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Buffer Overflows. James Walden Northern Kentucky University. Topics. What is a Buffer Overflow? Buffer Overflow Examples Program Stacks Smashing the Stack Shellcode Mitigations. Buffer Overflows. A program accepts too much input and stores it in a fixed length buffer that’s too small. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Buffer Overflows
James WaldenNorthern Kentucky University
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Topics
1. What is a Buffer Overflow?2. Buffer Overflow Examples3. Program Stacks4. Smashing the Stack5. Shellcode6. Mitigations
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Buffer OverflowsA program accepts too much input and stores it in a fixed length buffer that’s too small.
char A[8];short B=3;
A A A A A A A A B B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A A A A A A A A B B
o v e r f l o w s 0
gets(A);
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Buffer Overflow Examples
Morris WormTook down most of Internet in 1988.Exploited a buffer overflow in fingerd.Subsequent worms used overflow attacks too.
CVE-2012-4172: Adobe ShockwaveOverflow in Shockwave Player <11.6.8.638Allows arbitrary remote code execution.Adobe released patch to fix with 4 other CVEs
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Buffer Overflow Example #1
What’s the mistake in this program?int main() {
int array[5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
printf("%d\n", array[5]);}
Program output: > gcc -o buffer buffer.c> ./buffer7077876
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Buffer Overflow Example #2
Writing beyond the buffer:int main() { int array[5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; int i;
for( i=0; i <= 255; ++i ) array[i] = 41;}
Program output: > gcc -o bufferw bufferw.c> ./bufferwSegmentation fault (core dumped)
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What happened to our program?The buffer overflow:
Overwrote memory beyond buffer with 41.Memory page was not writable by program.OS terminated prog with segmentation fault.
Do overflows always produce a crash?Most of the time, yes.Careful attacker can access valid memory.
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Why do we keep making the same mistake?
C/C++ inherently unsafe.No bounds checking.Unsafe library functions: strcpy(), sprintf(), gets(), scanf(), etc.
D, Java, Python, Ruby largely immune.C/C++ gains performance by not checking.
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Process Memory Layout
argv, env
stack
heap
bss
data
text
high mem
low mem
Argv/Env: CLI args and environmentStack: generally grows downwardsHeap: generally grows upwardsBSS: unitialized global dataData: initialized global dataText: read-only program code
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Memory Layout Example
/* data segment: initialized global data */int a[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };/* bss segment: uninitialized global data */int b;
/* text segment: contains program code */int main(int argc, char **argv) /* ptr to argv */{ /* stack: local variables */ int *c; /* heap: dynamic allocation by new or malloc */ c = (int *)malloc(5 * sizeof(int));}
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Program Stack Layoutb() {…}a() { b();}main() { a();}
Unallocated
Stack Frame for b()
Stack Frame for a()
Stack Frame for main()
High Memory
Low Memory
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Stack Frames A function call produces a stack frame.
– Return address of the caller.– Actual arguments used in function call.– Local variables.
Register EBP points to current frame. Stack frame is deallocated on return.
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C Calling Convention
1. Push params on stack in reverse order.Parameter #N…Parameter #1
2. Issue a call instruction.1. Pushes address of next instruction (the
return address) onto stack.2. Modifies EIP to point to start of function.
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Stack before Function Executes
Frame Pointer
Stack Pointer
old stack frame
parameter #N
…
parameter #1
return address
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Function Initialization
1. Function pushes FP (%ebp) onto stack.pushl %ebp
2. Sets FP to current SP.Allows function to access params as fixed indexes from frame pointer.
movl %esp, %ebp
3. Reserves stack space for local vars.subl $12, %esp
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Stack at Function Start
Frame Pointer
Stack Pointer
old stack frame
parameter #N
…
parameter #1return addressold FPlocal vars
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Function Return
1. Stores return value in %eax.movl $1, %eax
2. Restores stack and frame pointers.movl %esp, %ebppopl %ebp
3. Pops return address off stack and transfers control to that address. ret
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Controlling Execution
Let’s make the program an infinite loop by changing the return value to start of main().
(gdb) disassemble mainDump of assembler code for main:0x080483c1 <main+0>: push %ebp0x080483c2 <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp0x080483c4 <main+3>: call 0x804839c <printInput>0x080483c9 <main+8>: leave0x080483ca <main+9>: ret
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Sending a non-ASCII Value
void main() { char addr[44]; int i; for( i=0; i<=40; i+=4 ) *(long *) &addr[i]=0x080483c1; puts(addr);}
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Does it work?
(./address; cat) | ./overflowinput1input1input2input2input3Segmentation fault (core dumped)
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Code and Data
What’s the difference between code and data?
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Code Injection
Use a two step process:1. Use buffer overflow to write machine
code (shellcode) onto stack.2. Rewrite return address to point to
machine code on the stack.Program will do whatever we tell it to do in those machine instructions.
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Shellcode
Shellcode is machine code that starts a command shell. With a shell, you can run any command.
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Shellcode
Shellcode in C.int main() { char *name[2]; name[0] = "/bin/sh"; name[1] = 0x0; execve(name[0], name, 0x0);}
Running the program.> gcc –ggdb –static –o shell shellcode.c> ./shellsh-3.00$ exit
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From C to Machine Language
char shellcode[] ="\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b""\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd""\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
void main() { int *ret; ret = (int *)&ret + 2; (*ret) = (int)shellcode;}
> gcc -o testsc2 testsc2.c> ./testsc2sh-3.00$ exit
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Writing an Exploit
1. Construct shellcode to inject.2. Find exploitable buffer in a program.3. Estimate address of buffer.4. Run program with an input that:
1. Injects shellcode into stack memory.2. Overwrites return address with address of
your shellcode.
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Improving the Odds
Determining the correct address of your shellcode is difficult.What if you could use multiple addrs?
Pad buffer with NOP instructions preceding the shellcode.If function returns anywhere in NOP pad, it will continue executing until it executes the shellcode.
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Overflow Exploits w/o the Stack
Overflows can exist in other segments.Only the stack has return addresses.Must rewrite other addresses
Function pointersLongjmp buffers
Or alter security critical variables.
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Buffer Overflow Mitigations
1. Use language with bounds checking.2. Do your own bounds checking.3. Avoid unsafe functions.4. Use safe functions securely.5. Operating system defenses.6. Compiler-based defenses.
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Languages with Bounds Checking
High-level languages do bounds checks Java JavaScript OCaml Python Ruby Scheme Smalltalk
C variants CCured Cyclone D
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Bounds CheckingCheck input length before copying into buffer.
int myfunction(const char *str) { char buf[1024];
/* strlen() doesn’t count NULL */
if (strlen(str) >= sizeof(buf)) { /* str too long */ exit(1); }}
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Unsafe Functions: Input
gets(char *s)Always an overflow. Cannot be checked.Use fgets(char *s, int size, FILE *stream);
scanf(const char *fmt, …)Similar: _tscanf, wscanf, sscanf, fscanf, …Use of “%s” format allows overflow.Use “%Ns” to limit length of input.
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Unsafe Functions: strcat
strcpy(char *dst, char *src)Similar: wscpy, wcscpy, mbscpyOverflow if dst smaller than src.
strncpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t n)Similar: _tcsncpy, wcscpyn, _mbsncpy, …No NULL termination if src >= dst.
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Bounded Function Pitfalls1. Destination buffer overflows because bound
depends on size of source data, not destination buffer.
2. Destination buffer left without null terminator, often as result of off-by-one error.
3. Destination buffer overflows because its bound is specified as the total size of the buffer, rather than space remaining.
4. Programs writes to arbitrary location in memory as destination buffer is not null-terminated and function begins writing at location of first null in destination buffer.
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Safe String Libraries
UNIX LibrariesC
BstrlibMT-SafeSafeStrstrlcpy(), strlcat()Vstr
C++std::string (STL)
Windows LibrariesC
Safe CRTstrlcpy(), strlcat()StrSafe
C++CString (MFC)Safe C++std::string (STL)
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strlcpy() and strlcat()
size_t strlcpy (char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
size_t strlcat (char *dst, const char *src, size_t size);
Size is max size of dest buffer (not maximum number of chars to copy), including NULL.
Destination buffer always NULL terminated Return how much space would be required in
destination buffer to perform operation. BSD-style open source license.
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Character SetsChars represented using encoding forms that map code points to printable chars.
Fixed Width ISO-8859-1 UTF-32
Variable Width UTF-8 UTF-16 (Java, .NET)
Character Encoding Code Points ISO-8859-1
UTF-87373
ÿ ISO-8859-1UTF-8
FFC3 BF
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Wide Characters
C/C++ char contains 1-byte characters wchar_t is 2-byte, 4-byte on some platforms
Java and .NET strings UTF-16
Buffer Overflow issues Mixing up different character-set string types. Are sizes measured in bytes or characters?
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C++ String Dangers
Using C-style strings with cinchar username[16];cin >> username;
The [] operator does no bounds checking.Converting from C++ to C-style strings:
string::data() output is not NULL terminated.string::c_str() output is NULL terminated.
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Dealing with Overly Long Inputs Prevent operation with an error message.
Possibly exit program too. Truncate input to allowed length.
Can lead to null-termination errors. Can cause input to be misinterpreted later.
Resize the buffer to accomodate input. Limit resizing to avoid memory DoS.
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Dynamic vs. Static AllocationStatic
Simple Easy to track buffer size for bounds checks. Inflexible. Limited options if size is too small. Waste memory if size is too large.
Dynamic Complex Manually tracking buffer sizes can lead to overflows due
to stale size data. Flexible Can lead to memory exhaustion if no limits. Possibility of use after free and double free errors.
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Non-executable Stack
Memory protection prevents exploit code from being executed.– Some applications execute code on the stack/heap.– x86 arch doesn’t have exec bit in page tables.– Segment limits can divide memory into two parts:
executable and non-executable.• Keep program code in low memory.• Keep data and stack in high memory.• Coarse-grained.
– NX Technology• Exec bit for page tables.• Added in AMD64 and newer Intel P4 processors.• Only works in PAE 64-bit page table format.
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Return-Oriented Programming
ROP transfers control to code that already exists in memory.
Put function arguments on stack.Change return address to that function.libc has functions to start a shell.Allows exploit even if stack non-executable.
Sophisticated ROP attacks create multiple stack frames to run multiple functions that are in memory.
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Address Randomization
Randomize layout of memory space Stack location. Shared library locations. Heap location.
PIE: Position Independent Executable Default format: binary compiled to work at an address
selected when program was compiled. Gcc can compile binaries to be freely relocatable
throughout address space. gcc flags: -fpie –pie Program loaded at different address for each invocation.
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Defence: Stackguard
Compiler extension for gcc code must be compiled w/ Stackguard
Detects altered return address before function returns adds “canary” word to stack must overwrite canary to change return addr use random canary words for each function to
avoid guessing attacks
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Stackguard Stack Layout
Frame Pointer Stack Pointer
old frame
param1
param2
old PC
canary word
old FP
local vars
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Stackguard Effectiveness
Code dependencies are dynamic libraries stackguarded?
Compatibility Recompiled entire RedHat Linux system.
Small performance cost canary insert and check overhead on each call
Protects against future stack attacks. Similar tools:
gcc -fstack-protector flag Visual Studio 2005
CSC 666: Secure Software Engineering
Buffer Overflow: Key PointsBuffer overflow attacks.
C/C++ perform no bounds checking. There is no difference btw code and data. Smashing the stack.
Mitigating buffer overflows. Use a language with bounds checking. Check your own bounds in C/C++. Use safe functions, string libraries.
References1. Aleph Null, “Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit,” Phrack 49, 1996.2. Brian Chess and Jacob West, Secure Programming with Static Analysis, Addison-
Wesley, 2007.3. Johnathan Bartlett, Programming from the Ground Up, Bartlett Publishing, 2004.4. Matt Conover & w00w00 Security Team, “w00w00 on Heap Overflows,”
http://www.w00w00.org/files/articles/heaptut.txt5. Mark Graff and Kenneth van Wyk, Secure Coding: Principles & Practices, O’Reilly,
2003.6. Horizon, “Bypassing Non-executable Stack Protection on Solaris,”
http://packetstormsecurity.nl/groups/horizon/stack.txt7. Greg Hoglund and Gary McGraw, Exploiting Software: How to Break Code,
Addison-Wesley, 2004.8. Michael Howard and David LeBlanc, Writing Secure Code, 2nd edition, Microsoft
Press, 2003.9. Koziol, et. al, The Shellcoder’s Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security
Holes, Wiley, 2004.10. Robert C. Seacord, Secure Coding in C and C++, Addison-Wesley, 2006.11. John Viega and Gary McGraw, Building Secure Software, Addison-Wesley, 2002.12. David Wheeler, Secure Programming for UNIX and Linux HOWTO,
http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/Secure-Programs-HOWTO/index.html, 2003.
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