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Chapter One

ONTHECURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

1 Introduction

In his Tanner Lectureof1979calledldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoAmartyaSenaskedwhatmetricegalitariansshouldusetoestablishtheextenttowhichtheiridealisrealizedinagivensocietyWhataspect(s)ofaper-sonrsquosconditionshouldcountinafundamentalwayforegalitariansandnotmerelyascauseoforevidenceoforproxyforwhattheyregardasfundamental

In this study I examine answers to that question and discussionsbearing on that question in recent philosophical literature I take forgranted that there is something which justice requires people to haveequalamountsofnotnomatterwhatbuttowhateverextentisallowedbyvalueswhichcompetewithdistributiveequalityandIstudywhatanumberofauthorswhosharethategalitarianviewhavesaidaboutthedimension(s)orrespect(s)inwhichpeopleshouldbemademoreequalwhenthepriceinothervaluesofmovingtowardgreaterequalityisnotintolerable

I also advance ananswerofmyown to SenrsquosquestionMyansweris theproductof an immanent critiqueofRonaldDworkinone thatiswhichrejectsDworkinrsquosdeclaredpositionbecause it isnotcongru-entwith itsownunderlyingmotivationMyresponse toDworkinhasbeeninfluencedbyRichardArnesonrsquosworkinadvocacyofldquoequalityofopportunity forwelfarerdquobutmyanswer toSenrsquosquestion isnot thatArnesonianonenorismyansweraswellformulatedasArnesonrsquosis1

ItneedsmuchfurtherrefinementbutIneverthelesspresentithereinarough-and-readyformbecauseofitsassociationwithrelativelyfinishedcriticismsofotherswhichIthinkaretellingIfthisstudycontributestounderstandingitdoessomorebecauseofthosecriticismsthanbecauseofthepositivedoctrineitaffirms

ldquoOntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJusticerdquoEthics99(1989)906ndash44BypermissionofTheUniversityofChicagoPress

1 SeeArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquoMycriticismsofDworkinwereconceivedwithoutknowledgeofArnesonrsquospartlyparallelonesbut itwasreadingArnesonwhichcausedmetoseewhatpositiveviewmycriticismsimpliedeventhoughthatviewisnotthesameasArnesonrsquos

4

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CHAPTERONE

InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones

Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert

Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris

ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit

FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2

2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]

5

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

4

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones

Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert

Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris

ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit

FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2

2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]

5

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

5

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

2 Methodological Preliminaries

Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes

On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily

InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims

An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion

Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe

3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293

6

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CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

6

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme

Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger

4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone

7

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

7

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave

ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint

(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities

NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal

Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6

Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable

5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive

6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

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ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

8

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CHAPTERONE

valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize

(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis

NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian

Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7

(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault

SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive

7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

9

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature

3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare

Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression

Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim

Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto

8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

10

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CHAPTERONE

prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11

Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple

Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends

People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12

11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases

12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

11

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo

Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise

TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13

NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst

Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase

In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over

13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

12

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CHAPTERONE

andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage

IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple

But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)

OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto

14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

13

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop

4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut

a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial

Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16

15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo

16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow

14

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CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

14

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive

Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18

SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection

17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo

18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

15

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources

b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor

TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy

NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability

Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense

16

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CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

16

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople

IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles

InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21

Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople

ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine

19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97

20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe

psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit

Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples

OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses

People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes

ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot

18

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

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CHAPTERONE

nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit

Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage

IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain

(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis

22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask

23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])

24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

19

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)

c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent

InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings

DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26

SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation

IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant

25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

20

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CHAPTERONE

oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis

ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources

Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop

Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy

27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines

28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare

29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample

21

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

21

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes

IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason

InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31

Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32

30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

22

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CHAPTERONE

NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis

Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34

d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare

33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235

34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])

35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

23

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded

AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36

e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription

NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot

36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)

37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

24

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CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

24

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38

ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain

ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem

Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap

1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings

2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely

38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo

39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

25

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere

Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit

3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration

4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40

f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis

40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions

26

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CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

26

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41

ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion

Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson

It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein

41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169

42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson

43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

27

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone

Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste

Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal

Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances

44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-

terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis

owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)

47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

28

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CHAPTERONE

sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes

Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig

FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant

The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit

48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow

49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo

29

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

29

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo

IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy

The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources

g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities

CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should

50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo

51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff

30

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CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

30

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo

Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53

IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers

NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts

ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-

52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)

53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

31

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58

WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa

55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-

sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-

isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)

59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

32

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CHAPTERONE

differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit

SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer

TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes

NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice

LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas

Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63

h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather

61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo

62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)

63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

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CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

33

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception

5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness

aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)

Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism

Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64

Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit

64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities

65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-

tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim

34

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CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

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CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

34

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper

AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation

Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67

Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation

BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample

67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17

35

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

35

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround

Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68

ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69

Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample

Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad

68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction

69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

36

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem

ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)

ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers

Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism

Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-

37

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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

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CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

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CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

37

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70

I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment

b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences

CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72

Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong

70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet

71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian

ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above

73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

38

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter

Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76

IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues

Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78

Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave

75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

39

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe

OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment

(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter

ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-

eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice

(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)

Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79

InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind

Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding

79 Ibidpp665ndash66

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

40

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment

6 Sen on Capability

Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality

AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct

ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit

80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

41

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo

Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone

Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83

Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective

Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities

81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)

82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes

83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona

varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

42

Copyrighted Material

CHAPTERONE

butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87

Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered

It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90

ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis

86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism

87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11

88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere

89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs

43

Copyrighted Material

CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE

notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit

Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192

91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive

criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs