfactors.’
Inpractice, theprinciplesofResolution2250wereneverexplicitly referred to inanyof the interviewsor focusgroupsassociatedwith this
researchproject,althoughtheirinfluencecanbeinferredfromtheapproachofworkerstotheprogramme.Withoutexception,however,our
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respondentswereconsistentinbelievingthatyouthworkwasonlyoneaspectofawiderprogrammetoaddressparamilitaryactivity,culture
andorganisationinNorthernIreland.Inparticular,youthworkcouldnotberegardedasanextensionofpolicing,exceptinthewidestsenseof
upholdingbasicrightsandnon-violencewhileprovidingguidance,encouragementandsupportforyoungpeopleinmakingbetterchoices.In
all cases,youthworkershaddevelopedaveryclearbutsubtleunderstandingof theirprofessionaldemandsand thenatureofprofessional
accountability,especiallyinrelationtotheirpositionas‘adultsoftrust’foryoungpeopleintenserelationshipswiththeircommunitiesand/or
withthepoliceandthewidercriminaljusticesystem.
Ininterviewscarriedoutforthisresearchproject(seePart2)thisapproachwasevident:
‘Ifyoulookatyoungpeoplealoneontheirown,itdoesnotwork.Youhavetolookatthewholecommunitytounderstand
wheretheiryoungpeoplefit.’
‘We–youthworkers–needtodevelopandlearnanewlanguagewithyoungpeoplethatexplainstothemoursafeguarding
roleandengagementwiththepolicebutstillmakeclearthatwearenottouts.Thisisallabouttrust.Youthworkersneedto
havethetrustoftheyoungpeopleandthepoliceandthatisverychallenging.’
TheestablishmentofagroupofyouthworkerswithintheTacklingParamilitarismprogrammealsofocusedattentiononthenatureandscope
ofgoodpractice.Thisresearchwasdesignedtobetterunderstandtheroleandnatureofeffectiveyouthworkinrelationtoyoungpeopleat
riskofengagementwitharmedgroups,whetherasvictimsormembers, identifyingbothopportunitiesforchangeandpersistentriskswhile
also identifying the core elements of good practice. The work was divided into two parts: a desk-based review of a number of relevant
international interventionprogrammes;andasecondelementof fieldwork,whereresearchers interviewedanumberofyouthworkersand
otherstakeholders,witheachgrouphavinghaddirectexperienceandknowledgeofengagingwithparamilitary-relatedissues.
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1.3Methodology
TheresearchwasconductedbetweenJune2019andJanuary2020andinvolvedamixed-methodsapproach.Initially,theteamcompleteda
literature review that documented 13 international examples of youth work designed to reduce the impact of violence on young people
involvedwitharmedgroups,impactedbyarmedgroupsorpotentiallyattractedtoarmedgroups.
The second phase involved the completion of 16 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups. Interviewees were identified for their
expertise inworkingwithyoungpeopleat risk from involvement inparamilitarism inNorthern Ireland. Ineachcase, the respondentswere
askedtoreflectonthecurrentlandscapeandthefutureriskstothesecurityofNorthernIreland.
For reasons of confidentiality, it is not possible to identify the participants; however, the interviewees included youth workers directly
employed under the Fresh Start programme, youthworkersmanaging the programme, community activistswith a personal knowledge of
communitiesandparamilitarism,membersofyouthorganisationsandotherswithlong-standingexperienceofyouthworkpolicyandpractice.
ThefocusgroupswerearrangedwiththesupportofCorrymeelaandinvolvedarangeofpeoplefromvariousbackgroundsinyouthwork.
Confidentialitywascriticaltotheviabilityofthisproject,andtheresearchteamhastakencaretoensurethatnomaterial isattributedtoa
particularindividualororganisation.Theremainderofthisreportisstructuredaroundtwoparts,whichprovideareviewoftheinternational
literatureandareviewoftheNorthernIrishcontext.Thisisfollowedbyacriticalassessmentofthestudyandanumberofobservations.
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2.Youngpeople,‘gangs’andthe‘radicalisation’process:Areviewoftheoryandpractice
Thefirstpartofthisreportexaminesmodelsofpracticeestablishedtoengageyoungpeople,outsideNorthernIreland,whoareengagedin
violence.Ithasthreesubsections.Section1summarisessomeofthetheoreticalandphilosophicaldebateswithintheacademicliteratureon
youngpeople,‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’.Thissectionisfurthersubdividedintotwoparts,giventhedifferencesinthemorehistoricalworkon
the social dynamics of youth ‘gangs’ and themuchmore recent focuswithin the context of the ‘War on Terror’, inwhich the concept of
‘radicalisation’hasbeenusedtounderstandtheprocessesthatimpacton‘vulnerable’youngpeoplerequiringprotectionandsafeguarding.
Section2isareporton13casestudiesfromaroundtheworld(includingtheUKandIreland,theUSAandnorthernEurope),highlightingwork1
thattendstofocuseitheronprevention(preventingyoungpeoplefromjoining‘gangs’orbeing‘radicalised’inthefirstplace),orintervention
anddesistance(reducingrecidivism,providingsupporttoleavethestructuresofgangs/armedgroupsorattemptsto‘de-radicalise’them).This
distinctionbetweenpreventionandintervention/desistanceisanimportantonetomakeintermsofdevelopingprojectsthatareclearinwhat
theyareattemptingtoachieve–aclarityofpurposethatwillreduceconceptualconfusion(foryouthworkersandyoungpeople)andincrease
theeffectivenessofwork.
The13exampleshavebeenchosentoprovidearepresentativeoverviewofwork indifferingcountriesandcontextsworkingonprevention
and/ordesistancewithyoungpeople;however,theseexamplesshouldbeviewedasmerelyillustrative(ratherthanexhaustive)oftherangeof
workthat is takingplace.2Therearenumerousotherexamplesofyouthprogrammesworking inasimilar thematicarea,whicheitherhave
1Thesearemostlycommunity-ledyouthprogrammes,butalsodrawupontwostatutoryexamplesbywayofcomparison(theCHANNELmentoringprogrammewhichispartofthePREVENTstrandoftheUKCONTESTcounter-terrorstrategyandtheJ-ARCprogrammetoreducerecidivismamongstoffendersinDublin).AlsoincludedistheCommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence(CIRV)modelinGlasgow;thisapproachisledbytheStrathclydePolice,butwithcommunityinvolvement.2 Forexample, theCHANNELmentoringprogrammehasbeen included for comparativeand informationalpurposes rather thanasoneofbestpractice, as it hasbeenheavilycriticisedonseveralfronts.Theseissueswillbediscussedinsection2.
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limited information publicly available in relation to them (perhaps due to the sensitivities of the subject area),3 or that have very little
informationinrelationtotheoutcomesoftheproject.Theexamplesthathavebeenselectedhave,therefore,beenchosenonthebasisthat
thereisrequisiteinformationavailableandalso,insomecases,potentiallessons(bothpositiveandnegative)thatcouldbelearntforsimilar
workinaNorthernIrishcontext.
Section3concludesthereviewofthe literatureandpracticeoutsideNorthern Irelandby identifyingnineemergingthemesofbestpractice
arisingfromthecasestudies.
2.1:Youngpeople,‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’:Areviewoftheliterature
‘Gang’researchinaWesterncontextcanbetraceddirectlytotheworkofFrederickThrasherandHerbertAsburyin1920sChicagoandNew
York,respectively(seeFraser,2017).4Thrasher(1927)arguedthat‘gangs’werenotinherentlyanegativephenomenon;rather,theywerean
associationof youngmalepeers in highly populated areaswhere therewas little in thewayof amenities or facilities.5While violence and
conflictcould(anddid)emergein‘gang’activity,thiswasnottheraisond’êtreofjoininga‘gang’foryoungpeople;primarily,itwastoprovide
asenseofpurposeandidentityamidstthesocialdislocationtheyfeltasaresultoftheirdisadvantagedsocio-economicbackgrounds(seealso
ShawandMcKay,1942).Thisfocusonthesociologyofdevianceanddislocationfromsocietywasbuiltuponinseveralstudiespost-WWII,most
notablybyAlfredCohen(1955).Cohensuggestedthat theclasscontextandthe formationofoppositional identities (rich/poor,haves/have
nots)wascrucialtothedevelopmentofyouthgangsindevelopinginner-cityareas.BuildingonthisworkinaUKcontext,StanCohen(1972)
laterfamouslyreferredtothesocietal‘moralpanic’relatingtotheactivitiesofthe‘Mods’and‘Rockers’in1960sEngland,suggestingthatthe
3Forexample,thereislimitedpublicinformationinrelationtodocumentingtheworkofcommunityfundedprojectsengagingwithyoungpeopleaspartofthePREVENTstrandoftheUKGovernment’sCONTESTcounter-terrorismstrategy.4 Throughout this section, ‘gangs’ and ‘radicalisation’ are referred to in inverted commas. This is to reflect the fact that both terms are heavily contestedwithin theacademicliterature.Theycanbothbeusedpejorativelytonegativelylabelyoungpeople,andthereisalsonosingledefinitionofeitherterm.5Boysandyoungmenaremorelikelytojoin‘gangs’andbeinvolvedincriminalactivitiesthanaregirlsandwomen(Messerschmidt,1997).
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government,mediaandpublic ingeneralalloverplayedtheviolenttendenciesofyoungpeople inthese‘gangs’.Youngpeople inthesetwo
youthsubcultureswereperceivedtobe‘delinquent’bytheadultgenerationprimarilybecausetheydresseddifferently,listenedtodifferent
musicandprioritiseddifferentvaluesthandidpreviousgenerations(ibid.).
Althoughseminalstudies,theworksofThrasherandthetwoCohenshavebeencritiquedonthegroundsthattheypresentarather‘idealised’
presentationof‘gang’life,whichtendstodownplayorminimisetheroleofcriminalityandviolenceinsustainingthe‘gang’asacollective(see
Fraser,2017).6Indeed,theresearchfocuson‘gangs’fromthe1960sonwardsshiftedfromsociologicalapproachestothefieldofcriminology.
Criminologistsbeganconsideringboththesocial significanceofyouth ‘gangs’ to theirmembersaswellasthecriminalactivitieswithwhich
theymaybeengaged(ibid.). ‘Gangs’wereincreasinglyassociatedwithterritory,crimeandviolence(Densley,2013).Inthisvein,andaftera
wide-ranging consultation with youth and community workers, police, criminal justice agency representatives and young ‘gang’ members
themselves,Miller(1975:121)defineda‘gang’as:
A self-formed association of peers, bound together bymutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well-developed lines of
authority, and other organisational features, who act in concert to achieve a specific purpose or purposes which generally
includetheconductofillegalactivityandcontroloveraparticularterritory,facility,ortypeofenterprise.7
Yablonksy(1962)distinguishedbetweensocial,delinquentandviolent‘gangs’,withviolent‘gangs’drawingtheirmembershipprimarilyfrom
‘emotionallydisturbedyouths’(ibid.:21).Thiswouldsuggestthatthereisnotasimpledichotomybetween‘perpetrator’and‘victim’interms
of‘gang’membership;andrecentresearchsuggeststhatyoungmembersof‘gangs’themselvestendtohaveverychallengingpersonal,familial
andsocialcircumstances.IntheirreviewoftenyearsoffieldworkontheissueintheUK,McAraandMcVie(2010)foundthatpersistentand
6InaUKcontext,Scott(1956)andDownes(1966)havealsobeenaccusedofunderstatingthelinksbetweengangsandcrime.7Morerecently,theEurogangacademicresearchnetworkhassimilarlydefinedagangas‘anydurable,street-orientatedyouthgroupwhoseinvolvementinillegalactivityispartoftheirgroupidentity’(vanGemert,2005:148).IntheUK,undertheSeriousCrimeAct2015,‘gangs’havebeendefinedasreferringto‘morethan3people’;andwhichhavecharacteristicsthatallowthememberstobeidentifiedbyothersasadistinctgroup(seeFraser,2017).
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seriousoffendersof‘gang’violenceweremorelikelythemselvestobevictimsofviolenceandengageinotherharmfulorriskybehaviourssuch
asself-harm,druguseandregularalcoholconsumption.8
Contemporaryworkonyoungpeopleand‘gangs’suggeststhattheystilltendtoforminareasof‘advancedmarginality’,thatis,spaceswhere
thereisalimitedstatepresenceandeconomicmarginalisation,andwhereisolatingsocialconditionsaremorepronounced(Wacquant,2007).
In such contexts, ‘gangs’ may come to constitute an alternative form of social order to the police and the state. It is therefore perhaps
unsurprising that under these conditions, ‘gang’ members are more likely to be involved in serious and violent ‘delinquency’ than non-
members (Thornberry et al., 2003; Bennett and Holloway, 2004). Yet, the evidence would suggest that the links between membership,
criminality and violence are complex, with identities for youngmembers shifting in differing contexts between ‘gangmember’/’non-gang
member’andconventional/criminalactivity(Medinaetal.,2013;Weaver,2015).
Whileitisclearthat‘gangs’existacrossdifferingcountriesandcontexts,whatisnotclearistheactualextentorscaleofthe‘problem’andhow
many young people are involved. Although there are challenges (both ethical and practical) in relying upon self-reported data from ‘gang’
membersthemselvestoestimatethescaleoftheissue,officialdataon‘gangs’andtheirmembershiparealsonotoriouslyunreliable(Rennison
andMelde,2009;Fraser,2017). In2012,therewasestimatedtobemorethan30,000gangswith850,000members intheUS(Egleyetal.,
2014). Inthesameyear,theLondonMetropolitanPoliceServiceidentifiedapproximately260violentyouth‘gangs’ inthecitywhileGreater
ManchesterPolice suggested thereweremore than60 streetgangs inManchester,withalmost900members (HouseofCommons,2015).
Outdatedrecordsandlimitedintelligenceontheinternalstructureof‘gangs’(Katz,2003),andattimesthe‘racialprofiling’ofnon-affiliated
young men from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds (Bjerregaard, 2003; Williams, 2015), suggest that such statistics cannot
necessarilybereliedupon.Yet,theyareoftenutilisedbystatutoryagenciestohighlighta‘growingproblem’intermsofyouth‘gang’violence.
8ForthecontextintheUSandthelinksbetweensocialexclusion,structuralinequality,traumaandcrime,seeThornberryetal.(2003).
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Thiswasmostvisiblymanifestin2011withthepublicationbytheUKgovernmentofEndingGangsandYouthViolence:ACross-Government
ReportintheaftermathoftheriotsinAugust2011inEngland.Thereportsuggestedthat:
Gangs and serious youth violence are the product of the high levels of social breakdown and disadvantage found in the
communitiesinwhichtheythrive,buttheyarealsoakeydriverofthatbreakdown(HMGovernment,2011a:4).9
Otherthanthemoregeneralcritiqueofthereportforthepejorativeandnegativelabellingofyoungpeoplegenerallywithcriminality(Shute
andMedina,2014),thereisagreatdealofcomplexityinthecausallinkthatisimpliedintheconnectionbetween‘gangs’andviolentcrime:do
(young)peopleengageincriminalityandviolencebecausetheybecomepartofa‘gang’?Inotherwords,isitthestructureofthe‘gang’itself
that drives crime and violence, or do thosewho aremore predisposed to criminality and violence join ‘gangs’? Inwhich case, are acts of
violenceandcriminalitymorerelatedtothepersonalmotivationsanddispositionsofindividualmembersthanthedynamicsofthegroup?
Ifsocialissuesareindeedatthecoreofwhyyoungpeoplejoin‘gangs’,then,logically,dealingwithissuesofinequalityandsocialexclusionwill
helpyoungpeopletoeithernotjoin‘gangs’inthefirstplaceortoleavethem.This‘penalwelfarist’(Garland,2001)approach,baseduponthe
principlesofrehabilitationandsocialsupport,formedthebasisofmuchoftheapproachto‘gangs’inaUSandUKcontextuntilthelastthree
decades,whenafocusonretributivejusticeinordertofightcrimeemerged(Fraser,2017).10Atthecoreofsuchpunitiveapproachesisthe
viewthat‘gang’members(regardlessofage)arerationalagents,whomakeachoicetoengageincriminalactivitiesasaresultofweighingup
the‘pros’and‘cons’inacost-benefitanalysis(Fraser,2017).11
9ThisisverydifferentlanguagefromthatusedbytheLabourgovernmentinits2008YouthCrimeActionPlan,whichmadelittlementionofyouth‘gangs’andnotedthat‘…onlyaminorityofyoungpeopleareactivelyengagedinseriouscrime’(HMGovernment,2008;seealsoFraser,2017:203).10Althoughithasgenerallybeenacknowledgedthatimprisonmentplayedakeyroleinmaking‘gang’structuresmorepermanentintheUSA(seeSkarbek,2014).11Afocusonalawandorderresponse,withsomesecondarywelfaristpolicies,ispromotedbytheCentreforSocialJustice(2018).TheorganisationischairedbyformerConservativePartyleader,IainDuncanSmith.
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WhilesuchapositionseeminglyrunscountertotheUNConventionontheRightsoftheChild,theageofcriminalresponsibilityandthe‘Beijing
Rules’(whichfocusupondiversionaryactivity,theavoidanceofcriminalisationanddecisionsthataremadeinthebestinterestsofthechild),
theincreasingglobalisationofpolicestowards‘gangs’hasledtocountriessuchastheUKadoptingthosemorepunitiveapproachesthathave
dominatedtheapproachto‘gangs’intheUS(RalphsandSmithson,2015;seealsoCottrell-Boyce,2013).12Whiletheapproachto‘gangs’inthe
US has tended to focus on prevention, intervention (including street and outreach work) and suppression (Fraser, 2017) – the use of
suppressionandpolicingtactics–havebeenincreasinglyprevalent(ibid.).
However, alternative models of dealing with youth ‘gang’ violence have developed, even within the US context. One such model is the
Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV),13 which is a violence-reduction and problem-orientated policing approach to ‘gangs’ that
prioritisespartnershipandmulti-agencyworkingalongsidedeterrencestrategiesthatfocusonasmallnumberofyoungpeoplemostactively
involvedin‘gangs’.Suchapproachesareoftenbasedupon‘thecallin’,wherebyyoung‘gang’membersareaskedtoattendapublicmeeting
and sign a ‘no violence’ contract/pledge, which then allows them to access various health, social, educational and employment support
servicesandresources–providingthey‘holduptheirendofthebargain’(Fraser,2017).Suchanapproachframesviolenceasa‘publichealth
issue’, which can be tackled by statutory agencies and the community working together. A contemporary example of the CIRVmodel in
Glasgowwillbediscussedinsection2.
12Thedoctrineof‘jointenterprise’,usedintheUS,hasbeenintroducedinrecentyearstotheUKandisintendedtoattributeguiltinassistancetowardsacommoncriminalpurpose (Fraser, 2017). Thus far, it hasbeenuseddisproportionately againstBAMEyoungpeople (seeWilliamsandClarke, 2016), and its usehasbeen limitedby theSupremeCourtintheUK.Civil‘gang’injunctionshavealsobeenintroducedintheUKunderthePolicingandCrimeAct2009.Thislegislationstatesthataninjunctioncanbeusedifthedefendanthasengagedin,encouragedorassistedany‘gang-relatedviolence’,andthepolicywasextendedtoinclude14–17-year-olds inEnglandandWalesundertheCrimeandSecurityAct2010(Fraser,2017).13BasedupontheworkofProfessorDavidKennedy.ThismodelhasalsobeenusedinChicago,Indianapolis,LondonandGlasgow.
16
Thediscussionthusfarhasfocusedontheroleofyoungpeoplein‘gangs’–butwhatoftheroleofyoungpeopleinarmedgroupsthatuse
violenceinamoreovertmanner?TheUN-ledChildreninOrganisedArmedViolenceProject(COAV)foundthatthereweresimilarreasonsasto
whysomechildrenandyoungpeoplejoinanarmedgroupindifferingcountriesandcontexts.Thesethemesweresimilartothereasonsfor
joining‘gangs’:marginalisation;livinginareasofhighpopulationdensitywithapoorqualityoflife;ayoungageprofileofthelocalcommunity;
lowlevelsofeducation;andhighlevelsofunemployment(Dowdney,2007).Insuchsettings,armedgroupsmay:
Offerdisfranchisedyouthafast-tracktosomeformofsocial,politicaloreconomicinclusionorbelonging,howeverlimited,and
…offerexcitementandentertainmentinplaceswherethereisoftenlittleelsetodo(ibid.:11).
Theconcernwiththeinvolvementofchildrenandyoungpeopleinviolencerelatesnotonlytocriminalactivityin‘gangs’,oreventhosewars
andcivilconflictswhere ‘child-soldiers’havebeenutilised;suchconcernshavebecomeincreasinglysignificant inthe lastdecadewithinthe
policycontextofthe‘WaronTerror’.Theemergenceoftheconceptof‘radicalisation’andthefocusonpreventingyoungpeoplefromjoining
extremistand‘terrorist’movementshasbeenplacedfrontandcentrestage,inbothpolicyandpractice.
2.2Youngpeopleand‘radicalisation’
Althoughtheterm‘radicalisation’isnowcommonparlanceandassociatedwithviolence,ithasonlybeenpopularisedrelativelyrecentlyinthe
discourseand contextof the ‘WaronTerror’ (Coolsaet, 2019).Historically, tobea ‘radical’wasnotnecessarilyperceived tobeanegative
development,norwas itnecessarilyassociatedwithviolence(BartlettandMiller,2012). Itwasoftenassociatedwithcriticalthinking,which
hadthecapacitytoimprovethe‘humancondition’(AdornoandHorkheimer,1944).Itiswithinthelast15yearsthattherehasbeenadistinct
shiftinhowtheterms‘radical’and‘radicalisation’areused.The2005EUdocumentTerroristrecruitment:Addressingthefactorscontributing
toviolentradicalizationhasbeencreditedwithintroducingtheterm‘radicalisation’intothelexicon(HörnqvistandFlyghed,2012).Themass
17
mediaandpoliticiansinvariousWesternEuropeancountriesadoptedthetermasitseepedintowiderpublicdiscourseintheaftermathofthe
‘terror’attacksinMadridinMarch2004andLondoninJuly2005,andthemurderofDutchfilm-makerTheoVanGoghbyan‘Islamicextremist’
(Sedgwick,2010).
Theuseof ‘radicalisation’now,however,commonlyreferstothosewillingtouse(orsupport) indiscriminateviolencetofurthertheirwider
politicalor religiousagenda (Kundani, 2012).14 Irishpsychologist JohnHorgan (2012)has suggested that the shift away from focusingupon
‘terrorism’towards‘radicalisation’wasasaresultoftheinabilitytoproduceacoherentpsycho-pathologicalprofileofthe‘terrorist’(ibid.).This
led, instead, to a switch from analysing being a ‘terrorist’ to how someone becomes one, in other words, how an individual becomes
‘radicalised’(Horgan,2008).This includedamoveawayfromfocusingupon‘actsofterror’themselvestothethoughtsand ideasthatcould
leadtoviolence(HörnqvistandFlyghed,2012).
Mostconceptualisationsof ‘radicalisation’suggestthat it is ‘aprocessofsocialandpsychologicalchange,which insomecases,canprecede
involvement in terrorism’ (Braddock and Horgan, 2016: 385). This ‘process’ definitionwas adopted by the UK government and used in its
definition of ‘radicalisation’. The June 2011 CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (updated to its fourth edition in June 2018)15 states that
‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’ (HM
Government, 2011b: 108).One of the benefits of conceptualising ‘radicalisation’ as a ‘process’ at a policy level is that it implies there are
variousincrementalstagesthroughwhichanindividualisrequiredtoproceedbeforetheybecome‘fullyradicalised’.Theoretically,atleast,this
meansthatthereisthepotentialtointerveneinsomeone’slife,typicallywhentheyareyoung,beforetheir‘radical’ideasleadthemtocommit
anactof‘terrorism’.
14MarkSedgwick (2010:480)notes that ‘radicalisation’washardly referredtoby theUKprintmediaprior to2001;yet,press references to ‘radicalisation’significantlyincreasedfrom2005onwards(doublingbetween2005and2006),peakinginusagein2007.15CONTESTfirstemergedin2003andhasbeenupdatedin2006,2011and2018.
18
However,thewiderpsychologicalliteraturequeriesthisdirectlinkbetweenideasandactionsandsuggeststhat‘ideologicalradicalisation’does
notnecessarilyprecedeandleadto‘behaviouralradicalisation’andtakingpartinviolentacts(BjørgoandHorgan,2009;HorganandBraddock,
2010). Insteadof focusinguponthe ‘de-radicalisation’ofbeliefsystems,Horgan(2009)suggeststhatthefocusshouldbeuponencouraging
disengagementfromviolence(seealsoFinkandHearne,2008;SchuurmanandBakker,2016).Aninterestingpracticalexampleofprioritising
disengagementratherthan‘de-radicalisation’istheEXITSwedenproject,whichworkswithyoungpeopleseekingtoleaveneo-Naziandfar-
rightmovements.Thisexamplewillbediscussedatgreaterlengthinsection2.
Afurtherdifficultywiththe‘process’metaphoristhatnotonlydoesitlacktheempiricaldatatosupportsuchsuppositions,butthefocusof
interventiontendstobeattheindividualandpsychologicallevel.Thisapproachminimisesthewiderpolitical,socialandstructuralcontextin
which ‘radicalisation’ occurs (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Schmidt, 2014). Reducing the concept to focus purely upon the psycho-
pathologyoftheindividualignoresthepotentialforviewing‘radicalisation’asinvolvingacollectiveinter-groupconflictdynamicof‘us’against
‘them’(McCauleyandMoskalenko,2017),whichintheNorthernIrelandcontextappearsparticularlyrelevant.
InaUKcontext,theCONTEST‘counter-terrorism’policycontainsfourstrands:Pursue,Prevent,ProtectandPrepare.Thefocuswithin‘Prevent’
isuponthe ‘pathway’analogyof ‘radicalisation’asaprocessand theaim is tostop ‘terrorism’,basedona ‘warped’ ideologyorworldview,
beforeitoccurs(Heath-Kelly,2017):
The stated objective of the counter-radicalisation assemblage is to anticipate threat and enable intervention at the earliest
possible stage. In particular, the knowledge practices that cast radicalisation as a social process or continuum suggest the
possibilityofearlyidentificationandinterventioninthelifeworldsofpotentialfutureradicals(DeGoedeandSimon,2013:317).
ThefocusonIslamicextremism,andonMuslimyoungpeopleinparticular,withinthePreventstrandhasledtoaccusationsthatthepolicyis
creatinganew‘suspectcommunity’ intheUKthathasbeendisproportionately impacteduponby‘racialprofiling’, inapolicingandsecurity
19
context (Hillyard, 1993; Hickman et al., 2012; Choudhury, 2017). As part of the pre-emptive ‘counter-radicalisation’ efforts in the UK, the
CHANNELprogrammewasestablished in2007toprovidetargeted interventions(includingmentoring)forthose ‘vulnerable’ individualswho
aredisplayingsignsofbeing‘radicalised’(SukariehandTannock,2015:25).Theveryyoungageatwhichsomeyoungpeoplearereferredtothe
initiative (someunder12yearsold)has,however,beencalled intoquestion (CoppockandMcGovern,2014;Elshimi,2015).16TheCHANNEL
mentoringprogrammewillbeconsideredfurtherinsection2.
InEnglandandWales,theCounterTerrorismandSecurityAct(2015)placesalegaldutyonallpublicbodiesto‘have“dueregardtotheneedto
preventpeoplefrombeingdrawnintoterrorism”’(Choudhury,2017:239).Thisplacesastatutoryrequirementonhealthprofessionals,social
workers,teachers,universitystaff,youthworkersandotherstoreport individualstotheauthorities inthosecases inwhichtheybelievethe
individualtobe‘vulnerable’to‘radicalisation’(SpalekandDavies,2012).17
Anumberofguidesandrisk-assessmentmatrices (nominalscalesorchecklistmenus,suchastheVERA2assessmentscaleused intheUK),
havebeenproducedtoassistfront-linepractitionersspotthesignsof‘radicalisation’(Klausenetal.,2016:69–90;Sarma,2017:281).Typically,
themore‘riskfactors’thataretickedoffonthelist,themore‘atrisk’theyoungpersonistobeing‘radicalised’(HerringtonandRoberts,2012).
Asidefromtheethicalissuesinherentinthe‘enlistmentoftheprofessionsintofunctionsofintelligencegathering’(Ragazzi,2017:172;seealso
StanleyandGuru,2015;SewellandHulusi,2016),whichispresentedasnodifferentfromotherformsofmanagingriskandchildsafeguarding
16Elshimi(2015:121)notesthat:‘Ofthe1,120individualsidentifiedbyCHANNELbetween2007and2010,290wereunder16years,and55wereunder12years(HO2011,59). Therefore, a high proportion of individuals identified by CHANNEL was below the age of 16 years, with some being under 12 years. Ultimately, the CHANNELprogramme, whichmakes de-radicalisation interventions possible, strongly exemplifies the workings of disciplinary technology in the technology of the self.’ Similarly,Coppock(2014,p.118)statesthat:‘TheUKHomeOffice(HerMajesty’sGovernment,2013)reportsthatinthefiveyearsfrom2007to2012,2,500individualswerereferredtoCHANNELprojectpractitionersfor‘support’.Ofthese,over500wereyoungpeople;290wereunder16yearsoldand55wereunder12yearsold.Over90%wereMuslim.IthasbeenreportedthatschoolstudentshavebeenreferredthroughCHANNELaftermakingstrongpro-Palestinianstatements.’17Theintroductionofthelegislationseemstohaveimpacteduponthenumberofreferralsto‘counter-radicalisation’programmessuchasCHANNEL.Indeed,inthefirstyearafterthelegislationcameintoeffectinJuly2015,thenumberofoverallreferralstoCHANNELincreasedby75%(to4,611),whilereferralsfromschoolstaffmorethandoubled(from537to1,121;seeChoudhury,2017:239).
20
(deGoedeandSimon,2013;O’Donnell,2016),thesemeasurementtoolshavebeencritiquedonanumberoffronts.Suchchecklistapproaches
tendtolackempiricalevidencesupportingwhytheyfocusuponvarious‘riskfactors’inparticular18(Sarma,2017).Theyalsorequirestaffwith
verylittleknowledgeortraininginrelationto‘radicalisation’tomakesubjectivejudgements,shapedbyalackofknowledgeorstereotypical
viewsofminorityethniccommunities(Coppock,2014;CoppockandMcGovern,2014;SukariehandTannock,2015;JeromeandElwick,2019).19
Despite numerous criticisms, the UK counter-terrorism strategy has been very influential in the development of similar strategies in other
countries (suchastheUS,which launcheda ‘CounteringViolentExtremism’strategy in2011;seeKlausenetal.,2016).TheBRAVE(Building
Resilience Against Violent Extremism) model of ‘counter-radicalisation’ in the US promotes the ‘public health’ approach to ‘risk’ and
‘vulnerability’ (referred to previously in relation to ‘gangs’), which focuses upon building ‘resilience’ to ‘radicalisation’, in particular by
supporting families toprovide ‘protectivenetworks’ for their childrenwhomaybe ‘vulnerable’ to ‘radicalisation’ (Weineetal., 2009,2016;
Weine,2012;Alyetal.,2014;Mirahmadi,2016).OneoftheprojectsoftheStGilesTrustisbaseduponthisBRAVEModel,albeitinanEnglish
context,andwillbediscussedfurtherinsection2.
Itisimportanttobearinmindthatwhiletheterminologyandconceptsbehindtheworkonyoungpeopleand‘gangs’and‘radicalisation’may
tendtohaveadifferentleveloffocus–theformertendingtoprioritisethesocialcontextandconditionsforjoiningandthelattertendingto
focusontheviolent ideology/ideasof the individual–engagementwithyoungpeople inbotha ‘gangs’anda ‘terrorism’contextultimately
seeks to achieve the same ends: to prevent young people from joining them (prevention); or to support them to leave the life behind
18However,somepupilstakingafamilyholidayhometovisitfamilymembersincountriessuchasPakistanorAfghanistanhavebeenreferredforinterventionincasetheyattended‘terrortraining’camps(seeCoppockandMcGovern,2014).19CoppockandMcGovern (2014:249)note in relation toa guideproduced for theDepartmentof Education inEngland: ‘In LearningTogether toBe Safe:A toolkit tocontribute to thepreventionof violent extremism (Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), 2008), teachers aregivenadviceon “what canmakea youngpersonsusceptibletoadoptingextremistviewsandsupportingviolence”,asfollows:“maybeginwithasearchforanswerstoquestionsaboutidentity,faithandbelonging;maybedrivenbythedesirefor‘adventure’andexcitement;maybedrivenbyadesiretoenhancetheself-esteemoftheindividual”.’
21
(desistance). There are currently a number of innovative approacheswithin both the ‘gang-related’ and ‘radicalisation’ paradigms that are
seekingtodojustthat.Itistoananalysisofthesecasestudiesthatthisreportnowturns.
22
2.3Comparingmodelsofyouthworkintervention
Projectdetails Keythemes Programmeandactivities Outcomes?
STREET:(StrategytoReach,Empower,andEducateTeenagers)
‘Counter-radicalisation’programmeledbylocalcommunitySalafists.
Brixton,SouthLondon
FundedbyHomeOffice.Theprojectcametoanendinmid-2011whenthenewBritishcoalitiongovernmentchangedstrategywithinthecounter-terrorismpolicy(anddecidednottofundgroups
FocusonPREVENTION
Community-led
TheuniquenessofSTREETwasthatitwasacommunity-ledinitiativebylocalSalafists20inBrixton–withmanystaffandSTREETmentorsbeingfromthelocalcommunityorthemselvesMuslimconverts,likethosetheyworkedwith.
Whoisengaged?
Youngpeople(predominantlyAfro-Caribbeancommunityaged15–25)‘atrisk’ofengagingin‘anti-socialbehaviour,‘gang’violence,or‘terrorism’.Manyyoungpeoplecamefrombackgroundswhereviolence,emotionalorphysicalabuse,lowself-esteem,isolationandlowaspirationswerecommon.
STREET undertook a detailed risk-assessment of a person’s backgroundand potential ‘vulnerabilities’. STREETdeveloped its assessment frameworkforthose‘atrisk’ofengaginginviolentextremism.Staffwereexpectedtohave‘corecompetencies’inatleastthreeoffive‘influencerfactors’:
• Emotionalwell-being;
• Socialexclusionandestrangement;
• Perceivedgrievanceandinjustice;
• Foreignpolicy;
• Religiousextremistideology.
STREETstaffusedtheassessmenttohighlightthestrengthofinfluencerfactorsvis-à-visprotectivefactorsandtailorinterventionsaccordingly.If
EvaluationbyJackBarclayfromtheCentreonGlobalCounter-TerrorismCooperationfoundthatintervieweesfromthestatutorysector(includingthepolice)andalsoacademicswhohadengagedwiththeprojectbelievedtheimpacttobeoverwhelminglypositive.
Theevaluationfoundthefollowingimportantsuccessfactors:
• Anexistingbackgroundincounteringviolentextremismprotectscredibilitywiththelocalcommunityagainstclaimsby‘spoilers’ofa‘governmentfront’;
• Operationalindependencefromstatutorypartnershelpedmaintaincredibility;
• Educated,dedicatedandknowledgeablestaffwiththe
20 A conservative theological branchwithin Sunni Islamwhich is promoted by the governing regime in Saudi Arabia. AsGithens-Mazer and Lambert (2010: 895) note:‘SalafismisdistinctfromotherIslamicreligiousorientations.Itisbased,initsessence,onabeliefthatIslammustreturntoitstwokeysources—theQur’anandtheHadith—andreorientatetheirfaith,beliefandpracticeinordertobelikethe‘CompanionsoftheProphets’.Tothisextent,Salafis(sic)perceiveanyformofreligioustraditionoutsidetheimmediatetextualboundariesofthesesourcesasdeviationsfromthosetenetsmandatedbyGodthroughhisProphet,Muhammad.’
23
withconservativemoralandworldbeliefs,suchastheSalafists,whomayhave‘street-cred’withyoungdisaffectedMuslims).
STREETmaintained‘operationalindependence’fromthestate,whiledevelopingtermsofengagementwithorganisationssuchaspoliticiansandtheYouthOffenderService.Informationwouldnotnecessarilybesharedwiththeotherpartnersunlessdeemednecessary.
Purposeandapproach:
‘Foryou,bypeoplelikeyou.’
STREETstaffandmentorschallengeIslamicextremism‘onthestreet’byadoptingaresponsetailoredtoindividualyoungpersons’needsincluding:
• emotionalwell-being(counselling);
• helpwithemploymentortraining;
• personaldevelopment;
• faith-basedworkto‘motivatepersonalreformandencouragepositivecitizenship’,toprovideamoregroundedandtextualunderstandingofparticularIslamicteachingsonissuessuchascitizenship.
required,STREETstaffdrewonastrongertheologicalinterventioncalledtheDeconstructprogramme–whichaimedtohighlighthowal-Qa’idaandothersusevideosandtheinternetto‘distortthetruth’andputouttheirmessage,regardlessofitsveracity.
• Challenginginfluencesanddecision-makingthatmaycausesomeonetolegitimateviolence;
• Improvingconfidenceandself-belief,increasingresistancetonegativeinfluences;
• Providinga‘safespace’foryoungpeopletodebateproblemsandissuesbotheringthem,andaddressfeelingsofdisempowermentandmarginalisation;
• Unlocking‘socialcapital’ofindividualsthrougheducationalandvocationaltraining.
abilitytochallengeparticularnarratives;
• Robustmethodologicalrigourinriskassessmentprocess;
• Addressingwiderissuesinrelationto‘radicalisation’isimportant–includingpoverty,educationalattainment,mentalhealthandaddiction.
CHANNEL:PartofthePREVENTstrandoftheCONTESTcounter-terrorismstrategy.
Firstpilotedin2007andextendedacross
FocusonPREVENTION(safeguarding)
Multi-agencyapproach
Establishedasgovtpolicy/legislation:
Counter-TerrorismandSecurityActmade‘spottingthesigns’of
• Afterreferral,a‘CHANNELlpanel’isconvened(monthly),chairedbythelocalauthorityandattendedbyeducation,socialservicesandhealthcarerepresentatives.
ImpactassessmenthasproveddifficultasCHANNELfocusesonthepre-criminalspace,atthelevelofideasbefore‘terrorism’orviolentbehaviouroccurs.
• In2017/18,ofthe7,318
24
EnglandandWalesinApril2012.
ParticipationbecameastatutorydutyforlocalauthoritiesinEnglandandWalesundertheCounter-TerrorismandSecurityAct2015.
‘radicalisation’astatutoryrequirementforalllocalauthoritiesinEnglandandWales.
ReferralsforCHANNELcomefrom:police,socialservices,medicalprofessionals(includingGPsanddentists),youthworkers,teachers,universitystaffandsocialworkers.EducationbodiesnowaccountformorereferralstoPREVENTthananyothersector(35%in2017/18).
Trainingsessionsandhandbooksareavailableforstatutorystafftoassistthemtospotthesignsof‘radicalisation’atanearlystage,predominantlyamongstyoungpeople.
Whoisengaged?
CHANNELisprimarilyfocusedonthosewhohaveyettocommitacriminalact,butwhoitisthoughtmaypotentiallydoso.
Aimedatthosedeemed‘vulnerable’to‘radicalisation’tosafeguardthose‘atrisk’ofbeingdrawnintoanyformofextremismor‘terrorism’(includingIslamicorright-wing‘terrorism’).
In2017/18,62%ofthe1,314referralswere20yearsofageoryoungerand86%
• Eachreferralisdiscussed,andasuitable‘packageofsupport’agreed.
• Ifidentified‘vulnerabilities’arenot‘terror-related’,thenthepersonisreferredtoexistingmainstreamsupportservices(mentalhealth,counselling,addiction,etc.).
ParticipationinCHANNELisvoluntary(ifthepersonisunder18,parentalorguardianconsentmustbegained)andissupposedtobeconfidential.
VaryingtypesofsupportareavailableforthosereferredtotheCHANNELprogramme.Theseinclude:
• Mentalhealthservicesupport;
• Educationalandemploymentsupport;
• One-to-oneideologicalortheologicalmentoringfromaCHANNELInterventionProvider.
referralsmadetoPREVENT,18%(1,314)werediscussedataninter-statutoryCHANNELpanel.
• 70%ofthosereferredtoCHANNELweredeemednottorequirespecificintervention.
• 30%(394)receivedsupportthroughtheprogramme,76%ofwhomhavenowlefttheprogramme(298).
Theprogrammehasbeenpoliticallycontentious.
Thefocusonthethoughtsandideasofpeoplewhohaveyettocommitacriminalact,butwhoitisthoughtmaypotentiallydoso(ratherthanbeingjudgedonbehaviour)hasbeenwidelycriticisedasthestateoversteppingitsremitintermsofanOrwelliansurveillanceofcitizenspriortothemcommittinganyactualoffence.
Guidelineshavebeencritiquedas‘unscientific’,basedonprejudiceandassumptions,andencouragingfront-linestaffto‘seerisk’wheretheremaybenone.
ABehaviouralInsightsTeamreport(2018)foundthatmorethan95%of33
25
weremale.
Purposeandapproach:
• Identifyindividuals‘atrisk’;
• Assessthenatureandextentofthe‘risk’;
• Developanappropriateindividualsupportplan.
‘de-radicalisation’schemesassociatedwithPREVENTasacounter-terrorstrategywereineffectiveorfailing.Onlytwoprogrammeswerefoundtobeeffective.
AashaGangMediationProject:AprojectcoordinatedbyOsmaniTrustinTowerHamlets(UK)between2003–2016.
Projectaimedtosupportlocalyoungpeople‘vulnerable’tojoiningagang.
TowerHamletshasbeenafocalpointofthePreventingViolentExtremism(PVE)fundofPREVENT.OnlyBradfordandBirminghamreceivedmore‘anti-terror’and‘de-radicalisation’funding.
FocusonPREVENTION
Community-led
Whoisengaged?
Focusonchangingtheideasofyoungpeopleto(hopefully)alterlaterbehaviour.
Purposeandapproach
Peer-to-peerengagementmodeltoreduceterritoriallyassociatedviolenceandcriminality:
• Accreditedtraining;
• Diversion:Excursionstohighlightalternativeactivitiesto‘gang’culture;
• One-to-onementoringandpersonaldevelopment;
• Streetoutreach;
In2015/16Aasha:
• Reachedoutto270localyoungpeopleinavarietyofactivities(109ofwhomwereunder19yearsofage);
• 88youngpeoplewererecruitedaspeer-to-peermentors;
• 25youngpeoplewereinnationally-recognisedaccreditedtraining;
• 21workshopson‘gangs’,drugsandanti-socialbehaviourweredelivered;
• Twocommunityeventschallenging‘gang-culture’wereheld(attendedby340peoplefromthelocalcommunity);
• Aashastaffmediatedin12
Arelativelysmall(24)internalevaluationbasedonself-reportedchangeidentifiedprogressinanumberofareas(2016).
Anexternalevaluation(2011)foundthattheOsmaniTrusthadbuiltuprelationshipswithyoungpeoplewithinthecommunityoveryearsbeforetryingtodeliverwhatwasperceivedbysomeasacontroversialprogramme(PREVENT)directedtowardstheircommunity(Muslims).
Evenwithpriorwork,astronglocalbase,and‘culturalcompetence’todealwithidentity,faithandviolence,ittooktimetobuildrelationshipstodealwithsensitiveissuesassociatedwiththecounter-terrorismstrategy.
Theexternalevaluationfoundthattheprojecthadmoreimpactonyoung
26
• Gangmediationintimesofcrisisorviolence.
De-glamorisationusingpositiverolemodelsfromthelocalcommunity,andinparticular,youngpeoplewhowereformer‘gang’membersbutwhohadultimatelychangedtheirlifestyleforthebetter.
gang-relatedincidents.
peoplebyfocusinguponissuessuchaseducation,promotingvolunteeringandcivicengagementthantheinitialnarrowerremitfocusedonchallengingfaith-basedextremism.Theevaluationconcludedthatthiswasdrivenbylocalpriorities,whichfoundthatIslamicradicalisationwasalessimportantasariskfactorforyoungpeoplethanothervulnerabilitiesandconcluded:‘Comparedtothatofthefunder,thismayrepresentaslightlydifferentmodelofwhat‘violentextremism’isandhowitshouldbeaddressed.’
EXITSweden:
Establishedin1998inStockholmtoworkwithpeople(predominantlyyoungmen)seekingtoleavetheneo-Naziandfar-rightsubculture.
Basedonthepremisethatyoungpeoplejoinwhitesupremacistmovementsfrompersonalandsocialcircumstances–
FocusonDESISTENCE
Voluntary-led/policecooperation
EXITSwedenispartofFryshuset(YMCAnetwork),fundedprimarilybygrantsfromtheSwedishgovernment.
Whoisengaged?
People(mostlyyoungmen)seekingtoleavetheneo-Naziandfar-rightsubculture.
Referralsaretakenpurelyonavoluntary,self-referralbasis.Trustiscrucial.Moststaffareformermembersoffar-rightgroups,andhavebeenthroughasimilarprocess.Engagement
Assessmentismadeona‘violentextremism’spectrumrangingfrom-10(mostextreme)to+10(mostpositive).Staffapplythescalebasedonmanyfactors–socialconnectedness,levelsoftolerance,(power)relationswithothers,willingnesstouseviolence,socialskills,etc.Thisnumericalspectrumisusedtotailorinterventions.Todealwithsomeoneatthe-10endwillrequireastaffmemberwhohasalsobeenatthatlevelofextremism.Differentstaffareusedatdifferingtimesintheinterventionandmentoringprocess,dependingonwheretheyoungpersonis,atthat
Since1998,EXITSwedenhasworkedwith800individuals,helpingthemleavefar-rightgroups.ThereisnopubliclyavailabledataonrecidivismlevelsforparticipantsinEXITSweden,butsincetheyear2000,recidivismlevelsofparticipantsintheEXITGermanyprogrammeareestimatedtobeaslowas3%.
27
feelingexcludedfromsocietyordisconnectedtoothers–ratherthaninherentbeliefinideology.
Joiningfar-rightgroupsisassociatedwithasearchforidentity,statusandpower.
withclientscanlastfromseveralmonthstoseveralyears.
Purposeandapproach:
EXITSwedensupportsclientstobuildanewsocialidentityforthemselves,inwhichtheirformerworldview/ideologywillnolonger‘makesense’.
Crucialtotheengagementinbothprojectshavebeenqualifiedstaffwhothemselveshavepersonalexperienceoftheissueswithwhichtheyareworking.
Themainmethodistotrainparticipantstomeetnewpeopleandhandlenewrelationshipsandsituationsthataredifferenttowhentheywereinthewhitepowermovement,whichinturnmakesthemlessdependentontheirformerneedforpowerandcontrol.Gradually,anextremistworldviewstopsmakingsense.
EXITSwedenusestherapeuticdialogue,mentoringschemesandotheractivitiestosupportclientstodevelopalternativeworldviews,self-understandingandinternallycritiquetheidentitytheyhaveascribedtothemselves.
particulartime.
Theprogrammeincludes:
• Personalmeetingsandacontactperson(initiallyavailableatalltimes,ifneeded);
• Assistancetoliaisewithgovernmentagencies(housing,socialservices,probation,police,etc.);
• Supportforfamilyandfriends;
• Counselling,managingconflictsessionsandpsychotherapytoclientsaswellasparents,siblings,partnersandothers;
• Socialactivities(sports,music,etc.)andtrainingtoencourageparticipantstocarveoutanewsocialidentityforthemselvesawayfromnegativepeergroup;
• Helpwitheducational/vocationaltrainingandfindingajob;
• Practicalassistancewiththeremovaloffar-righttattoosandemblems.
28
‘Mechelenmodel’:foundedontheprinciplesandvaluesofinclusion.
MechelenisacityinBelgium(Flanders).AlargeproportionofMechelen’simmigrantpopulationwereborninBelgiumofMoroccandescentandoftenexperiencedastruggletobalancethedifferingculturesandexperiences.
Thesedifficultieswereexacerbatedbypopulist(andattimesxenophobic)reactiontoimmigrantcommunitiesfollowingthe‘terrorist’attacksinParisandBrussels.
FocusonPREVENTION
Localauthority-led
Whoisengaged?
Integrationofwholecity
Purposeandapproach:
Theproblemof‘radicalisation’wasre-conceptualisedasmarginalisation.Mechelenacknowledgedthatsocio-economicconditionsofdeprivation,socialexclusionandalackofopportunitieswerecultivatingconditionsthatenabledgroupssuchasSharia4Belgiumto‘radicalise’andexploityoungpeople:
‘Wedon’tneedmorepoliceorspeciallaws.Thefirstthingtodoishaveaninclusivepolicyatthelocallevel,youneedtocreatesecurityinyourcity,don’tallowneighbourhoodstobewithoutservices,withcriminalsasrolemodels.Inmanycitiespeopledon’tlivewitheachotherbutnexttoeachother,inarchipelagosofmonoculturalsocieties.’
• Safety–applicationofthelawiscriticaltopreventthecreationofavacuum.Responsibilitydoesnot,however,falljusttolawenforcementagenciesorthecriminaljusticesystem.InMechelen,an‘OlderBrothersProgramme’operatesduringsummermonthsandholidayperiods,withyounginternsbeingappointedtoworkintheircommunitiestotellotheryoungpeopletoobservesocialandcivicresponsibility.Thiscreatesleadershipandmentoringskillsininternsandmaymakethemmoreactivelythinkaboutsocietalnormsandbehaviour;
• Developanewnarrativeofdiversitythatallcitizenscaninputintoorconnectwith.
• Avoidgroup-thinkthatresultsinfurtherdemarcationinsocietalgroupsratherthanpromotingengagementandinclusion;
• Counteractsegregationinsociety,e.g.inschools;
• Appreciatetheever-changing
WhencomparedwiththeneighbouringtownofVilvoorde,theimpactofthe‘Mechelenmodel’isstark.VilvoordeishalfthesizeofMechelenbuthasbeenasourceof28jihadisconnectedwiththeoutlawedIslamistgroupSharia4Belgium.TheMayorofMechelenestimatedthatbutfortheimplementationofthe‘Mechelenmodel’,25residentswouldhavelefttojoinjihadinSyriaorIraqbasedontheregionalaverage.
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dynamicsoftownsandcities;
• Discusscommonvaluesthatunderpinsocietyasabridgingtoolbetweenindividuals;
• CombatWahabistpropaganda.
CommunityInitiativetoReduceViolence(CIRV):wasestablishedinGlasgowin2008bytheViolenceReductionUnit,managedandledbytheStrathclydePolice.
TheaimsofthementoringaspectoftheCIRVprojectwereto:
• Reduceoffending(includinganti-socialbehaviour)rates;
• Encourageparticipantstoconsider
FocusonDESISTENCE
Police-led
Whoisengaged?129street‘gang’memberswereinvitedtoapublicmeeting(heldatGlasgowSheriffCourt)–andtoldthat‘Theviolencemuststop’.Voluntaryfollow-upmeetingswereheldwithnon-policestafffromtheprogramme(usually‘onthestreet’).Participantswereaskedtosignawrittenpledgethattheywoulddesistfrom‘gang’activity.Withintheparametersoflaw,collectiveresponsibilitywasexpectedfrom‘gangs’–ifone‘gang’memberbrokethenon-violenceagreement,theentire‘gang’wasinviolation.
Purposeandapproach:
‘Focuseddeterrencestrategy’promotedbytheBostonCeasefireprojectandtheCincinnatiInitiativetoReduceViolence.
Adopteda‘publichealthapproach’(like
ThreecorecomponentstoCIRV:
• Themoralvoiceofthecommunity.
• Enforcement–disruptingtheactivitiesofgangsviaintelligencegathering;‘gang’violenceanalysis;andgrouptargetedenforcement.
• Servicesandprogrammes:
Coursesandtrainingofferedtoyoung(predominantlymale)‘gang’membersincluding:
• Personaldevelopment;
• Employability;
• Mentoring;
• Intensivesupport;
• Diversionaryactivities(includingsport).
Afull-timefour-weekcourse(TacklingGangViolenceProgramme)for‘gang’
Interimtwo-yearevaluationfoundthattheCIRVmodelhadcontributedto:
• A46%reductioninviolentoffendingbyparticipating‘gang’members;
• A34%reductioninallothertypesofcrimesandoffencesbyparticipating‘gang’members;
• ‘Gang’fightingwasreducedbyapproximately73%andweaponpossessionreducedby85%;
• Violentoffendingforthemost‘atrisk’membersreducedby56%(andoffendingamongstthiscohortforotheroffencesreducedby34%);
• Participantswhoengagedwithintensivementoringreducedtheirviolentactivityby73%andtheircriminalbehaviourby62%;
• CIRVclientsonaveragereduced
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victimissues;
• Reducenegativepeerassociation;
• Improveself-esteem;
• Helpsupportparentsandcarers;
• Supportaccesstoeducation;
• Reducealcoholanddruguse.
illness,violenceis‘preventable’)tocoordinateexistingwork,whichhadtendedtoworkindependently–inthebeliefthatuncoordinatedresponsesfocusedonenforcementhadpreviously‘failed’.
Takesapartnershipapproachincludingthepolice,socialservices,education,housingandcommunitysafety,alongsidethelocalcommunity.
membersinvolvedinhighlevelsofviolence.Thecoursedeliberatelyincludesmembersfromdiffering‘gangs’,‘forcing’themtomeetandengageindialogue.Usingsports(includingmartialarts)fromtrainedinstructors(someofwhomareformer‘gang’members),coursecontentincludedsessionsonterritorialismandtheimpactof‘gang’violenceonthelocalcommunity,anti-knifecrimeawareness,drugandalcoholawareness,motivationalworkshops,employmentregistrationanda‘careeressentials’programme,workshopsonvisualisation,affirmationandemotionalintelligenceandconflictresolutionworkshopsandteam-buildingactivities.
Followinggraduation–andiftheyhadnotreoffendedduringtheperiod–youngparticipantsproceededtoafour-week‘Employabilityprogramme’.
Amentoringservice,providedbytheIncludemcharitywasacorecomponentofthewrap-aroundservicesprovided.Thisone-to-onementoringsupport(byreferral)tookplacewiththose‘gang’membersdeemedtobethe‘highestrisk’andthosewhohavetendednottoengagewithotherservicesprovided
theirviolencelevelsbyapproximately22%morethanthose‘gang’memberswhodidnotparticipate.
Theresultsofthefinalevaluation(Williamsetal.,2014),usingbeforeandafteranalysisalongsideanon-participatingcomparisongroup,foundthatforthe167youngmen(aged16–29)whoengagedintheresearchforbetweenoneanduptotwoyearsfollowingtheirparticipationinCIRV:
• Violentoffendingreducedby52%forCIRVparticipantscomparedto29%fornon-participating‘gang’members;
• TherateofphysicalviolencewasnotovertlydifferentbetweenCIRVandnon-CIRV‘gang’membersevenafterparticipation;
• Buttherateofweaponscarryingreducedby84%forCIRVparticipantscomparedto40%fornon-participants.
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withintheCIRVpartnership.
A‘TrainingofTrainers’componentwasdeliveredtoover80staffofpartnerorganisations(aswellasex-‘gang’members),toenablethemtoworkwithyoung‘gang’membersinthefutureandensuresustainability.
OtheraspectsoftheprogrammeincludedtheCIRVEastEndFootballLeague,andanImpactYouthprogrammeforunder16stoimprovehealth,lifestylechoicesandreduceanti-socialbehaviour.
FightforPeace:FoundedbyLukeDowdneyinRiodeJaneiroin2000andopenedanotherbaseinNewham,EastLondonin2007.
Utilisesboxingandmartialarts,alongsideeducationandpersonaldevelopment.Theprogrammespecificallyaimstoworkindisadvantagedareas,
FocusonBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE
Voluntaryorganisation
Personalapproach
Whoisengaged?Youngpeoplefromdisadvantagedbackgroundsto‘realisetheirfullpotential’.
Purposeandapproach:
FightforPeacedrawsona‘publichealth’modeltoviolencepreventionandfocusesonthreecoreareas:
• Promotingthesocio-economicinclusionofthoseaffectedby
Fivepillars:
• Boxingandmartialarts:A‘hook’toencourageyoungpeopletojointheprogramme.Thesportsarealsousedtoencouragediscipline,self-controlandpromotemorepositivelevelsofself-esteem;
• Education:Educationalopportunitiesforyoungpeoplemarginalisedor‘failing’inmainstreameducationorwhoarenotattendingschool;
• Employability:Trainingandvocationalcoursesand
In2018,1,256youngpeopletookpartintheevaluationinRioand727tookpartinLondon(seeFightforPeace,2018):
DataforLondon(%):
Lesslikelytocarryaweapon
80
Lesslikelytocommitacrime
87
Lesslikelytobepartofagang
80
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whicharedisproportionatelyimpactedbycrimeandviolence.
The‘TheoryofChange’oftheprogrammeisbasedontheassumptionthat‘ayoungperson’sbehaviour,situationandthechoicestheymake,aredependentonthewaytheyseethemselves,howtheyrelatetoothers,andhowtheyseetheirfuture’.
crimeandviolence;
• Supportingthoseyoungpeopleidentifiedasbeing‘atrisk’ofengagingincrimeandviolence;
• Supportingyoungpeopletodisengagefromcrimeandviolenceandhelptheireffortsnottoreoffend.
opportunitiestoengagewithpotentialemployers(particularlyintheprivatesector);
• Supportservices:Includesmentoring,medicalandlegalreferrals,homevisitsandcommunityoutreach;
• Youthleadership:Youngparticipantsareencouragedintoleadershiprolestopromote‘activecitizenship’bybecomingmembersoftheYouthCouncil,whichliaisesontheorganisation’sbehalfwithexternalorganisations.
InRioin2018,410youngpeoplegainedjobinterviewsthroughemploymentsupportand42youngpeoplegainedemployment.
DataistakenfromFightforPeaceandisnotindependent.Anexternalevaluation(peer-reviewedaspartofProjectOracle2013)oftheRioandLondonprojectsfoundthattheprogrammewas‘highlysuccessful’.Thisexternalevaluationalsofoundthattheorganisationencouragedreflectionandadaptivepracticeamongstbothyoungpeopleandstaff.
FightforPeaceAlliancehastrainedmorethan160organisationsacross25countries.
StGilesTrust:WorkstoresettleandreintegrateoffendersonreleasefromprisoninCamberwell,London.
Theprojectoperatesonapeer-to-peerbasistotrainandassistnewlyreleasedoffenders,workingwith3,000offenders
DESISTENCE(SoS)andPREVENTION(SoS+)
Voluntaryorganisation
Whoisengaged?
SOSoffersintensivehelptoyoungpeopleexposedtoorattheriskofbeingavictimofviolence,‘vulnerability’orexploitation.
TheSOS+programmefocusesonpreventingyoungpeoplefrombecoming
SOS+
Thecourseisdeliveredbytrainedprofessionalswithdirect,personal,livedexperienceoftheissuestheyarespeakingabout.Theprojectaimsto:
• Debunkmythsandstereotypesaroundthe‘glamorous’lifestyleassociatedwith‘gangs’,crime,weaponsandtochallengesocialmediabyexposingtherealitiesofnegativelifestylechoices;
In2017/18:517peopleweretrainedasPeerAdvisors;4,793werehelpedtofindapermanenthome;795clientswerehelpedtofindpaidwork;aneconomicanalysisfoundan£8.34savingforevery£1investedinpeer-ledservicesthroughtheStGilesTrust.
TheSocialInnovationPartnership(TSIP)evaluationintotheSOSprojectin2012/13found:
• 87%ofclientintervieweessaid
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inthelasttenyears.Theprojectmakescontactwithprisonleaversfourweekspriortotheirrelease.PeerAdvisorsassesseachclient,identifytheirneeds,drawupanagreedactionplanofsupportandliaisewithagenciesbothwithintheprisonandinthecommunity.
Withspecificreferencetoyoungpeopleand‘gang’involvement,StGilesTrustoperatestwoprogrammes:SOSandSOS+.
involvedin‘gangs’throughaseriesofinteractivesessionsinschools,pupilreferralunitsandcollegesthatprovidepracticaltoolsonhowtostayclearof‘gangs’,violenceandcrime.
Purposeandapproach:
SOS
Selected,trainedindividualsofcomparablebackgroundstotheyoungpeopleutilisetheirpersonalandprofessionalexperiencetorelateto,supportandmentor‘at-risk’youngpeople.‘CountyLines’,whichoffersflexiblesupportforyoungpeopledrawnintosupplyinganddealingdrugsthroughoronbehalfof‘gangs’.Thefocusistosupporttheyoungpersontoreconnectwithfamilyandpositivesupportnetworksawayfromdrugs,crime,‘gang’involvementandexploitation.
• Imparttoolsandstrategiestoyoungpeoplesothattheycanresistnegativepeerpressureand‘grooming’from‘gangs’;
• Encourageyoungpeopletostayineducationandpositiveactivities.
Eachcourseistailoredtotheindividualneedsofeachgroup,andmodulesincludetopicssuchas:knifecrime;therealitiesofprison;sexualexploitation;andtheimpactonvictims.
thatengagingwiththeSOSprojectchangedtheirattitudetooffending;
• 73%saiditwasimportantthatcaseworkerswereex-offenders;
• 100%agreedorstronglyagreedthattheSOSprojecthelpsclientstostoporreducereoffending.
CountyLinesDemonstrationProject
IndependentresearchbyJHConsulting(2019)found:
• 38childrenandtheirfamilieswereprovidedwithone-to-onesupport,with35remainingengagedwiththeprojectattheendofSept2018.Ofthose,11(31%)childrensuccessfullyexitedCountyLinesactivity;19(54%)childrenweredeemedtobeatdecreasedrisk;
• KentPolicereportedthat50%ofchildrenexperiencedareductioninreportedcrime(eitherasvictimorsuspect)andmissingepisodesacrossthecohorthavehalved.
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J-ARC:beganinNovember2014inDublin
StartedwithajointprotocolbetweenAnGardaSíochána,theIrishPrisonServiceandtheProbationServiceandaimsto:
• Developandfurtherstrengthenamulti-agencyapproachtothemanagementofcrime;
• Prioritiseoffenderstodevelopinitiativestoaddresstheiroffendingbehaviour;
• Reducecrimeandincreasepublicsafetyinlocalcommunities.
FocusonDESISTENCE
Statutory-led
Whoisengaged?
ACER3:Workingwith20people(involvedinburglary)aroundTallaghtandKevinStreetStations(May2015–December2016).
ChangeWorks:Engagedwith50‘priority’individualsinthefirstquarterof2015andafurther50inthesecondquarter.
STRIVE:Workedwith18‘prolific’offendersaroundEastBallymun(January2015–December2015,andJuly2016–December2016).
Unlike the CIRV model, participants didnothavetoconsent toparticipationbutwere selected after proposal by theGardai (ACER3) or Probation Board(Change Works) or all three partneragencies (STRIVE) and encouraged to‘buyin’toeachpilotprogramme.WithintheSTRIVEpilotinparticular,communityagencies played an important rolealongside statutory agencies in termsofsupportforprojectparticipants.
Whatistheapproach?
Acorecomponentbehindallthreepilotprogrammesisforpersonalplansforaccesstosupport–participantsareexpectedtoadheretoplans(e.g.attendingtheJobCentre).Iftheydonotfollowactionplans,thenthereistheprospectofreturntocustody.
• ACER3:Threeofthe20(15%)offendersdidnotreoffendduringtheobservationperiod,whileninehadpartiallydesisted(45%).Therewasalsoareductionby37%inburglariesbyparticipants.Burglaryoffencesinandaroundthetwotrainstationsreducedby40%duringtheinterventionperiod.However,tenparticipantswerereturnedtoprison;
• ChangeWorks:37%ofparticipants(19of51)didnotreoffend.31%(16)ofparticipantswhoreoffendedwerereturnedtoprison.18(35%)participantsweredeemedtohavecompletedallaspectsoftheirpersonalactionplanandcompletedtheprogramme;
• STRIVE:28%(fiveof18participants)didnotreoffend.Therewasareductionby43%(35fewer)inoffencesbyparticipants.Therewasa57%reductioninarsonoffencesinthegeographicalareaduring
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Threetwo-yearpilotprogrammesinDublin:
• ACER3:Localdrugtreatmentservicesaswellasemploymentorganisationswerealsoinvolved;
• ChangeWorks:Focuswasonthoseengagedinviolentandharmfulbehaviour.TheBridgeProjectwasinvolvedalongsideJ-ARCpartners;
• STRIVE:TheBallymunSocialRegenerationSub-Committee,theJobCentre,DSP,DCCandLocalDrugsTaskforcealsoinvolvedwithJ-ARCpartneragencies.
thistime,whiledrugoffencesreducedbyapproximately30%(seeJARC,2018).
As the general recidivism rate in theRepublic of Ireland in 2018 wasestimatedat58%(JARC,2018:29),thereview of the external evaluationssuggestedthattheearlyfindingsoftheprogramme were ‘promising’.However,theevaluatorsacknowledgedchallengeswiththeevaluation:
• Nobaselinedata;
• No randomised control groupusedforcomparativepurposes;
• Difficulties in comparing acrossthethreepilots;
• Smallsamplesizes(onlyaround90 individuals were involvedwith the three J-ARC pilots atanyonetime).
ROCA:InterventionistyouthworkmodelinMassachusettssince1988andlaterinBaltimore.
FOCUSONBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE
Community-led
Whoisengaged?
Targetsyoungmenwho:
• Areaged17–24yearsold;
Four-stageapproach:
1. A‘relentless’outreachapproachthatinvolvesmembersofROCAconfrontingyoungpeoplewithintheircommunity,withwhomotheryouthprogrammeshavebeenunabletowork,by
ROCAusesa‘SocialSolutions,Outcomes’datacollectionmethodandtrackingonaweekly,monthly,quarterlyandannualbasistochartparticipantprogressandstaffperformance.Thedatacollectedincludescapturingeveryeffortmadetocontactayoungpersonaswellastime
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• Havebeenpreviouslyarrested;
• Havepriorincarceration;
• Are‘gang-’or‘street-involved’;
• Useordeal‘drugs’;
• Haveapriorjuvenileprobationand/oraprioradultprobation;
• Havedroppedoutofschool.
Purposeandapproach:
ThemottoofROCAis‘lessjail:morefuture’.
ROCA’svisionistodisrupttheexpectedcycleofincarcerationandpovertybyhelpingyoungpeopletransformtheirlives.Theirworkisunderpinnedbyanorganisationaltheorythatwhenyoungpeopleareengagedbypositiveandintensiverelationships,theycanchangetheirbehavioursandtheirlives.
knockingondoors,meetingthematschooland‘persistingwiththem’untiltheyagreetoparticipateintheprogramme.
2. Atransformationalrelationshipapproachtendingtowardsarestorativeapproachinwhichobligationsandresponsibilitiesareattached,notonlytotheyoungperson,butalsotheROCAyouthworker,ona24/7contactbasis.
3. Afocusonthreecoreareas:education;lifeskills;andemployment.
4. Engagementwithexternalorganisationsthatimpactonthelivesofhigh-riskyoungpeople.ROCAadoptsa‘relentlessoutreach’approachindemandingthatexternalorganisationsengagewiththemselvesandtheyoungpeopleinvolvedwiththeprogramme.
loggedbyayoungpersonengagedinprogramming,arisk/needsassessment,theprogressofthetransformationalrelationshipbetweeneachyouthworkerandayoungperson,andoverallprogrammeandstaffevaluation.
In2018,ROCAengagedwith942‘high-risk’youngmen.Ofthese:
• 88%werenotarrestedagainafterengagementinROCA;
• 298(32%)wereintransitionalemployment;
• 267(28%)wereplacedinajob;
• 78%stayedwithROCA;
• 66%heldjobsforoversixmonths.
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GREAT(GangResistance,EducationandTraining):anevidence-based‘gang’andviolencepreventionprogrammebuiltaroundschool-basedlawenforcementcurricula,whichbeganin1991inPhoenix,Arizona(USA).Thepolicedepartmentwastaskedtodevelopa‘gang’preventionpilotinschools.
FocusonPREVENTION
Police/school-led
Whoisengaged?
Targetedprimarilyatchildrenandyoungpeopleagedjustbelowwhatisconsideredtobetheprimeagesforinductioninto‘gangs’.
Purposeandapproach:
Theprogrammewasdesignedtoreduce‘gang’activitybyeducatingyoungpeopleonhowtoresistpressuretojoin‘gangs’byhavingtrained,uniformedpoliceofficersteachlifeskillstostudents.Atypicalprogrammeincludes13‘middle-school’lessons,asix-lessonelementary-schoolcurriculum,asummercomponentandafamilycomponent.
• Elementaryschoolcomponent:Designedforstudentsaged8–10yearsoldwithafocusonintroducingstudentstoGREATskillsandconcepts.Theprogrammeisdeliveredbyspeciallytrainedanduniformedpoliceofficers.Theprogrammeisstructuredsothatthe30–45-minutelessonsrunconsecutivelywithnomorethantwo-weekgaps.Attheendofeachlesson,aletterdetailingwhatthepurposeofthelessonwas,issenthometoparents.Themesincludeviolenceprevention,stayingsafe,effectivecommunication,angermanagement,respectandcitizenship.
• Middleschoolcomponent:Targetedatyoungpeopleattending‘middle-school’(aged11–16).Trainingisdeliveredbyuniformedpoliceofficers.Themesincludetherelationshipbetweencrime,violence,drugabuseand‘gangs’,beliefsabout‘gangs’andviolence,rolesandresponsibilitiesintheirfamily,
SinceGREATwasestablished,morethan13,000policeofficershavebeentrainedtoteachthecurriculatooversixmillionchildrenandyoungpeople.Havingtrained1,859lawenforcementofficersanddeliveredcurriculatomorethan500,000middleschoolstudents,aUniversityofNebraskaOmahaevaluationoftheprogrammein1995foundthatitwasnotclearlydemonstratingthatitwasmeetingitsgoalsforreducing‘gang’activityandmembership.
AsecondevaluationbytheNationalInstituteforJustice(reviewperiod2006–2012)focusedonstudentswhohadreceivedthemodifiedcurriculum,inordertoassesswhethertheredesignedprogrammewouldensuretheprojectaimswerebeingmet.Theevaluationconcluded:
‘OurmulticomponentevaluationfoundthattheG.R.E.A.T.program[sic]isimplementedasitisintendedandhastheintendedprogrameffectsonyouthgangmembershipandonanumberofriskfactorsandsocialskillsthoughttobeassociatedwithgangmembership.Resultsone-year
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schoolandcommunities,personalgoals,decision-makingskills,effectivecommunicationskills,active-listeningskills,effectiverefusalskills,anger-managementskills,conflictandviolenceprevention,andconflict-resolutiontechniques.
• Familiescomponent:Asix-sessionfamilystrengtheningprogrammeinwhichparentsandtheirchildrenareengagedingroupactivitiesandfacilitatedgroupdiscussions.Thecurriculumincludesanexplorationofviolence,familyrolesinsafeandhealthycommunities,improvingfamilyrelationships,communicationskills,clear,consistentrules,limitsandtheroleofeffectivedisciplineandmonitoring,addressingbullyingandinternetsafetyforfamilies.
• Summercomponent:Thesummercomponentcomplementsschool-basedcomponents.Theaimsareto:
• Buildonschool-based
post-programshoweda39%reductioninoddsofgangjoiningamongstudentswhoreceivedtheprogramcomparedtothosewhodidnotandanaverageof24%reductioninoddsofgangjoiningacrossthefouryearspost-program.’
Fromaschoolperspective,surveysofteachersandschooladministratorsfoundthat:
• 91%ofteachersandadministratorssupporthavinglawenforcementinschools;
• 94%ofadministratorsand87%ofteacherssupporthavingGREATintheirschools;
• 100%ofadministratorsand83%ofteacherssaythatGREATaddressesproblemsfacingtheirstudents;
• 88%ofadministratorsand80%ofteachersagreethatGREATteachesstudentstheskillsneededtoavoid‘gangs’andviolence.
Incontrasttothosewhodidnottakepartintheprogramme,theevaluation
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curriculaandreinforcegoalsbyofferingyoungpeopleanopportunitytoenhancetheirskills;
• Strengthenlawenforcement’srelationshipwiththecommunity;
• Providepositivealternativesto‘gang’involvement;
• Improvepublic/communityrelations;
• Providestructuredactivitieswhenstudentsarenotinschool.
revealedthatGREATstudentsdemonstrated:
• More-positiveattitudestowardpolice;
• Less-positiveattitudesabout‘gangs’;
• Moreuseofrefusalskills(saying‘No’);
• Highercollectiveefficacy(andresearchcorrelateshighercollectiveefficacywithlowercrimeratesinneighbourhoods);
• Lessuseofhittingneutralisations;
• Lessanger;
• Lowerratesof‘gang’membership;
• Higherlevelsofaltruism;
• Lessrisk-seeking.
BUILD(BroaderUrbanInvolvementandLeadershipDevelopment):BUILDhasbeenoperatinginChicagosince1969,withtheexplicitfocus
FOCUSONBOTHPREVENTIONANDDESISTENCE
Community-led
BUILDprovidescounselling,mentoring,communityeducationandwork-readinesstraining.
• PreventionProgramme–aten-weekin-schoolcourseaimedatpreventingyoungpeoplefromengagingindruguseand‘gang’life;
• InterventionProgramme–
BUILD’sannualreportstates:
• 3,765youngpeopleweredirectlyservedbyBUILDprogrammes;
• 87%ofyouthreducednegativeorriskybehaviour;
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‘toengageat-riskyouthinschoolsandonthestreetstohelpthemrealizetheirpotentialandcontributetoourcommunities’.
ViolenceInterventionCurriculumisdesignedtohelpyoungpeopleindetentioncentresovercomechallenges,issuesandproblemsthattheymayfaceintheircommunities,specificallyrelatingto‘gangs’,crimeandviolence.
Note
$2,000annualcostperyouthforBUILDintensivementoringcomparedwith$187,765annualcostperyouthforincarcerationinIllinois.
solicits‘gang’membersfromthestreettoparticipateinrecreationalactivitiesandoffersdrugabuseeducation,referralstomedicalspecialists,andcounselling.BUILD’s‘PeaceLeagues’bringtogetherex-’gang’members,policeandyoungpeopletodeveloppositivealternativesto‘gang’life.Intensivementoringprovidesat-riskyoungpeoplewiththesupportandopportunitiestomoveawayfrom‘gang’involvement;
• CommunityResourceDevelopmentProgramme–involvesadultswhovolunteertodevelopmentoringrelationshipswith‘gang’membersandtocreatestrongcommunitybondsanddisrupt‘gang’development;
• RehabilitationProgramme–interveneswithadjudicatedyouthintheCookCountyJuvenileTemporaryDetentionCentretoreducerecidivism.
• 85%ofyouthimprovedconflictresolutionskills;
• 98%ofBUILD’syouthwerepromotedtothenextgrade;
• 96%ofBUILD’shigh-schoolseniorsappliedforpost-secondaryeducation;
• 93%ofeligibleBUILDyouthreceivedajoborinternship;
• 96%ofBUILD’shigh-schoolseniorsearnedadiploma;
• 72%ofjustice-involvedyouthdonotreoffend–thestate-wideaveragebeing40%.
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HomeboyIndustries:EstablishedinEastLAin1988totryandimprovethelivesofformer‘gang’members.Itisthelargest‘gang’intervention,rehabandre-entryprogrammeintheworld.
FocusonDESISTENCE
Community-led
Whoisengaged?
Formerlygang-involvedandpreviouslyincarceratedmenandwomen.Eachyearover10,000former‘gang’membersfromacrossLosAngelescometoHomeboyIndustries.
Purposeandapproach:
ThefiveprincipalobjectivesofHomeboyIndustriesareto:
• Reducerecidivism;
• Reducesubstanceabuse;
• Improvesocialconnectedness;
• Improvehousingsafetyandstability;
• Reunifyfamilies.
• Tattooremoval
• Workforcedevelopment:Employmentspecialistsassistclientsindiscoveringskills,gainingnewskills/qualifications,interviewpreparationandidentifyingjobopportunities.
• Solarpaneltraining:Developingmarketableskills.
• Educationalservices:Over40classeseachweekincluding:lifeskills;substanceabuserecovery;workreadiness;artsandwellness;academic.
• Mentalhealthservices:Professionaltherapistsforone-to-onecounselling.Additionalsupportgroupsarealsoavailableandopentothepublic.
• Domesticviolence:A52-weekinterventionprogramme.
• Legalservices:Legalprofessionalsassistclientswithanylegalissuesthatmayinhibittransitionfrom‘gang’involvement.
The2018AnnualReportforHomeboyIndustriesstates:
• 7,712receivedprogrammeandservicesupport;
• 65%ofTraineesreportedarrestsinthethreemonthspriortojoiningHomeboyIndustries–afterjoiningHomeboyIndustries,only1%ofTraineesreportedarrests.
• 24%ofTraineesreportedusingharddrugsinthe30dayspriortojoiningHomeboyIndustries–2%ofTraineesreportedrarelyorneverusing‘harddrugs’afterjoiningHomeboyIndustries.
• 95%ofTraineesreportedatleastweeklycontactwithsupportivepeoplesincejoiningHomeboyIndustries.
• 80%ofTraineesreportedhavingreunifiedwiththeirchildrensincejoiningHomeboyIndustries.
• $19,258infinesandfees
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• Casemanagement:ClientsengagedonHomeboyIndustries’18-monthjobtrainingprogrammeworkwithcasemanagerstodevelopbespokeserviceplans.
• Substanceabuse:Supportforclientswhomayusedrugsandothersubstances.
• Socialenterprise:Currentsocialenterprisesinclude:
• HomeboySilkscreenandEmbroidery;
• HomeboyNationwide:Brandedandlicenseditemsforsaleatgrocerystoresnationwide;
• HomegirlCaféandHomegirlCatering;
• HomeboyElectronicsRecycling;
• HomeboyBakery,HomeboyFoods.comandHomeboyFarmers’Market:
• HomeboyDineratCityHall.
removedforclients.
• 11,240tattooremovals.
• 26,398classeswereattended.
• 32studentswereenrolledincollegeforthefirsttime.
• 85participantsbecamecollegestudents.
• 34traineesgainedadriver’slicence.
• 8traineesobtainedcustodyoftheirchildren;
• 23traineesweredischargedfromprobation/parole.
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2.4Summarisingtheapproachesandmethods
A summary of the approaches andmethods adopted by the projects (see Table 1 below) shows that no single or consistent approach to
interventionhasyetemergedinrelationtoyoungpeopleandinvolvementingroup-basedviolence.However,fromthetable,itispossibleto
identifyanumberofpatternsofpriority.
• Fiveoftheprojectsinthissurveyweredirectlyledbythestateorgovernmentagencies.InthecaseofCHANNEL,thepolicyhadahigh
profileandwassupportedbyallagenciesofthestate,fromthepolicetoschoolstolocalgovernment.Others,suchasCIRV,werepolice
coordinated and led. The majority of programmes were delivered by voluntary agencies, some in conjunction with broader state
policiesandothersasindependentprojects.
• Projectswithyoungpeopleweredirectedatbothpreventingyoungpeoplejoiningviolentgroupsandathelpingpeopleleave.
• Theoverarchingquestionofyoungpeopleandgroupviolenceisdividedbetweenthosewithaclearideologicalpurpose(Islamistorfar
right),thosedirectedatterritorialgangsandthosedirectedatpeoplecomingoutofprisonandbecominginvolvedingangs.Someof
the projects were designed to address how people think, whereas others were entirely directed at preventing or stopping violent
behaviour.
• Almostalloftheprojectsthattargetedindividualpeopleusedpersonalmentors.
• Formalteachingwasoneelementofalltheprojects,andthefocusoftheBUILDandGREATprojects.
• Connectiontoemploymentwascentraltothemajorityofprojects.
• Sportwasavehicleforengagementintwooftheprojects.
• Counsellingandsupportforwell-beingandpersonalhealthwasathemeinthemajorityofprojects.
• Changingthesocialenvironmentwasaconsciouspartofanumberofprogrammes.
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• Sixofthe13projectsworkeddirectlyonmattersoffaithandideology.
• Removingsymbolssuchastattooswasanexplicitgoaloftwoprojects.
• Oneprojectwasaimedataddressingprimary-agedchildrenandworkedwithinschools.
• Oneprojectworkedonthebasisofanamnesty,whereyoungpeoplewerepresentedwithchoicesinrelationtothestyleofpolicingto
beadopted(CIRV).
• Other themes includeddirectpersonaldevelopmentplanning, inter-agencycoordinationandcooperation,mediationwithgangsand
groups,communitiesofsupportforyoungpeople,developinganewnarrativeatlocallevelforinclusion,programmesforthetrainingof
trainers,drugtreatment,legalservicesandsupportincasesofdomesticviolence.
• Theslogan‘relentlessoutreach’wasuseddirectlybyoneproject(ROCA).However,itcharacterisedanumberofotherprojects.
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Table1:Summarytableofapproachesandinterventionmethodsadoptedbyallprojects
Group State/NGO
PD
Target VoluntaryParticipation
PersonalMentors
FormalTeaching
Workissues
Sport Counselling/MentalH
Diversion/Social
Faith/Ideology
Tattoos OtherMethods
STREET Islamistyouth
Personaldevelopment
CHANNEL Radical-isation
Referrals
Statutoryobligationoncouncils
AASHA Islamistyouth
Gangmediation
Positiverolemodels
Communityevents
EXIT Far-rightextremism
Supportforfriendsandfamilies
MECHELEN Segregation Newnarrativeforthecity
CIRV Knifecrime Enforcement
Trainingoftrainers
FFP PD Youthatriskofcrime
Youthleadership
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developmentSTGILES PD Young
peopleandgangs
Countylinesproject
J-ARC Youngviolentoffenders
Drugtreatment
ROCA PD Lessjail,morefuture
Relentlessoutreach
GREAT Youngpeopleandgangs
Curricular-basedapproach
BUILD PD At-riskyouth
PeaceLeague
HOMEBOY Peopleingangs
Substanceabuse
Domesticviolence
Legalservices
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2.5The‘fit’ofinternationalmodelstoNorthernIreland?
Havingcompletedadesk-basedanalysisofmodelsofgoodpracticeforinterventionwithyoungpeople(eitheratriskoforactuallyengaging
withviolenceelsewhereintheUK,Ireland,continentalEuropeandtheUS)someimportantsimilaritiesanddifferenceswereimmediately
apparent.
Althoughthereisaclearcommonthreadrunningthroughalloftheinternationalmodelsofpracticerelatingtotheconnectionbetweenyoung
peopleandgroup-basedviolence,itisalsoapparentthattheproblemthateachprojectisdesignedtoaddressvariessignificantlyineachcase.
No single project directly meets the challenges associated with paramilitarism, and translating the learning in external projects into the
NorthernIrishcontextmustbedonecarefully.
OutsideNorthernIreland,‘Gang’violence,evenwhereaganghaslocalterritorialdominance,isnormallybetreatedascriminalwithoutfearof
creatingwiderpoliticalsympathy.Ontheotherhand,neitherIslamistgroupsnotviolentfar-rightgroupshaveachievedterritorialdominance
orhegemonyinanyterritoryorneighbourhoodintheWest.ArmedstruggleinNorthernIreland,ontheotherhand,emergesfromadeeply
embedded andwidely accepted ethnic and political narrative of hostility and aspiration,where armed violence has at various times been
regardedasalegitimatetooloristoleratedasafactoflifebyahighproportionofthesurroundingcommunityinsomeareas.Thelongevityof
conflictinNorthernIrelandsince1970meantthatarmedandparamilitarygroupsbecameanintegralpartofthefabricoflifeofmanylocalities
for decades. Over time, paramilitary organisations and paramilitaries were a critical part of the internal community structure and the
organisation of community life, embedded in families, cultural tradition, social control, the local economy and community development.
Although the political conditions have altered substantially since 1998, paramilitary and armed groups claim symbolic continuitywith this
legacyofcommunity-politicallegitimacy.
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InsomepartsofNorthernIreland,widespreadsympathyfor‘armedstruggle’onbehalfofacommunityagainstitsexternalenemiesremains
integral to community and spatial identity, reflected in public visual culture, annual celebration and historical remembering of events. In
Belfast, tourism now celebrates the activity of paramilitary and armed organisations continue to be presented as historic indigenous
instrumentsofdefenceorattackforthecommunityagainstacommonfoe,partof‘us’against‘them’.
Thiscreatesanalmostinevitableambiguitybetweenaninformalandembeddednarrativeof(good)internaldefendersagainst(bad)external
attackersandaformalbutessentiallynovelnarrativepitting(good)stateactorsainoppositionto(bad)internalcriminals. Whilethereisa
longhistoryinNorthernIrelandofsecurityinitiativesandeffortstodeterparamilitarismthroughpoliticsandcommunityinitiatives,ithasnot
yetbeenpossible toassumewhatCIRV calls the ‘moral voiceof the community’with full effect, especially at local level. Is actionagainst
paramilitaryandarmedgroupsbythestatein2020tobeunderstoodasanessentialandpositiveactiontoupholdtheruleoflaworaheavy-
handedexternalattackoncommunitiesbytheirfoes.Intheeventofconfrontation,whowillbeconsidered‘us’andwhois‘them’?Tackling
paramilitarismuntil nowhasbeen seenas theprovinceof theexternal impositionof law. Changing theemphasis to reducingcommunity
toleranceforandcopoperationwithparamilitarismthereforeinvolvesalongandcomplexprocessofresolvingembeddedcontradictionsand
transformingtheeveryday‘normal’patternsofcommunitylifeinsomeplaces.Itwillnotbeeliminatedbytakingenforcementactionagainst
‘abnormal’behaviourwithoutdevelopingnewpatternsofcommunitynormality.
Uncertainty about political, administrative or community support in ‘tackling paramilitarism’ continues to mean that actively pursuing
paramilitaries and paramilitarism is treated as an unacceptable personal or organisational risk by many state and voluntary agencies,and
avoided. As a result, practice in relation to paramilitarism and armed groups in Northern Ireland remains informal and dependent on
individualsmorethanfiftyyearsaftertheyreappearedinthepost-CivilRightsera.
The surveyof internationalprojects suggests that thecommon thread isnot found in thedirect comparabilityofarmedgroups,but in the
principlesofyouthworkandtheir relationshiptoyoungpeople. Thecommonprofessional task is the intentionalextensionofyouthwork
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practicetoincludetheprotectionofyoungpeopleincommunitiesfromengagementin,orbecomingthevictimsof,armedgroupsbecauseitis
achallengetovaluesandprinciples,ratherthanbeingresponsibleforapolicytaskof‘tacklingparamilitarism’.However,inNorthernIreland
thisdoesentailacceptancethatparamilitarismhasanegativeimpactonyoungpeople,andthatyouthworkersmustbepracticalandproactive
inresponse.
Takingthisasastartingpoint,theinternationalprojectsofferedanumberofimportantinsightsintogoodpractice:
• Althoughthereligious/theologicalaspectofSTREETisnotequivalenttotheNorthernIrishcontext,thefactthatSTREETstaffwerelocal
and had ‘street cred’ amongst their young people was an important element in working with young people. The rigorous risk-
assessmentprocessundertakenbySTREETstaff,takingintoaccountbothriskandprotectivefactors,anddesigningaperson-centred
approachwasalsoevidenceofimportantyouthworkvalues.
• Aasha’sfocusonapreventativeapproachtostoppingyoungpeopleillustratestheneedtoseteffortstotackleviolentextremismwithin
awidercommitmenttothewell-beingofyoungpeople.ThefactthattheAashaprojectworkedmosteffectivelywhenit focusedon
those issues impactingdirectlyonyoungpeopleonthe fringesof ‘gang’culture, including improvingschoolattendance,educational
attainment,raisingtheirhopesandaspirationsandencouragingthemtoconsidertheiremploymentoptionsmovingforwards,suggests
thatasimilargroundinginthelivedexperiencesofyoungpeopleinNorthernIrelandwillbeacriticalelementofsuccessfulyouthwork.
• ThelearningoutcomesofEPICSweden,capturedinWilchen’s(2015)doctoralthesis,suggestanumberofkeyactions:
o Usingtheexperienceofstaffofsimilarbackgroundstothosewithwhomtheywork;
o Thevalueofself-referrals,andpersonalmotivationtochange;
o Thefocusontheemotionalandsocialunderpinningsofextremismratherthanideology;
o Theimportanceof(re)establishingasupportnetworkaroundthe(vulnerable)youngperson;
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o Accessingwideryouthandsocialsupportservicesforyoungpeopletoensurethattheprojectisnotisolatedandtakesplacewithina
wideryouth-worksetting.
• Creatingaconnectiontoemploymentandwrap-aroundserviceswasanimportantelementoftheGlasgowanti-knifecrimeexperiment
(CIRV), confirming a continuing connection between the attraction of armed groups and the provision ofmeaningful pathways for
youngpeopletoamoresecurefuture.ThisisdespitethefactthatCIRVmaynottranslatedirectlyintoNorthernIrelandwherepolice
leadershipremainsasensitiveissue,especiallywherethepoliceareofferingachoicebetweenparticipationandaharshclampdown,
andwherehandingoverweaponsisahighlypoliticalissue,regulatedbytreaty.
• TheprincipleofreconnectingyoungpeopletotheircommunitiesisreproducedintheFightforPeaceprojectthroughits‘fivepillars’:
sport,education,employability,supportservicesandyouthleadership.Theuseofsportastheinitialhooktoencourageengagement
withyoungpeopleemphasisesthevalueofestablishingconfidenceinrelationships,asapre-cursortoanywiderexplorationofideology
orbeliefs.
• TheROCAmodelbuildsonabeliefinthepotentialoftransformationalpro-socialrelationshipstodisruptcyclesofpoverty,violenceand
criminality among young people (TEO, 2018a) by targetting a core demographic of young people (aged 17–24) at particular risk of
becominginvolvedin‘gangs’and,incarcerationandexpectedlivesofcriminality.
• ThefocusontransformationalrelationshipsisalsosharedwithinHomeboyIndustries.Here,theemphasisisontheimportanceofre-
establishingsocialconnectednessandreducingsocial isolationasawaytoprovideasenseofpurposeoridentity(McAraandMcVie,
2010), and to nurture an environment within which people can address all sorts of negative behaviours. These include substance
misuse,barrierstoemploymentandeducation,andtheremovalofsymbolsof‘gang’identity.
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• Twooftheprojectshaveaspecificfocusonworkingwithyoungpeopleleavingprisonasanatriskgroup.Havingacriminalrecordcan
be a factor for young people either coming to the attention of the paramilitaries or joining a ‘gang’ or armed group for their own
protection(Densley,2013;Fraser,2017).InNorthernIreland,40outof41youngpeoplereleasedfromcustodyin2015/16reoffended
withinoneyear(DOJ,2018).TheStGilesTrust’s‘ThroughtheGates’programmeprovidessupportforpeoplebefore,duringandafter
theirreleasefromprisontoenasblere-entrybackintoacommunity.TheresultsoftheJ-ARCprogrammeforyoungoffendersmayalso
provideaninterventionmodeltoreducerecidivismforyoungoffendersinNorthernIreland.
• Researchhasshownthatsomeyoungpeoplehaveaglamorisedviewof‘theTroubles’,prisonlifeandtheroleofparamilitariesintheir
community(TEO,2018a;2018b).TheSOSprogramme/modelmightbeadaptedtochallengetheperceptionsandstereotypesthatmay
resultinyoungpeoplejoining‘gangs’orparamilitariesinsearchofwhattheybelieverepresentsaglamorouslifestyle.
• TheemphasiswithintheGREATprogrammeonbuildingthesocialskillsandcapacityforyoungpeopletoresistandrefuseparamilitary
coercioncouldbehelpful inacontextofwidercommunitysupport.The focuswithinBUILDonwhathappensoutsideofschoolalso
offerspotentialareasofexploration,requiringcloseinter-agencycollaborationandcommunityendorsementofthecurriculum.
Paradoxically,giventhatTacklingParamilitarismisagovernment-ledprogramme,themostdistinctivedifferencestoNorthernIrelandpractice
were in the two models led directly by public policy rather than youth workers. The ‘Mechelen model’ consciously reconceptualises the
‘radicalisation’ debate in terms of marginalisation and social exclusion and seeks to address the conditions that create a vacuum within
communitiesthatcanbeexploitedbyviolentextremistgroups.Thereisnodoubtthatthesocio-economic,culturalandhealthconditionsthat
impactyoungpeopleincommunitiesinBelgiumhavesignificantparallelsinNorthernIreland.Importantly,the‘Mechelenmodel’suggeststhat
youth-workinterventionmustbeinacontextofwiderculturechange.Responsibilityisspreadacrossallsectionsofsocietyinrecognisingthat
long-termobjectivesofsocialinclusioncanonlybeachievedthroughco-ordinatedinvestmentandcooperation.
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PerhapsthemostchallengingmodelforyouthworkersinNorthernIrelandisCHANNEL.Since2015,therehasbeenastatutorydutyonlocal
authorities in England andWaleswith provision for teachers, doctors and youthworkers to be trained to spot the signs of ‘radicalisation’
amongstyoungpeoplewithwhomtheywork.TwoaspectsarestrikingfromaNorthernIrelandperspective:ontheonehand,theabilityofthe
statetoactthroughavarietyofmeansagainstidentifiedradicalgroupswithoutfearofcommunityoppositionisnotdirectlytransferrable.In
NorthernIreland,elementsofthestate,especiallypolicing,wereunabletorelyonbroadco-operationineverycommunity.Wherethestate
didcontinuetooperateincludinginsocialservices,health,educationandyouthwork,eachservicerestricteditsresponsibiliitytoupholding
lawwithinitsdirectareaofservice,ratherthanovertlysupportingwiderpolicing.Evensince1998,thepolicecannotfullyrelyon‘presumed
consent’inallplacesatalltimesineitherrepublicanandloyalistdominatedareas.Teachers,youthworkersandprofessionalsinmanyareas
maynotyetfeelconfidentthattheycouldextedinformation-sharingbeyondexistingboundarieswithoutriskingcommunityconfidenceand
theirabilitytodelivercoreservices.Somewouldfeelthatitputthelivesofstaffintopersonaldanger.Furthermore,manywouldfeelthatany
efforttochangethedutyonprofessionalstoreport,wouldnotendradicalisationbutdriveitdeeperintothecommunityandresultingrowing
communityresentmentagainstallauthorities.Inotherwords,adoptingaCHANNELapproachinNorthernIrelandwouldprovokeratherthan
preventradicalisation.
2.6:Emergentthemesfromtheinternationalfield
1. Engagementmustbespecifictocontext:Whileallofthecasestudyexamplesarearesponsetocriminalinfluenceonyoungpeople,
context matters to each of them. That context includes location, the social status of the individuals, the people engaged both as
practitionersandyoungpeopleandthepoliticalenvironment.Similarchallengesandbehaviourswithinadifferentsocialandpolitical
environment inevitably alters practice. Thus none of the examples can be treated as ‘best practice’ and transferred without
qualificationintotheNorthernIrelandcontext.
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2. Youthworkmustbeperson-centred:Allofthemodelsinthisstudyweretargetedataddressingindividualneedsratherthanmeeting
securitytargets.Changeinyouthworkisnot‘forced’,but‘chosen’asyoungpeopleareencouragedtotakepartinnewsocialactivities
anddevelopnew(andmorepositive)socialnetworks,inwhichtheyareexposedtoalternativeworldviews.Theprojectsthemselves
areadirectresponsetoadesiretochangenegativeinfluencesonyoungpeople,‘vulnerable’torecruitmentorvictimhood.Allofthe
intervention and prevention approacheswere consciously targeted at the needs of the individuals at risk of ‘gang’ involvement or
‘radicalisation’.
3. Youthwork is relationship-based,and loses its capacity to influenceyoungpeoplewithout trust: Acommoncritical theme in the
international projects dealing with desistance and ‘radicalisation’ is the reliance of youth work on building and fostering strong,
sustainablerelationshipsoftrustwithyoungpeople.Organisationsdirectlyinvolvedinpreventing(orcountering)the‘radicalisation’of
youngpeople,suchastheAashaGangMediationProjectandEXITSweden,emphasisedtheimportanceofestablishingrelationships
withtheyoungpeoplebeforeaspaceiscreatedforideologiesthatneedtobechallenged.Indeed,thevalueofyouthworkinrelation
toengagementwithyoungpeopleatriskoforengagedinviolentorextremebehaviourdependsalmostentirelyontheextenttowhich
youthworkersareconsideredtrustworthybyyoungpeople.Forthattrusttobepossible,youthworkersmustalsocommandthetrust
of the sponsorand thehost community. There is an inherentdifficultywith top-down, state-drivenapproaches tograding ‘risk’, in
whichthestatedefinestheriskandappliesittotheyoungpersonordefines‘need’inrelationtostatecriteria.Inthisstudy,thiswas
particularlyevident inthecriticismofCHANNEL (O’Donnell,2016;Hill,2019). InTacklingParamilitarism,thesponsor isthestate. By
engaging youth work, the state also engages the primacy of trust-building within youth work, and accepts clear distinctions with
policingandsecurity.Byengagingwiththestate,youthworkersalsoacceptparameters,includingcommitmentstosafeguardingand
theruleoflaw.InthecontextoftheambiguityaroundparamilitarismandtheroleofthestateinNorthernIreland,however,realtrust
can only be developed through open public discussion about how trust is to be nurtured and grown. Compromising these values
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preventsyouthworkersfromdoingtheirjobwithyoungpeople,byturningthemintodirectagentsofsecuritypolicy.Aboveall,thereis
aneedtoestablishwhatelementofpracticeiscentrallydetermined,andwhataspectsrelylargelyonprofessionaljudgement.
4. Successfulyouthworkisahubforre-connection,coordinationandcooperationfortheyoungperson:Youthworkinterventionisnot
astand-aloneactivity.FromtheSTREETcommunity-led‘counter-radicalisation’programmeinBrixton,SouthLondontotheHomeboy
Industries project in LosAngeles, the youthwork is predicatedupon re-establishing connectivity, coordinationand cooperation for
marginalisedyoungpeoplewhomayhavebecomeisolatedfrommainstreamsociety:
• InHomeboyIndustries,thisisachievedbyreunifyingfamiliesandimprovingsocialconnectedness.
• TheBUILDandROCAprojects(andalsotheStGilesSOSproject)engagecommunitymemberstoestablishmentoringandsupport
relationshipsbetweenthecommunityandtheyoungperson.
• CIRV,inGlasgow,encouragespartnershipworkingandgreatercoordinationbetweenstatutoryagenciesandthelocalcommunity,
toprovidewrap-aroundsupportservicesfor‘vulnerable’young‘gang’members.
• TheProjectOracleSynthesisStudy(McMahon,2013:4)concludedthatsuchtargeted,comprehensive,multi-agencyprogrammes
gave‘thestrongestindicationofaneffectonyoungpeople’sparticipationingangactivityandviolenceinLondon’.21
This also includes signposting young people into professional support. Most of the projects surveyed (including the two statutory
examples ofCHANNEL and J-ARC) actively reconnect young peoplewithprofessional support services, in a process of coordinated
engagementtoaddressunderlyingneedssuchasdrugsandalcoholabuse,socialisolationormentalhealthissues,andwhichmayhave
contributedtocriminogenicbehaviour.
5. Changerequirescriticalself-reflectionbyyoungpeople,andintense,focusedandacutework.Aconsistentthemeintheinternational
examples is that change is possiblewhen a previousworldview no longermakes sense under changed life conditions.Most of the21ProjectOracleisaLondon-centricprojectaimingtogenerateanevidencebaseofevaluatedyouthservices.TheProjectOracleEvidenceHubemergedasapartnershipbetweentheSocialInnovationPartnershipandLondonMetropolitanUniversity.In2018,itjoinedwiththeCentreforYouthImpact.
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projectsbelievethattargeted,continuousandsustainedsupportandengagementonthetermsoftheyoungpersonofferstheonly
prospectofsuccess.Youngpeoplewillnotnecessarilybereadytoengageorprogressatthespeedthatthecommunityortheprojects
themselvesmayseekto.Evenwhereayoungpersondisengagesorfallsaway,theyshouldnotbeabandoned.
• TheCIRVproject inGlasgow, itselfborne fromthe ‘focuseddeterrencestrategy’of theBostonCeasefireproject,exemplifies the
intense nature of approaches that balance harsh punishments with support for individuals seeking to move beyond ‘gang’
involvement.
• ROCAbalances intenseand‘relentless’directengagementwithyoungpeoplewithfollow-upsupportiveelementsdesignedtobe
transformationalinbuildingthecapacityfortheyoungpersontotransitionfromviolenceandcriminalbehaviour.
6. Addressingunderlying social issues is vital:Almost all of theprojects are aimedat themost at-risk,marginalised and ‘vulnerable’
youngpeopleinat-riskandmarginalisedcommunities.Manyofthecasestudiesdrawdirectlyontheoriesthatsuggestthatchangecan
onlyoccurifitdisruptscyclesofpoverty,hopelessness,crimeandincarceration.Educationoremploymentareoftenseenascrucialin
sustainingthetransitionofayoungpersonawayfromnegativeinfluences.Notonlydoesthisapproachformthebackboneofanumber
of projects such as Fight for Peace, but it is an incentive to participate. Young ‘gang’ members participating in CIRV in Glasgow
suggestedthatthemainreasontheychosetoparticipateintheprogrammewasthehopeofsecuringajob.
7. Communityengagementishugelyvaluable:Thevalueofcommunitymembersalongsideprofessionalsinmentoringyoungpeoplewas
anothercommonthemeofmostofthecasestudies.Bybeingabletospeakwithfirst-handknowledgeofhavinggonethroughsimilar
situationswithregardto‘gang’cultureandexpectationsplaceduponthem,mentorsareabletonotonlyrelatetoyoungpeoplebut
alsotoofferhopeandinspirationthatmovingbeyond‘gang’lifeispossible.Thisalsoopenedupapathwaytowardsreconnectionwith
thewidercommunity:
56
• TheSTREET,AashaandBUILDprogrammeshighlightedtheroleofformer‘gang’membersascriticalinbuildingrelationshipswith
youngpeople.
• ManyEXITSwedenstaffarethemselvesformermembersoffar-rightgroups.
Insummary,theinternationalprojectssuggestthatgoodyouthworktoaddressviolencemust:
• belocallyrelevant;
• beperson-centred;
• buildtrustthroughrelationships;
• reconnectyoungpeopletothecommunity,servicesandhealthynetworks;
• betargeted,continuousandsustained;
• addressrealeducationalandemploymentdeficits;
• workwithcommunitysupport.
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3.TacklingparamilitarisminNorthernIreland
InternationalpracticehasresultedinnumerousexamplesofgoodyouthworkpracticewithclearlessonsforNorthernIreland.LikeCHANNEL,
the Tackling Paramilitarism programme has its roots in public policy. However, unlike CHANNEL, and as outlined above, the state has a
differenthistoricalrelationshipwithcommunities,organisationsandpeopleinNorthernIreland,shapedinparticularbythepoliticalandpeace
processof the1990s. Inbroadtermsanti-radicalisationprogrammespresumethat theradicalelement (whether Islamistor far right) isan
abnormalandidentifiableviolentpresencewhichdoesnotrepresentthewidercommunity,andcanultimatelybeisolatedfromit.InNorthern
Ireland, armed groups are woven into the community infrastructure in a way which cannot be eradicated by external pressure without
communityconsenttochange.OtherworkoutsideNorthernIrelandespeciallywithmembersofgangshasofteninvolvedvoluntaryinitiatives
committedtoofferinganalternativetocriminaljusticeforyoungpeople.Theyarenotnecessarilyintergratedintoanywiderframeofpublic
policy.Voluntaryleadershipofthisnaturetendstoproduceexemplaryprojectswithoutnecessarilyengageingsystemicchange.
Thissectionofthereportsummarizestheoutcomesofaseriesofinterviews(17)andfocusgroups(2)withyouthworkersandothersinvolved
incommunityyouthwork inNorthern Ireland,duringwhichweexploredtheirdirectexperienceandpracticeaswellas theirapproachand
attitudetotheworkestablishedwithintheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme.
3.1DefiningparamilitarisminNorthernIreland
BuildingonthecommitmentsoftheGoodFridayAgreementof1998,itcanbeinferredthattheintendedpurposeoftheFreshStartis:
• toreinforcethecommitmentintheAgreementtoremovinglegitimacyfromallunlawfulviolenceforanypurpose-actual,intendedor
tolerated-andfromanygroupsthatuseit
• togiveoperationalmeaningtothatcommitmentthroughanactivepolicyofstoppingandpreventingongoingparamilitaryactivity;
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• totreatanyresidualviolence,andthegroupsperpetratingit,asentirelycriminal
• tonurtureandsupporttheemergenceofculturewhichhasnoongoingarmedactivity,organisationsorcultures.
InrealitytheserelativelysimplepolicygoalsarebeingimplementedinacontextwheretheterminologythathasemergedinNorthernIreland
aroundparamilitarism is no longer precise, andmay even add to confusion.While ‘paramilitarism’ and ‘paramilitaries’ are still referred to
without qualification on a daily basis in politics, community and the media, closer scrutiny shows that the terms appear to be used
interchangeablyforwhathavebecomeavarietyofdistinctconcepts,interalia;
• illegalterroristsingeneral,
• ‘armedgroups’engagedinalegitimateconflictbefore1998,
• communityleadersofstandingandpopularauthorityinsomeareas,consultedonmajorpoliticalchanges,
• local‘gangs’,
• organisedcrimeoperations,
• para-stateoperativescarryingoutclandestineactionsonbehalfofthestate,oreven
• a specifically loyalist termwhose nearest equivalent is either the provisional IRA,which formally disbanded in 2007 butwhowere
accusedofthekillingofKevinMcGuiganin2015,and/oranti-peaceprocessrepublicandissidents.
Itwasclearinourinterviews,thatthenature,purposeandgeographicalscopeofarmedactivityevenbetweentheareasdesignatedunderthe
programmerangedfromthenormalised‘extracurricular’activitiesofnamedindividualsandspecificactivitiestoaninformalbutever-present
59
andsinistercoerciveinfluenceoncommunitylife,experiencedasrealoranticipatedintimidation,decisive‘political’controlandswayshaping
powerrelationsandfreespeechincommunities.Thiswasreflectedbymanyofourrespondents:
‘Paramilitariesareeitheragangorinvolvedincommunitydevelopment,andthereisconflictbetweenthetwo.’
‘In this area, people connected toparamilitarismaremore forward thinkingand trying todo things the rightway. It comes
downtopersonalities.Iwouldhazardaguessin[otherareas]thattheyhavethissiegementality.Theyareusingloyalismasa
flagofconvenienceforcriminality.Theyhappentobeprotestantslivinginaprotestantareaandusethattopoisonthekids.’
‘Wefoundtheterm‘paramilitary’isadifficulttermtogetyourheadaround–becausetherearesomanydifferentlayers.We
wouldalwayssaywewouldworkwithanyoneandwithanyonewhohaslearnedandturnedthecornerandisworkingforthe
commongood.Butthereareotherswhoarenotworkingforthecommongood.’
‘Thenthere is theword ‘paramilitary’,which issometimesan issueofcriminality.Someof themoneywhichgoes in tothese
groupsisusedtokeepthemquiet.Butitgivesthemlegitimacy–ashardtoreach[people]whoneedtobebroughttothetable.
Butoncetheycometothetable,itisimpossibleforanyoneelsetocometothetable.Decentpeoplehaveleft.Itisokaytowork
withthem…ifitistheoneswhohaveturnedthecorner.’
‘PeopleheredonotmakeaconnectionbetweenthedeathofLyraMcKeeandgettingalocal‘guy’togiveabeatingtothekid
thatbrokeintoyourhouse.’
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‘Whatyoualsohave,especiallyintheloyalistside,arethesegroups…thatclaimtobethepeacefulelementofparamilitarism,
but they all have an agenda about trying to legitimate the narrative around loyalist paramilitaries and be the good side of
them.’
‘So,onebodyisbroughtintodoworkinplaceA.ButtheyarethesameorganisationinplaceB.Theyareallbranchesofthe
sameorganisationdoingworkoneachother’spatchesbyagreement–theyjustlookdifferently.’
‘Inreality,it’sallveryblurredandcomplicated–youhavethosealignedwiththegroupsthatareinvolvedincrimeanddrugs
andotherswhoaremoreconcernedabouttheirlegacy…So,youngpeoplearegrowingupinthisconflict;itseverywheretothe
pointthatitisnormaltohavetheseillegalinstitutionsresponsibleforgovernanceincommunities,andthisisanotherlayerof
complexitiesthatyoungpeoplehavetonavigate.’
Aspolicyresponsestoeachofthesephenomenaarenecessarilydifferent,‘tacklingparamilitarism’mayhavebecomeanunhelpfulandeven
inaccurate tool for defining policy or action. In the interim, public debate about tackling paramilitarism too often consists of generalised
soundbites,andappearstoproceedsfromthepresumptionofsharedmeaning,withoutdueregardforthecomplexityofthelegacyofconflict
intheshapeofparamilitarismincommunitiesinNorthernIreland.
‘Wearedeliveringinanecosystem–quickanswershaven’tworkedandwon’twork.’
‘Wearechangingthetrajectoryofcommunitiesandpeople:thatisusuallynotashort-termexperience.’
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3.2.ThecontextofchangeIn thisextremelycomplicated landscape forpolicy,politicsandpractitioners, rhetoricaloversimplificationof tacklingparamilitarism
carriessignificantrisks.Someofthecomplexcontextualissuesevidentfromthisresearchinclude:
• Thelanguageand‘mentalmap’ofloyalistandrepublicanrespondentswereclearlydifferent.Whereasthoseinloyalistareasidentified
‘paramilitarism’ within their communities, they also pointed out that the experience of what this meant at local level varied
enormously, even where the same organisation was involved. Loyalists largely equated their role as community activists with
mainstreamSinnFein-supportingrepublicans,andindirectlywiththeprovisionalIRAandnotwithdissidents.Mostrepublicans,onthe
otherhand,didnotassociateparamilitarismwithSinnFein-linkedactivity. Theclosest internalanalogyof ‘paramilitarism’ for those
workinginrepublicandominatedareaswaswithviolent‘dissident’republicans.Evenherethetermparamilitarywasseldomdeployed:
‘Theterm‘dissidentrepublican’coversamultitudeofgroupsandpeople,andtheblankettermdoesnothelpwiththosethatare
tryingtodissuadepeoplefrombeingassociatedwiththesegroups.’
‘The issuesare similar in republican communitieswith thebiggest issue thedissidentsand themultiple splinterswithin that
community. They – the dissident republicans – are always trying to circumvent the law-and-order argument. Also, the
geography–thelackofspace–meansitiseasiertorecruit.Youcancontroltheenvironment.’
Anumberofrespondentsindicatedthatbyusingthelanguageofparamilitarism,theprogrammeisperceivedbyloyalistsastargeting
loyalist communities and exempting mainstream republicanism from change. Some loyalists express concern that community
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organisation, which they perceive as coercive ‘political’ control of republican areas by mainstream republicans, is excluded from
scrutiny.Intheirowndefence,theypointtotheoriginsoftheFreshStartprogrammesintheactivityofapartofthe‘mainstream’IRA,
whichnonethelessexemptsitselffromconsiderationas‘paramilitary’.Thisapparentlysemanticissuehasimportantconsequencesifit
shapesnotonlyexpectationsaboutwhothetargetsforchangewithintheprogrammeare?,butwhatcountsassuccess?,howitistobe
measured?andwhoisconsideredapotentialfuturepartner?
• InsomeplacesinNorthernIreland,theinterpenetrationof‘armedgroupsandtheirculture’withlocalcommunitydevelopment,local
politicsandpoliticalorganisation, traditional culturaldisplayandevenwithaspectsofcriminal justiceappears tobealmostorganic,
meaningthatitmaynotbefinallypossibletodistinguishbetweenwhat‘is’and‘isnot’paramilitary:
‘Everybodyfromthelocalcommunityknowswhoisconnectedwithindissidentrepublicangroups–butnothingchanges.What
doesthattellyou?’
Thisisalsolocallyvariable:indeedinmanyotherplacesinNorthernIrelandarmedgroupshavenomeaningfulpresence.Wherearmed
groups are embedded, some community, political, cultural and criminal justice interestsmay be, at best, ambivalent about actively
upsetting this symbiosis,or at least thoseaspectswhich they seeaspositive,where theyareassociatedwith identityorwhere the
changeprocesswoulddisruptthepatternofcommunitylife.
• Theexperienceandperceptionofarmedgroupsisalsostronglyaffectedbyanumberofdifferences,includingpoliticalallegiance,age
and geography. Attitudes to paramilitarism shaped by very different local experience and by different generational experiences
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inevitably shape attitudes to policy and to priorities for intervention. These differences impact directly on the language, content,
methods and measurement of the programme. A single approach to intervention inevitably hits against this reality that the
circumstancesofcommunitiesdiffer:
‘Whenyouthinkofit,alotoftheworkovertheyearshasbeenconsistentbutcontradictory.Whatworksherewillnotworkin
otherplaces.Theprinciplesarethesame.’
‘Obviously,inthisparticulararea…youstillhavethescaffoldingoftheconflict,whichstillwrapsaroundcommunitiestoday,
evidencedbythecontinuingexistenceoftheUDA,UVF,RHC–andontherepublicansideyouseethesplinteredandfractured
dissidentgroups.’
• Theresponseofgovernment,politicsandthepublicsectortoparamilitarismiswidelybelievedtobe‘two-faced’:rhetoricinfavourof
tackling paramilitarism is seldom matched by action on the ground. Over a long period of time, the press has regularly carried
allegations that former paramilitaries and alleged current paramilitaries hold visible positions of formal and informal authority and
influence.Wheretheseallegationsarebothdeniedandrepeatedbutnotinvestigated,manyinthewidercommunityareleftunsettled
andambivalent.
Thiswasreflectedbysomerespondentswhomaintainedthatthepolicehaveattimesdevelopedpragmaticbutconsistentchannelsof
engagementwithsomeparamilitary-linkedindividualsandgroupsandatacitacceptanceofsomeaspectsofparamilitarystructuresat
local level, regardingthemasconstructiveandsupportiveorderingelementsactingtomaintainconfidenceandorder. Atthesame
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time,fewstatutoryorganisationsoutsidethepoliceadmittoengagingdirectlywithparamilitarismatall,althoughwefoundthatthisis
widely disputed in the community. Where the links between paramilitary organisations and community development, political
leadership and cultural organisations or on justice issues are hard to distinguish at local level, agencies are inevitably facedwith a
dilemma. Thus numerous Interviewees commented on the ambiguous attitude to paramilitarism, armed groups and political
connection by statutory agencies and funding agencies supporting community development, often for pragmatic asmuch as policy
reasons:
‘Therewasamajorissueatlocallevelandanefforttoengageallparties.Butthateffortmeansthatcontrolofthepolicymoves
tothegroupswhichhavecausedthetrouble.Whenalocalresidentcomplainedabouttheimplicationsofthiscontroltoalocal
electedrep,theelectedrepwenttothegroupandtoldthem.’
‘Inthisarea,thereisone‘clientofchoice’whoarebroughtintodealwithissuesofviolence.Itissanctionedbythepowersthat
be.Buttheyarepartoftheorganisation–theboundaryisentirelyfluid.Yougetthemoneybecauseofthetrouble.Butifyou
stopthemoney,thentheygobacktothetrouble.’
‘Andthenthereispeopleinthestatutorieswhoappeartobesupportingthem.’
‘TheXPeaceImpactprogrammeisgearedtothedifficultorganisations,nottothemiddleoftheroad.Weweretakenoutofthe
programme.’
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• Without exception, group domination of these areas is strongly associated with multiple deprivation and strict housing
segregationbyclass,politicsandreligion.We foundaconsensus that ‘tacklingparamilitarism’ is inextricably linked towider
efforts to end poverty and underlying political/ethnic/religious division, although therewere a number of views about the
relationshipofcauseandeffect:
‘Housingareasdictatethestretchofparamilitaries–theyhavelittleswayinprivatelyownedareas,eveniftheyareinthesame
postcode.’
‘This [is]alwaysalsoaboutsocialchangeandaboutthereduction inalienationandviolence insocial relationships.Business
andpeopleneedtobepartofthepathways.Currently,thisisanicheissue–forpeoplealreadyinmultipledeprivation.’
Thepracticalpoliticalconsequenceofspecificgeographicalconcentration,however, is that tacklingparamilitarism is treated
acrossNorthernIrelandasaspecificissueofcriminalityforthoseinthepoorestdistrictsandnotinthecontextofthepoliticsof
thewidersociety,playedoutwherelawandorderstrugglestoprotect,andtheadvantagesofgangbehaviourincreased.
• TheareasidentifiedascoreltotheTacklingParamilitarismProgrammeareallmarkedbymultipleissuesofdeprivation.Manystatutory
agenciesarethereforeinevitablyandproperlyengagedindirectcollaborationwithlocalpartnersasacriticalelementtoprovidepublic
services.Intheabsenceofanywaytoguaranteetheboundarywithparamilitarypresence,however,thiscreatessignificantdilemmas
forallpublicservicesinpractice-includingtheyouthservice.Formally,allagenciesmaintainthattheyhavenodirectconnectionswith
anyparamilitarygroup.Inpractice,ithasprovedverydifficult,ifnotimpossible,toensurethatthereisnostatutoryengagementwith
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paramilitarismwhenitisimpossibletomarktheboundary,leadingtoallegationsofstatutoryhypocrisyanddouble-standards.Despite
thefactthatarmedgroupsre-emergedincommunitiesinNorthernIrelandfiftyyearsago,fewstatutoryagencies,withtheexceptionof
policing,haveformally identified ‘tackling’paramilitarismasanamedpriority instrategicoroperationalplanning, (ie intentionaland
accountableprogrammeswhosesuccessismeasuredontheeliminationofparamilitaryorganisationsandactivity).Asaconsequence,
theTacklingParamilitarismprogrammeisnotdrawingon50yearsofestablishedpractice,buton50yearsof‘creativeadaptation’to
circumstances combinedwith relianceon individual initiatives and relationships. Formany respondents, formal ‘condemnation’ of
paramilitarieswaspersistentlyunderminedbythecontinuedinteractionofpublicagencieswiththosebeingcondemned:
‘Youthclubscondemnrepublicanviolenceagainstyoungpeople.Noneofthoseyouthworkersarelistenedto.Theycannotgivesupport.
Weareaskingcommunitiestoturntheirbacksonparamilitariesandyetthesamepeopleareinvitedtothemeetings.Itishypocrisy.’
• During research for this project, many interviewees commented that the political environment had become more polarised, and
communities were less willing to criticise paramilitaries than previously, attributing this to the collapse of the Northern Ireland
Assemblyin2017,tensionsoverculturaldisplaysandconflictlegacyissuesandtheincreasinglyfebriledebatesovertheimplicationsof
UKwithdrawalfromtheEUforNorthernIreland:
‘Sixmonthsago,peopleweresupportive.Butpeoplesay,“EverytimeIlook,peoplearestickinguptwofingerstous”.’
‘Attitudestobehaviourdepend.Manyofthoseactive inpoliticsandsupportiveofthepeaceprocessfindtheirviewpointand
toleranceisbeingtested.Itisalsoaculture.Alotofthingsthatpeopleexperiencedinthepastiscomingupagain.Maybeyou
areright–thingshaven’tchanged.’
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‘Whathaschanged?Iwouldsay lookatthecity,the infrastructure,the investment.Peopleseecertainbitsofthat.Butwhat
they see that is blatant and in-your-face is people are saying, “No”. Young people are in an arenawhere they can feel the
tension,theycanpickitup.Allofsuddentheyareasking,“Aretheseorganisationsgoingtomakemesafe,standupforus?’’’
‘Theyarecriminalsinsearchofmeaning.Theyclingtothemeaningforaslongastheycan.Brexithasrecreatedthenotionthat
paramilitariesareforsomething.’
Progressinthisuncertainenvironmentisclearlyatriskunlessboththe‘ecological’natureofparamilitarisminNorthernIreland(thisisnotonly
a lawandorder issue) and the local variations are taken into account. Only flexible engagement and active learningbyworkers, funders,
communities,politicalleadersandagencypartnerscannegotiatethesecomplexdilemmas
3.3AttitudestoviolenceandarmedgroupsincommunitiesinNorthernIreland
Underlyingtheinconsistentterminologyandexperience,however,respondentsinthisresearchwereunanimousinconfirmingthecontinuing,
pervasivenatureandrelativetoleranceof‘paramilitary(armedgroup)activity’inthe‘FreshStart’areas.Consistentlyandimportantly,armed
group activity beyond legal limitation was so common as to be treated as part of the fabric of ‘normal’ community life rather than an
‘abnormal’shorttermexception,integratedintothecommunity’sdailyexperience:
‘Theabnormalisnormal–peoplebecomeconditionedtotheplaceandstopquestioningwhatisabnormalbehaviour.’
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‘Maybepeopledon’t see itasaspecialandspecific issuebecauseparamilitarism is ingrainedwithin thesecommunities; it is
entwinedinallaspectsoflife.’
‘Thereachishuge.Weseeitinallplaces.’
‘InNorthernIreland,wetakeitforgranted–theviolenceandtheexistenceofarmedgroups–becauseourbenchmarkisthe
past,evenifit’snothinglikethepast.’
‘Thevacuuminlawandordercreatesaplatformwhichtheyfill–that’stheproblem.’
Inthoseareaswherearmedgroupviolencehasbeenalongtermreality,relationshipsbetweenmembersofthecommunityandthosedirectly
involvedinparamilitaryorganisationsandactivitiesarethereforeshapedwithinapatternofcomplexity,continuityandambivalence:
‘Thevillagesareallfamilyconnections.Theywillsupporttheirown.Therearerelationsbetweenthegroupsandthepoliceat
personallevel.Theyarereleasedrightandquickly.Iftheyarearrestedandreleased,thatisanotherstripeontheirarm.’
Perhapsunsurprisingly,communityattitudesappearattimestobecomplex,contradictoryandunstable. Thisreflectsavarietyofdifferent,
andsometimescompeting,experiences,including:
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• Personal relationships with individuals who are also known for their contribution to family and community outside paramilitarism,
includingleadershipandorganisationalskills;
• Disdainanddisapprovalofillegalparamilitary/armedgroupactivityrelatedtodrugsandothercriminalactivity;
• Admirationforanidentificationwiththepoliticalcausesforwhichparamilitary/armedorganisationsstoodinthepast;
• Fearofparamilitary/armedgroupattentionorreprisal,whichactstosuppressopendebateorcriticism;
• Latenttoleranceforparamilitary/armedactivityactingagainstanti-socialbehaviour;
• Resentmentatallegedcontrolofcommunitydevelopmentandcommunityresources,andtheperceptionthatstateagenciescollude
withthisdevelopment;
• Toleranceofpublicdisplaysofparamilitary-relatedorerectedemblems,history,symbolsandflags.
This pattern of ambivalence and ambiguity was reflected throughout our interviews. On the one hand, interviewees emphasised that
community support for illegality was strictly limited, and silence largely amatter of fear. Paramilitaries in this viewwere a sinister and
coerciveforceinthecommunity:
‘Whyis itthatparamilitarismisthoughtofasauthenticworkingclassandanyonewhoobjects iscalledmiddleclass?Middle
classmeans[a]do-gooderwhodoesn’tunderstand.Butitisnottrue.Igrewupinacouncilestate.Addressingparamilitarismis
seenasanti-workingclass.Butitisn’t.Therearepeopletryingtokeeptheirchildrenoutofit,buttheycan’tspeak.’
‘Hasitchanged?Idon’tthinktherealityhaschanged.Therearesomechanges–moreintegratedrelationships,andthatcomes
fromthecross-communityclubs.Butthepeopleintherelationshipsstillcan’tlivewheretheywant.Italwayswasbrutalising,
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controllingandcoerciveinfluenceonwhatyoucanandcan’tdo.Thereisacodeofconductoutthereandifyoustepoutofline
youwillhaveheatcomingtoyourdoor.Itisthere.Youdon’tneedtowriteitdown.’
‘Ifwewere to condemn them, theywould stop talking to us.When Iworked on the X interface,we couldn’t say anything
against loyalist paramilitaries. They ensured their members were always in attendance. When young people live in these
communities,theyareforcedtojoin.’
‘Electionpostershadtobe‘approved’tohangincertainvillages.AndIhadtohaveconnectionstofindthatout.’
Yet, on the other hand, the tradition of heroic local armed resistance is still celebrated and nurtured in the cultural messages
transmittedtoyoungpeople.Thenamesoforganisationsandlocalheroesofwararewidelydisplayedinmurals,symbolsandstreet
markinginalloftheareasoftheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme:
‘Ifyoucanbrandyouractivityasparamilitary,thestatecan’ttouchyoubecauseyouhavelegitimacy.’
‘The legacyofconflict incommunities isdeep–yousaw it in the localbonfires.Yousawtheestablishment–yougetall the
grants,yougettherulesandthenyougettheconstraintsonthepolice.Thatisthelegacyofconflict.Itissociallyacceptable.
Theyarepoisoningthewell.’
‘Thereisnodoubtthatparamilitariesputpressureonpeoplenottoengagewiththepolice.’
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‘Thiscommunityislikealivingmuseum–inessence,youarenotallowedtoforget.’
‘Asyouthworkers,wewereouttryingtosortoutthebonfire[inourarea].AndwhenIwasthere,Saoradhcameoutandsaid,“If
thepolicecomeinhere,wewilldefendthiscommunity”.Andtheyhadatraction.’
‘Communities are still defined by crime. Community identity is tied up with heroic resistance, and the paramilitaries are
associatedwiththis.Alternativeidentityformation.Paramilitariesstandupformeasalostperson.’
Even apparently straightforward descriptions of paramilitaries as criminals anddrug dealerswere qualified by some interviewees. In some
areas,paramilitariesseemtoseetheirroleasprotectingthecommunityfromdrugsandmaintainingorderagainstthepotentialforcriminal
organised crime. However, it was acknowledged that this type of action also inevitably sustained the brand of paramilitarism within the
community,whichcouldlaterbeabused:
‘Drugsisabigproblem…Wehavelostthedrugswar.Youalwayshearabouttheparamilitariesinvolvedindrugs.Andthereis
some–andIwouldacknowledgethat.ButnotALLofthemaredrugdealers.Butthereareothersdealingdrugstoo.Drugdeals
andparamilitariesarenotonething.ButChineseandEasternEuropeansaresupplyingdrugstoo.Thereisa lotof laziness in
sayingparamilitariesareinvolvedinracketeeringandgangsterism.Therearesome,butitismuchbiggerthanthat.’
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‘Inthisarea,ifdrugsarepickedup,theparamilitariesandloyalistgroupsareoutsupportingthepolice.Thedifficultyisthatthe
paramilitaries are still perpetuating the messenger. We needed a suitability panel [that existed in restorative justice] or
somethinglikeit.Thethingaboutex-prisonersisthatyoucan’tgettaxilicencesbutyoucanrunthecountry.’
The‘legitimacy’orparamilitarismisthusahighlyvolatilesocialvariableandmaychangequicklydependingonthespecificissueindispute,the
immediate political environment and local perceptions of the alternatives. This volatility makes it hard for youth workers to develop a
consistent approach to intervention. For example, some youth workers reported that community support for violent attacks on local
‘hoodlums’involvedinchronicanti-socialbehaviourwashighandembedded:
• ‘Weranfiveseminarsoverthelasttwoyearstryingtogetthecommunitytogetpeopletounderstand.Thathasn’tworkedin
thisareayet.Wewillhavetocontinue.’
• ‘Wegetaccusationsofrewardingbadbehaviour–goodiesforbaddies.’
Overall,theresearchconfirmedthatparamilitarismisnotaphenomenonwithclearandunambiguousboundaries incommunities,but isan
aspectofcommunitylifethathasbecomeorganicallyembeddedthroughitscomplex,locallyspecificandimpreciseboundarieswithfamilies,
political ideology and identity, community organisation, informal community power structures including the local formal and informal
economy, criminal justice andwelfare issues. At this stage of development, external partners relate on a daily basis to ‘paramilitaries’ or
membersofarmedgroups ina varietyof contexts that, superficiallyat least, areonly tangentially linked toparamilitarism,orengagewith
paramilitariesascommunityspokespeopleonissuesasdifferentaseducationalneeds,housingandchildren’sservices.
Thismaynotalwaysbeapparenttoobserversoutsidecommunities,whoseeonlytheillegalandpoliticalconsequencesofarmedgroups.Butit
doessuggestthatchangeinthiswillrequirebothasensitivitytolocaldifference,andthereforerelianceonlocalknowledgeANDtheabilityto
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confrontpowerstructuresthatrelyoncoercionandrepressionfortheirlocalpower,whichcanonlycomefromoutside.Italsosuggeststhat
publicdiscoursewillhavetobecomemorehonestaboutthedilemmasandambiguities facing local,politicalandstatutoryactors (including
councils,thepolice,youthservicesandhousingauthorities),which‘tacklingparamilitarism’meansinpracticeatcommunitylevel.
‘Weneedanewconfidentsocialnarrativeaboutcommunities.’
3.4ThepressuresonyoungpeopleincommunitiesinNorthernIrelandwithaparamilitarypresence
Therewasconsensusamongallintervieweesthatyoungpeoplewereatthefrontlineoftheexperienceofparamilitarismincommunitiesas
bothparticipantsinandvictimsofactivity,ideologyandculture.
‘Youngpeople in this areausually have threeoptions: one, theygo to school, get a jobandhavenoassociationwith these
groupsorcriminalactivity;two,thosethataremanipulatedintojoiningbecauseofadebtorriskofbeating;three,thosethat
choosethislifestyle.Thatthirdgrouprequiresaspecificskillsettoworkwith–[a]speciallanguageandrelationshipstyle–to
confronttheirchoices.’
‘Thepeoplethatarebeingarrestedareyoung.Andthatiswhyitimportanttogetthemearly.Thepsychologyofthisisgetthem
early,whentheirlifejourneyisshaped.So,alotofourworknowis[in]primaryschool.Ourchallengeisnottheyoungpeople;it
isbuildingresilienceinyoungpeople.’
The interviewees identified both ‘push’ factors, which encouraged or drove young people to either become or remain involved in
paramilitarism,and‘pull’factors,whichattractedyoungpeople.Thesefactorsincluded:
• familyties,whichencouragedasenseofidentityandbelonginginextendednetworks;
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• personalsecurityinahostileenvironmentthroughmembershipofagroup;
• pathwaystoidentityandpoweratlocallevel;
• excitementandperceivedglamour;
• opportunitiesforfinancialgain;
• debtanddependencyissues,includingdrugs;
• badexperiencesofpolicingorwiderauthority.
Intervieweesacknowledgedthatparamilitarismwasnotanewphenomenonbutwasestablishedasanelementofcommunityandsometimes
familyidentity:
‘Forsomeofthem,itiswhattheyareusedto.’
Thiswas combinedwith the attraction of belonging to a ‘gang’ identified in the previous section onmodels of practice outside Northern
Ireland:
‘Thegroupinthisareaareyoungpeoplesearchingforasenseofidentity/security/belongingtofeelsafe.Theyidentifywitha
group to have protection. The other element is the rush, the adrenaline. The youngmendon’t understand the fear and the
consequences. For a lot of them, it is a bit of craic, a bit of banter, and they don’t see the short-term or long-term
consequences.’
Associationwithaparamilitarygrouporactivitycanthereforebetheresultofavarietyofpushandpullfactors,someofwhicharevoluntary,
somecoercive,anditmayormaynotbeconsciouslytodowithideologyorcriminality.Critically,theintergationofparamilitarismispervasive,
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such that even where young people consciously separate from paramilitaries, they end up participating within the sphere of action of
paramilitarygroups:
‘Young people initiate their own gangs distinct from the paramilitaries but are involved in drugs and crime so really they are being
controlledbutdon’toftenrecogniseit.Theydon’tnecessarilyholdallegiancestoparamilitariestheydon’trecognisetheircause/ideology
orwhytheyexistbeyondacontrolfunction.Theironyistheywanttoengageinthebehavioursassociatedwithparamilitaries–drugs
andcrime.’
Atthesametime,manyyoungpeopleseearmedgroupsasanotherformofsocialcontrol.Accordingtoyouthworkers,someactthisoutby
escalatingviolenceandanti-socialbehaviourinthecommunityasareactiveanddistortedmeansofresistanceandidentityexpression:
‘Therearealsoyoungpeoplethatrebelagainstallformsofauthority–illegalandlegal.’
‘Somehavewhatwecall‘‘Fuck‘emsyndrome”andtheysay,“IfIamgoingtojail,Imayaswellgoforsomethingbig”.’
Manyintervieweesidentifiedtheabsenceofmeaningfulrelationshipsbetweenyoungpeopleandpolicingasacommonthemeinbothloyalist
and republican areas andwere critical of the approach of policing at-risk young people,which they feltwas often counterproductive, and
createdimpedimentstotheirownabilitytoworkwithpolice:
‘Currently,thepracticeispersonality-basedandthereisnorealinstitutionalcontract.Also,therelationshipiswithconstables
andonceyougoupthepipethepolice loseknowledgeandbecomeunclearaboutwhat ishappening.Basically, Idon’tthink
theyinternallyshareinformation.’
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Manyyoungpeoplestillsharethebasicassumptionthattheprimaryaimofpoliceofficersistogatherwiderintelligence,potentiallyturning
theyoungpeopleinto‘touts’andsocialpariahsamongtheirpeers:
‘There is a fear factor there still when you explain to the young people the nature of your role with the police. From the police
perspective,theyneedtogetbetteratsharinginformationandnotseeitallasintelligence.’
Insomeplaces,thishascreatedavacuuminsocialcontrolthattheparamilitariesfirstfilledandnowprotectagainsttheencroachmentofthe
police,usinganideologicaljustification:
‘Thevacuuminlawandordercreatesaplatformwhichthey[theparamilitary/armedgroups]fill–that’stheproblem.’
In this context, young people are largely the targets of brutal paramilitary action, where members of armed groups are able to portray
themselvesasactingonbehalfofthecommunityintheabsenceofpolicing.
3.5Istacklingparamilitarismaroleforyouthwork?
Armedactivityincludingrecruitmentbyarmedorganisationsengaginglocalyoungpeoplehasbeenacontinuousrealityinsomecommunities
inNorthernIrelandsince1969.However,thisresearchdidnotidentifyanycurrentprojectorcommunity-basedyouthworkprogrammewith
the explicit or primary aim of preventing young people from joining local armed groups or paramilitary organisations, or with an explicit
mission to support youngpeople if they seek to leave.There isnodevelopedor formalbodyofpracticewith thisaimandonlyoccasional
community-ledcommentonitsabsence,andusuallyfromexternalcommentators.ThiscontrastssharplywithPREVENTandCHANNELinGreat
Britain,andwithinternationalprojectsthatexplicitlyseektotackleradicalisation,whetheramongyoungMuslimsorinthecontextofextreme
right-wingorganisationsortosupportexit.Moreover,wedidnotfindyouthworkprojectsthatequatemembershipofaparamilitaryorarmed
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groupwiththeinternationalconceptof‘gangs’andtherehasnotyetbeenanydirectefforttoendparamilitarymembershipalongthelines
attemptedinGlasgowintheCIRVprojectinrelationtoknifecrime.
Inasense, itappearsthat ‘paramilitaries’andorganisationswhichpromotearmedactionwithinapolitical ideologyhavebeenuntouchable
withincertaincommunities,anchoredinataken-for-grantedunderstandingthatanyefforttoaddressthiswouldputbothlivesandservicesat
risk.Implicitly,therefore,armedgroupscontinuetodeterminewhatcanandcannothappeninthelivesofcommunitiesandyoungpeoplein
alloftheFreshStartcommunitiesintransition.
In general, therefore, the phenomenon of ‘paramilitarism’ has been seen as a political phenomenon or series of connected political
phenomenainNorthernIrelandrequiringapoliticalsolution,ratherthanaproblemofviolence,safeguardingorcriminality.Strikingly,despite
theGoodFridayAgreement,newelectedframeworksandformalsocialconsensusthatchangeshouldonlybeachievedby‘exclusivelypeaceful
anddemocraticmeans’,armedgroupactivitydrawingonhistoricalcausesandsymbolismhasnotyetbeenbroughttoahalt.Forsomepeople,
thisisaglaringgapforsocietyasawhole:
‘Youcan’ttacklethisissueheadon.Wearetoldthereisnosuchthingasparamilitariesinthisareabecauseitdoesn’texist.This
dogissoviciousyoucan’tkickit.’
‘Forme,thisisacrisisofvision,understanding[analysis],trust,authority,concept,leadership,management.Andallwillneedto
change.’
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‘Noorganisationhastacklingparamilitarismasaremit.Butweseeourselvesasprovidinganalternative.’
‘On the issueof direct naming, there is a general feelingwe should be takingpeople out of paramilitarism, butweare still
clingingontoit.[T]heonlytacticthatwehaveisnotnamingdirectly.Theotherdirectapproachwouldgetitsheadblownoff.So
youhavetoworkoutwhatyouareupagainst.Therearestillthosetherewhoseetheseinitiativesasthreat.’
Thisclearlyhasimplicationsforthesafetyofbothyoungpeopleandpeopleworkingwiththem.Throughtheresearch,weexploredwhether
preventingyoungpeoplefrombecomingmembersofarmedgroupsorsupportingthemto leavewasayouthworkresponsibilitywithinthe
termsof theconceptofsafeguarding.Respondentshadavarietyofviews. Overwhelmingly, respondentsbelievedthat thecommitmentof
youthworkerstoyoungpeopleimpliedarelentlessengagementontheirbehalfagainstallthreats,includingparamilitarism,ratherthaneither
focusingonorignoringparamilitarismasatopic:
‘Weprobablyoperatefromayouthengagement[and]personaldevelopmentangle.Buttheissueofparamilitarismisthere.You
arenotdoingitspecifically,workingwithyoungpeopleattachedtoayouthclub,buttheyaresusceptibletoallinfluences.We
providediversionaryactivitiesandthatiswhatitis.’
‘Whatwewere trying to stop [was]peoplebeingbrutalised…Ourprimarypurpose thenwasde-escalating situational crisis,
supporting young people in opportunities to engage in something while they weren’t working. It was also workforce
developmentforourselves.’
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‘Buttheothersideisthatpersonaljourney.Whenyougowiththemthroughthecourt,theyrealiseyouareinterestedinthem:
“Iusedtothinkyouwereawanker,butyouarealright”.’
‘Therearethosethatstayawayfromthatstuff,andotherswhogoatitstraighton.Wearetryingourbesttoengageonrisks.
Weareprovidingadifferentopportunityforyoungpeople.WewouldmeetonaFridayeveningwhentheywouldbeoutrunning
thestreets.Itisalmosta‘midnightclub’.ButitgivesthemsomewhereonaFridaynight.Theymaynotstay.’
The majority of rinterviewees in this research acknowledged that paramilitarism and its implications for young people in some
communitiescouldnotbeignoredbyeitherworkersoryoungpeople.Atthesame,time,mostfeltthattheonlywaytoaddressthe
issueofarmedgroupsandyoungpeoplewasobliqueandopportunisticratherthandirectandconfrontational:
‘Inthisarea,youhavetobeconstantlymindfuloftheissueandtheimpactithasonthecommunityandrelationships,butwe
trynottoletitdominateourwork.Possiblythemainareawhereitcouldimpactisinrelationtodetachedyouthwork,because
oftheissueofterritory.’
‘Yesitisanissue…butitisnotsomethingthatIconsciouslythinkabout.’
‘Thereusedtobeanissuethatparamilitariesdidn’tgoforyouthworkers.Butwhentheywentforoneofours…Ihadtotell
people,“Tellmewhatyoucan’tordon’twanttodo”.Whenwesaid,“WearegoingtomeetSaoradh”,wedidittoprotectthe
youngpeople.Ifweseetheyareindanger,wewillchallenge.’
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‘Howdoyoubuildresilienceinwhichthetrenchesarepartofthearchitecture?Wegivepeopledifferent,emotionallypowerful
experiencesofeachother.’
‘Whatdoesittaketorunacommunity?Lawandaccountabilityforactionsarepartofit.Becauseoftheirlackofpolitical
leadership,wearestartingtocreateasocietyoflawlessness.Andsomeoftheyoungpeople’sattitudesare“Sowhat?”Howdo
wegetbackto“No,youcan’tdowhatyouwant”?’
‘Wenowhaveagirlwhowastrailedthrough[amajorcommunityconfrontation]in2001.Shewasaprimetargetforgetting
involved.Wewentinandshemetthepeoplein[theprimaryschoolsinthesamearea]anddecidednottogothere.Now,sheis
runningagameofthreehalvesin[front-linedistricts].Sheconsciouslysays,“Icouldhavebeenpartofthat”.Thatjourneyup
thereisaprettysignificantone.’
‘Youdon’tknowhowmanypeoplewouldbeinvolvedifwehadn’tbeenthere.Wouldtheynotbetheboysorthepeopleifthere
hadnotbeenanalternative?Wedon’tname itup front,butwedotry tobuildaresilience.Wedotalkabout it.Theyknow
somebodyfromtheotherside.Contactisnotenough.Conversationhastobepartofit.Arelationshipfacilitatesaconversation
andaconversationcreatesarethinkpossibility.’
Forothers,however,worktoendparamilitarismwasanautomaticextensionofyouthworkvaluesinaNorthernIrelandcontext:
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‘Inacommunitywereyoungpeoplecanberecruitednow,oneofourjobsistokeepthemoutofthehandsofparamilitaries.Our
jobistoreducetheirhatredofothers.Thisisourtask.Theproblemis,wearefartoofocusedongeneralism.Theproblemis,itis
seenassomethingonlyforspecialistsineightareas.Itisakeypartofourjob.’
‘Itisjustpartofthejob,anacceptedresponsibility.Attheendoftheday,youaretherefortheyoungpersonregardlessofthe
issues–that’swhywegot intothisprofession–and if theydoendupwithinaparamilitarygroup it isnotthefailureofthe
youthworker.Therearesomanyvariables that lead to that scenario.Youcanneverwrite someoneoffbut, instead,always
leavethedooropen.’
Theseworkerswerelargelyoftheviewthatavalues-ledapproachhadalwaysbeencentraltothetaskofyouthworkincommunities:
‘We were always dealing with these issues then Fresh Start came along and everyone thought it was something new and
unique.Youthworkersdon’tnecessarilyseethisasdifferentwork,especiallyifthisisalltheyhavedoneandconfronted–this
hasbeentheirenvironment.’
Thisincludeddirectnegotiationonbehalfofyoungpeoplewithorganisationsinthecommunity:
‘Iseeitasan‘ofcourse’issue.Allofmyfriendswereprominentparamilitaries.Someofmykidsinthisareaarethedissidents.
So,Ihavetonegotiate.’
Ingeneral,theywerecriticaloftheabsenceofformaltraining,organisationalguidanceorofficialsupportforworkersoryoungpeople.Asone
workercommented:
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‘Theyarenot training it inhere [UlsterUniversity]. Iamfighting tohave ‘circleofcourage’and ‘goodrelations’backon the
degree.Thereisnotrauma-informedpracticeonthecourse.’
This view cannot, however, be regarded as an established consensuswithin youthwork. For some, the political nature of armed struggle
remains an ‘option’ that a young person can legitimately explore, even if youthwork is obliged to offer and suggest alternatives. Tackling
paramilitarismwastheresponsibilityofthepoliticalclassandthepolice,whocouldalsonotbefullyendorsedbyyouthwork.Youthwork’s
taskistoofferafreespaceforopenexplorationwithinthatpoliticalframe:
‘Itisnotayouthworker’sjobtotackleparamilitarism.Itisthejoboftheyouthsectortoengagewithparamilitarismasitaffects
youngerpeople.Itisourresponsibilitytomitigatetheeffectsonyoungpeople.Itisuptogovernmentstotackleparamilitarism
–itiswaybeyondourbrief.’
‘Peopleclaimingthattheyaredoingthisworkandareclearlynot.Forty-oddyearsago,inworkingclassareas,workerswerenot
aboutgettingpeopletostopsupportingtheUDAortheIRA.Manyyouthworkerswouldhavesupportedtheexistenceofthese
organisations.Manypeoplewouldnothaveseentheirjobasgettingyoungpeopletostoppeoplejoining.Butwhentheyoung
peopleweengagewithsay“Werecognisetherightofrepublicanstoengageinarmedstruggle”,weneedtoseeifitiseffective
andwesaywhynot.’
‘Ourpassionistocreateoptions–tohelppeoplepushbackagainstthesysteminadifferentway.Weidentifiedanissuewitha
realdeficitinyoungpeoplewithleadershipcapacityfromloyalistcommunities–toempoweryoungpeopletopushback.Our
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roleistoestablisharelationshipwithyoungpeopletogivethemvoice.[Andona]policylevel,tospeaktopoliticians–tocreate
aninfluencingrole.’
Inthisview,anobligationonyouthworkerstotackleparamilitarismwouldalsoputbothworkersandyoungpeopleatunacceptablerisk:
‘Copsnegotiatedthedealsdirectly[aroundthebonfires]–sotheyseewherepowerlies.Itisnotmyrole.Itputsmystaffand
youngpeopleIworkwithatrisk.Thecommunityknowsthatthestatecannotgetridofthegroups.Sowhyshouldwe?Despite
recentdeaths,thereisstillcontinuingrecruitment.’
‘Therealityofthesituationisthatmembersofourstaffhavetheircarsattacked.Ihavewokenupwithacaroutsidethedoors.
Weworkwithanyone.Itisveryrisky.Wehavestaffworkingincommunitieswherepeopleareactive.Peopleareasking,“Where
doesthemoneycomefrom?”’
Whilelargercohortofyouthworkersinthisresearchtooktheviewthattacklingparamilitarismwasaresponsibilityofyouthwork,themajority
alsofeltthatitcouldonlybeundertakenonthebasisofstrictadherencetothegoals,valuesandpurposesofyouthwork,andlargelywithout
directreferencetotheissueof‘tacklingparamilitarism’.Inpractice,youthworkersoftenprovidethelastavailableresponsibleadultformany
youngpeople:
‘Also,ifitisoutofsightthenitisoutofmind–so,statutorybodiesdropinandoutandtheydon’thavetoconfrontthereality
everyday, so it’seasier to ignore it.However,ayouthworker in theareacan’t ignore itas it transcendsallaspectsof their
work.’
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In thisview, theover-ridingdutyofayouthworker is to focusonthefutureofeachyoungperson,placingtheemphasisofyouthworkon
youngpeopleandtheirneeds,includingbutnotdefinedbyarmedviolence.:
‘Wewillalwayschallenge,becausetheultimatethingisprotectingyoungpeople.’
‘The role of youth work is in the transition from childhood to adulthood. Relationships are key to successful work, not
programmeperse.Investinlocaladultswithmentoring–notparent-child,butparent-youngadult.Aspecialadultiscriticalto
youngadultsasbothawitnessandameasure.’
‘Ourroleistobuildthecapacityofyoungpeopletouseothermechanismstoachievetheirends.Tothinkaboutdifferentways
ofaffectingsocialchange.Moreimportantis:areweencouragingthemtobecriticalthinkersandpushback?Themeslikesocial
justiceandsocialchange,andwhatdoesyouth-ledjusticemean?’
‘We are trying to empower young people to support the view that violence is not the only possibility. We focus on the
individual.’
Inallcases,however,respondentsagreedthatyouthworkcouldonlymakeausefulcontributionwithinacollaborativeenvironmentandwere
keenthatthispointthatshouldbeemphasisedbytheEducationalAuthority:
‘EAcannotcreateastrategicengagement.Collaborationiscritical.’
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‘Collaborativepartnershipandlearningiscrucial.’
‘Investingincommunitiesisimportant.Youthworkhasarolebutitisnotallyouthwork.’
3.6Youthworkwhereparamilitarismisacontinuingrealityincommunities
Asidefromthecentraltasksofprovidingprotectedspaceawayfromtraumaticsocialinfluences,directpersonaldevelopmentinterventionand
personalemotionalsupport,youthworkactivitytopreventdamagetoyoungpeopleinrelationtoparamilitarismoftenfell intothreebroad
categories:mediation,diversionandadvocacy.
Asmediators,youthworkersdescribedfindingthemselvesatthecentreofnegotiationswithyoungpeople(bothindividuallyandingroups),
armedorganisations,politicalparties,localresidents,statutoryagencies(includingthepoliceandlocalcouncils)andthemediaasoneofthe
fewpeopleoftrustcapableoffindingsolutions.Forexample:
‘Wehadconversationswith localcommunity, independentcouncillorsandSinnFéinabout thebonfire.Oncewegot themto
agreethattyresarenotgoodforourcommunity,theyoungboystookthemout.Wehavebeenbuildingrelationshipswiththese
youngpeopleformonths.Theyhavenoaspirations,nohopeornothing.’
‘Therealityisthatparamilitarygrowthrequirescommunitysupport,sotheyhavetobecarefulnottoalienatethecommunity.
So, the relationshipsbetweenyouthworkersandyoungpeople is important,becauseweareengagingandmanaging issues
associatedwithoftenverymarginalisedyoungpeople.’
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For some critics, thismay fall short of tackling paramilitarism, but itwas also acknowledged that diversion often creates opportunities for
changeorpreventsescalationallowingyouthworkerstoprotectyoungpeoplefromharmandfurtherinvolvementbytakingyoungpeopleinto
unknownyettrustedcircumstances.Thiswasconsciouslypartofthestrategyofprojectsthatusedsportorexcursionsasavehicletoengageor
protectalienatedyoungpeople.
‘Sportdoesnothavetobeaboutfriendshipsbutithastobeaboutthepossibilityofafriendship.Therelationshipwhichateam
createsallowspeopletotalkdifferently.Youhavetotaketheopportunityofthatnewrelationship.Youhavetosustainit–a
teamsportcreatesthis.Italsocreatesasharedmissionandvision.Anditcreatesashareddependency.’
‘Wheresomethinghappensinthecity,thereisnowasystem.TwelfthJuly,policerangme–Irang[anotheryouthclub],“Can
youput[on]someactivities?”Theysaidyes,weputstreetworkerson,and[theotherclub]took60kidstothebowlingalley.’
‘Interventionsshouldnotalwaysmeanpeoplehavetoleavetheircommunity.AtthetimeofLyraMcKee,weweregoingtotake
peopleoutofourcommunity.Itchangedourmindset.WeputmoneyfromtheAgileFund.Wedroppedthe‘takingpeopleout’
process.Instead,weorganisedafamily-orientatedday[here]toshowthetruespirit–music,watersports,staffminglingwith
community:1,542peopleparticipated–butthemediarefusedtoreportit.’
Beyond short-termdiversion, anumberof youthworkerspointed topersistentpresentationofalternatives suchasemployment, asa vital
elementinanyprocessofchange:
‘This year, therewasnopolitical involvement in thebonfire. Thatwasabighelp. The youthemployment schemeunder the
EducationAuthoritywasalsoagreathelp.Wehaveagroupof12youngpeopleallpreviouslyinvolvedatdifferentlevelsinriots
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andbonfiresandsoon.Iaskedtheyoungpeoplewhytheywantedthejobandtheysaid,“Idon’twanttobepartofwhatIwas
part of last year”. Not one of them has been arrested this year.We got the right people in – they had to go through an
applicationprocesstoreinforceachievement.Theyhadaninductionandtraining–induction,childprotection,CRED.Thisyear,
nobodywillbeoutonbonfirenight.’
Youthworkersoften also find themselves as the advocates for youngpeople at risk fromparamilitaries, exploitationbyother elementsor
caughtupinanti-socialbehaviour:
‘Youhavetoproveyouhavethekid’sback.Youhavetovisittheminjail.Youhavetohelpthemwhentheyareofftheirfaces.’
‘Youneedtotalktotheparamilitaries?Wewilldothatforyou.Doyouneedcounselling?Wewillgetthat.Howdowekeepyousafe?Do
youneedtimeout?Thequestionis,“Howdowefixit?”’
Theresearchconfirmedthatthereiscurrentlynofixedviewamongpractitionersabouttheappropriateapproachtobetakenbyyouthworkers
towardsaddressingparamilitarism.However,itispossibletoidentifyanumberofissuesthatmaybeimportanttodebateatprofessionallevel:
• Youth workers in local communities rely on community confidence and consent to do their work. The key to effective work is an
effectivetrustbetweenthecommunityandtheprogramme,thecommunityandtheworker(s),theworker(s)andtheyoungperson.In
theabsenceofaconsistentpositionontacklingparamilitarismamongpoliticalandcommunityleaders,especiallyatlocallevel,youth
workerscannotactwithoutcaution.
• Tackling paramilitarism directly in communities in Northern Ireland could put young people and youth workers at personal risk or
preventthemfromdoingtheirjob.Alltheevidenceisthatthemoresuccessfulitisinaddressinginterestsincommunity,themorework
needstobesupported.However,itisnotalwaysclearwhoworkersandyoungpeoplecanrelyonforprotection.
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• YouthworkerssharetheambivalenceinNorthernIrelandasawholeaboutpolicingandthehistoryofarmedstruggle.
• There are tensions within value-based approaches to youth work between an emphasis on non-violence and an emphasis on
participationandfreedomofexpression.
• Thefocusofyouthworkisthedevelopmentandqualityoflifeofyoungpeople.Tacklingparamilitarismisasecondaryaimwithinthis
primarypriority.
3.7Evolvingyouthworkpracticetoaddressparamilitarismincommunities
Theresearchidentifiedanumberofcommonthemesinrelationtogoodpracticeforyouthworkwithyoungpeople‘atrisk’ofengagementin
criminalbehaviourthrough‘gangs’orarmedgroups.
Everyyouthworkerinthisresearchprojectagreedthatchangeinbehaviouronlyhappenedinandthroughrelationships.Asseveralpeoplesaid
independently, ‘Relationships are the heart of thework’. This is entirely consistentwith all of themost successful internationalmodels of
violencereductionsurveyedinthefirstpartofourresearch.Formanyworkers, itwasalsopartoftheirownexperienceasyoungpeoplein
relationtootherissues:
‘Churchandyouthworksavedme.Ifyougetpeoplewhoarepreparedtogivepeopletime.Peoplethinkitismoneybutitisnot
–itistime.Persistent,professional,well-boundaried.Accountabilitycomesfromthat.Kidswillrollwiththeflow.’
It therefore seems likely that the specific contributionof youthwork toanyprogramme related toarmedgroupsmay lie in its capacity to
engage in face-to-face relationships with young people at risk, rather than simply ‘tackle paramilitarism’ as a specific political or social
phenomenon.Atthesametime,asdescribedbyanumberofrespondents,thisworkrequiresprofessionalandboundariedworkentailinga
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degreeofhonestyanddirectnessthathassometimesbeencharacterisedas‘toughlove’,combiningfocusedattentionwithaninsistenceon
responsibility-taking:
‘These kids get all their love, care and attention from negative behaviour. They get negative skills; they get attention from
deviancy.So,wesitthemdownandwetalktothem.Wehaveaposterineveryroom.Andwesay“Whatdidyoudo?Whatare
youresponsiblefor?Whataretheconsequences,andhowwouldyouresolvetheissue?”’
‘Wekeeptellingthem,“Stoptellingmeaboutwhathedone.Whatdidyoudo?”Wehavetogetthembackto“Whatdidyou
do?”’
The qualities of a good worker were, perhaps unsurprisingly, consistent with core qualities of good youth work in the work identified at
internationallevelandincluded:
• Persistence
• Consistency
• ‘Onthestreet’
• Value-driven
• Prioritisingpastoralcare
• Clearaboutboundaries
• Pro-socialmodelling
• Adegreeofstreetcred.
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Itwasacknowledgedthatmanyworkersalreadyhadthesequalities,butthattherehadbeenlittlestrategicsupport,eitherinrelationtofocus
onthequestionoftacklingparamilitarismand itsconsequencesforyoungpeople incommunitiesorforworkersworking inthefieldwhere
paramilitarismwasareality:
‘Thereisagapintermsofourpracticearoundengagingwithgangsandtheoryofgangculture–thatisabigandgrowingissue
inthesecommunities,anditdoesn’tnecessarilystartoutasparamilitary-controlled.’
‘Wedohavedefinedpractice.Butitisstillnotstrategic.’
‘Thisisaprocessofchangingwhatyouthworkersdoandhowyouthworkersunderstandwhatyouthworkistodo.Forfartoo
longwehavebeentooairy-fairy.’
Thethemesofpersistenceandconsistencywerealsocommonamongall theprofessionals interviewed. In relation toyoungpeopleat risk,
workersacceptedthat inconsistencyandunreliabilitywereexpectedbehavioursandthatthe jobofyouthworkerswastoofferapro-social
model that could challenge this for young people. It also echoed the themes of ‘relentless follow-up’ evident in someof the ‘gang’-based
projectsintheUS,surveyedearlier:
‘The Education Authority were sending different people and opening on different days. What we did was keep turning up. That
consistencywasreallyimportant.’
‘Itisaquestionofnotsucceedingforawhile–andyetstickingwithit.’
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‘Youneedtocommitandfollowthrough.Consistentandpersistent.Thelandscapeisbetter.Before,youhadtorappeople’sdoorsand
youbuiltrelationswiththeirdasandmasandcousins.’
‘Myroleisnotfournightsinayouthclub.Igoouttothefamily.Wehavethiscircleofcourage,whichwedoasone-to-one,andwecan
knowtheyoungperson.Throughourlifemapsystemweknowtheperson.Wecanidentifywhattheissueis.Wecan’tbeallthingstoall
people–andwecantransferbetweenpeople.’
Buildingonthesethemes,therewasadegreeofconsensusabouttheprioritiesofanyyouth-basedprogrammetoreduceengagementwith
armedorgroupviolence:
• De-glamorisation–de-glamoriseviolencewithrestorativeprinciples
• Streetbystreet
• Keepgoing–persistence
• Localpeoplearecritical(bothinsupportandinchange)
• Downanddirty–realissues(nocheapanswers)
• Peerapproachtochange(learningisfromamodel,notfromaninstructor)
• Reformulatingtheissue(notagainstparamilitarism–FORameaningfulidentity)
• Hotspotwhereitmatters–butbeflexiblewithboundaries(respondwithintelligence)
• Agileandflexiblefunding(think,act,account)
• Givecreditforgoodwork–donotkeeppeopleinthebox(allowpeopletochange)
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According to one interviewee, the outstanding challenge in Northern Ireland remains the continuing lack of urgency in relation to the
developmentofgoodpracticeandoftestingandapplyingitappropriately:
‘Idevelopedthegear-stickmodelofyouthwork–fifthgearisallaboutthegangculture.’
Nonetheless,ininterviews,anumberofissuesemergedasconsistentpriorities,inanychangedapproach,toimproveyouthworkpracticein
thisarea:
1. A revision of the understanding of ‘risk’ in youthwork to ensure that the concept of ‘at risk’ is focused away from generic socio-
economic indicators, to enable youthworkers to identify and focus effort on those young people identified as at risk from serious
involvementwithcriminalityandviolence:
‘Wehavetakenaserviceandpushedthemandtrainedtheminunderstandingwhat‘youngpeopleatrisk’(YPAR)isandhowwe
transitionpeoplebackfromthedarksideofsocialcapitaltothe lightside.The languagedoesn’thelp.Becauserisk isaterm
whichcanmeananything.Wedealwithitintermsofnormalrisks–drugsandthelike.Butwewanttoworkatthereallyhard
end–thoseatriskofgettinginvolvedinphysicalattacksandviolence,ofharmingthemselvesandharmingothers.’
‘Thesekidshateeverybodyandeverybodyhatesthem.Thisisatwo-waysystem.Thecommunityhatesthem,persecutesthem.
Weareonlytalkingseventotenkids [inmyarea].Buttheyarethemost fragile,brokenkidsyouhaveevermet inyour life.
Nobodywantstohelpthem,butnobodywantstowalkwiththem.’
2. A formal professional recognition of the damage that violence does to young people, both through trauma as victims and in
traumatisingothers.Thiswould, in turn,enable significant commitment todifficult youngpeoplewhohavesuffered inand through
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violence,requiringawillingnessbyprofessionalstobehonestaboutunacceptablebehaviourswithyoungpeople,whileworkingmore
closelywiththem.Foroneworkerinthisresearch,thisentailedaformalshiftintheemphasisofyouthworktowardstrauma-informed
practiceandsupportingyouthworkersinlearninghowtorespondappropriately:
‘Wearenowoutinthefield,trainingyouthworkersandteachersinwhatthemeaningofATRISKisandknowinghowto
tackleit,allinastrength-basedperspective–youdon’tjudgetheperson,butyoujudgethebehaviourandgetthemto
takeresponsibility.Yougetthemtoprogressthebehaviourwhileunderstandingthemasavaluablehumanbeing.’
3. Focused work that may reduce the total number of young people being worked with at any one time but that also involves a
commitmenttoendexclusionsfordifficultyoungpeople,acultureofreflectivepracticeforworkersandincreasedattentiontoaction
research.Thisalignedcloselywiththeconceptof‘relentlessoutreach’adoptedinROCA.
‘Itusedtobeaboutnumbers–45anight,atleast.Ioncedid90.Itwasmental.Iwenttothemandsaid,“Fortyisour
maximum,withthebehaviourswearedealingwith”.Now,Itakefourstaffwith12people.’
‘We need one-on-one work, bespoke programmes, sufficient time resources – which means enough people and the
capacitytoadaptspendingtoneedsandchangingevents.’
‘Timeisamassiveissue–youjustdon’thavethetimeorspace.Wevalueit,buttimeisthebarrier.Thereissuchahigh
burnoutinthiswork–peoplecangetverynegativetoo.’
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‘Weneedreflectivepracticewhichencouragesreflectioninyoungpeople.’
‘Wearenotdoingenoughresearch.Weneedmore.’
‘We need new techniques, new knowledge, new research.More expert advice.More accountability. I have external
evaluatorsandtheyadvise.Theygivemeresources.Wehaveneverhadthatinthepast.’
Thecontributionofthiskindoffocusedcommitmenttoyouthatriskasawaytolimittheimpactofviolenceisclearlydistinctivefromother
approachestotacklingparamilitarism,includinglawandorder.Atthesametime,itmaygosomewaytosquaringthecircleofaroleforyouth
workinpreventingviolenceandtheimpactofviolence,andthedirectlypoliticaltaskoftacklingparamilitarismbyensuringthatyouthwork
retainsitsfocusontheyoungpersonwhileaddressingparamilitarismasatraumaticexperienceofviolence.
Inthemostextremecasesofdamage,however,youthworkersinthisresearchalsoacknowledgedthatyouthworkinterventionalonewillnot
resolveissuesofgangviolenceandrequiresinteragencycooperation:
‘Wegradedouryoungpeopleasgreens,ambersandreds–greensandamberswehavebeensuccessfulwith,redsnotsomuch.
Ournewmethodis‘anti-group’work.Ourjobwastobuilddowntheirgroupidentityandrebuildit.Wewantedthembackfrom
thedark sideof social capital.Theambers takemorework than thegreens.For the reds,wecan’tdo thatwithyouthwork
alone.Weneedamulti-disciplinaryapproach.Theyouthworker is theirpersonof trust.We take themtoappointments;we
meettheminprison.Buttheyneedmorethanthat.’
Thenotionof ‘anti-group’workhasechoesoftheworkofEXITSweden,whichsees itstaskascreatingpositivepeergroupassociationasa
criticalsupportivefactorforpeopleleavingviolentgroupideology.
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3.8Collaborativecommunityyouthworkfortacklingparamilitarism
OneofthemoststrikingthemestoemergefromtheresearchwastheinitiallyparadoxicalsuggestionthatanysuccesswoulddependonBOTH
localcredibilityANDtheengagementoftrustedoutsiders.
Inthefirstinstance,localcredibilitywasaconstantthemeofintervieweesinrelationtotheabilityofanyprofessional,includingyouthworkers,
toengagewithparamilitarismandarmedgroupviolenceinNorthernIreland.Indeed,allrespondentswereoftheviewthatunlesstherewas
sufficienttrustwiththelocalcommunity,noworkcouldbesuccessful:
‘Youhavetoalsorememberthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofyouthworkersintheselocationsareallfromthearea.Theyhave
always lived here or have family. That means they know the history and identity of the place, they know who are the
partnershipsthatyouneedtomake,whatthepoliticsofthelocalcommunityarelike,whatconstitutesgoodandbadbehaviour
–andtheyalsohavecredibility.Thisiscrucialforthistypeofwork,andalotofitcannotbetrainedorreadinabook.’
‘Ifyouwantsomebodytodoit,youneedtothinkaboutthat.It’slikeallthings–anideayouprove.Itissimple:youknowyour
areaandyouknowwhereyoucango.Whenyougetlocalpeoplecommittedtotryingtodothingsrightintheircommunities
youcanchangeit.Outsidersgoinginwillneverchangeit.’
‘Youhavetogetthesupportinthecommunity.Butiftheyseelocalpeopledoingit,theyhaveavestedinterest.Andeveninthe
East,thereispeopletotalkto.Eventhen,wedidstreetbystreet.Mothersandgranniesoutonthestreetstellingtheirkidswhat
todo.’
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‘Workingclasscommunitieswhoaretryingtodothingsneedsupported…Thosewhoweredoingitputthebootsontheground.
Weweredoingitfor‘us’.Itwasourchildren,itwasourcommunitiesgettingcaughtupinit.’
‘Youngadultstuff.Ithinkthisissueistotallydifferentindifferentplaces.Ifyoulookatyoungpeoplealone,ontheirown,itdoes
notwork.Youhavetolookatthewholecommunitytounderstandwheretheiryoungpeoplefit.’
‘Youhavetogetoutandaboutonthestreets.EAneedtodothat.Youhavetoknowthekids.Youhavetogetdownanddirty.’
Tosomeextent,thisisalogicalconclusionfromthedemonstrablerealitythateachcontextissubtlydifferent,madeworseinNorthernIreland
bytheinsularityandinwardfocusofmanyoftheseparatedareasinthisprogramme.
‘Ineachcommunity,theFreshStartworkerisdifferent.Evenhere,itisdifferent.’
Yet,somerespondentswerealsoawarethattheneedforlocalcredibilitysometimescameatthecostofindependenceofaction,creativityand
innovation,especiallyinachallengingareaofworkwheretherearepowerful,localvestedinterestswillingtouseintimidationtoachievetheir
ends,orwherethecommunitysidesdecisivelyagainsttheinterestsofayoungperson(forexample,incasesofanti-socialbehaviour):
‘Local knowledge and reputation is key in this field of work – it gives credibility. But the risk then is that it does not create an
environmentwherenewthinkingcanbeintroduced.’
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‘Weareoftenslowtorecognisewhatisnormalandwhatisabnormalbehaviour.Webecomeconditionedtothelocalissuesandthink
that is simply the way things are – you see everything as normative – so reflective practice is crucial. But… you also need a good
challengewhendoingreflectivework–needtobequestionedaboutwhywedothethingswedo.’
Therewas, therefore, a broad agreement that the generation of trust towards the goal of tackling paramilitarism in youthwork required
attention toactive relationship-buildingbetweenanumberofkeystakeholdersandpartners. Ineverycase, these includedmaintaining the
confidence of young people, local workers and theirmanagers, the local community, externalmentors, and partner agencies (sometimes
includingthepolice).Theintervieweesmostcommontermsusedtodescribethiswere‘mentoring’,‘activelearning’and‘co-delivery’,including
co-design:
‘Mentoringiscritical.’
‘TheEducationAuthorityworkdoesn’tworkdirectlyhere.Co-deliveryisveryimportant–vital.’
‘Havingtransitionalfiguresofauthorityandidentityisveryimportanttoayoungperson.ThefourPs:[a]parental,persistent,
protectivepersonality.Amentorissometimesonegoodadult.’
‘Wemustco-designandcreateinterventionstogether.Itisgettingmuchbetter.Butitneverhappenedbefore.’
‘Partnershipallowsustosharerisks...Risk-sharingiscritical,becausewesharethesamevalues.’
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‘The key to effective work is an effective trust between the community and the programme, the community and the
worker/workers,theworker(s)andtheyoungperson.’
Oneintervieweesuggestedthatthisapproach,togetherwithacommitmenttoreflectivepracticeandflexibilityinresponsetolearning,should
behard-wiredintoanyprogrammeonthethemeoftacklingviolenceincommunities,establishing:
• Abespokeprogrammeofworkinvolvingteams;
• Ensuring that people are paired – a young person just out of university with all the knowledge of best practice and a clear
understandingofcurrentapproachesandtheoriesalongsideamoreexperiencedperson,say50+yearsofage;
• Thiswouldensurethattheprogrammeofworkhadlocalcredibilityandthattheteamwouldhavetheknowledgeofcommunitypolitics
andlocalhistorytoguidetheinteractions–alocalpersoncancommandrespect;anoutsiderwouldstruggleforlegitimacy;
• Thisworkischallenginganditiscrucialthatpeoplehaveopportunitiesfordebriefingandreflectivepractice.
This kind of co-delivery approachmight allow for both established and new knowledge to be engaged, for learning involving a number of
sourcesandfor localcapacitytobeengagedfruitfullyandproducingnewoutcomes.Oneworkerdescribedchangingunderstanding intheir
ownproject:
‘Wedon’tsign[youngpeople]uptobasketballanymore.Weareacommunityrelationsandpeacebuildingorganisationthat
usessport.Basketballisparticularlyusefulherebecauseitdoesn’tbelongtoanygroup.Butyouhavetoleverthesport.They
joinanintegratedteamandtheyknowthat.Ideally,thekidsgethooked.Maybethebasketballisthehook.IfIhadgoneto[a
stateschool]andsaid,“Let’splayGaelic[football]”,itwouldnothaveworked.Basketballallowedsomeoftheparentstostep
up…Iaminterestedinthetool.Theoriginalmotivationwaswewanttodosomethingwiththesport.Indesperation,theyused
moneyasahook.Theschoolssawthedollars.ButnowtheyseeitasawaytodotheirPDMU.Now,wesaytheteachersneedto
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change, and the teachers need to change. There is a transfer from our work to “Today, we talked about diversity in the
classroom”.’
3.9Challengesforyouthworkinaddressingissuesarisingfromparamilitarism
Inthecourseoftheresearch,workersidentifiedtenspecificchallengestothesuccessfuldeliveryofasystematicprogrammetotackling
paramilitarismthatshouldbeaddressed:
1. Tacklingparamilitaryactivityandthecultureofparamilitarismincommunitiesiscurrentlynotsystematicbutreliesonindividual
workersandtheirrelationshipsincommunitiesandwithotheragencies.
‘Detachedyouthworkisstillthebestwayofrespondingtotheseissues–one-to-onemethodologies,withgoodstrong
links to statutory partners. However, a lot of this work is still personality-driven – so we know people in the NIHE
[NorthernIrelandHousingExecutive]orPSNIandwecangetthingsdone.Butthereisnocorporateknowledgeofhowto
dojoined-up,consistentwork.’
‘OutsideBelfast,theprofessionalstructuredoesnotexist.’
2. Traininginthisareaofyouthworkremainspoorlydevelopedandcannotbereliedoninthefield.Respondentsfeltthatmentoring
and reflective practice for workers were more appropriate for a developing field with huge risks and the potential for worker
isolation.
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3. Dealing with difficult young people at risk from involvement as either perpetrator or victim is complex work, requiring both
attentiontorecruitmentandconstantattentionandreflectiononthepartoftheworker:
‘Muchofthisworkhastohappenonthestreet,butitisdifficult.Becauseyouonlyhaveyourownboundaries.Youarein
their classroom. If you have them in a room, you can reinforce a healthy learning environment. You can use peer
influencetode-escalatethesituation.Itisavaluabletool,butyouneedtherightpeople;otherwise,theriskssupersede
thelikelihoodofsuccess.Eithertheytakeunnecessaryrisksortheyendupavoidingtheriskandwalkingarounddoing
nothing.’
4. There are real fears about the intimidation and safety of workers in communities, especially if workers are seen to work in
cooperationwiththepolice.Theexpectationsonworkersneedtobeappropriatelymanaged.
‘Ifweweretosaythatwewereworkingonparamilitarism,howlongwouldtheprojectlast?Howlongwouldwelast?’
5. Work to address the consequences of paramilitarism for young people in communities needs to be imaginative and flexible,
requiringactiveandintelligentworkers,andwillrequirethatresourcescanbemadeavailableinatimelyway.Thiswillrequirenew
approachestoaccountabilitythatfocusonoutcomesaswellasprocedures.
‘Therearecertainsituationswheretherulesdon’tfit.STARTprogrammeworkswith12kids.Youwouldneverhavegot
thatinthepast.xhastakenarisk.Xisseeingthatthequalityandtheinterventionisthere.’
‘Rulesareguidelines,notlaws–youneedtheabilitytotakedecisions.’
101
‘Agilefundingisvitalifyouaretotakeopportunities.’
‘[Here]fourofusaretheoverseersofthemoney.Wedecide.Thiswholeethoscameaboutbecauseofthelocaltension
about [the]outcomeof theBloody Sunday Inquiryand thedecision toprosecuteoneperson.Weknewwe shouldbe
flexible.Wearefocusedonyoungpeople,wherebeforehandwewouldhavefocusedontheclub.Isaid[ourclub]would
dotheriskassessmentforeveryone[inourcity],andwewereabletotake310peopletoactivities.’
‘Theamountofmoneythatispumpedintoareasisnotreviewed.Itismoneytomanage.’
6. Re-orientating youthwork provision to tackling paramilitarismmeans prioritising thosemost at risk. This is a culture change for
muchyouthwork.
‘Weareseeingchanges.Wearenotageneralservice;weareafocusedservice.’
7. Tacklingparamilitarismsuccessfullythroughyouthworkwillrequirepersistenceandconsistencyfromfundersaswellasprojects.
‘Ifpeoplehavepavedtheway,don’ttryandinventthewheel.Noveltygetsprioritised,noteffectiveness.’
8. Thereisnosimplecauseandeffectthatyouthworkcandeliverintacklingparamilitarism.Successforyouthworkmaynotlooklike
statisticalchange,butrather,smallchangesthatenablelargersocialchanges.Governmentagenciesneedtosupportworkersasthey
102
engagewiththistopicandchangetheirownexpectationsofsuccess.Additionally,theyshouldbewillingtoadaptchangeslearned
throughtheprogrammeintotheirmainstreamactivities.
‘Wearepunchingholesinsomeofthewalls.Creatingcomplexityistheissue.Weworkwith2,500peopleand250stick
anddotheschoolprogramme.Parentsmakethatdecision,notschools.Andthekidsmakethedecision.Andofthe250,
we have the 50 people who become coaches and facilitators – they are trained to be community relations workers
throughsport.Andtheythenusethesports.Youhaveempoweredandskilleduppeople,buttheyhiteverybarrier.What
canwedotostartpunchingholesinthewalls?Themachineswallowsyouup.’
9. Honestyaboutdifficultiesandchallengesisdifficultinanenvironmentthatisdrivenbycorporatesuccessandamediaculturethat
moneyspentontacklingdifficultissuesismoneymisdirected.
‘Howdopeoplebecomehonestabouttheuncertaintyofthework?Weneedamorehonestenvironment…Xissaying,“I
amokaywithpeoplemessingup,aslongasyoulearn”.’
10. Accountability needs to be related to outcomes. Outcomes need to be assessed honestly,with the chance to evolve and adjust
practiceifthingsdonotworkonthefirstattempt.Reflectivelearningshouldbecoordinatedacentrallevel.
‘Howdowebuildthesafeguardsintothesystem[accountability]?’
103
3.10Measuringsuccess?
Inthisresearch,manyoftherespondentswerekeentopointoutthattheTacklingParamilitarismprogramme,moregenerally,shoulddevelop
ameaningfulunderstandingofchangeandthepaceatwhichitcanbedelivered,aswellastherolethatyouthworkcanplay insupporting
youngpeopleinchange.Foryouthworkers,paramilitarismisthecontext,nottheproblem:theprofessionalchallengeisfindingeffectiveways
tosupportculturechangeagainstviolenceforyoungpeopleincommunitieswheregroup-basedviolenceandself-protectiveorganisationhave
remainedingrained.
In general, youthworkers in this research agreed that the onlymeaningful level ofmeasurementwas in changed life prospects for young
peopleandcommunities. The contributionof youthwork in thisenvironment isnever the single-handederadicationofparamilitarism,but
seekingtoendtheviolationofyoungpeople.Inevitably,thatisamulti-agencytask,withthecommunityalsoatitsheart:
‘Outcomeaccountabilityisultimatelytheonlytest.’
Therewasasensethatameaningfulprogrammewouldhavetoacceptthatchangeforyoungpeopleismeasuredinchangesovertime,rather
thaninimmediateresponses.
‘Wetouchlotsofpeople,whodon’tdeliverfortenyears.Itismuchmoreorganicsthancauseandeffect.Aseedproduces–butonlyifit
getssupport.Youhavetokeepsowing.Verydifficulttotrack.Therearetriggersandthekeyisresiliencewhenithappens.’
‘Weare equippingour children todo it differently tohowwedo it now.Wearenotasking the kids todo it for us.Weareputting
somethingnewin,notdoingthesamething–thedefinitionofmadness.’
104
Within this broad framework, youthworkers accepted that indicative changeswere also important asmilestones in the shorter term. This
required a degree of qualitative assessment, including stories of potential, which could act as exemplars for future work, especially in a
developingnewareaofwork.Anumberofexampleswereoffered:
‘Recruitment isnotat the level itoncewas. Iknowthatwhenyouare lookingaround,sayatRemembranceDay, therearevery few
youngones.Noteenagerscomingthrough.Dotheywanttobeinvolved?Somedo.Thereisnoparamilitarismintheoldsense,butthose
fromthatkindofbackgroundwhowanttodothingsinapositivewaydon’tgetachance.’
‘In2002,wecouldnothavegoneinto[someschools].Butin2010wecould.Gettingthemfromtwobusesintoonebuswasnewaswell.
Thengoingtoeachother’sschools.Butthatwasaten-yearjourney.Thekidsbecamethechampionsfortheparents.Butthatisallabout
theresiliencething.’
‘Success looks like the kids that are coming throughandarenowgivingback.Of course,wedo surveysandattitudinal surveysand
numbersandallthat.Butwearetryingtostartsomething.Wegivethemthetoolsandthecontextwherethatmightbepossible.You
givethemthelanguageandtheknowledge.Wewouldtestsomeofthekids.Thekeyis[that]ithastogetundertheirskin.Thereisa
hugeissueingettingthatintoorganisations.Youhavetopunchholesintheorganisationstoo.’
Importantly,respondentsfeltthatthisaspectoftheworkshouldbeintegratedintoawiderreflectivelearningframework, inwhichhonesty
aboutbothsuccessesandfailurescouldalsocontributeactivelyaspartofwiderprofessionallearningandaccountability.
3.10Summaryobservationsandrecommendations
105
a. Paramilitarism remains a contested concept in Northern Ireland. Both loyalist and republican communities have been shaped by
embeddednarrativesofarmedstruggleand/ordefenceofthecommunitybyarmedgroupsformanygenerations.Boththepresenceof
armedgroupsandyoungpeoplejoiningthemhasadegreeof‘historictradition’,even‘normality’, infamiliesandcommunities. This
givesgroupsoutsidethelawanunusualdepthandcontinuityaswellasatradition,howevertenuously,ofclaimingpoliticalpurpose.
TacklingarmedviolenceinNorthernIrelandthereforemeanstacklingsomethingthatistreatedasintegrated,traditionaland‘normal’,
andpartofthecommunityfabricandinfrastructure,notsomethingthatisdistinct,separateandexceptional.Whileotherpartsofthe
UKandIrelandhaveknownaspectsofthis,andmanyhavehadyouthgangsorlocal‘ethnic’groups,noneofthemlivedthroughthis
phenomenonforso long,andnowherehas it impactedoneverydaycommunity lifeandpolitics foroveracentury.Anyoneworking
withparamilitarismisthereforeworkinginanunusualpoliticalcontext,inwhichpersonalhistoryandlocal‘tradition’havecombinedto
createadegreeof‘normality’-evenacceptability-aroundthepresenceanduseofviolenceforpoliticalends.
In1998,however,allofthemainpoliticalparties,includingthoseassociatedwitharmedgroups,acceptedthatviolencehasnoplacein
solvingpolitical disputes, that the ruleof law should apply everywhere and that paramilitary groups shoulddisband. In theory, this
represents a watershed political consensus that any armed activity is no longer ‘political’ but is instead ‘violence’ and therefore
criminal.Twentyyearslater,however,armedactivityincommunitiescontinues-albeitatareducedlevel-usuallyassociatingitselfwith
thepoliticaltraditionsofthepast.Youngpeopleindeprivedcommunitiesareinthefrontlineofthisactivity,bothasperpetratorsand
victims.
Modelsofpracticetoaddressviolencedevelopedelsewherecannotthereforesimplybe‘lifted’andappliedwithoutreferencetothis
historicalandsocialcontext.
106
b. Thisstudyconfirmsthattherearenumerousexamplesofeffortstopreventarmed-groupviolence indemocraticsocietiesacrossthe
world,arededicatedtopreventinggangviolenceand/orenablingmemberstoleaveandintegrateintomainstreamsociety.Youthwork
approaches, specifically of relationship building, providing alternative services, counselling, support for employment and education,
mediationandpersistenttargetingofthosemostatrisk-havebeenanessentialelementintheseefforts.Themostsuccessfularethose
whichofferagenuinealternativepathandsupporttoreachit.
Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2250, the contribution of youth work is a commitment to young people and their
participationandarefusaltoengagein‘moralpanic’,whileatthesametimerecognisingthatviolenceandconflictshapesanddistorts
young lives disproportionately to the lives of the wider community. The evidence from this study shows a surprising degree of
consensusabouttheprioritiesofyouthworktoaddressviolencebygroupsincommunities:
• De-glamorisationviolencewithrestorativeprinciples;
• Thereisnosingleformula:workhastobestreetbystreetandperson-
• centred;
• Mentor-andPeer-approachestochangearecritical.Relationshipsarethecoreofthework;
• Success requires persistence and commitment to the young person, especially those most at risk because of trauma and
marginalisation;
• Localpeoplearecritical(bothinsupportandinchange);
• Authenticandhonestengagementwithdilemmas(reflectivepractice);
107
• Youthworkexiststosupportyoungpeopleandtheirwell-beingnotpoliceproblems;
• Goodyouthworkrequiresanabilitytofocusresourcesonthosemostindifficulties;
• The systems supporting youth work with young people at risk have to be agile and flexible and not pre-determined or
bureaucratic;
• Wherepeoplechange,thishastobeacknowledgedandpermittednotresented.
c. The formal commitment to tackling paramilitarism in Northern Ireland is qualified by the experience that society is much more
ambivalentabouttakingactioninpractice.Theabilityofyouthwork,oranysingleprofession,todeliverchangeinisolationinrelation
toarmedgroupsinNorthernIrelandislimitedby:
• Perceivedcontinuingambivalenceinpoliticalleadershipandcommunitiesabouttacklingparamilitarismthatcreatesuncertainty
andriskforthoseworkingwithyoungpeople;
• Organisationssuchascouncils,police,housingorcommunitydevelopmentseldomnametacklingparamilitarismasacorporate
goal,andmuchoftheworkstilldependsonindividualswillingtotakerisks.
• Ataprofessionallevelthespecificcontributionandresponsibilityofyouthworktowardsyoungpeopleandtheirrelationshipto
armedgroupsisnotclear.Therearecurrentlyinadequatesystemsofprofessionalsupport,insufficienttraining,andinflexible
sources of protection and finance. Anyone charged professionally with tackling paramilitarism at local level without
unambiguoussupportisperceivedtobeimmediatelyatrisk.Thishasnotsubstantiallychangedsince1998;
• There is inconsistency in the wider community about the role of law and order (retributive) and personal and community
(restorative)approachesindealingwithviolenceleadingtoalackofconsistentnarrative;
108
• Funders appear to treat tackling paramilitarism as a short-term delivery target rather than a major culture-change project
requiringthedevelopmentofculturesoftrust,collaboration,co-designandco-delivery.There isaneedtomoveawayfrom
short-term ‘delivery’models, toonewhichmeasures long-termand sustainable changes in culture, reflected in the livesof
youngpeople;
• There are few opportunities for honest dialogue about challenges, opportunities and risks on these themes between young
people, local communities, youthworkers and political leaders or public agencieswith responsibilities. Aworking culture,
whichpenalisesmistakesratherthanlearnsfrommistakesiscounter-productiveinacontextofrisk.Thereisarequirementfor
opportunitiesforreflectivelearningandsupportforatransformativepracticeforyouthworkers.
d. Changewill depend on addressing the identified challenges and embedding the values and practice of supporting young people to
escape violence in thepractice of youthworkers, requiring a transformation in training, community expectations and attitudes and
professionalsupport.
3.11Recommendations
1. TheTacklingParamilitarismprogrammeshouldleadawidersocialandpoliticalconversationtoseekgreaterclarityaboutterminology
withintheprogramme,includingadiscussionofthecomplexityoftacklingparamilitarismandthevarietyofdifferentphenomenawhich
arecurrentlyencapsulatedinasingleterm.Thisshouldinformthedevelopmentofappropriateinterventionsandoutcomes,aswellas
expectationsandmeasurementsofchange.
109
2. Thevalueofyouthworkinterventioninrelationtoarmedgroupscanonlybefullyrealisedifthereareclearpathwaysforcollaborative
workingwithotheragencies.TheYouthServiceshouldconsiderhostingaquarterlymeetingofotherstakeholdersandpolicy-holders
focussingon ‘TacklingParamilitarismforYouth’asavehicle forenhancing learningacrosssectors,sharingresourcesand identifying
commonpriorities.Atminimumtheseforumsshouldincludecouncils,education,policeandcommunityhealthagencies.Aspartofa
PolicingwiththeCommunityapproachtoTacklingParamilitarism,thePSNIandyouthserviceshoulddevelopclearprotocolsforyouth
workersandpoliceofficersonformalcollaboration,toenableclearpathwaystosupportsafeguarding. Thiscouldalsocouldexplore
opportunities for a triage system,perhaps including communitymentalhealth services, toenableappropriate response to issuesof
youngpeople and violence in the community. The central importance of pastoral care andmental health supportwas a consistent
themeofthisresearch.TheSTARTprogrammeshouldbedirectlyconnectedtomentalhealthservices,toenablefastaccesstomental
healthacuteservicesatthepointofvulnerability.
3. AddressingParamilitarismand its impactonyoungpeople remainsanundevelopedareaofyouthworkpractice. TheYouthService
couldestablishclearopportunities for reflective learningandcritical reflectivepractice tounderpin thedevelopmentofprofessional
standards.Suchaprocessmightconsiderwhethertacklingparamilitarismandrelatedissuesofarmedgroupviolencerequiresspecialist
skillsorbecomespartofgenericyouthworkinNorthernIreland.
4. Youthwork practice, professional standards and training should be developed to ensure that tackling paramilitarism and all other
programmesaregovernedbyinternationalstandardsofworkingwithyoungpeople(asarticulatedin‘TheMissingPiece’(2018));This
includesaformalcommitmentto:
• mentoring and positive relationships , including one-to one mentoring for those most at risk. This could include the
establishmentofformaltrainingforMediation,DiversionandAdvocacy
• recreatingandmaintaining‘socialbridges’betweenyoungpeopleandtheircommunities,workingalongsideothers.
110
• Designingandmakingavailableavarietyoftoolsforyouthworkersengagingthosemostatrisk,includingthepotentialofgroup
work,diversionaryactivitiesandtheroleofsport,entertainmentandthearts.
• Anidentifiedroleforyouthworkersinidentifyingissuesofpersonalwell-beingandpathwaysforsignpostingyoungpeopleto
appropriatewellbeingandmentalhealthsupport.
• Explorationofgenderandtheappropriateinterventionsrelatingtothisparticularissue.
• Educationoremploymentarewidelyseenascrucialelementsinsustainingthetransitionofayoungpersonawayfromharmful
behaviour and influences. The Tackling Paramilitarism programme should ensure that these pathways are available and
integratedwithbroaderyouthworkapproaches.
5. Youthworkprogrammesarecommittedtoworkingtowardsreducingexposuretotrauma,andriskofanyfurtherharmtoparticipants
within traumatised communities. Youth work agencies should continue to explore the potential of Restorative Practices, Trauma-
informedapproaches topractice, and thepotential forpublichealth approaches to violence reduction toenhance youthwork, and
integratelearningintoprofessionaltraininganddevelopment.
6. One of the most important concepts emerging from this research was ‘relentless outreach’ to young people at risk. There was
widespreadsupportamongworkersfordivertingresourcestothosemostatrisk.Whilethisconceptwasseenasvitalinestablishing
commitment to some of the most marginalised, it was also recognised that successful outreach was emotionally and physically
challengingforworkers. Toenablethis, theYouthserviceshouldestablishclearmechanismstosupportworkers inthisdifficultand
pioneering area, where workers may feel isolated or under stress. Youth workers should have clear support within their line-
managementstructurewithinwhichsometimesdifficultjudgementscanbeconsideredandsupportedandhavethecapacitytodraw
onexternalsupportandplannedrespiteifrequired.
111
7. Likeallstatutoryandcommunityservices,youthworkdependsontheruleoflaw.Theroleofyouthworkinaddressingparamilitarism
arisesfromaparticularapplicationofthedutytosafeguardyoungpeoplefromriskswhichhaveamoreuniversalapplicationincluding
violence,seriouscriminalityandcoercivecontrol.Whilethenatureoftheriskinarmedgroupsisspecific,itisultimatelyadevelopment
ofanexistingrole.ConsiderationshouldbegiventothearticulationofaProfessionalDutywhichappliestoallyouthworkandisnot
simplythedomainoftheSTARTworkers.
8. Ameaningfulyouthworkcontributiontotacklingparamilitarismincommunitieswillnotbeachievedunlessyouthworkisresourcedto
sustaintheworkoverameaningfulperiodoftime.Relationship-basedworkrequiressustainedengagement. Longtermsuccesswill
requireresourceplanningfora5-10yearprogramme.
9. Approachestotacklingparamilitarismrootedinvoluntaryengagement,alternativepathwaysandsupportingtransition,suchasyouth,
social development and trauma-informedapproaches arenecessarily distinct fromenforcement-basedapproaches, throughpolicing
andcriminaljusticeontheother.Youthworkprogrammescanonlycontributetotheoverallprogrammeifyouthparticipationremains
voluntary rather thanmandatory. Theways inwhicheach canand should contribute to theoutcomeof theTacklingParamilitarism
programmeisdistinctive,anditwoldbehelpfuliftheexpectationsofhoweachmethodisappliedandcomplementseachothercould
beclarifiedby theProgrammeBoard,andused todevelopclearermeasuresand indicatorsof successandhoweachcontributes to
outcomes.
10. Atthesametime,thespecificfocusonsupportingyoungpeople‘atrisk’orinvolvedinarmedgroupsinthisprogrammecaneasilybe
lostin‘generalprinciplesofgoodyouthwork’unlessthereisclearunderstandingofpurposeandmeasurementandstrongprofessional
supportandguidanceforworkers.Youthworkshoulddevelopnewmethodstogatherinformationonchangeanddevelopment.This
includesqualitativemeasureswhichindicatehowapparentmicro-developmentsaresometimesmajorachievementsforyoungpeople.
Clarifying expectations at programme and professional level, and developing a clearer understanding of the range of possible
112
interventionsandmeasuresofsuccesswouldbeanimportantcontributiontoprofessionaldevelopmentinthisarea.Theseshouldbe
presentedinsuchawayastocontributetooutcomes-basedaccountability.
11. Therelationofyouthworkerstothepolicewithin‘PolicingwiththeCommunity’shouldbeclarified.ThePSNIandyouthserviceshould
developclearprotocolsforyouthworkersandpoliceofficersoncollaboration,makingclearboththedistinctandseparaterolesofthe
two services while enabling collaboration to support safeguarding. Thismight explore explore opportunities for a triage system to
enableappropriateresponsetoissuesofyoungpeopleandviolenceinthecommunity.
113
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Countering Paramilitary & Organised Criminal Influence on Youth: A Review
Full Report
ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThank you for taking the time to read this research. We would like to thank all of those who gave up their time to be interviewed or to assist with the study.
AUTHORSDuncan Morrow & Jonny Byrne
DESIGN StudioStereo PUBLISHED BYThe Corrymeela Press, BelfastMarch 2020
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