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Copyrighted Material
Chapter One
ONTHECURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
1 Introduction
In his Tanner Lectureof1979calledldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoAmartyaSenaskedwhatmetricegalitariansshouldusetoestablishtheextenttowhichtheiridealisrealizedinagivensocietyWhataspect(s)ofaper-sonrsquosconditionshouldcountinafundamentalwayforegalitariansandnotmerelyascauseoforevidenceoforproxyforwhattheyregardasfundamental
In this study I examine answers to that question and discussionsbearing on that question in recent philosophical literature I take forgranted that there is something which justice requires people to haveequalamountsofnotnomatterwhatbuttowhateverextentisallowedbyvalueswhichcompetewithdistributiveequalityandIstudywhatanumberofauthorswhosharethategalitarianviewhavesaidaboutthedimension(s)orrespect(s)inwhichpeopleshouldbemademoreequalwhenthepriceinothervaluesofmovingtowardgreaterequalityisnotintolerable
I also advance ananswerofmyown to SenrsquosquestionMyansweris theproductof an immanent critiqueofRonaldDworkinone thatiswhichrejectsDworkinrsquosdeclaredpositionbecause it isnotcongru-entwith itsownunderlyingmotivationMyresponse toDworkinhasbeeninfluencedbyRichardArnesonrsquosworkinadvocacyofldquoequalityofopportunity forwelfarerdquobutmyanswer toSenrsquosquestion isnot thatArnesonianonenorismyansweraswellformulatedasArnesonrsquosis1
ItneedsmuchfurtherrefinementbutIneverthelesspresentithereinarough-and-readyformbecauseofitsassociationwithrelativelyfinishedcriticismsofotherswhichIthinkaretellingIfthisstudycontributestounderstandingitdoessomorebecauseofthosecriticismsthanbecauseofthepositivedoctrineitaffirms
ldquoOntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJusticerdquoEthics99(1989)906ndash44BypermissionofTheUniversityofChicagoPress
1 SeeArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquoMycriticismsofDworkinwereconceivedwithoutknowledgeofArnesonrsquospartlyparallelonesbut itwasreadingArnesonwhichcausedmetoseewhatpositiveviewmycriticismsimpliedeventhoughthatviewisnotthesameasArnesonrsquos
4
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CHAPTERONE
InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones
Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert
Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris
ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit
FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2
2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]
5
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
2 Methodological Preliminaries
Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes
On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily
InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims
An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion
Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe
3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293
6
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CHAPTERONE
strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme
Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger
4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone
7
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave
ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint
(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities
NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal
Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6
Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable
5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive
6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection
8
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CHAPTERONE
valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
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Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
19
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
4
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CHAPTERONE
InSection2of thearticle IdistinguishbetweenegalitarianthesesofdifferentstrengthsandIindicatethatcertain(notall)counterexamplestostrongersortsofthesesfailtodisturbcorrelativeweakerones
Section3scrutinizestwoRawlsiancriticismsofequalityofwelfareThefirstsaysthatanuncorrectedwelfaremetricwronglyequatespleasuresandpreferenceswhichdifferinmoralcharacterItputsthepleasureofdomi-nation for exampleonaparwithpleasure froman innocentpastimewherethetwoareequal in intensityAndthesecondcriticismsaysthatthewelfaremetriccatersunjustifiablytoexpensivetasteswhicharegener-atedbyforexampletheirbearerrsquoslackofself-disciplineThosecriticismsdefeatequalityofwelfarebutsoIclaimtheydonotasRawlsthinksalsoinducesupportforaprimarygoodsmetricandthesecondcriticismismoreoverhardtoreconcilewithRawlsrsquosviewsoneffortanddesert
Ronald Dworkin refines and extends both Rawlsian criticisms ofequalityofwelfarealthoughprimarygoodsarereplacedbyresourcesintheDworkiniandevelopmentoftheRawlsianviewInSection4Ishowthat much of Dworkinrsquos critique of equality of welfare will be met ifegalitariansallowdeviationsfromequalityofwelfarewhichreflectpeo-plersquoschoicesthatisArnesonrsquosequal opportunity for welfaretheoryButsomeofDworkinrsquosobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecannotbehandledinArnesonrsquoswayandtherightresponsetothemistoaffirmwhatIcallequal access to advantagewhereldquoadvantagerdquoisunderstoodtoincludebuttobewiderthanwelfareUnderequalaccesstoadvantagethefun-damentaldistinctionforanegalitarianisbetweenchoiceandluckintheshapingofpeoplersquosfatesIarguethatDworkinrsquosdifferentmasterdistinc-tionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesislesstruetothemotivationofhisownphilosophythantheoneIfavoris
ThomasScanlonargueshoweverthatthefactthatapersonchosetodevelopacertaintasteisonlysuperficiallysignificantfordistributivejus-ticeThereasonhesayswhyegalitariansdonotcompensatepeopleforchosenexpensivetastesisthatthosetastesbeingchosenareoneswhichtheymightnothavehadAccordingtoScanlonitisnottheirchosenbuttheirperipheraloridiosyncraticcharacterwhichexplainswhyexpensivetasteshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedInSection5IdefendmyemphasisonchoiceagainstScanlonrsquosskepticismbutIalsosignificantlyamendthechoice-centeredegalitarianproposaltocatertowhatseemsundeniableinScanlonrsquoscaseagainstit
FinallyinSection6IclaimthatAmartyaSenrsquoswritingsonldquocapabil-ityrdquointroducetwoanswerstohisldquoEqualityofwhatrdquoquestioneachofwhichhas itsattractionsbutwhichdiffersubstantially incontentasIshallshowatlengthelsewhere2
2 SeemyldquoEqualityofWhatrdquo[reprintedasChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]
5
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
2 Methodological Preliminaries
Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes
On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily
InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims
An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion
Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe
3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293
6
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CHAPTERONE
strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme
Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger
4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone
7
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave
ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint
(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities
NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal
Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6
Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable
5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive
6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection
8
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CHAPTERONE
valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
5
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
2 Methodological Preliminaries
Apersonisexploitedwhenunfairadvantageistakenofhimandhesuf-fersfrom(bad)brute luckwhenhisbadluckisnottheresultofagambleorriskwhichhecouldhaveavoided3Ibelievethattheprimaryegalitar-ianimpulseistoextinguishtheinfluenceondistributionofbothexploi-tationandbrute luckTobesureprinciplednon-andantiegalitariansalsocondemn(whattheyconsidertobe)exploitationbuttheydonothavethesameviewofexploitationasegalitarianshavepartlybecausetheyarelessdisturbedbybrute-luck-derivedassetdifferenceswhichskewdistributiveoutcomes
On the foregoing sketchof theprimaryegalitarian impulsea state-mentwhichpurportstoexpressandassertitisexposedtotwokindsofchallengeFirstsuchastatementmightbecriticizedformisidentifyingwhatshouldinthelightofthefundamentalegalitarianaimbeequal-izedIshallmyselfsocriticizeDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesproposalsinceIthinkthat(amongotherthings)itpenalizespeoplewhohavetastesforwhichtheycannotbeheldresponsiblebutwhichunluckilyforthemcostalottosatisfyButonemightalsorejectequalityofresourcesonthequitedifferentgroundthatitconflictswithsomeimportantnonegalitar-ianvaluesOnemightsayforexamplethatwhileitisindeedbruteluckwhichdistributeschildrenintorichandpoorfamiliesitwouldbewrongtoseekrectificationoftheresultsofthatlucksincethatwouldunder-minetheinstitutionofthefamily
InthisarticleIshallnotdiscussproblemsforegalitarianproposalsofthat secondkindproblems that is of trade-offbetween equality andothervaluesThatisbecauseIshalltreatthevariousegalitarianpropos-alstobereviewedbelowasweak equalisandum claims
An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalizedwhat that is people should be rendered equal in An unqualified orstrong equalisandum claimwhich is the sort thatanuncompromisingegalitarianassertssaysthatpeopleshouldbeasequalaspossibleinthedimensionitspecifiesAqualifiedorweak equalisandumclaimsaysthatthey should be as equal as possible in some dimension but subject towhatever limitationsneed tobe imposed indeference toother valuesthoselimitationsarenotspecifiedbytheclaiminquestion
Nowstrongequalisandumclaimsfaceobjectionsofthetwokindsdis-tinguishedaboveandwhichIshallnowcallegalitarianandnonegalitar-ianobjectionsAnegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallywhichdiffersfromtheoneembodiedinthe
3 Thelatterkindofluckisoption luckThedistinctionbetweenbruteandoptionluckcomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293
6
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CHAPTERONE
strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme
Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger
4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone
7
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave
ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint
(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities
NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal
Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6
Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable
5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive
6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection
8
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CHAPTERONE
valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
6
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CHAPTERONE
strongequalisandumclaimitchallengesTheegalitarianobjectorthinksthatpeopleshouldbeequaltosomeorotherextentinsomethingotherthanwhattheclaimheopposesspecifiesbuthedoesnotquaegalitar-ianobjectorobjecttothestrengthofthatclaimassuchBycontrastanonegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimsaysthatwhiletheclaimmight(andmightnot)correctlyidentifywhatshouldbeequal-izeditwronglyfailstodefertononegalitarianvalueswhichrestricttheextenttowhichtheformofequalityitproposesshouldbepursuedbe-causeofthosevaluessotheobjectionsaystheequalisandumproposalisunacceptable(atleast)initsstrongformAnegalitarianobjectiontoastrongequalisandumclaimalsoappliestotheweakonecorrelativetoitwhereasanonegalitarianobjectionchallengesstrongproposalsonlySinceminewillbeaweakproposalobjectionsofanonegalitariankindwillnotdetainme
Takingwelfareasasampleequalisandumproposal IshallpresentlyillustratethedistinctionIhavetriedtodrawbydescribingsupposedob-jectionstothewelfareequalisandumwhichare(i)plainlynotegalitar-ian(ii)arguablyandsoIbelieveegalitarianand(iii)problematicwithrespecttohowtheyshouldbeclassifiedButbeforeembarkingonthatexerciseindifferentiationawordaboutwhatIshallmeanbylsquowelfarersquohereandthroughoutthisstudyOfthemanyreadingsoflsquowelfarersquoalive(ifnotwell)ineconomicsandphilosophyIaminterestedintwowel-fareasenjoymentormorebroadlyasadesirableoragreeablestateofconsciousnesswhichIshallcallhedonic welfareandwelfareasprefer-ence satisfactionwherepreferencesorderstatesoftheworldandwhereapersonrsquospreference is satisfied ifa stateof theworld thatheprefersobtainswhetherornotheknowsthatitdoes4anda fortioriwhateverhedonicwelfarehedoesordoesnotgetasaresultofitsobtainingAper-sonrsquoshedonicwelfareincreasesashegetsmoreenjoymentandhispref-erencesatisfactionincreasesasmoreofhispreferencesorhisstronger
4 ThesetworeadingsofwelfarecorrespondtoSenrsquosldquohappinessrdquoandldquodesirefulfillmentrdquoreadingsandexcludehisldquochoicerdquoreading(seeSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp187ff)ItisreasonabletoignoretheldquochoicerdquoreadingsinceasSenshowsitcomesfromconfusionabout the relationshipbetweenpreferenceandchoiceMy tworeadingsalso correspond toDworkinrsquos ldquoconscious staterdquo andldquorelative successrdquo conceptions (seeDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp191ndash94204ndash9220ndash21)Idonotconsiderwelfareasldquooverallsuccessrdquo(ibidpp209ff)becauseitisveryhardtohandleandinanycaseitisarguablyundermotivated(seen34below)Ialsosetasideso-calledobjectivetheoriesofwelfare(ibidpp224ndash26)sincemostphilosopherswouldconsiderthemalternativestoanysortofwelfaretheoryScanlonforwhomwelfareispreferencesatisfactionwoulddescribehis theoryasantiwelfaristyet it isanobjective theoryofwelfare inDworkinrsquossenseFinallytocompletethereviewofthefivethinkerswhoseworkissalientinthisstudyArnesonhasthesameunderstandingofwelfareasScanlondoesandRawlshasnotspeci-fiedaparticularconceptionwhichisnottosaythatheshouldhavedone
7
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave
ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint
(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities
NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal
Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6
Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable
5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive
6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection
8
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CHAPTERONE
valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
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Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
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oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
7
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
preferencesarefulfilledNotethatonewaytoachievemorepreferencesatisfactionistocultivateifyoucanpreferencesthatareeasiertosatisfythanthosewhichyoucurrentlyhave
ItwillsometimesbenecessarytosaywhichofthosetwoideasImeanbylsquowelfarersquobutnotalwaysForveryoftenthedebatesonwhichIcom-menthaveasimilarshapeundereitherinterpretationofwelfaresothatI shallhaveeach inmind (bywhich Idonotmean someamalgamofthetwo)atonceUnlessIindicateotherwisemycontentionsaremeanttoholdundereitherofthetworeadingsofwelfarewhichIjustdistin-guishedandtherestofthepresentsectionisacaseinpoint
(i)Manypeoplethinkthatapolicyofequalizingwelfareisinconsis-tentwiththemaintenanceoffamilyvaluesbecausesotheysaythosevaluesendorsepracticesofbenefitinglovedoneswhichgeneratewelfareinequalities
NowhoweverpenetratingthatpointmaybeitdoesnotrepresentanegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareUnregulatedkinshipgeneros-itymaybepreciousonothergroundsbutitcouldnotbethoughttopro-motetheresultthatpeoplegetanequalamountofsomethingthattheyshouldhaveequalamountsofAccordinglyifthefamilyvaluesobjectionindeedhasforceagainstequalityofwelfareitisareasonforrestrictingthewritofthatparticularequalisandumorformofequalityandnotareasonforproposinganotherequalisanduminitssteadFamilyvaluesdonotchallengeequalityofwelfarewhenthelatterisconstruedasaquali-fiedequalisandumproposal
Anotherobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfarewhichisnotegali-tarian is that implementing itwould involve intolerably intrusive statesurveillance5(ldquoHiIrsquomfromtheMinistryofEqualityAreyoubyanychance unusually happy todayrdquo) Gathering the information neededtoapplyunqualifiedequalityofresourcesmightwellinvolvelessintru-sionandthatwouldbeareasonforpreferringunqualifiedequalityofresourcestounqualifiedequalityofwelfarebutnotonewhichimpugnedtheegalitariancharacterofequalityofwelfare6
Stillanothernonegalitarianobjectiontoequalityofwelfareisthatifprioritywerealwaysgiventorelievingmiserythennoresourcescouldbedevotedtomaintainingcathedralsandothercreationsofinestimable
5 IdonothaveinmindtheobjectionthatthelevelofwelfareapersonenjoysisnoneofthestatersquosbusinessImeantheobjectionthatwhetherornotwelfarelevelsareanybusi-nessofthestatetheproceduresnecessarytofindoutwhattheyarewouldbeunacceptablyinvasive
6 Recallthatldquoanegalitarianobjectionrestsonaviewabouttherightwaytotreatpeopleequallyrdquo(seep5above)Henceeveniftheldquointrusionrdquoobjectiontounqualifiedequalityofwelfareissued insupportforunqualifiedequalityofresourcesitwouldnotthereforebeanegalitarianobjection
8
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valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
8
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CHAPTERONE
valueThatpowerfulobjectiontouncompromisingequalityofwelfaredoesnotchallengetheclaimthattotheextentthatequalizationisdefen-siblewelfareistherightthingtoequalize
(ii)Considerpeoplewhoconvertresourcesintowelfareinefficientlysothatifwelfareistobeequalizedtheymustbegiventwicetheresourcesthatordinary converters getThesebad convertersdivide into varioussubsetsSomeofthemareinefficientbecausetheyarenegligentorfeck-lessinamorallyculpablewaytheybuytheirfoodatFortnumrsquosbecausetheycannotbebotheredtowalkuptotheBerwickStreetmarketOth-ers areblamelessly inefficient because theyare in somewaydisabledTheyneedtwicethenormalrationbecausehalfofsuchadouble-shareisrequiredtoovercometheillfareeffectsofahandicapfromwhichtheysufferThathalfcouldbethecostoftheirrenaldialysis
NowthereseemstometobeanegalitarianobjectiontoapolicyofensuringthattheFortnumrsquoscustomerrsquoswelfarelevelisashighasevery-bodyelsersquosItseemstomethatwhenotherpeoplepayforhisreadilyavoidablewastefulnessthereispro tantoanexploitativedistributionofburdenwhichegalitariansshouldcondemnEqualityofwelfareshouldhereberejectednotbecauseofothervaluesbutbecauseitisinegalitarian
Buttherecouldalsobeanobjectiontoservicingkidneyfailure(andsimilar) sufferers to theextent required toequalizewelfare thepolicycouldbesaidmdashisoftensaidmdashtohavetoodepressiveaneffectonthewel-fareofeverybodyelseinsocietyYetwhilethatmayberightithardlyrepresents an egalitarian objection to equality ofwelfareKeeping ag-gregatewelfarehighattheexpenseofkidneysufferersisnotawayofdistributingsomethingmoreequally7
(iii)Therearepeoplewhoseinefficiencyatturningresourcesintowel-fareisclearlytheirownfaultandotherswhoseinefficiencyisclearlybadluckButbetweentheseextremetypesthereisavastrangeofcaseswhereitisunclearwhetherornotfaultappliesItisveryhardtosaywithrespecttomanygrumpypeopleforexamplewhethertheycanbeheldtoaccountfortheirgrumpinesswhetheraswesaytheyaremoretobepitiedthanblamedNowgrumpypeoplearebadconvertersandifwefeelreluctanttoservicethemwiththeextraresourcestheyneedtobecomeabitcheer-fulthenitisunclearwhethertheobjectiontoequalityofwelfareassoci-atedwiththatreluctanceis(atleastinpart)egalitariansinceitisunclearwhetherornottheirconversioninefficiencyistheirownfault
SomuchinillustrationofdifferentbasesonwhichegalitarianclaimsmightbechallengedLetusnowtakeequalityofwelfareasaproposedsolution to theequalisandumproblemmdashitseems tomethemostnaive
7 IbelievethatIheredisplaydisagreementwithwhatDworkinsaysinldquoEqualityofWel-farerdquop242whichIfindobscure
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
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Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
19
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
9
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
oneandthereforeanaturalonewithwhichtostartmdashandletusseehowitmustbemodifiedinthelightofegalitarianobjectionstoitwhichhavebeenraisedinrecentphilosophicalliterature
3 Rawlsian Criticism of Equality of Welfare
Agoodwaytobeginisbyexaminingtwoobjectionstoequalityofwel-fareinbothitshedonicanditspreferenceinterpretations8whichderivefromtheworkofJohnRawlsandwhichIshallcalltheoffensive tastes andexpensive tastes criticisms Ibelieve thateachcriticismcanbeac-commodatedbyawelfareegalitarianthroughanaturalmodificationofhisoriginalviewInthecaseoftheoffensivetastescriticismthatwouldprobablybeconcededbyRawls(andbyRonaldDworkinwhodevelopsthe criticism more systematically and at some length) But the secondcriticismissupposedbyRawlsandDworkintojustifyanabandonmentoftheterrainofwelfarealtogetherandasIshallindicateIdonotthinkthatitdoesThesecondcriticismalsocreatesaproblemforRawlsrsquossys-temwhichIshalldescribeinabriefdigression
Rawlsadvertstooffensivetastesinthecourseofhiscritiqueofutili-tarianismbutasAmartyaSennotesheisatthatpointreallycriticizingwelfarismassuchwherewelfarismistheviewthatjustdistributionissome or other function of nothing but the welfares of individuals9 ItfollowslogicallythattheoffensivetastescriticismalsoappliesagainstaconceptionofjusticeinwhichequalityofwelfareistheonlyprincipleAndalthoughaldquoweakrdquo(seeSection2above)egalitarianofwelfareneednotbeawelfarist(saveofcoursewithrespecttothemetricofequalityinparticular)itisextremelyunlikelythatagoodcriticismofwelfarismproperwillnotalsoapplytothatrestrictedwelfarismwhichacknowl-edgestherelevanceofnoinformationbutwelfareinthecontextofequal-ity even if itsproponentadmitsnonwelfare informationelsewhere Inanycasetheoffensivetastescriticismstrikesmeaspowerfulagainstevenaweakwelfare-egalitarianclaim
Theoffensivetastescriticismofwelfarismisthatthepleasureapersontakes indiscriminating against otherpeopleor in subjectingothers toalesserlibertyshouldnotcountequallywithothersatisfactionsinthecalculusofjustice10Fromthepointofviewofjusticesuchpleasuresde-servecondemnationandthecorrespondingpreferenceshavenoclaimtobesatisfiedeveniftheywouldhavetobesatisfiedforwelfareequalityto
8 Forthedifferencebetweentheseinterpretationsseeabove9 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21110RawlsA Theory of Justicepp30ndash31
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
19
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
10
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CHAPTERONE
prevailIbelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfarismandhenceequal-ityofwelfareButthenaturalcourseforawelfareegalitariantotakeinresponsetotheoffensivetastescriticismistoshifthisfavortosomethinglikeequalityofinoffensivewelfareThecriticismdoesnotseemtoneces-sitateabandoningequalityofwelfareinamorefundamentalway11
Theexpensive tastescriticismisthoughttonecessitatesuchanaban-donmentItoccursinthecontextofRawlsrsquosadvocacyofprimarygoodsas the appropriate equalisandum ldquoImagine two persons one satisfiedwithadietofmilkbreadandbeanswhiletheotherisdistraughtwith-outexpensivewinesandexoticdishesInshortonehasexpensivetastestheotherdoesnotrdquoAwelfareegalitarianmustceteris paribusprovidetheepicurewithahigherincomethanthepersonofmodesttastesinceotherwisethelattermightbesatisfiedwhiletheformerisdistraughtButRawlsarguespowerfullyagainstthisimplicationofthewelfareegalitar-ianprinciple
Asmoralpersonscitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesItisnotbyitselfanobjectiontotheuseofprimarygoodsthat itdoesnotaccommodatethosewithexpensivetastesOnemustargueinadditionthatitisunrea-sonable ifnotunjust toholdsuchpersons responsible for theirpreferencesandtorequirethemtomakeoutasbesttheycanButtoarguethisseemstopresupposethatcitizensrsquopreferencesarebe-yondtheircontrolaspropensitiesorcravingswhichsimplyhap-penCitizensseemtoberegardedaspassivecarriersofdesiresTheuseofprimarygoodsreliesonacapacitytoassumeresponsibil-ityforourends
People with expensive tastes could have chosen otherwise and if andwhentheypressforcompensationothersareentitledtoinsistthattheythemselvesbearthecostldquooftheirlackofforesightorself-disciplinerdquo12
11 InfairnesstoRawlsoneshouldrecallthathepresentedtheoffensivetastescriticismasanobjectionnottoequalityofwelfarebuttoutilitarianismandforutilitariansamovetoldquoinoffensivewelfarerdquonodoubtconstitutesaprettyfundamentalshiftFromthefactthatthesamecriticismappliesagainstbothviewsandthateachshouldberevisedinthesamewayinthefaceofititdoesnotfollowthatthedistancebetweentheoriginalandtherevisedviewisthesameinbothcases
12 RawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquopp168ndash69CompareRawlsldquoFairnesstoGoodnessrdquop553ldquoJusticeasFairnessrdquopp243ndash44Forasomewhatdifferentexplana-tionofwhyjusticeignoresexpensivetasteswithless(notno)emphasisontheideathattheyaresubjecttotheagentrsquoscontrolandmoreontheideathatitisappropriatetoholdhimaccountableforthemseethereplytoArrowrsquosldquoSomeOrdinalist-UtilitarianNotesrdquoinRawlsrsquosldquoCitizensrsquoNeedsandPrimaryGoodsrdquoForinterestingcommentonandsym-pathetic developmentofRawlsrsquos viewson responsibility forpreference seeLandesmanldquoEgalitarianismrdquop37
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
11
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Ibelievethatthisobjectiondefeatswelfareegalitarianismbutthatitdoesnot asRawls supposes also vindicate the claimsof theprimarygoodsmetricTherightwayforanerstwhilewelfareegalitariantore-spondtotheobjectionseemstometobethefollowingldquoTotheextentthatpeopleare indeedresponsiblefortheirtastes therelevantwelfaredeficits donot command the attentionof justiceWe should thereforecompensateonly for thosewelfaredeficitswhicharenot in somewaytraceabletotheindividualrsquoschoicesWeshouldreplaceequalityofwel-farebyequalityofopportunityforwelfareItwouldbeutterlyunjustifiedtoadoptaprimarygoodsmetricbecauseoftheexpensivetastescounter-examplerdquo
Ishallpursuethatresponsefurtherinthenextsectioninconfronta-tionwithDworkinrsquos extensivedevelopmentof the themeof expensivetasteButbeforeturningtoDworkinIwanttoindicateaseriousprob-lemforRawlsrsquossystemwhichhisremarksaboutexpensivetastesraise
TheproblemisthatthepictureoftheindividualasresponsiblyguidinghisowntasteformationishardtoreconcilewithclaimsRawlselsewhereusesinafundamentalwaytosupporthisegalitarianismIhaveinmindtheskepticismwhichheexpressesaboutextrarewardforextraeffortldquoTheeffortapersoniswillingtomakeisinfluencedbyhisnaturalabili-tiesandskillsandthealternativesopentohimThebetterendowedaremorelikelyotherthingsequaltostriveconscientiouslyandthereseemstobenowaytodiscountfortheirgreatergoodfortuneTheideaofre-wardingdesertisimpracticablerdquo13
NowtherearetwowaysoftakingthispassageOnewayisasIthinkRawlsintendeditandtheotherisasRobertNozicktookitandonthebasisofwhichheenteredstrongcriticismofRawlsNozickIamsuremisreadthepassagebuthismisreadingofitconstitutesacorrectreadingofwhatmanysocialistsandegalitarianssayabouteffort so itwillbeworthourwhiletopausedigressivelytoattendtoNozickrsquoscriticismOneitherreadingofthepassageitishardtoreconcilewithwhatRawlssaysaboutforesightself-disciplineandexpensivetastesButIshallcometothatpointinamomentforthepassagecanalsobecriticizedindepen-dentlyandIwanttodothatfirst
Thetworeadingsofthepassagedividewithrespecttohowtheytaketheword lsquoinfluencedrsquo inRawlsrsquosuseof it here Inmy readingof it itmeansldquoinfluencedrdquoInNozickrsquositmeanssomethinglikeldquowhollydeter-minedrdquoThereisdifficultyforRawlswhicheverwaywetakeitbutnotthesamedifficultyineachcase
In my reading of Rawls in which he means ldquoinfluencedrdquo by lsquoinflu-encedrsquo he does not say that the more effortful have no control over
13RawlsA Theory of Justicep312
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
12
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CHAPTERONE
andthereforedeservenocreditfortheamountofefforttheyputinHisdifferentpointisthatwecannotreckontheextenttowhichtheirabove-pareffortisattributablenottoadmirablestrivingbuttoldquogreatergoodfortunerdquothereisldquonowaytodiscountrdquoforthelatterThatisapracticalobjectiontotryingtorewardeffortthatdeservesrewardnotaclaimthatthereisnosucheffortmdashseethefinalsentenceofthepassage
IfRawlsisrightthatnotalleffortisdeservingthenwemightagreenotalleffortdeservesrewardButwhyshoulditfollowthateffortde-servesnorewardatallThepracticaldifficultyoftellinghowmuchofitmeritsrewardhardlyjustifiesrewardingitatarateof0percentasopposed toata rate somewherebetween0percentand100percentforexamplethroughataxationschemewhoseshapeandjustificationescapes because of its deference to effort the writ of the differenceprinciple
But that criticism of Rawls is mild by comparison with the one towhichheisexposedonNozickrsquosreadingofhisremarksTheplausibilityofthatreadingisenhancedbyNozickrsquoscarelessormischievousomissionofwhatfollowsldquoconscientiouslyrdquowhenheexhibitstheTheory of Jus-ticepassagequotedaboveTherebyNozickcreatestheimpressionthatRawlsispresentingafamiliaregalitariandeterministdoctrineNozickrsquosresponsetothatdoctrineisverypowerfulHesaysthatldquodenigratingapersonrsquosautonomyandprimeresponsibilityforhisactionsisariskylineto take for a theory that otherwisewishes tobuttress thedignity andself-respectofautonomousbeings Onedoubts that theunexaltedpictureofhumanbeingsRawlsrsquotheorypresupposesandrestsuponcanbemade tofit togetherwith the viewofhumandignity it is designedto leadtoandembodyrdquo14Nozickispressingadilemmaeitherpeoplehaverealfreedomofchoiceinwhichcasetheymaybecredited(atleasttosomeextent)withthefruitsoftheirlaborsorthereisnosuchthingasfreechoice inwhichcase liberalsshouldtakethepurpleoutofthepassagesinwhichtheysetforththeirconceptionofhumanityandmdashwecanaddmdashsocialistsshouldstoppaintinginspiringpicturesofthehumanfuture(unlesstheybelievethatpeoplelackfreewillundercapitalismbutthattheywillgetitaftertherevolution)
OnNozickrsquosreadingoftheldquoeffortrdquopassageitisclearlyinconsistentwiththeresponsibilityfortasteformationwithwhichRawlscreditsciti-zensThatdoesnotmattersomuchsinceNozickrsquosreadingisamisread-ingBut it is not easy to reconcilewhatRawls says about effortwithwhathesaysabouttastesevenonmylesscreativereadingofhistextOnmy readingof it effort ispartlypraiseworthyandpartlynotbutwecannotseparatethepartsandtheindicatedpolicyconsequenceisto
14NozickAnarchy State and Utopiap214
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
13
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
ignoreeffortasaclaimtorewardNowthepassageabouttastesbeginswiththethoughtthatldquocitizenshavesomepartinformingandcultivat-ingtheirfinalendsandpreferencesrdquothoughitendsbyassigningamorewholesaleresponsibilityforthemtocitizensIfwestaywiththeopeningthoughtthenwecanwonderwhypartialresponsibilityforeffortattractsnorewardatallwhile(merely)partialresponsibilityforexpensivetasteformationattractsafullpenalty(andthosewhokeeptheirtastesmodestreapawelfarereward)And ifweshift to thewholesaleresponsibilitymotif thenwecanwonderwhybeingswhoareonly ina limitedwayresponsiblefortheefforttheyputinmaybeheldwhollyresponsibleforhowtheirtastesdevelop
4 Relocating Dworkinrsquos Cut
a Ronald Dworkin denies that equality of welfare provides the rightreadingoftheegalitarianaimandIagreewithhimaboutthatButIdonotsharehisviewthatthedemiseofequalityofwelfareshouldpromptegalitarianstoembraceequalityofresourcesinsteadPartofmyreasonfordisagreeingwithDworkinonthatscoreismybelieftobedefendedinamomentthatoneofhismajorobjectionstoequalityofwelfarecanbemetbyarevisedformofthatprincipleTherevisedwelfareprincipleunlikeequalityofwelfarepermitsandindeedenjoinsdeparturesfromwelfareequalitywhentheyreflectchoicesofrelevantagentsasopposedtodeficientopportunityforwelfareIfapersonrsquoswelfareislowbecausehefreelyriskedawelfarelossingamblingforawelfaregainthenundertheopportunityformoftheprinciplehehasnoclaimtocompensationNordoesapersonwhofritteredawaywelfareopportunitieswhichoth-ersseizedNortotakeadifferentkindofexampledoesapersonwhochosetoforgowelfareoutofdevotiontoanidealwhich(expresslyormerelyasithappened)requiredself-denial
Therevisedprinciplecanbecalledequalityofopportunity forwel-fare15ItisnotaprinciplethatIshallendorseEqualityofopportunityforwelfareisabetterreadingofegalitarianismthanequalityofwelfareitselfisbutitisnotasgoodaswhatcurrentlystrikesmeastherightreadingofegalitarianismnamelythatitspurposeistoeliminateinvol-untary disadvantagebywhichI (stipulatively)meandisadvantageforwhichthesufferercannotbeheldresponsiblesinceitdoesnotappro-priatelyreflectchoicesthathehasmadeorismakingorwouldmake16
15 Foracleararticulationandpersuasivedefenseofitinitspreferencesatisfactioninter-pretationseeArnesonrsquosldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo
16 TheneedtoaddthatthirddisjunctisexplainedinSection5abelow
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
14
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CHAPTERONE
Equalityofopportunityforwelfareeliminatesinvoluntarywelfaredefi-cienciesandwelfaredeficienciesareformsofdisadvantageHencetheprinciple I endorse responds to inequalities inpeoplersquoswelfareoppor-tunitiesButaswillbeillustratedbelowadvantageisabroadernotionthanwelfareAnythingwhichenhancesmywelfareispro tantotomyadvantagebuttheconverseisnottrueAnddisadvantageiscorrespond-inglybroaderthanwelfaredeficiencysotheviewIfavorwhichcanbecalledequal opportunity for advantageorpreferablyequalaccess toadvantagecorrectsforinequalitiestowhichequalopportunityforwel-fareisinsensitive
Whyisldquoequalaccesstoadvantagerdquoabetternamefortheviewthanldquoequalopportunity foradvantagerdquo isWewouldnotnormally regardmeagerpersonalcapacityasdetracting fromopportunityYouroppor-tunities are the same whether you are strong and clever or weak andstupidifyouareweakandstupidyoumaynotusethemwellmdashbutthatimpliesthatyouhavethemButshortfallsonthesideofpersonalcapac-ityneverthelessengageegalitarianconcernandtheydosobecausetheydetractfromaccesstovaluablethingseveniftheydonotdiminishtheopportunitytogetthemHencemypreferenceforldquoaccessrdquo17butIstillrequirethispossiblyunnaturalstipulationIshalltreatanythingwhichapersonactuallyhasassomethingtowhichhehasaccess18
SomeofDworkinrsquoscounterexamplestoequalityofwelfarefailtochal-lenge equality of opportunity for welfare and they fail a fortiori tochallengethewiderdisadvantageprincipleTheDworkinexamplesIherehave inmindwhichare todowith expensive tastesnotonlydonotchallengeequalityofopportunityforwelfareonecansaythestrongerthingthattheybringitsclaimstotheforeasacandidatereadingoftheegalitarianaimButother counterexamples toequalityofwelfarepre-sentedbyDworkinnecessitatemovementbeyondequalityofopportunityforwelfaretothebroaderconceptionofequalityofaccesstoadvantageOnesortofcounterexamplethathasthateffectconcernshandicapsintheliteralsenseofthewordandIshallbepresentingahandicapcoun-terexampletoequalityofopportunityforwelfareatthebeginningofthenextsubsection
17 For analogous reasons Arneson would have been better advised to call his theoryldquoequalityofaccesstowelfarerdquo
18 IamnotentirelyhappywiththewordldquoadvantagerdquointhetitleoftheviewIamespous-ingIusethewordonlybecauseIhavebeenunabletofindabetteroneItsinfelicityrelatestothefactthatitissofrequentlyusedtodenotecompetitiveadvantageadvantagethatisoversomebodyelseButhereldquoadvantagerdquomustbeunderstoodshornofthatimplicationwhichitdoesnotalwayshaveSomethingcanaddtosomeonersquosadvantagewithouthimasaresultbeingbetterplacedorlessworseplacedthansomebodyelseandthewordwillherebeusedinthatnoncompetitivesense
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
19
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
15
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
In my view however equality of resources is subject to objectionswhicharejustasstrongasthosewhichdefeatequalityofwelfare(andequalityofopportunityforwelfare)IshallnowdefendthatconclusionbydescribingthecaseofadoublyunfortunatepersonIbelievethategal-itarianswillbemovedtocompensatehimforbothofhismisfortunesbut the fact that thefirst calls for egalitariancompensationchallengesequalityofwelfareandthefactthattheseconddoeschallengesequalityofresources
b MyunfortunatepersonrsquoslegsareparalyzedTogetaroundheneedsanexpensivewheelchairEgalitarianswillbedisposedtorecommendthathebegivenoneAnd theywillbe sodisposedbefore theyhaveaskedaboutthewelfareleveltowhichthemanrsquosparalysisreduceshimWhencompensatingfordisabilityegalitariansdonotimmediatelydistinguishbetweenthedifferentamountsofmiseryinducedbysimilardisabilitiesinpeoplewhohavedifferent(dis)utilityfunctionsTheyproposecompen-sationforthedisabilityas suchandnotornotonlyforitsdeleteriouswelfareeffectsInsofaraswecandistinguishcompensationforresourcedeficiencyfromcompensationforwelfaredeficiencythefirstappearstoenjoyindependentegalitarianfavor
TheegalitarianresponsetodisabilityseemstodefeatnotonlyequalityofwelfarebutalsoequalityofopportunityforwelfareTinyTimisnotonlyactuallyhappybyanystandardHeisalsobecauseofhisfortunatedispositionblessedwithabundantopportunity forhappinessheneednotdomuchtogetalotofitButegalitarianswouldnotonthataccountstrikehimoffthelistoffreewheelchairreceiversTheydonotthinkthatwheelchairdistributionshouldbecontrolledexclusivelybythewelfareopportunity requirementsof thosewhoneed themLamepeopleneedthemtobeadequatelyresourcedwhetherornottheyalsoneedthemtobeortobecapableofbeinghappy
NotethatIdonotsaythatwhateverotherdemandstheyfaceegali-tarianswillalwaysservicepeoplelikeTinyTimOnecouldimaginehimsurrounded by curably miserable sound-limbed people whose welfarewassolowthattheirrequirementswerejudgedtoprecedehisThees-sentialpointisthathisabundanthappinessisnotassuchdecisiveagainstcompensatinghimforhisdisability
Infaceof(whatIsayare)theintuitivephenomenatheonlywayofsustaining theview that equalityofwelfare is the right readingof theegalitarianaim is toclaim that egalitariansproposeassistance fordis-abilitywithoutgatheringwelfareinformationbecauseofageneralcor-relationbetweendisabilityandillfarewhichitisimpossibleortoocostlytoconfirminindividualcasesLikeSenandDworkinIfindthatdefense
16
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CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
16
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
unpersuasiveandIconsequentlyconcludethattheegalitarianresponsetodisabilitydefeatsequalityofwelfare19AndasIargueditalsodefeatsequality of opportunity for welfare since the response to disability isshapedbysomethingotherthanthedifferentcostsinlostopportunityforwelfarewhichdisabilitycausesindifferentpeople
IhavenotcompletedmydescriptionofthemanrsquosmisfortuneThereisalsosomethingwrongwithhisarmsHeisnotlessabletomovethemthanmostpeopleareIshallevenassumetomakemypointmorevividthat he is especially good at moving them But there is neverthelesssomethingseriouslywrongwiththemanditisthisafterhemovesthemhesuffersseverepaininhisarmmuscles
InthetermsofadistinctionwhichIoncehadoccasiontomakeinadifferentcontextitisnotdiffi cultforthemantomovehisarmsbutitisverycostlyforhimtodoso20WhatIcalllsquodifficultyrsquoandlsquocostrsquoaretwowidelyconflatedbutimportantlydistinctwaysinwhichitcanbehardforapersontodosomething(Itiscostlybutnotdifficultformetosupplyyouwithacheckforpound500orformetotellyousomesecrettherevela-tionofwhichwilldamagemeItisextremelydifficultformetotransportyoutoHeathrowonthebackofmybicyclebutitisnotcostlysinceIlovethatkindofchallengeandIhavenothingelsetodotodayAtthefarendofthedifficultycontinuumliestheimpossiblebutitistheunbear-ablewhichoccupiesthatpositioninthecaseofcostliness)21
Nowthereisanexpensivemedicinewhichtakenregularlysuppressesthepainthatotherwisefollowsthemanrsquosarmmovementandthismedi-cineissoexpensivethatithasnoadversesideeffectsEgalitarianswouldIamsure favorsupplyingourmanwiththemedicineeven if itcostswhat a wheelchair does But providing the medicine cannot be repre-sentedascompensatingforaresourceincapacityThemanrsquoscapacitytomovehisarmsisin the relevant sensebetter(soIstipulated)thanthatofmostpeople
ldquoIntherelevantsenserdquodoesalotofworkheresoletmeexplainitSomeonemightinsistandIdonothavetodenythatthereisasenseinwhicha typicalnormalpersonhasa capacitywhich thisman lacks Ineednotdenythathelacksthecapacitytomovehisarmswithoutpainorifyouprefertomovehisarmswithoutpainwithouttakingmedicine
19 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp241ndash42followingSenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquopp217ndash18SenissurelyrightthatitishisdeficientcapabilityassuchwhichexplainstheclaimtoassistanceofacontentedcrippledpersonwhorequiresexpensiveprosthesisandwhoisnotparticularlypoorCompareSenldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp195ndash97
20CohenKarl Marxrsquos Theory of Historyp23821 AmanotherwiseliketheoneIdescribedmightfinditdifficulttomovehisarmsforthe
psychologicalreasonthathecouldnotfacethethoughtofwhatwouldfollowtheirmove-mentButmymanispsychologicallyrobusthecaneasilymovehisarmsthoughheoften(coolly)decidesnottoonoccasionswhenotherpeoplewouldmovetheirs
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
IcanevenagreethatitishislackofthatcapacitywhichistheegalitariangroundforcompensatinghimBut compensating for a lack of capacity which needs to be described in that way for the ground of the compensa-tion to be revealed cannot be represented as compensating for incapacity when that is opposed to compensating for welfare opportunity defi ciency Awould-be resource egalitarianwho said ldquoCompensation is inorderhere because theman lacks the resourceof being able to avoidpainrdquowouldbeinvokingtheideaofequalityofopportunityforwelfareevenifhewouldbeusingresourcistlanguagetodescribeit
Myexamplewasmedicallyfancifulbutamedicallymoreordinaryex-amplemakesthesamepointthoughyouhavetoexerciseslightlysharperperceptiontosee it Itwas fanciful in the foregoingcase that thepainshouldwhollysucceedandnotalsoaccompanythepain-inducingmove-mentThinknowofamoreordinarycase inwhicharthriticpainac-companiesmovementandsupposewhatislikelythatthemovementisnotonlypainfulbutconsequentlyandorotherwisealsodifficultThatdifficultyintroducesaresourcedeficiencyintothecasebuttheexampleneverthelessstandsasachallengetoequalityofresourcesForitseemsnotcoherentlyegalitariantocateronlytothedifficultyofmovingandnotindependentlytothepainwhichmovingoccasionsSothereisanir-reduciblewelfareaspectinthecaseforegalitariancompensationinreal-lifedisabilityexamples
OrjustthinkofpoorpeopleinBritainwhosufferdiscomfortinthewintercoldTheegalitariancaseforhelpingthemwiththeirelectricitybillsispartlyfoundedonthatdiscomfortitselfItdoesnotrestentirelyonthedisenablementwhichthecoldboththroughdiscomfortandinde-pendentlyalsocauses
People vary in the amountofdiscomfortwhichgiven low tempera-turescausethemandconsequently inthevolumeofresourceswhichtheyneedtoalleviate theirdiscomfortSomepeopleneedcostlyheavysweatersandagreatdealoffueltoachieveanaveragelevelofthermalwell-beingWithrespecttowarmththeyhavewhatDworkincallsex-pensive tastestheyneedunusuallylargedosesofresourcestoachieveanordinary levelofwelfareTheyare losersunderDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesbecauseasweshallseeitsetsitselfagainstcompensationforexpensivetastes
ThetwogroundsofegalitariancompensationwhichapplyinthecaseofthedisabledmanhavesomethingincommonThemanrsquosstraightfor-wardinabilitytomovehislegsandhisliabilitytopainwhenmovinghisarmsarebothdisadvantagesforwhich(Itacitlyassumed)hecannotbeheldresponsibleandIsuggestthatiswhyanegalitarianwouldcom-pensatehimforthemBothaspectsofhisplightrepresentunavoidabledisadvantages which he was unable to forestall and which he cannot
18
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CHAPTERONE
nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
19
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
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nowrectifyOnmyunderstandingofegalitarianismitdoesnotenjoinredressoforcompensationfordisadvantageassuchItattendsrathertoldquoinvoluntaryrdquodisadvantagewhichisthesortthatdoesnotreflectthesubjectrsquos choice Peoplersquos advantages are unjustly unequal (or unjustlyequal)whentheinequality(orequality)reflectsunequalaccesstoadvan-tageasopposedtopatternsofchoiceagainstabackgroundofequalityofaccessSevereactualdisadvantageisafairlyreliablesignofinequalityofaccesstoadvantagebuttheprescribedequalityisnotofadvantagepersebutofaccessallthingsconsideredtoit
Whendecidingwhetherornotjustice(asopposedtocharity)requiresredistributiontheegalitarianasksifsomeonewithadisadvantagecouldhaveavoideditorcouldnowovercomeit22IfhecouldhaveavoidedithehasnoclaimtocompensationfromanegalitarianpointofviewIfhecouldnothaveavoideditbutcouldnowovercomeitthenhecanaskthathisefforttoovercomeitbesubsidizedbutunlessitcostsmoretoovercomeitthantocompensateforitwithoutovercomingithecannotexpectsocietytocompensateforhisdisadvantage
IaffirmequalityofaccesstoadvantagewhateveradvantageisrightlyconsideredtobebutIcannotsayinapleasinglysystematicwayexactlywhatshouldcountasanadvantagepartlybecauseIhavenotthoughthardenoughaboutthisquestionwhichissurelyoneofthedeepestinnormativephilosophy23Whatdoesappearclearisthatresourcedeficien-ciesandwelfaredeficienciesaredistincttypesofdisadvantageandthateachofthemcoversprettydistinctsubtypespovertyandphysicalweak-nessareverydifferentkindsofresourcelimitationanddespondencyandfailuretoachieveaimsareverydifferentkindsofillfareWhatevertheboundariesandtypesofwelfaremaybe24lackofpainissurelyaformofitandlackofdisabilityconsideredjustassuchisnotifthereistobeacontrastbetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfareThosetwoclassificatoryjudgmentsarereasonablyuncontentiousandtheyaretheones Ineed to sustain the criticismofDworkinwhicharises fromreflectiononthecaseofinvoluntarypain
(IwarnedattheoutsetthatmypositiveproposalwouldbecrudeOnethingthatmakesitsoandmakesmewishthatitwillbesupersededis
22 Theanswerstothosequestionswillnotalwaysbeassimpleasthesampleanswersthatfollowbuttheyarealwaystherightquestionstoask
23 AnothermatteraboutwhichIcannotsayanythingsystematicistheproblemofhowtocomparethenetadvantagepositionsofdifferentpeopleTherightplacetobeginwouldbewithAmartyaSenrsquosperspicaciousdiscussionofthe(atleast)structurallyanalogousprob-lemofhowtoorderdifferentcapability-sets(seehisCommodities and Capabilitieschapter5)(Isayldquo[atleast]structurallyanalogousrdquobecauseitmayturnouttobethesameproblem[seeSection6below])
24DworkinrsquosldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoisamasterfulexposeacuteofambiguitiesintheconceptofwelfareevenifitdoesnotprovethategalitarianjusticeshouldignorewelfarecomparisons
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
19
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
the unlovely heterogeneity of the components of the vector of advan-tageOnehopesthatthereisacurrencymorefundamentalthaneitherresources or welfare in which the various egalitarian responses whichmotivatedmyproposalcanbeexpressedButIcertainlyhavenotdiscov-ereditsoatleastfornowIstaywiththeappearanceswhichcontradictwelfareresourcesandopportunityforwelfarereadingsoftheegalitar-iandemandandwhichpointinthefirstinstancetothetheory[orsemi-theory it isperhaps tooclose to the intuitivephenomenatomerit thenameldquotheoryrdquo]Ihaveaffirmed)
c Whatevernumberofdimensionsthespaceofdisadvantagemayhaveegalitarianismonmyreadingcutsthrougheachofitsdimensionsjudg-ingcertaininequalitiesofadvantageasacceptableandothersasnotitstouchstonebeingasetofquestionsabouttheresponsibilityorlackofitofthedisadvantagedagent
InRonaldDworkinrsquosdifferentreadingofegalitarianismpeoplearetobecompensatedforshortfallsintheirpowersthatistheirmaterialre-sourcesandmentalandphysicalcapacitiesbutnotforshortfallstraceabletotheirtastesandpreferencesWhattheygetshouldreflectdifferencesinwhattheywantandseekbutnotintheirabilitytogetthings
DworkinrsquosldquocutrdquocontrastswithmineintwowaysFirst itcallsforcompensationforresourcedeficienciesonlyandnotalsoforpainandotherillfareconsideredassuchldquoThereisnoplacein[Dworkinrsquos]theoryforcomparisonsofthewelfarelevelsofdifferentpeoplerdquonorIinferforcateringtopeoplewhosepainsdonotdiminishtheircapacitysincethatservicereflectsajudgmentabouthowtheirwelfareinonerelevantsensecompareswiththatofothers25Mycutawardsredressforbothresourceandwelfaredisadvantagesbut inDworkinrsquostheory there isnot even ldquosome small room for equality of welfarerdquo alongside otherconsiderations26
SoforpurposesofegalitarianinterventionDworkin-styleonlyonedimensionofdisadvantageisrecognizedAndtheseconddifferencebe-tweenourcutsisthatwithinthatsingleresourcedimensionDworkindoesnotputabsenceofresponsibilityintheforegroundasanecessaryconditionofjustcompensation
IsaythatthequestionofresponsibilityisnotforegroundedinDwor-kinrsquospresentationbecauseIshallarguethatinsofarashesucceedsinmakinghiscutplausibleitisbyobscuringbothofthedifferencesbe-tween it and the different cut that I have recommended I shall alsoargue that the grounding idea of Dworkinrsquos egalitarianism is that nooneshouldsufferbecauseofbadbruteluckandthatsincetherelevant
25 ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop33526 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop240
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
20
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CHAPTERONE
oppositeofanunluckyfateisafatetraceabletoitsvictimrsquoscontrolmycutismorefaithfultoDworkinrsquosgroundingideathantheoneheosten-siblyfavorsis
ForDworkinitisnotchoicebutpreferencewhichexcuseswhatwouldotherwisebeanunjustlyunequaldistributionHeproposescompensa-tionforpowerdeficienciesbutnotforexpensivetastes27whereasIbe-lievethatweshouldcompensatefordisadvantagebeyondapersonrsquoscon-trolassuchandthatweshouldnotaccordinglydrawalinebetweenunfortunate resource endowment andunfortunateutility function28Apersonwithwantonlyexpensivetasteshasnoclaimonusbutneitherdoes apersonwhosepowers are feeblebecausehe recklessly failed todevelop themThere is nomoraldifference froman egalitarianpointof view between a person who irresponsibly acquires (or blamelesslychoosestodevelop)anexpensivetasteandapersonwhoirresponsiblyloses(orblamelesslychoosestoconsume)avaluableresourceTherightcutisbetweenresponsibilityandbadlucknotbetweenpreferencesandresources
Thedifferencebetweenthosetwocutswillhavepolicysignificanceinthecaseofthoseexpensivetasteswhichcannotberepresentedasreflect-ingchoiceTherewillbenopolicydifferencewithrespecttoDworkinrsquosleadingexampleofapersonwithexpensivetastesIrefertoLouiswhorequiresancientclaretandploversrsquoeggs inorder toreachanordinarylevelofwelfareItreatLouisinpracticethewayDworkindoesbecauseasDworkindescribeshimhedidnot justget stuckwithhis tasteheschooledhimself into itButwhileDworkinandIbothrefuseLouisrsquosrequestforaspecialallowancewegroundourrefusalsdifferentlyDwor-kin says sorryLouiswe egalitariansdonotfinance expensive tasteswhereasIsaysorryLouisweegalitariansdonotfinanceexpensivetasteswhichpeoplechoosetodevelop
Nowconsideracaseofexpensive tastewheretherewillbeapolicydifferencePaullovesphotographywhileFredlovesfishing29PricesaresuchthatFredpursueshispastimewitheasewhilePaulcannotaffordtoPaulrsquoslifeisalotlesspleasantasaresultitmightevenbetruethatithaslessmeaningthanFredrsquosdoesIthinktheegalitarianthingtodoistosubsidizePaulrsquosphotographyButDworkincannotthinkthatHisenvy
27 OnthehedonicconceptionofwelfareXrsquostasteispro tantomoreexpensivethanYrsquosifmoreresourcesareneededtoraiseXtoagivenlevelofenjoymentOnthepreferencesat-isfactionconceptionofwelfarelevelsofpreferencesatisfactionreplacelevelsofenjoymentinthecharacterizationofwhatmakesatasteexpensiveThediscussionbelowofexpensivetastesmaybeinterpretedalongeitherhedonicorpreferencelines
28 Anunfortunateutilityfunctioncoulditselfberegardedasaresourcedeficiencybutnotbysomeoneconcernedtocontrastequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare
29 IthankAliceKnightforthisexample
21
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
21
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
testforequalityofresourcesissatisfiedPaulcanaffordtogofishingasreadilyasFredcanPaulrsquosproblemisthathehatesfishingandsoIampermissiblyassumingcouldnothavehelpedhatingitmdashitdoesnotsuithisnaturalinclinationsHehasagenuinelyinvoluntaryexpensivetasteand I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should behelpedinthewaythatpeoplelikePaulareindeedhelpedbysubsidizedcommunityleisurefacilitiesAsthisexamplesuggeststhereisbetweenDworkinrsquosaccountofegalitarianjusticeandminethedifferencethatmyaccountmandateslessmarketpricingthanhisdoes
IdistinguishamongexpensivetastesaccordingtowhetherornottheirbearercanreasonablybeheldresponsibleforthemTherearethosewhichhecouldnothavehelpedformingandorcouldnotnowunformandthentherearethoseforwhichbycontrasthecanbeheldresponsiblebecausehe could have forestalled them andor because he could now unlearnthemNoticethatIdonotsaythatapersonwhodeliberatelydevelopsanexpensivetastedeservescriticismIsaynosuchseverethingbecausethereareallkindsofreasonswhyapersonmightwanttodevelopanexpensivetasteanditiseachpersonrsquosbusinesswhetherhedoessoornotButitisalsonobodyelsersquosbusinesstopickupthetabforhimifhedoesEgalitar-ianshavegoodreasonnottoministertodeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesandequalityofwelfaremustthereforeberejectedButweshouldnot embrace equality of resources instead since that doctrine wronglyrefuses compensation for involuntary expensive tastes and it does notrefusecompensationforvoluntaryonesfortherightreason
InDworkinrsquosviewonlytheprincipleofequalityofresourcescanex-plainwhyLouisrsquosexpensivetastesshouldnotbeindulgedbyegalitariansButhislongdiscussionofLouisrejectsthemostobviousreasontheegali-tarianhasfordenyingLouistheresourcesneededtoservicehistastethatheldquosetsoutdeliberatelytocultivaterdquoit30ItiscrucialthatasDworkinacknowledgesldquoLouishasachoicerdquothetasteisnotinstilledinhimbyaprocesswhichcircumventshisvolition31
Insteadof foregrounding the factofLouisrsquoschoiceDworkinassertsthathecanbedeniedextraresourcesonlyifwethinkthatwereLouistodemandthemhewouldbeaskingformorethanhisfairshareofre-sourceswhereldquofairsharerdquoisdefinedinwelfare-independenttermsForDworkinitrequiresgreatldquoingenuityrdquotoldquoproducesomeexplanationorinterpretationoftheargumentinquestionmdashthatLouisdoesnotdeservemoreresourcesjustbecausehehaschosenamoreexpensivelifemdashwhichdoesnotusetheideaoffairsharesoranysimilarideasrdquo32
30 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop22931 Thequotedmaterialisfromibidp23732 Ibidp239
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
22
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CHAPTERONE
NowitiscertainlybecausetriviallytruethatifwethinkthatLouisshouldbedeniedtheresourceshedemandsthenwemustbelievethathewouldhavemorethanhisfairshareifwegavethemtohimButwecoulduseequalityofopportunityforwelfaretodefinefairsharesherewecouldsaythatsharesarefairwhentheyequalizewelfareopportu-nities It is therefore false and it scarcely takes ingenuity to show itthatonlyifwemovetowardequalityofresourcestowardfairsharesinDworkinrsquosspecialsensecanweexplainegalitarianismrsquoslackofsympa-thyforLouis
Iconcludethatwhileitisindeedtruethatldquoexpensivetastesareembar-rassingforthetheorythatequalitymeansequalityofwelfarepreciselybecausewebelievethatequalitycondemnsratherthanrecommendscompensatingfordeliberatelycultivatedexpensivetastesrdquotheproposalthatequalitymeansequalityofopportunity forwelfare33glidesby theLouiscounterexample34
d WhileaproponentofequalityofopportunityforwelfarecanreadilydealwithLouisthecaseofJudeismuchharderforhimtohandle35IshallarguethatJudersquoscasereflectscreditonequalityofaccesstoadvan-tagebycomparisonwithbothequalityofresourcesandequalityofop-portunityforwelfare
33 Whichmustonothergroundsbebroadenedintoequalityofaccesstoadvantage(seeSections4band4d)ThequotedmaterialisfromDworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop235
34 Equalityofopportunity forwelfareanda fortiori equalityof access toadvantagealsosupplywhatseemstometobeanadequateresponsetoacomplicatedargumentwhichDworkinthinkscontributesagreatdealtothisdrivetosubvertequalityofwelfareinfavorofequalityofresourcesTheargumentfirstappearsinthecontextofDworkinrsquosexplorationofthehypothesisthatequalityofwelfarebeunderstoodasequalityofoverallsuccessmdashthathypothesissurfacesafterthesupposedwreckageofseveralpreviousonesTheargumenthastwopremiseseachofwhichIfindhardtoassessbutneitherofwhichIshallherecon-testThefirstpremiseisthatldquoequalityofoverallsuccesscannotbestatedasanattractiveidealatallwithoutmakingtheideaofreasonableregretcentralrdquo(ibidp217)equalityofoverallsuccesswillseemdefensibleonlyifitpromisestomakepeopleldquoequalinwhattheyhavereasonablytoregretrdquo(ibidpp217218)Andthesecondpremiseisthattheideaofreasonableregretldquorequiresanindependenttheoryoffairsharesofsocialresourceswhichwouldcontradictequalityofoverallsuccessrdquo(ibidp217)ButifbothpremisesaretruesothatsuchatheoryisindeedrequiredwhycanitnotbeatheorywhichsaysthatsharesarefairwhentheyinduceequalityofopportunityforwelfareorequalityofaccesstoadvantageIdonotfindanythinginDworkinrsquosdenseratiocinationwhichappearstorulethatoutItfollowsthatthesupposedself-destructionofequalityofwelfareonthealtarofreasonableregretismuchlessofanargumentforequalityofresourcesthanDworkinappears to think it is (ForcriticismofDworkinrsquossecondpremise seeGriffinldquoModernUtilitarianismrdquopp365ndash66andforanargumentthattheideaofoverallsuccessshouldneverhavebeenfloatedinthefirstplaceseeArnesonrsquosldquoLiberalismDistributiveSubjectiv-ismandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo[pp180ndash81n28mdashEd])
35 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquopp239ndash40
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
23
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Judehaswhatmightbecalledcheap expensive tastesTheyarecheapinthatheneedsfewerresourcestoattainthesamewelfarelevelasothersButtheyareexpensiveinthathecouldhaveachievedthatwelfarelevelwith fewer resources stillhadhenot cultivated tastesmoreexpensivethanthosewithwhichhebeganJudebeganwithverymodestdesiresbutthenhereadHemingwayandcultivatedadesiretowatchbullfightsandoncehehaditheneededmoremoneythanbeforetoachieveanaveragelevelofwelfarethoughstilllessthanwhatothersneeded
AbelieverinequalityofopportunityforwelfarehastokeepJudepoorsincehedidnothavetobecomeabullfight-lover(itisreasonabletosup-posethathecouldhavesuppressedatnogreatcosthisdesiretoculti-vatethattaste)AbelieverinDworkin-styleequalityofresourcesignoresJudersquostastesandtheirhistoryandfindsnoreasoninanythingsaidsofartogranthimlessincomethananyoneelseIrejectbothviewsPace equalityofopportunityforwelfareIseenomanifestinjusticeinJudersquosgettingthefundsheneedstotraveltoSpainHethenstillhasfewerre-sourcesthanothersandonlythesamewelfaresoequalityofaccesstoadvantagecannotsayonthatbasisthatheisoverpaidButpaceequal-ityofresourcesitseemsnotunreasonabletoexpectJudetoacceptsomedeductionfromthenormalresourcestipendbecauseofhisfortunatehighabilitytogetwelfareoutofresourcesUnlikeeitherDworkinrsquostheoryorArnesonrsquosmineexplainswhybothgrossunderresourcingandgrossldquoun-derwelfaringrdquo(despiterespectivelyadecentwelfarelevelandadecentresourcebundle)lookwrong36
e There are some expensive tasteswhichDworkin regards asldquoobses-sionsrdquoorldquocravingsrdquoandwhichheispreparedtoassimilatetoresourcedeficiency forthepurposesofdistributive justiceThiskindof taste isone that itsbearerldquowisheshedidnothavebecause it interfereswithwhathewantstodowithhislifeandoffershimfrustrationorevenpainifitisnotsatisfiedrdquo37Dworkinconcludesthatldquothesetastesarehandi-capsrdquoandsinceequalityofresourcesredistributesforhandicapitwillpresumablydoso(withintheboundsofpracticality)inthecaseoftasteswhichmeetthequoteddescription
NowDworkinrsquosdescriptionofthemassigns(atleast)twofeaturestoldquohandicaprdquotastesandhefailstosaywhichfeaturemakesthemhandi-capsorequivalentlyendowstheirownerwithaclaimtocompensationIsthecrucialfeatureofthetastethefactthatthepersonwisheshedidnot
36 IdonotfeelcomfortableaboutthisvictorysinceinachievingitIexploittothehilta featureofmy theorywhich I regardas suspect theheterogeneityof its conceptionofadvantage(seelatterpartofSection4babove)
37 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
24
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CHAPTERONE
haveitOrisithisreasonforwishinghedidnothaveitnamelythatamongotherthingsitthreatenstocausehimfrustrationandpain38
ThelatterproposalisunavailabletoDworkinAninvoluntaryliabilityto frustrationandpaindoes indeedcommandcompensationbutas Iurged in Section 4b above that thought reflects egalitarian sensitivitytopeoplersquoswelfareratherthantotheirresourcespositionSinceDwor-kindefendsinterventioninresponsetohandicapsbutnotinresponsetoshortfallsinwelfareheisnotentitledtoclassifyatasteasahandicapbecauseitcausespain
ButperhapsthecrucialfeatureofthetastesweareconsideringisthattheindividualwhosetastestheyareldquowisheshedidnothaverdquothemHedisidentifieswiththemsothatmdashwecanattributethisthoughttoDwor-kinmdashtheyarenotinalienableaspectsofhisperson(seeSection4fbelow)butmorelikeunfortunateenvironingcircumstancesTheyformnopartofhisambitioninthespecialsenseinwhichDworkinusesthatwordandthatiswhyequalityofresourcescanregardthemashandicapsIbe-lievethatthisisindeedDworkinrsquospositionthatthefollowingregimentedstatementof it isnotunfair tastesare (subsidy-warranting)handicapsifandonlyiftheyrepresentobsessionswhichtheydoifandonlyiftheindividualwhosetastestheyaredisidentifieswiththem
Ihavefourcommentsonthethesisthatitistheindividualrsquosalienationfromhis tastewhichmakes itanobsessionandthereforeallowsus toregarditasahandicap
1 Some people in the grip of cravings are too unreflective to formthesecond-orderpreference-repudiatingpreferencebyreferencetowhichDworkin justifies theldquohandicaprdquoepithetBut itwould seemunfair todenytothemtheassistancetobeextendedtoothersjustbecauseoftheirdeficientreflectivenessSothemisidentificationcriteriondoesnotcoverallcompensation-worthycravings
2Notalltasteswhichhampertheindividualrsquoslifeandthereforeraiseacaseforcompensationqualifyeitherasobsessionsorastasteswhosebearerseven ifhighlyreflectivewouldrepudiatePaul (seeSection4c above)mightnotwantnottowanttotakepicturesandapersonwhoseunhappytasteisldquoformusicofasortdifficulttoobtainrdquomightwellnotdisidentify with his desire for that music39 He has a reason to regrethismusicalpreferencesinceitcauseshimfrustrationbutthatisnotaconclusive reason forwishinghedidnothave itWhathemost likely
38 ThisisoneofseveralkeyplacesatwhichthereisreasontoregretthatinexpoundinghisviewsDworkinabjuresthedeviceofcanonicalstatementOthercasesinpointarepas-sagesquotedatSection4fbelow(onchoosingtastesandchoosingpursuits)andpassagesquotedatSections4fand4gwhichgivethreemateriallydifferentrenderingsofDworkinrsquosldquomastercutrdquo
39 ThequotecomesfromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
25
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
regretsisnot(asDworkinstipulates)hismusicalpreferenceassuchbuttheimpossibilityorexpenseofsatisfyingitHistasteisinvoluntaryandunfortunatebutitisprobablynotanldquoobsessionrdquoorldquocravingrdquoaddic-tionisnottherightmodelhere
Atypicalunrichbearerofanexpensivemusicaltastewouldregarditasapieceofbadlucknot that he has the taste itself but that it happens to be expensive(Iemphasizethosewordsbecausesimpleasthedistinc-tiontheyformulatemaybeitisonethatunderminesalotofDworkinrsquosrhetoricaboutexpensivetastes)HemightsaythatinaperfectworldhewouldhavechosentohavehisactualmusicaltastebuthewouldalsohavechosenthatitnotbeexpensiveHecantakeresponsibilityforthetaste forhispersonalitybeing thatwaywhile reasonablydenying re-sponsibilityforneedingalotofresourcestosatisfyit
3Bycontrastwith themorerepresentativepersondescribedaboveDworkinrsquosmusiccraverprefersnot tohavehisunfortunatepreferenceyetbyhypothesispersistsinhavingitThatrathersuggeststhathecan-nothelphavingitandthatinturnraisesthesuspicionthatitisitsuncho-senanduncontrolledratherthanitsdispreferredcharacterwhichren-derscompensationforitappropriateWouldnotDworkinrsquosattitudetothemusiccraverbelesssolicitousifhelearnedthathehadbeenwarnednottocultivatehisparticularmusicalinterestbyasapientteacherwhoknewitwouldcausefrustration
4Supposethattherewasnosuchwarningthatourunfortunatecon-tractedhisexpensivetasteinnocentlyandthatwenowofferhimgratisaninexpensiveunrepugnanttherapywhichwouldschoolhimoutofitIfheagreestothefreetherapythensoIbelievetheidealofequalitysaysthatheshouldgetitregardlessofwhetherhesaysfarewelltohistastewithunmixedrelieforinsteadwitharegretwhichreflectssomedegreeof identification This suggests that identification and disidentificationmatterforegalitarianjusticeonlyifandinsofarastheyindicatepresenceandabsenceofchoice40
f The foregoing reflectionbringsme to theclaimwhich Iventured inSection4ctowitthatinsofaraswefindDworkinrsquoscutplausibleitisbecauseweareapttosupposethatitseparatespresenceandabsenceofchoiceChoiceisinthebackgrounddoingagooddealofunacknowl-edgedworkHereisapassagewhichsupportsthisallegationldquoItistruethat[my]argumentproducesacertainviewofthedistinctionbetweenapersonandhiscircumstancesandassignshistastesandambitionstohis
40 ForanamendmenttothatsuggestionseeSection5a belowwhereinter aliaIcom-mentonthecasewhichisnotaddressedaboveofapersonwhowouldrefusetheofferoftherapybecauseofhismusicalconvictions
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
26
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CHAPTERONE
personandhisphysicalandmentalpowerstohiscircumstancesThatistheviewofthepersonIsketchedintheintroductorysectionofsomeonewhoformshisambitionswithasenseoftheircosttoothersagainstsomepresumedinitialequalityofeconomicpowerandthoughthisisdiffer-entfromthepictureassumedbyequalityofwelfareitisapictureatthecenterofequalityofresourcesrdquo41
ThispassageofferstwocharacterizationsofldquotastesandambitionsrdquoinputativejustificationofplacingthemoutsidetheambitofredistributivecompensationThefirstsaysthatbycontrastwithmentalandphysicalpowerstheybelongtothepersonratherthantohiscircumstancesButintheusualsensesofthosewordsthatclassificationcannotbesustainedUsinglanguageintheordinarywaymymentalpowersareasintegraltowhatIamasmytastesandambitionsareThepersoncircumstancesdis-tinctionmustthereforebeatechnicalonewhichmeansthattheremustbeanotherwayofexpressingitandapossibledifferentwayemergesinthesecondsentenceofthepassageThatdifferentwayhastodowiththesuggestionthatpeopleformtheirpreferencesbutnotpresumablytheirpowersButtherearedifficultieswiththissuggestion
Thefirst is that itproposesa falsealignmentPeoplecertainly formsomeoftheirambitionsbuttheyarguablydonotformallofthemandtheycertainlydonotformalloftheirtasteswhicharealsosupposedtobelong to theperson42Dworkinemphasizes thatpeopleldquodecidewhatsortoflivestopursuerdquobuttheydonotdecidewhatinallpertinentre-spectstheirutilityfunctionswillbepaceDworkintheyareextensivelyunabletoldquodecidewhatsortsoflivestheywantrdquo43Sobeingldquoformedrdquobythepersoncannotbeanecessaryconditionofbeingpartofthepersoniftastesandambitionsmakeuptheperson
It confirms my claim that Dworkinrsquos cut looks plausible because itseemstoseparatepresenceandabsenceofchoicethatheusesthetwophrasesldquodecidewhatsortoflifetopursuerdquoandldquodecidewhatsortoflifeonewantsrdquo interchangeably thusassimilatingtwoverydifferentkindsofprocessonlythefirstofwhichstraightforwardlyembodieschoicein
41 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop302myemphasisThewordlsquoproducesrsquointhefirstsentenceofthepassageshouldDworkinconfirmsbelsquopresupposesrsquonotethecontrastwiththepictureldquoassumedrdquobyequalityofwelfare(ButthequestionwhetherDworkinhasarguedforasopposedtofromhisdistinctiondoesnotmatterhere)DworkindoesnotdescribethedifferentpicturewhichhethinksisassumedbyequalityofwelfareIfitisapictureofthepersonaspassiveandunchoosingthatwouldhelptojustifymyimmanentcritiqueofhisviewForthatpictureseeRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPrimaryGoodsrdquop169
42 Dworkindoesnotactuallysayinthepassageunderscrutinythatpeopleformtheirtastesldquotastesandambitionsrdquohaveshrunktoldquoambitionsrdquobythetimethatwegettothemotifofself-formationButunlessDworkinclaimsthattastestooareingeneralformedonwhatbasisishehereassigningthemtoapersonrsquosperson
43 ThequotesarefromDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop288myemphasis
27
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
27
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
thegeneralcaseElsewhereandsimilarlyldquothechoicebetweenexpensiveandlessexpensivetastesrdquoisputonthesamelevelasldquochoosingamore[oraless]expensiveliferdquo44Andwearealsotoldinanotherplacethatwhenldquopeoplechooseplansorschemesfortheirlivesrdquoldquotheirchoicesde-fineasetof[resultant]preferencesrdquo45Thatformulationsweepsawaythe(oftenunchosen)46preferenceswhichlieinthedeterminingbackgroundofchoiceApersoninpossessionofhisfacultiesalwayschooses(withintheconstraintshefaces)whatcareertopursuebuthedoesnotalwayschoosewhatcareertopreferandthelatterfactmayreasonablyrestricthisresponsibilityforchoosingtopursueanexpensiveone
Being ldquoformedrdquo is not only not a necessary condition of belongingto what Dworkin calls the person it is also not a sufficient one Formentalandphysicalpowersfalloutsidethepersoninhiscircumstancesandsomeofthosepowersareunquestionably formedOneithersideof the preferencecircumstance line people both find things and formthingsHenceappealtoformednessdoesnotshowthatdistributivejus-ticeshouldignorevariationsinpreferenceandtaste
Ifmoreoverthefalsealignment(formednotformed=personcircum-stances) indeedworked itwould surely constitutea reductionof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontothedistinctionbetweenwhatisandwhatisnotsubjecttochoiceTorepeatoneofmymainclaimsitisonlybecauseDworkinrsquospreferenceresourcedistinction looksalignablewiththeoneitcannotintheendmatchthatitcommandsappeal
Theideathatweformourambitionsisabsentfromadifferentformu-lationof thepersoncircumstancesdistinctionwhichcomes soonaftertheonewehave just studiedldquoThedistinction requiredbyequalityofresourcesisthedistinctionbetweenthosebeliefsandattitudesthatdefinewhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikewhichtheidealassignstothepersonandthose featuresofbodyormindorpersonality thatprovidemeansor impedimentstothatsuccesswhichtheidealassignstothepersonrsquoscircumstancesrdquo47Thisproposalhasdifferentimplicationsfromtheone(seeabove)whichcounterposes tastes and ambitions tocircumstances
44 DworkinldquoLiberalismrdquop193myemphases45 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop206Iintroducelsquoresultantrsquotoforestallthemisin-
terpretationthatDworkinmeansthatthechoicesrefl ectpreferences46 ldquoManyofapersonrsquosdesiresare indeedvoluntarysincetheyderivesimplyfromhis
owndecisionsSomeonetypicallyacquiresthedesiretoseeacertainmovieforexamplejustbymakinguphismindwhatmovietoseeDesiresofthissortarenotarousedinustheyareformedorconstructedbyactsofwillthatweourselvesperformoftenquiteapartfromanyemotionaloraffectivestateHowevertherearealsooccasionswhenwhataper-sonwantsisnotuptohimatallbutisratheramatteroffeelingsorinclinationsthatariseandpersistindependentlyofanychoiceofhisownrdquo(FrankfurtThe Importance of What We Care Aboutp107)
47 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop303
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
28
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CHAPTERONE
sincenotallambitionsandfewtastesareinformedbybeliefsandat-titudesplentyoftastesandambitionsarisewithoutbeingdrawnforthbyanysortofdoxasticpull48ButIshallheresetasidetheproblemofdiscrepancybetweentheldquobeliefrdquocutandtheldquopreferencerdquooneinordertoassessthebeliefcutinitsowntermsinthelightofDworkinrsquoslargerpurposes
Withinthosepurposesthepersoncircumstancesdistinctionismeanttobenotonlyexclusivebut(relevantly)exhaustivewedonothavetore-viewanythingbeyondpeoplersquospersonsandcircumstancestoknowhowtotreatthemfromanegalitarianpointofview49Butifthatissothenwherearewetoplacethelife-enhancingfeatureofcheerfulnessfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeCheerfulnessraisestwodifficultiesonesmallandonebig
FirstthesmalldifficultyCheerfulnessisnotsomethingthatldquodefineswhatasuccessfullifewouldbelikerdquoItshouldthereforecountasacir-cumstanceButcircumstancesareelsewherecharacterizedaspowersandincapacitiesandcheerfulnessisneitherofthoseItisnotapowerbuta fortunatedispositionwhich forgiven inputs generateshigher thanordinary utility outputs It is not something a person exercises whenpursuinghisgoalsevenifittendsoftentoimprovehispursuitofthemSinceitdoesthelatterthefactthatitisnotstrictlyapowerisperhapsnotaveryimportantpointButthereisanotherpointwhichiscertainlyimportant
The importantpoint is that thevalueofcheerfulness isnotmerelyor mainly that it raises the probability of a personrsquos achieving whatbyhis lights is ldquoa successful liferdquoCheerfulness is amarvelous thingquiteapart fromthatandonedifferent thing that itdoes isdiminishthesadnessoffailureItisawelfare-enhancerindependentlyofbeingagoal-promoterThismakesitdifficultforDworkintocompensatecheer-lesspeoplefullyfortheirgloominessButthenthereisaninconsistencybetweenthecriterionfordeterminingwhatliesoutsidethepersonandtheprinciplethatdisadvantagesnotderivingfromthecharacterofthepersonrequirecompensationCheerlessnessliesoutsidethepersonbutitisdifficulttoseehowDworkincanawardappropriatecompensationforit
48 Frankfurtrsquossensitivedistinction(seen46above)betweendesireswhichdoanddesireswhichdonotreflectdecisionscouldbematchedbyasimilaronebetweenthosewhichdoandthosewhichdonotdisplayattitudeandcommitmentFormoreonthatdifferentiationwithindesireseeSection5abelow
49 AtanOxfordseminaroneconomicjusticeofFebruary221988Dworkinwasexplic-itlyexhaustiveHespokeofhisproposalrequiringldquoasharpdistinctionbetweenpersonality(equalsattachmentsprojectsetc)andcircumstances(equalseverythingelsethematerialwithandagainstwhichpeoplelabortoachievewhattheirpersonalityfavors)rdquo
29
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
29
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
WhenIdiscussedgloominesswithDworkinhesuggestedthatitwasaborderlinecasewithrespecttothepersoncircumstancesdichotomyandthatthebestwaytocopewithitwouldbetoaskwhetheranindividualwouldhaveinsuredagainstturningouttobegloomyandtocompensatehimforhisgloomifwethinkthattheanswerisldquoyesrdquo
IthinkthattheinsurancedevicedoeshavesomeappealasamethodofdecidingwhetherornottocompensateforgloomButitsappealseemstometohavenothingtodowiththepersoncircumstancesdistinctiontheindividualwhochoosestoornottoinsureagainstgloomisnottherebymakingthatdistinctionAndifwesupposethatheisindeedmakingitthenanotherproblemarisesForinDworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedevicetheindividualknowswhatbelongstohispersonwhenhedecideswhetherornottoinsureDworkinrsquosveilofignoranceisinthatimpor-tantwaythinnerthanRawlsrsquos50Butanindividualwhodecidesnottoinsureagainstgloominessremainsex hypothesiignorantofwhetherornotheisgloomy
The insurancedevice seems thenunable to solveDworkinrsquos gloomproblemItisneverthelessindependentlyattractiveespeciallywhentheveilofignoranceisindeedthickenedandthatIopineisbecauseitseemstosortoutabigdifferencethatreallymattersforegalitarianjusticebe-tweendisadvantagesthatareanddisadvantagesthatarenotduetobadbruteluck51ItisintheessentialnatureofinsurancethatluckiswhatweinsureagainstandgenuinechoicecontrastswithluckSoanyonewholike Dworkin is strongly drawn to the insurance test should consideracceptingthechoiceluckcutandgivinguptheattempttodefendthedif-ferentcutofpreferencesresources
g Inmyviewalargepartofthefundamentalegalitarianaimistoex-tinguishtheinfluenceofbruteluckondistribution(seeSection2above)Bruteluckisanenemyofjustequalityandsinceeffectsofgenuinechoicecontrastwithbruteluckgenuinechoiceexcusesotherwiseunacceptableinequalities
CuriouslyenoughDworkinadvocatessomethingveryliketheforego-ingpointofviewinsketchystatements inldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquobutheisnotfaithfultoitinldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoHesays in ldquoWhy Liberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo that we should
50 DworkinrsquosmainuseoftheinsurancedeviceistodealwithhandicapsandtalentsseeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquosections35and6andseep296andespp345fortheparticu-larpointthatDworkininsurersknowwhattheythinkldquoisvaluableinliferdquo
51 Ifitisrelevantthatgiventhechanceapersonmighthaveinsuredagainstcheerless-nesswhyisitnotrelevantthathemighthaveinsuredagainstendingupwithtastesthathappentobeexpensiveCompareAlexanderandSchwarzschildldquoLiberalismNeutralityandEqualityofWelfareversusEqualityofResourcesrdquopp99ff
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
30
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CHAPTERONE
attendtoldquowhichaspectsofanypersonrsquoseconomicpositionflowfromhischoicesandwhichfromadvantagesanddisadvantagesthatwerenotmattersofchoicerdquo52Thatisthecompellingcoreideabutitismisren-deredinthecutbetweenpreferencesandresourcesElsewhereinldquoWhyLiberals Should Care about Equalityrdquo Dworkin also comes close toadoptinggenuine-choiceluckas thebasicdistinctionHesays that theliberalldquoacceptstwoprinciplesrdquo
Thefirstrequiresthatpeoplehaveatanypointintheirlivesdif-ferentamountsofwealthinsofarasthegenuinechoicestheyhavemadehavebeenmoreorlessexpensiveorbeneficialtothecommu-nitymeasuredbywhatotherpeoplewantfortheirlivesThemar-ketseemsindispensabletothisprincipleThesecondrequiresthatpeoplenothavedifferentamountsofwealthjustbecausetheyhavedifferent inherent capacities to produce what others want or aredifferently favoredbychanceThismeans thatmarketallocationsmustbecorrectedinordertobringsomepeopleclosertotheshareofresourcestheywouldhavehadbutforthesevariousdifferencesofinitialadvantageluckandinherentcapacity53
IsaythatDworkincomesclosetothebasicdistinctionIfavorherebuthedoesnotquitegettherepartlybecauseluck(orchance)appearsinhistextasonlyoneelementinasetofunjustdistributorsothersbeingdifferencesininitialadvantageandininherentcapacityAndIfindDwor-kinrsquosdisjunctionsofunjustdistributorsstrangeForanyonewhothinksthatinitialadvantageandinherentcapacityareunjustdistributorsthinkssobecausehebelievesthattheymakeapersonrsquosfatedependtoomuchonsheerluckthetaxainDworkinrsquosdisjunctionsbelongtodifferentlevelsandoneofthemsubsumestheothers
NowonceweseethecentralrolethatluckshouldplayinabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejusticeDworkinrsquosownpropensitytocompensateforresourcemisfortunebutnotforutilityfunctionmisfor-tunecomestoseementirelygroundlessForpeoplecanbeunluckynotonlyintheirunchosenresourceendowmentsbutalsointheirunchosenliabilitiestopainandsufferingandintheirunchosenexpensiveprefer-encesAwillingnesstocompensatefordeficienciesinproductivecapac-itybutnotincapacitytodrawwelfarefromconsumptionconsequentlyleadstoabsurdcontrasts
ConsiderluckyAdrianandunluckyClaude54ldquoThedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatis-
52 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop208(ldquoWhatIsEqualityrdquoisthejointtitleofldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquoandldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquo)
53 DworkinldquoWhyLiberalsShouldCareaboutEqualityrdquop20754 DworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop308
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
31
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
fying[gainful]occupationrdquoPeoplearehappytobuywhatAdrianbutnotClaudecanenjoyproducingandthatforDworkingivesClaudeaclaimtoredressquiteseparatefromtheonearisingfromtheincomedif-ferencebetweenhimandAdrianButnowsupposethatwithrespecttotheirleisurepreferencesAdrianislikefishermanFredandClaudeislikewould-bephotographerPaul55andthatthereasonwhyfishingischeapandphotographyisexpensiveisthatmanywanttofishandfewwanttotakepicturessothateconomiesofscalearerealizedintheproductionoffishingbutnotofphotographicequipmentItwouldfollowthatldquothedesiresandneedsofotherpeoplerdquomeanthatunlikeClaudeAdriancanpursueldquoasatisfying[leisure]occupationrdquoYetDworkinwillnotredis-tribute for that luck-deriveddiscrepancy since it lies in thedomainofconsumptionandnotthatofproduction56ButthatisnotagoodbasisforredistributivereluctanceItisquiteabsurdtoregardAdrianrsquosoppor-tunitytopursueasatisfyingprofessionasanenviableldquocircumstancerdquojustifyingredistribution57withoutextendingthesametreatmenttohisopportunityforsatisfyingleisure58
WemusteschewDworkinrsquospreferencesresourcesdistinctioninfavorofawideraccess-orientedegalitarianismWecanagreewithhimthatldquoitisperhapsthefinalevilofagenuinelyunequaldistributionofresourcesthatsomepeoplehavereasonforregret just inthefact that theyhavebeencheatedofthechancesothershavehadtomakesomethingvaluableoftheir livesrdquo59Butequalizingthosechancesrequiresadiscriminatingattentiontowhatisandisnotchosennottowhatbelongstopreferenceasopposed toendowment InabrilliantexpositionofhowDworkinrsquostheorycorrectsdeficienciesinRawlsrsquosWillKymlickaremarksthatldquoitisunjustifpeoplearedisadvantagedbyinequalitiesoftheircircumstancesbutitisequallyunjustformetodemandthatsomeoneelsepayforthecosts of my choicesrdquo60 That expresses Dworkinrsquos fundamental insightverywellbutaproperinsistenceonthecentralityofchoiceleadstoa
55 SeeSection4cabove56 Dworkinrsquos refusal to redistribute for thediscrepancy is explicit atldquoEqualityofRe-
sourcesrdquop28857 Ibidp30858 TheforegoingcriticismdependsonDworkinrsquosclassification(ibidp304)ofasat-
isfyingoccupationassodescribedaresourceInldquoJusticeandAlienationrdquoMichaelOt-sukaarguesthatthatwasasuperficialerroronDworkinrsquospartButIdonotthinkthatDworkincandeclassifyoccupationasaresourcemdashandtherebyescapemyargumentinthetextmdashexceptattheseverecostoflosinghisargumentagainstthrowingpeoplersquospowerstoproduceintohisislandauctionsincethatargumentrestsontheideathatwithpeoplersquospowers toproduceup for auction the talentedwould endup envying thepackageofoccupationandincomeenjoyedbytheungifted(seeDworkinldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquopp311ndash12)
59 DworkinldquoEqualityofWelfarerdquop21960 KymlickaldquoSubsidizingPeoplersquosChoicesrdquop5
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
32
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CHAPTERONE
differentdevelopmentoftheinsightfromDworkinrsquosownDworkinhasineffectperformedforegalitarianismtheconsiderableserviceofincor-poratingwithinitthemostpowerfulideainthearsenaloftheantiegali-tarianRight the ideaof choiceand responsibility61But that supremeeffectofhiscontributionneedstoberenderedmoreexplicit
SomeonemightsaythattomakechoicecentraltodistributivejusticelandspoliticalphilosophyinthemorassofthefreewillproblemThedis-tinctionbetweenpreferencesandresourcesisnotmetaphysicallydeepbut it is by contrast awesomely difficult to identify what representsgenuinechoiceReplacingDworkinrsquoscutbytheoneIhaverecommendedsubordinatespoliticalphilosophytometaphysicalquestionsthatmaybeimpossibletoanswer
TothatexpressionofanxietyIhaveoneunreassuringandonereassur-ingthingtosayTheunreassuringthingisthatwemayindeedbeuptoournecksinthefreewillproblembutthatisjusttoughluckItisnotareasonfornotfollowingtheargumentwhereitgoes
NowforthereassuringpointWearenotlookingforanabsolutedis-tinctionbetweenpresenceandabsenceofgenuinechoiceTheamountof genuineness that there is in a choice is a matter of degree62 andegalitarianredressisindicatedtotheextentthatadisadvantagedoesnotreflectgenuinechoiceThatextentisafunctionofseveralthingsandthere isnoaspectofapersonrsquossituationwhichiswhollyduetogenuinechoice
LetmeillustratethispointOneofthethingsthataffectshowgenuineachoicewasistheamountofrelevantinformationthatthechooserhadButwedonothavetoaskExactlywhatsortandamountofinformationmustapersonhavetocountashavinggenuinelychosenhisfateAllthatweneedsayfromthepointofviewofegalitarianjusticeisthemorerelevantinformationhehadthelesscauseforcomplainthenowhas
Itseemstomethatthisplausiblenuancingapproachreducesthede-pendenceofpoliticalphilosophyonthemetaphysicsofmind63
h Inatheoryofdistributivejusticewhoseaxisisthedistinctionbetweenluckandchoice thepositive injunction is toequalizeadvantage savewhereinequalityofadvantagereflectschoiceNowthatsoundsrather
61 Itisanideamuchlessdeniablethanthedifferentideaofself-ownershipwhichisalsocentraltoright-wingthoughtSeetheclosingpagesofCohenldquoAreFreedomandEqualityCompatiblerdquo
62 ThispointcorrespondstoDworkinrsquospointthatthereisacontinuumbetweenbruteandoptionluck(seeldquoEqualityofResourcesrdquop293)
63 ScanlonrsquosrecentTannerLecturesentitledldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquopresentalib-eratinglynonmetaphysicalapproachtochoiceinthecontextofamongotherthingsdis-tributivejusticeIhavenotyethadthetimetodeterminetowhatextentwhatheofferscanbeusedtoimprovethestatementofabroadlyDworkiniantheoryofdistributivejustice
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
33
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
likeequalizingthescopeofgenuinechoiceofwhatonemightperhapsequivalentlysaypeoplearecapableofdoingButifthoseassimilationsarecorrectthenthepositionlatentinDworkinlooksclosetotheldquocapa-bilityequalityrdquoespousedbyAmartyaSentowhichIshallturnafterfirstfacingachallengetotheemphasisIhaveplacedonchoiceinarticulatingmyconceptionofegalitarianismThechallengewillinduceaneededrevi-sionofthatconception
5 Scanlonrsquos Doubts about Voluntariness
aAccordingtoThomasScanlonwhenweexamineapersonrsquosconditionwithaviewtodeterminingwhatdistributivejusticeoweshimwetreatsomeofhis interests as commandingmoreattention thanothersonabasiswhichisindependentofhisownrankingofthoseinterestsItfol-lowsthatwedonotpursueapolicyofequalityofwelfarewherewelfareis understood as preference satisfaction (and it will be so understoodthroughoutthissection)
Scanlondoesnot address the view that justice should concern itselfwithopportunityforwelfareasopposedtowelfaretout courtButthefactthatherejectsthesovereigntyfromthepointofviewofjusticeofthesubjectrsquosownpreferenceorderingmeansthathewouldalsorejectanopportunityformofegalitarianwelfarism
Now the featuresofScanlonrsquospositiondescribedaboveproducenoconflictwith the view Ihave espoused since equalityof access to ad-vantage isnot identicalwith equalityofopportunity forwelfare andindecidingbothwhatqualifiesasanadvantageandtherelativesizesofadvantagesitisnecessarytoengageinobjectiveassessmentofthekindthatScanlonemphasizesIneverthelessfindtwochallengestotheviewIhaveadoptedinScanlonrsquoswritings64
Asthusfardevelopedthatviewfavorscompensationforalldeficitsin(ldquoinoffensiverdquo)65welfarewhichdonotreflectthesubjectrsquoschoiceOnthisreadingoftheegalitarianattitudeitrecommendsatwo-stagepro-cedureFirstanydeficitinwelfareistreatedasapossiblecaseforcom-pensationthenwhetheritactuallyconstitutessuchacaseisdecidedbyfactsaboutchoice66IdiscoverinScanlonrsquoswritingsanobjectiontoeachstage of that procedure First he adduces examples of welfare deficit
64 TherearefurtherchallengesinhisldquoTheSignificanceofChoicerdquowhichIhavenotyetbeenabletostudywithcareSeeinparticularthesecondlecturersquoscritiqueoftheldquoForfei-tureViewrdquowithwhichmyownhasaffinities
65 SeeSection3aboveIshallhenceforthtaketheparenthesizedqualificationasread66 Idonotheremeanaconclusivecasenotonlythedistributionofnonwelfareadvan-
tagesbutalsononegalitarianconsiderationsmightdefeatthewelfaredeficitclaim
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
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CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
34
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CHAPTERONE
wheretheideaofcompensationseemsexcludedfromthestartSecondheoffersatrainofreasoningwhoseconclusionisthatchoicelackstheimportancefordistributivejusticewhichitinitiallyappearstohaveIfScanlonisrightchoiceisjustasurfaceindicatorofsomethingdifferentanddeeper
AccordingtoScanlon(certain)welfaredeficitswhichreflectthesub-jectrsquosadherencetoareligionraisenoprima faciecaseforcompensation
Differencesinreligiousbeliefareonethingthatcanproducediffer-encesinutilitylevelandsomeonewhoregardedequalityofwelfareasthestandardofinterpersonaljustificationwouldhavetoregardthesedifferencesasbeinggroundsforcompensationcompensationforhavingacquiredaparticularlyonerousorguilt-inducingreligionor one particularly unsuited to onersquos own personal strengths andweaknessesThisstrikesmeasdistinctlyoddQuiteapartfromthefactthatitmightdestroythepointofreligiousburdenstohavethemlightenedby social compensation the idea that theseburdens aregroundsforsuchcompensation(aformofbadluck)isincompatiblewithregardingthemasmattersofbeliefandconvictionwhichonevaluesandadherestobecauseonethinksthemright67
Scanlonrsquospowerfulexampleforcesmetochooseamongthefollowingstrategies(1)toarguethatitisbecausetheburdensofreligionsomani-festlyreflectchoicethatcompensationforthemisoutofthequestion(2)toarguethatitisnotasoddasScanlonmaintainstocompensateapersonforthoseburdens(3)torevisemyviewthatallburdenswhichdonotreflectchoiceraiseacaseforcompensation
BeforeexploringthesealternativesIwanttoremarkonadifferencebetweenthetwokindsofreligiouslyderivedburdensmentionedbyScan-loninthepassagequotedaboveFirstthereistheburdenofreligiouslyinducedguiltAndthenthere is theburdenofonersquosreligionbeingun-suitedtoonersquosstrengthsandweaknessesThosetwoburdensseemtometoberelevantlydifferentItdoesseematleastatfirstldquodistinctlyoddrdquotocompensateforreligiouslyinducedguiltbuttherearesomediscrepan-ciesbetweenapersonrsquosreligionandhisrepertoireofcapacityforwhichitisnotsimilarlypeculiartooffercompensationIdonotthinkthatitisstrangeforalameorpoorpersontorequestthecostoftransportforapilgrimagemandatedbyhisreligiousconvictionsAndevenifScanlonmeansldquostrengthsandweaknessesrdquoofanintimatelypsychologicalkindonly there would still I think be cases falling under that descriptionwherecompensationdidnotlooksooddIshallhoweverfocusontheparticularlypowerfulguiltexample
67 ScanlonldquoEqualityofResourcesandEqualityofWelfarerdquopp116ndash17
35
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
35
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Strategy1 fordealingwith that example is to represent thepersonrsquosguiltasduetohischoiceofreligionandasnotraisingacaseforcom-pensationforthatreasonButpeopleoftennomorechoosetoacquireaparticularreligionthantheydotospeakaparticularlanguageinmostcasesbothcomewithupbringingAndwhenupbringinginstillsareligionwhichliketheoneScanlondescribeshasadoxasticcharacter(itisnotjustawayoflifebutcentrallyasetofbeliefs)thenwecannotregarditsconvincedadherentaschoosingtoretainitanymorethanwecanregardhimaschoosingtoretainhisbeliefthattheworldisround
Strategy2saysthatcompensatingapersonforreligiousguiltisnotasstrangeasScanlonmaintainsTobesureitwouldbestrangeforthesub-jecthimselftorequestcompensationforhispainfulguiltfeelingssincehebelievesthatheshouldfeelguiltyalthoughhehasinnosensechosentohavethefeelingshe would not choose not to have them if he could68
ItishoweverfarlessclearthatthoseofuswhorejecthisreligionshouldhavenoinclinationtocompensatehimforhisguiltIfapersonsuffersbecauseof (whatwe think is)aplainly falsebelief thatGodhascom-mandedhimtosufferandwecannotpersuadehimthatheisunderanil-lusionshouldwedonothingforhimbecausehebelievesthatheisowednothingIfhisbeliefissappinghislifemightwenotgivehimprioritywhenwedistributescarcerecreationalfacilitiesWhyshouldhisbeliefbesovereignhere69
Whenourownconvictionsmatchthoseofthebelieverthereisnopur-chaseforthemainclaimofstrategy2whichisthatthedemandsofjus-ticemayexceedthedemandsapersoncouldintelligiblymakeonhisownbehalfStrategy3doesnotemploythatclaimThisfinalstrategyistore-visetheviewIhavedefendedasfollowsInsteadofsayingldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoicerdquosayldquocompensatefordisadvantageswhicharenottraceabletothesubjectrsquoschoice and which the subject would choose not to suffer fromrdquo TherevisionaryelementisthesecondclauseIntherevisedviewchoiceap-pearsattwolevelsactualandcounterfactualTherevisionseemstomenotad hocbutanaturaldevelopmentoftheoriginalviewinthefaceofScanlonrsquosexample
Theamendmentisnaturalbecauseitistruetothegroundingideathatdisadvantageistoberedressedwhenitreflectseitherexploitationorbad
68 Idonotmeanthatifcontrarytofacthecouldchoosenottohavethemhewouldnotsochooseldquoifhecouldrdquoiswithinthescopeofthedescriptionofwhathewouldnot(now)chooseInsayingldquoIwouldnotgiveitupifIcouldrdquoheisnotmakingaprediction
69 OnemightsaybecauseitwoulddestroythepointforhimofhisreligiouscommitmenttocompensatehimfortheburdensassociatedwithitButthatanswerishereoutofplaceIamrespondingtothepartofScanlonrsquoscasewhichherepresentsasldquoquiteapartrdquo(seethelastsentenceofthepassagequotedatn67above)fromtheforegoingconsideration
36
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
36
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
luckUptonowIhavetreatedchoiceastheonlyrelevantoppositeofluckbuttheScanlonexampleshowsthatsomeofthecostsofunchosencommitments(andtheyarecommitmentsbecauseonewouldnotchoosenot tohave them) are alsonotbad luck they arenotbad luckwhentheyaresointrinsically connectedwithhiscommitmentsthattheirbearerwouldnotchoosetobewithoutthem
ThestrongrequirementofintrinsicconnectionestablishesacontrastbetweenScanlonrsquosbelieverandpeoplewhoseexpensivepreferencesen-gagemyconcernbutnotDworkinrsquosThebelieverdiffersfromapersonwhosepreferencesarenotgovernedbybeliefatallandwhicha fortiori representnocommitment suchassomeonewhoprefersploversrsquoeggstohensrsquobecausetheformerwerehouseholdfareinchildhoodAndthecosts thebeliever incursalsodifferrelevantlyfromthosesustainedbythecommittedloverofexpensiveesotericmusic(seeSection4eabove)sincethehighpriceofsatisfyingthelatterrsquospreferenceisnotintegraltothecommitmentmandatingthatpreferencethatBergismoreexpensivethanbebopisnopartofwhatmakesBergbetterformostBergloversItisjustanunfortunatefactandBergloversconsequentlydonotbreakfaith with their commitment to what they think is good music whentheycampaignforaLincolnCenterinwhichtohearitMostwouldnotchoosetolacktheiresoterictastebuttheywouldcertainlychoosenottosustainthefrustrationthathappenstoaccompanyitandthatproducesa relevant disanalogy with the case of the guilty religious believer ItmeansthatwemightthinkitrighttoprovideaLincolnCenterevenforthosewhoforgoanoffertobeschooledoutoftheirhighbrowmusicaltastes(seecomment4inSection4eabove)
ItfollowsfromthosecontraststhattheScanlon-inspiredamendmentenforcesnoretreatfromanythingventuredaboveincritiqueofDwor-kinrsquosviewIdonothoweverwanttounderstatetheamendmentrsquossig-nificanceItspolicyimplicationsareentirelynegligiblebutitdoesintro-duceaconceptualelementverydifferentfromanythingrequiredtoresistDworkinForcounterfactualchoiceisnotakindofchoiceeventhoughlikechoiceitisstrictlyinconsistentwithluckItisneitherbecauseofhischoicenorbecauseofbadluckthatScanlonrsquosbelieversuffers
Since theScanlonamendmentchargesonly for the intrinsic costsofcommitmentsitisnotengagedbythepilgrimagecaseintroducedearlierin this section That case is similar to the example of the monumentwhichScanlonusesinprosecutionofhisoppositiontowelfarism
Thestrengthofastrangerrsquosclaimonusforaidinthefulfillmentofsome interestdependsuponwhat that interest isandneednotbeproportionaltotheimportanceheattachestoitThefactthatsome-onewouldbewillingtoforgoadecentdietinordertobuildamonu-
37
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CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
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CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
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CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
37
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
menttohisgoddoesnotmeanthathisclaimonothersforaidinhisprojecthasthesamestrengthasaclaimforaidinobtainingenoughtoeat (evenassuming that the sacrifices requiredofotherswouldbethesame)PerhapsapersondoeshavesomeclaimonothersforassistanceinaprojecttowhichheattachessuchgreatimportanceAllIneedmaintainisthatitdoesnothavetheweightofaclaimtoaidinthesatisfactionofatrulyurgentinterestevenifthepersoninquestionassignstheseinterestsequalweight70
I see no glaring oddity in a believerrsquos claim that since all should beequallyabletoworshipastheywillhisownworshipbecauseitrequireswhathappenstobeexpensivewarrantspublicsubsidy71NotethatevenScanlonallows thatunlike themanburdenedwitha senseof sin themonumentbuildermightwellhavea claimonusButunder thesug-gestedamendmenttomyviewandasIamsureScanlonwouldagreethemanrsquosclaimwouldlapseifhisreligionrequiredhimtobuildamonumentbecauseitwasexpensiveandthereforeoneroustosupplyforitscosttohimwouldnotthenbeadisadvantagewhichhewouldchoosetohaveremoveditwouldbeintrinsictohisreligiouscommitment
b IturntoScanlonrsquossecondchallengetothepositionIhaveespousedI have inmindhis argument against the importanceof beliefs aboutchoice in the explanation of our unwillingness to cater to expensivepreferences
CitingRawlsrsquossuggestionthatdistributive justicedoesnotattendtodesireassuchbecausedesiresaresubjecttoourcontrolScanlonprovi-sionallyhypothesizesthatitisbecausepreferencesareldquotoonearlyvol-untaryrdquothattheyarenotldquoanappropriatebasisfortheadjudicationofcompetingclaimsrdquo72
Scanlonthenasksinwhatwayorsensepreferencescouldbeconsid-eredvoluntaryHenotesthattheyarenotvoluntaryinthesenseofbeingimmediatelysubjecttothewillbutallowsthatthereisscopeforvolitionldquointhemalleabilityofpreferencesovertimerdquo73Soldquoperhapstheforceofthevoluntarinessobjection74liesinthatitispossibleforunusuallystrong
70 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquopp659ndash60SinceScanlonlater(p666)assignsaspecialurgencytoreligiousconcernonemustcharitablyreadthesuggestionabovethattheneedforamonumentisnotaldquotrulyurgentinterestrdquoasatoostrongwayofsayingthatitislessurgentthanapersonrsquosinterestinadecentdiet
71 CompareArnesonldquoEqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfarerdquo72 Scanlon ldquoPreference and Urgencyrdquo pp 663ndash64 Scanlon cites Rawls ldquoA Kantian
ConceptionofEqualityrdquop97SeetoothepassagefromRawlsldquoSocialUnityandPri-maryGoodsrdquoquotedinSection3above
73 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66474 Toietheideathatdistributivejusticeshouldtrackpreferencestrengthassuch
38
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CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
38
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
orunusually expensivepreferencesrdquonot indeed tobe chosen atwillbutldquotobelsquomanufacturedrsquobythepersonwhohasthemrdquo75ButScanlonproceedstorejectthisaccountofthematter
Butifthiswerethewholebasisforthevoluntarinessobjectiononewouldexpectthatatleastinprincipletheactualgenesisofaper-sonrsquospreferenceswouldberelevanttothestrengthoftheirclaimtobesatisfiedTheverysameintenseinterestmighthavearisenoutofaconsciousdecisiontoldquotakeuprdquoacertainactivityoritmighthavegrownalmostunnoticedastheresultofaseriesofchanceencoun-tersWhichoftheseisthecasedoesnothoweverseemtomatterforthepurposesofdeterminingthestrengthofthepersonrsquosclaimonothersforaid inthesatisfactionofthis interest (Althoughitmayberelevanttotheassessmentofhisclaimtoaidingettingridoftheinterestshouldhecometoregarditasanobsessionwhichcrippleshiminthepursuitofhisnormalactivities)76
IdonotagreewithScanlonrsquoscontentionthatldquotheactualgenesisofapersonrsquospreferencesrdquoisirrelevanttothestrengthofhisclaimtohavethemsatisfiedSupposethateachoftwopeoplehavedevelopedanex-pensiveinterestandit isofakindwhichoncecontractedcannotbeextinguishedsothatthereisnoquestionofanyclaimforassistanceingettingridofitOneofthemhowevermadealdquoconsciousdecisionrdquotodeveloptheinterestwithfullforeknowledgeofthecostofsatisfyingitwhiletheotherjusthappenedtocomebyitunawaresordevelopeditbeforeitbecameexpensiveforwhollyunforeseeablereasonsThensoIbelieveweshouldextendmoresympathyandfavortothesecondper-sonWemightsayofthefirstldquowemustinallcharityhelphimrdquobutitwouldbemuchhardertosayinhiscasethaninthecaseoftheotherldquowemust inall justicehelphimrdquo I thereforedissent fromScanlonrsquosreasoningatthispointButitwillneverthelessproveinstructivetoseehowitcontinues
Scanlonholdsthatthereissomethingquitedifferentfromvoluntari-nessunderlyingthereferencetovoluntarinessItistheveryldquofactthataninterestgiven itscontentcouldhavearisenrdquoeithervoluntarilyornotwhichiscrucialforthatfactshowsthattheinterestinquestionmightnothavearisenatall77AndsinceitmightnothavearisenScanloncon-cludesthatfromanobjectivepointofviewitisofldquoperipheralimpor-tancerdquowhatevermaybetheimportanceithastotheindividualhimself78
Hencebyaroundaboutroutethesuggestionthatexpensivetasteshave
75 ScanlonldquoPreferenceandUrgencyrdquop66476 Ibidpp664ndash6577 Quotedmaterialfromibidp665myemphasis78Ibid
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
39
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
noclaimonusbecausetheyaredeliberatelycultivatedistransmutedintotheideathattheyareofobjectivelysecondarysignificancehoweverhighthepersonhimselfmayranktheminawordjusticeshouldnotcatertoidiosyncrasywhateveritsgenesismaybe
OnemaysaythataccordingtoScanlontheliaisonbetweeninterestandvolitionhasimplicationsforjusticebecauseofthefollowingargu-ment
(1) Sometimespeoplechoosetodevelopacertaininterestthere4(2) Itisthesortofinterestthatapersoncoulddevelopasamatter
ofchoicethere4(3) Itisaninterestthatmightnotdevelopitisobjectivelyperiph-
eralthere4(4) Itisaninterestnotcommandingtheurgentattentionofjustice
(whetherornotitwasdevelopedasaresultofchoice)
Thefinal inference inthisargumentappearstometobequestionableScanlonhimselfraisesaquestionabout itldquoCouldtherebeaninterestwhichpeoplemightormightnothappentohavemdashbutwhichifapersonhaditwouldbethebasisforurgentclaimsIcannotcomeupwithanexampleReligionmightseemtobeanexampleInoursocietysomepeopleareconcernedwithreligionothersarenotYettheclaimsofonersquosreligiouspreferencesnottobeinterferedwitharethoughttohaveaspecialurgencyButwouldthisbesoifitwerenotthoughtthatreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquo79
InassessingScanlonrsquosclaimthatthereisnourgentinterestwhichisnotuniversallysharedwehavetobecarefulaboutthelevelofgeneralityatwhichinterestsareindividuatedFacedwiththeputativecounterex-ampleofreligionScanlonregresses toahigher levelofgeneralityhesays thatwethinkreligionmeritscertain formsofprotectionbecauseldquoreligionor something like ithasacentralplaceinanyonersquosliferdquoButnowonehastoasklikereligioninwhatwayAndtheanswercannotbelikeitinmatteringsomuchtothepersoninquestionforthatwouldreturnustothesubjectivewelfareorderingwhichScanlonisseekingtoeschewldquocentralplacerdquoattheendoftheforegoingpassagehastobetakenobjectivelyButthenIcannotseewhatthingrelevantlysimilartoreligionappearsineverynormalpersonrsquoslifeAndIthereforedisagreewithScanlonrsquossuggestionthatreligionfailstoprovideacounterexampleoftherequiredkind
Idonotinconclusiondisacknowledgetheneedforobjectiveassess-mentinarrivingatdistributivedecisionsIrecognizeditsinescapabilityatthebeginningofthissectionItisnecessaryforthepurposeofdeciding
79 Ibidpp665ndash66
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
40
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
whatanadvantageisMymorelimitedconclusionisthattheapparentimportanceforjusticeoffactsaboutvolitionwithrespecttothegenesisofadisadvantagederivingfrompreferenceisnotaconfusedsurfacere-flectionofthepriorityofobjectiveassessment
6 Sen on Capability
Howdoesequality of access to advantagerelatetowhatAmartyaSenhascalledcapability equality
AsIamusinglsquoaccessrsquoapersonenjoysaccesstosomethingwhichhedoesnothaveonly ifhehasboththeopportunityandthecapacity toobtainitintheordinarysensesofthosewordsunderwhichtheynamedistinctrequirementsneitherofwhichentailstheotherNoweveniflsquoca-pabilityrsquoinitsordinarymeaningdiffersfromldquocapacityrdquoittoonever-thelessfailstoentailldquoopportunityrdquo(onemightbecapableofswimmingwithouthavingtheopportunitytoswim)andfromthatonemightcon-cludethatmyaccessismoredemandingthanSenrsquoscapabilityandthatourreadingsofequalityconsequentlydifferButSenrsquoscapabilityisnotordinarycapabilityItrequirespossessionofexternalwherewithalanditcoversopportunitytoosometimesindeedSenusestheverywordlsquoop-portunityrsquoinanextendedsensetomeanwhathemoreusuallyusesthewordlsquocapabilityrsquotomean80Hencetheordinarymeaningsofthewordslsquoaccessrsquoandlsquocapabilityrsquodonotestablishthatourtworeadingsofequalityaredistinct
ItwouldhoweverbeprematuretoconcludethattheyareidenticalforseveralreasonsOneofthemisthatthereisasubstantialambiguityinSenrsquosuseofthetermlsquocapabilityrsquowhichmakesithardtobesureexactlywhathisconceptionofequalityimpliesForinhisseminalldquoEqualityofWhatrdquoSenidentifiedtwowaysofassessingapersonrsquosconditionunderthe singlenameldquocapabilityrdquoand theunnoticedandconfusingdualityhaspersistedinhissubsequentwritingsBothdimensionsofassessmentshouldattract egalitarian interest but atmostoneof themmerits thenameldquocapabilityrdquoTheidentificationoftheotherdimensionconstitutesastrikingcontributiontonormativeunderstandingbutjustthatdimen-sionishardtoperceiveinSenrsquosexpositionbecauseitisnotfelicitouslydescribedinthelanguage(ofldquofunctioningrdquoandldquocapabilityrdquo)whichSenusestocharacterizeit
80 Immediately after introducing the notion of ldquocapability to functionrdquo in his DeweyLecturesSenshiftstothealternativelanguageofldquoopportunityrdquotoexpressthesameidea(seeldquoWell-BeingAgencyandFreedomrdquopp200ndash201)CompareSenCommodities and Capabilitiesp59The Standard of Livingp36
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
41
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
Senarrivedatwhathecalledldquocapabilityrdquothroughreflectiononthemaincandidatesforassessmentofwell-beingwhichwereinthefieldwhenhegavehis1979lecturetowitutilityorwelfareandRawlsianprimarygoods81 Senpleaded for ametricofwell-beingwhichmea-suredsomethingfallingbetweenprimarygoodsandutilityinasensethatwill presentlybe explained a somethingwhichhad amazinglybeenlargelyneglectedinpreviousliteratureHecalledthatsomethinglsquocapabilityrsquo
Right from the start however lsquocapabilityrsquo was used to denote twothingsoneofwhichwaslargerthantheotherandlsquocapabilityrsquowasnotafelicitouslychosennameforthelargerone
Sensaidthatldquowhatismissinginallthisframework82issomenotionoflsquobasiccapabilitiesrsquoapersonbeingabletodocertainbasicthingsrdquo83
Butthatrelativelynarrowcharacterizationofthemissingdimensionwasdifferentfromanotherwhichheofferedinthesametextandwhichwasmoreinkeepingwithhisargumentforthenewperspective
Senrsquosargumentagainsttheprimarygoodsmetricwasthatdifferentlyconstructed and situated people require different amounts of primarygoods to satisfy the sameneeds so thatldquojudgingadvantagepurely intermsofprimarygoodsleadstoapartiallyblindmoralityrdquo84ItisSenrightlysaidaldquofetishisthandicaprdquotobeconcernedwithgoodsassuchtotheexclusionofwhatgoodsldquodo tohumanbeingsrdquo85Bothhedonicandpreferencesatisfactionwelfaristsarefreeofthatparticularfetishismsincetheyareconcernedldquowithwhatthesethingsdotohumanbeingsbuttheyuseametric[utility]thatfocusesnotonthepersonrsquoscapabilities
81 AnotablefurthercandidatenotyettheninprintwasDworkinrsquosequalityofresourcesDworkinianresourcesdifferfromRawlsianprimarygoodsinanumberofwaysOneisthattheyincludeapersonrsquosmentalandphysicalpowersItwouldbeaworthwhilemdashanddifficultmdashexercisetodistinguisheachofthetwoSendimensionsIshalldescribefromtheDworkinresourcesdimension(ForpertinentremarksseeSenrsquosexcellentrebuttalallofwhichstrikesmeascorrectofDworkinrsquoscriticismofSenrsquosviewatpp321ndash23ofldquoRightsandCapabilitiesrdquo)
82 Thatistheframeworkofdiscussionrestrictedtotherivalclaimsofprimarygoodsandutilityasmeasuresofwell-beingandwithinldquoprimarygoodsrdquotogoodsintheordinarysenseThatistherelevantsubsetofprimarygoodshereandalsoinRawlsrsquosdiscussionofexpensivetastes
83 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop21884 Ibidp21685 Ibidp218ComparethisstatementldquoWhatpeoplegetoutofgoodsdependsona
varietyoffactorsandjudgingpersonaladvantagejustbythesizeofpersonalownershipofgoodsandservicescanbeverymisleadingItseemsreasonabletomoveawayfromafocusongoodsassuchtowhatgoodsdotohumanbeingsrdquo(SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementpp29ndash30)CompareSenldquoEthicalIssuesinIncomeDistribu-tionrdquop294Commodities and Capabilitiesp23andThe Standard of Livingpp15ndash1622
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
42
Copyrighted Material
CHAPTERONE
butonhismentalreactionrdquo86AndthatmentalreactionisanunsuitableguidetopolicyifonlybecausepeopleadjusttheirexpectationstotheirconditionsThefactthatapersonhaslearnedtolivewithadversityandto smile courageously in the faceof it shouldnotnullifyhis claim tocompensation87
Capabilities were thereby identified with what goods do to (or for)humanbeingsinabstractionfromtheutilitytheyconferonthemButthat identification was a mistake For even when utility has been setasideitremainsuntruethatallthatgoodsdoforpeopleisconfercapa-bility88onthemorthattheuniquelyimportantthingtheydoforthemisthatorthatthatistheonlythingtheydoforthemwhichmattersfromanegalitarianpointofviewInnaminghisviewldquoCapabilityEqualityrdquoSenfailedtorecognizethetrueshapeandsizeofoneofthedimensionshehaduncovered
It is indeed false that the normatively relevant effect on a personofhisbundleofprimarygoodsdependsentirelyonhismentalreactiontowhat theydo for himThere is alsowhatwelfarists ignorewhat theydoforhimwhathegetsoutofthemapartfromhismentalreactiontoorpersonalevaluationofthatserviceConsequentlySenwasrightthatintheenterpriseofassessingapersonrsquoswell-beingwemustconsiderhisconditionorstateinabstractionfromitsutilityforhimWemustlookatsomethingwhichisldquoposteriorrdquotoldquohavinggoodsrdquoandldquopriorrdquotoldquohav-ingutilityrdquo89WemustlookforexampleathisnutritionlevelandnotjustasRawlsiansdoathisfoodsupplyoraswelfaristsdoattheutilityhederivesfromeatingfood90
ButthissignificantandilluminatingreorientationisnotequivalenttofocusingonapersonrsquoscapabilitywherethatiswhatheisableallthingsconsideredtodoCapabilityandexercisesofcapabilityformonlypartoftheneglectedintermediate(betweenprimarygoodsandutility)stateWhat goods do to or for people is not identical with what people are able to do with themnorevenwithwhattheyactuallydowiththemTobesureitisusuallytruethatapersonmustdosomethingwithagood(takeitinputitongoinsideitetc)inordertobebenefitedbyitbutthatis
86 SenldquoEqualityofWhatrdquop218ldquoMentalreactionrdquomustherecovernotonlyakindofexperiencebutalsoasubjectivevaluationtocaterforthepreferenceformofwelfarism
87 This argument against the utilitymetricwas not fully explicit in Sen ldquoEquality ofWhatrdquoItappearsatCommodities and Capabilitiespp21ndash2229ldquoRightsandCapabili-tiesrdquopp308ndash9introductiontoResources Values and Developmentp34ldquoGoodsandPeoplerdquoinResources Values and Developmentp512The Standard of Livingpp8ndash11
88 EveninSenrsquosacceptablyextendedsenseofthetermmdashseeearlierinthissectionmdashwhichisthesenseinwhichIuseithere
89SenCommodities and Capabilitiesp1190 SenintroductiontoChoice Welfare and Measurementp30
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
43
Copyrighted Material
CURRENCYOFEGALITARIANJUSTICE
notalwaystrueandevenwhenitistrueonemustdistinguishwhatthegooddoesforthepersonfromwhathedoeswithit
Notall thatmattersand isnotutility iscapabilityoranexerciseofcapabilityoraresultofexercisingcapabilityAndmanystateswhichareindeedaresultofexercisingcapabilityhavea(nonutility)valuewhichisunconnectedwiththeirstatusaseffectsofcapabilityexerciseandwhichisnotclearlyexhibitedin itstrue independenceofcapability(properlyso-called) by Sen A further development and defense of these criticalcontentionswillappearelsewhere9192
91 [SeeChapter2ofthisvolumemdashEd]92 IthankJerryBarnesandTimScanlonfortheirgenerouslyextendedandveryincisive
criticismofadraftofthisarticleAndfortheirmanyhelpfulcommentsIalsothankRich-ardArnesonJohnBakerTimBesleyRonaldDworkinJohnGardnerDavidKnottWillKymlickaDavidLloyd-ThomasGrahameLockJohnMcMurtryMichaelOtsukaDerekParfitJosephRazAmartyaSenandPhilippeVanParijs
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