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CHAPTER I11
ANTECEDENTS OF STATE-LED FORMALISATION
This chapter begins with a review of the development experience of
Kerala. It has been often highlighted that in Kerala, despite high levels of social
development, economic stagnation persists; and this has given rise to scepticism
about its sustainability. There are many factors that have caused stagnation of
agriculture and industry in Kerala. Its image as a 'labour problem state' is said to
be one of the important factors. It is viewed that headload workers have
contributed much to creating such an image. The emergence of headIoad workers
as a distinct labour category in the urban and semi-urban areas is analysed. This
analysis is followed by a study of the unionisation of this labour class. Its
impacts on themselves and on the development process are underscored. The
circumstances that led to the state intervention in the headload labour market
is also highlighted.
3.1 Development and Labour
Though Kerala is a small state in the Indian Union with a poorly
developed industrial base, it has received world- wide attention and admiration in
certain respects. After a year of its formation as a state, the people of Kerala
elected a Communist government into power.' In the state many different classes
of workers were mobilised and strengthened with more bargaining power and
I The State of Kerala was formed on 1 November 1956. The state's first legislative election was held in 1957. The Communist Party of India (CPI) won the elections and formed a democratically elected Communist government.
more control over the labour process.2 The state is known for the peculiar
attitude of its people to migrate to different parts of the world and enjoy a divine
blessing in the form of foreign remittances.' The early trade relationship with the
outside world brought Kerala into contact with different races, religions and
cultures and this resulted in a cultural integration in the state.4 A noted
achievement of Kerala, as appraised by many, has been its distinct development
experience, which has been referred to as the 'Kerala Model of ~ e v e l o ~ m e n t " .
Social development indicators suggest impressive performance of the
state, but economic development has not caught up with it.6 That is, the
development experience of Kerala is such that with a low level of per capita
income, lower than the all India level, the state has achieved a high level of
human development, somewhat equivalent to that of the developed countries
2 K.P Kannan, "Labour Institutions . . . ," Op. cit., pp.49-69. 3 P. Surendran, The Kerala Economy Dcvelopmenr, Problems and Prospects, Delhi, Vrinda
Publications (P) Ltd, 1999, p.3 1. 1 P.P. Pillai, Kerala Economy: Four Decades of Development, Thrissur, Institute of
Planning and Applied Economic Research, John Mathai Foundation, 1994, p.5. 5 The expression 'Kerala Model of Development' is associated with a study conducted by
the scholars at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapurarn, in 1975. Based on this study entitled "Poverty, Unemployment and Development Policy: A Case Study of Selected h u e s with ret'erence to Kerala", published by the CDS and the United Nations, international scholars rojected a 'Kerala Model of Development'.
'Some of the statistical figurer can be invoked here to substantiate the argument. Kerala, the southernmost state of the Indian Union, spreads across 38863 sq. kms, which is only 1.27 per cent of the total area of the country. The population is 3 1.84 million, which is 3.1 per cent of the total population of India. (Census of India, 2001). Kerala's position is the third among the Indian states in respect of density of population, which is estimated to be 819 persons per. sq. km. Kerala is the most literate state in the country having the literacy rate of 90.92 as against the all India figure of 65.38. (Census of India, 2001). Kerala had the birth rate of 18.2, death rate of 6.4 and infant mortality rate of 16 in 1998 and the comparable rates of all India were 26.4, 9.0 and 72 respectively. (Economic Review, 1999). The life expectancy at birth was 68.23 years for men and 73.62 years for women in 1996-2000. Compared to the all India Level of 62.8 years for men and 64.2 years for women (Economic Review, 1999). These statistics show that in the case of physical quality of life indicators such as birth rate, death rate, infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy the achievement of Kemfa is remarkable as comparable with the a1 t India performance. In addition to these, Kerala has achieved substantial development in the areas of women's education, land reforms, adequate food supply, spread of reading habit, reduction of spatial gaps, people's participation in planning etc.
of the worlda7 The significance of Kerala's development experience is such that
i t challenges the widely held paradigm that agricultural and industrial
development would take place first and then only the improvement of the
standard of living of the people occur^.^ As this type of development contradicts
the paradigm, it has caught the attention of the academics and the policy makers.
But this development experience cannot be said to be unique to Kerala because
Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Peru also have similar development
experience.9 Though commonness may be observed, the causes and the specific
processes that engendered the deveIopment are distinct for each region. Given
the specificities of Kerala, two questions are worth addressing:
1. How could the state attain a high level of human development with a low
per capita income?
2. Given the low level of per capita income and economic growth, is it possible
to sustain and improve the achieved level of human development?
It is well known that the development experience of Kerala was not a
planned one, but evolved over centuries due to the pecuIiarities of the
state." The environment of the state, long history of international contact,
emergence and spread of working cIass consciousness and the presence of many
committed and self sacrificing organisers and leaders, are said to be the
important factors which contributed to the success of Kerala in building up high
7 C.T Kurian, "Sustainability of Kerala's Development Experience", in M.A. Oommen Rethinking Developmenl: Keralu 's Development Experience, Volume I, New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company, 1999, p. 149.
8 T.M Thomas Issac and P.K. Michael Tharakan, "Kerala: Towards a New Agenda", Economic und Political Weekly, August 1995, p.1993.
9 C.T Kurian, "Sustainability . . ., " Op. cif., pp. 150-5 1 . I0 P. Surendran, The Kerala Economy . . . Up, cil, p. 42.
social development." The important factors that have created a favourable
environment for development in the fields of education, health care, trade etc. in
the state are well documented.'* The important features in the educational sector
were spiritual learning attached with Hindu tempIes, Assan's Kudippallikudams,
(an indigenous institution for imparting learning), contribution of Christian
missionaries, that of Hindu and Muslim religious groups, government
intervention (through starting schools and providing grants to educational
institutions run by the private sector), opportunities for women's education and
linking of government jobs with educational qualification. In the field of health
care also Kerala has a remarkable heritage. The healthy physical environment
due to geographical and climatic reasons, spread of ayurvedic system of
medicine, government intervention in both preventive and curative measures of
health care etc. have contributed to a healthy environment for health care. Trade
links with the rest of the world, agrarian reforms, socio-cultural movements etc.
have also created a congruous environment for the development of the state.
From this brief account, one can state that the achievement of the state in human
development was entrenched in the history of social, political, economic and
religious milieu.
Kerala's development experience has been wall documented and analysed
in a number of studies.I3 These studies underscore the roles of the state, trade
unions, and socio-religious and cultural institutions, along with the influx of
" Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerafa: Developmeni Through Radica) Reform, New Delhi, Promilla and Co. Publishers, 1994, pp.49-54,
l2 P.P. Pillai, Keraia Economy . . . , Op, cit,, pp. 1-1 7. 13 Cenh-e for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapurarn, Poverty, Unempioyment and Development
Policy A Case Srudy ofSeIecud Issues wirh Reference ro Kerala, New York, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1975. Jean Dreze md Amartya Sen, Economic. . . , Op. cir., 1998. Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cir., 1994. K.K George, Limits to KeraIa Modei of Development: An Analysis of Fiscal Crisis and its impIicatiom, Thiruvananthapurarn, Centre for Development Studies, 1 999. M. A .Oornrnen, Essqs on Kerala Economy, New Delhi, Oxford and 1 B H PubIishing Company, 1993. Patrick Heller, The Labour. , . , Op. cii., 1999.
foreign remittances. Some of the institutions that were formed during pre-
independent period continued to function even after the formation of the state.
Nevertheless, among the different institutions that have contributed to the social
development of Kerala, the most prominent is the government.
3.1.1 State policy
In the post-formation period of Kerala, various schemes were executed by
the government for social development. Among them, the institutions for
education and health care were the most decisive. Special welfare measures of
different types were undertaken exclusively for uplifting the poor and the
marginalised. An efficient public distribution system was set up. State enterprises
were established to provide the people with necessary facilities like transport,
electricity etc.
Kerala's success in the all important field of basic capabilities was due to the
public policy involving education, health services, public distribution, better position
of women in the sociev and the greater public activism.14 ~ i f fe ren t social
organisations, with the patronage of the government, were active and strong in
building up educational institutions and hospitals at different parts of Kerala. These
efforts of the government should be viewed within the broader context in which
different social agents' function. The general tendency among the wealthy and
influential groups is to make use of all the opportunities and resources available in
the society for their profit, and while doing so the poor are made to remain poor.
Moreover, as they are preoccupied with the perpetuation of their place and position
in the society and economy, there will not be any significant effort to uplift the poor
from their sad plight. As the state and the social institutions are controlled by the
14 Amartya Sen, Inegualib Reexamined, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1 999, p. 1 28.
upper class in the society, an initiative from them to extend more facilities to the poor
cannot be expected. Yet, in KeraIa we observe state intervention in the
empowerment of the poor. Such a response of the state has been mainly due to the
active involvement of social agencies. For instance, different community based
social reform movements, trade unions and voluntary organisations have made
significant contributions in this direction. "The influence of western liberal thinking
and the socialist revolution in the erstwhile Soviet Union had facilitated a qualitative
improvement in the community based social reform movement to turn to radical
political movement that was emerged first in the Indian National Movement and was
later formed in to ~ o m m u n i s t s " ~ ~ . This was the general condition under which the
state had to perform such welfare functions.
The coexistence of high human development and weak economic
performance since the mid seventies may be best explained in terms of Iiberal
spending of the state and remittances fiom the Gulf countries. Kerala economy
may be referred to as an upward cum outward looking economy. It is an
economy of upward looking in the sense that society expects the government to
spend on human development even if it is through public borrowing. At the same
time, it i s also an outward looking economy as the society expects and does
receive considerable remittances from outside the statelnation. The inflow of
foreign remittances since the beginning of the fourth quarter of the twentieth
century has enhanced the standard of living of the people of ~ e r a 1 a . l ~
ln this it is worthwhile to make an enquiry on whether Kerala's
development experience is a model to the developing countries of the world or not.
I5 K.P Kannan, "Poverty Alleviation as Advancing Basic Human Capabilities: Kerala's Achievements Compared", Working Paper, Thiruvananthapuram, Centre for Development Studies, 1999, pp.26-27.
16 B.A Prakash, "The Economic Impact of Migration to the Gulf', in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerclla's Economic Drvelopment: Issues and Problems, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999, pp. 146-47.
Franke and Chasin observes that Kerala cannot be taken as a model to be copied,
but it has provided some useful lessons to be learned.I7 One of the statements
about the Kerala Mode1 of Development can be invoked here.
The basic weakness of the model is that it created only a few demographic indicators as the indicators of the quality of life. But if we take unemployment of labour force and the extent and magnitude of poverty as indicators of quality of life, then the model becomes a negative model. An economic performance with a steady deterioration of the productive sectors cannot be considered as a positive sign of development. l 8
The message conveyed through these lines is that Kerala's development
experience is not a desirable model, as it has not been able to solve the problems
of chronic unemployment and incidence of abject poverty. The mounting
unemployment and spread of poverty are thought to be posing hurdles to social
development and it is feared that in the future there wiIl be only the skeleton of
the much praised achievements made earlier. This calls our attention to the
nature of social development that has taken place.
Any discussion on Kerala's social development raises the question
whether the state has in reality achieved a high level of social deveIopment or
not. If the primary outcome of social development is the content of the society
and if we take into account the fact that there are undesirable incidences of high
rates of suicide, divorce and mental disorders, then the question is, how can one
say that Kerala has achieved a high level of social de~elo~tnent?'~ This brings
out the negative effects of development and its limitations.
17 Richard W. Franke and Barbara H. Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cit., p. 1 12. IS B.A Prakash, "Kerala Economy: An Overview", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala's Economy:
Performance, Problems Prospects, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 28-29. 19 S.K Sasikumar and S. Raju, Dynamics of labour Market in Kerala, N L I Research
Studies Series, Noida, V.V Giri National Labour Institute, 2000, p.3.
We shall also look into the sustainability of Kerala's development experience.
As mentioned earlier, the influx of foreign remittances and excessive public
expenditure for nearly three decades have maintained and improved the physical
quality of the life of the Keralites. It is a blessing for the state that the flow of foreign
remittances is still continuing. But excessive public expenditure has put Kerala in a
severe fiscal crisis. The important causes of the fiscal crisis are "revenue deficit, low
realisation of revenue potential, excessive growth of non-plan revenue expenditure,
unsustainable debt burden, unsatisfactory performances of public sector enterprises
and low cost recovery of public services"20. It is viewed that the slow growth in
economy and the fiscal crisis reinforcing each other have been setting limits to the
Kerala Model of ~eve lo~rnent .~ '
It is true that Kerala has succeeded in extending the facilities of social
development not only to a few privileged classes but also to almost the entire area
covering a vast majority of people. But such governmental intervention does not
seem likely to continue as it is facing the predicament of financial crisis. Under such
a condition the sustainability of the Kerala Model of development does not allow us
to be optimistic about it. For instance, if the government withdraws its financial
supports to the educational and health sectors in Kerala, then the cost of education
and health care will rise to the extent that for a majority of the population they will
become inaccessible. Under such circumstances it is important to examine the causes
that lead to a lopsided economic development.
The gap between social and economic development in Kerala began to
widen in the 1950s resulting in acceIerated social development accompanied by
'O N.J. Kurian and Joseph Abraham, "The Financial Crisis: An Analysis", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala S Economic Development . . . , Op. cit., p.328.
2 I K.K George, Limits . . . , Op. cit., p. 1 12.
slow economic development.22 The economic stagnation of the state was visible
since the mid-1970s. The deterioration and stuntedness in the performance of
agricultural and industrial sectors is the combined result of a number of factors
such as the lopsided land reforms, lack of irrigation facilities, inadequate power
supply, resistance to technological change, high wage level and labour militancy.
In short, neither market mechanisms nor government interventions could
stimulate economic processes in Kerala. When we examine the government
interventions, we can find that failures lurked both in the formulation of policies
and in their implementation. We shall move on to substantiate the argument
employing select examples.
Land reforms have been implemented in the state for increasing
agricultural production, eliminating exploitation in the agricultural sector and
ensuring social justice. The performance of land reforms has been disappointing
in the case of fixing ceiling on land holdings and in the distribution of surplus
land. The unsatisfactory performance of the land reforms (though better than in
the all India level) may be attributed to the failure of the government to conceive
the sprit of land reforms and to implement the programmes effectively. The
interval of more than one decade between the ceiling proposal and its actual
implementation and the exceptions granted to plantation crops were serious
lapses from the part of the state.23 The long interval between the proposal and the
implementation of the ceiling on land holdings enabled many owners of surplus
land to transfer the surplus portion safely to others. The exceptions granted to the
plantation crops actually reduced the availability of surplus land to be distributed.
'* S.K Sasikumar and S. Raju, Dynamics . . . , Up. cit., pp. 10-1 1 M.A. Oornrnen, Essays . . . , Op, cit., p.9.
It is very clear that the state was lenient towards the pressure of capital. The role
of the state in this context is very clear in the following words "... unless land
reforms are backed by mass mobilisation, with a government sympathetic to the
working class, both in the States and in the Centre, they cannot s~cceed"'~.
In Kerala, irrigation facilities have been extended only to a limited area. It
is estimated that only 1 5 per cent of the total cropped area is under irrigation.25 it
is also estimated that more than 80 per cent o f the irrigated area is under paddy
~ u l t i v a t i o n . ~ ~ This shows the limited irrigation facilities extended to cropped area
under non-paddy cuI tivation. Though the per hectare cost of irrigation through
minor projects is comparatively low, priority has been given to major and
medium projects in the state." So it may be concluded that the government has
failed to set correct priorities and extend irrigation facilities to more areas
through minor projects.
Another instance of failure and limitation is in the generation and
distribution of electricity. The government set up the Kerala Electricity Board on
3 1 March 1957 for the generation and distribution of power in the state. Till the
beginning of the eighties the power position of the state was generally
satisfactory, but since then, shortage of supply has occurred. And power cuts
have been executed continually and regularly. The mismatch between the
demand and supply of power and the shortage of power supply to cop with the
increased demand are mainly due to the defective policy of the government. The
Kerala State Electricity Board depends on the hydro-electric source of power,
.- - -
24 {hid., p.6. ? S P.M. Thomas, "Agricultural Performance in Keraia", in B.A. Prakash, ed., Kerala's
E~~onomicDeveiupment , O p c i i , , p.179. 26 P.P. Pillai,Kerala . . , Up cit., p.81. 27 P.M. Thomas, "Agricultural. . . . , " Op. cir., p. 179.
63
which i s the main reason for the power shortage of the state. Therefore, the
government has to think seriously of the installation of atomic and thermal power
stations in the state." Thus the government failed both in taking proper polic,ies
and in the efficient implementation of the policies taken. This was the important
cause of the low level of commodity production in the state.
3.1.2 State and labour
Yet, another example for unsuccessful governmental intervention in Kerala
can be found in its labour policies. An important achievement of unionisation in
the state was the ensuring of sustained increase in wages that exceeded the increase
in cost of living.29 Along with the high wage cost, psychic cost was also high in the
state. Psychic cost is the cost incurred by the entrepreneurs due to psychological
fear which arises out of many factors, like labour unrest, input scarcity,
government policies, environmental problems etc, and among them labour unrest is
the most relevant one in the Kerala context.30 So, it may be concluded that
unionisation in the state has increased both wage cost and psychic cost.3' In the
analysis of psychic cost the cost of isolation should be emphasised in the context of
Kerala. Isolation cost may be defined as the feeling of isolation of the
entrepreneurs/ernployers due to the state's policy of non-interference of the police
in labour disputes.'' The state's policy of keeping the police out of labour disputes
28 N. Gopinathan Nair, "Power Development in Kerala", in B.A Prakash, ed., Kerula's Econonzy . . . , Op. cir., p.328.
29 K.P. Kannan, "Political Economy of Labour and Development in Kerala: Some Reflections on the Dilemmas of a Socially Transforming Labour Force in a SIow Growing Economy", Thiruvananthapuram, Centre for Development Studies, 1998, p.8.
30 M.M. Tharnpi, "Economic Liberalisation and Industrial Development in Kerata: Challenges to New Investments", in B.A Prakash, ed.,' Kerala *s Economic Development: . . . , Op. cit., p.26 1 .
3 1 Labour c,ost = wage cost + phychic cost. j2 The coinage 'isolation cost' is intended to mean the helpless position of the employer when the
state had taken the policy of police neutrality in disputes between workers and employers. Employers felt isolated in front of the organisational clout and political influence of the working class.
was actually intended to help the labourers and their unionisation. But it created a
feeling of isolation among the entrepreneurs, as they were not given protection
when labour problems occurred. Employers were harassed and threatened by
unionised workers. The organisational strength and political clout made them
challenge the power of the capital. Employers quite often surrendered their rights
before trade unions. Therefore, in the analysis of the psychic cost, the isolation cost
faced by the entrepreneurs should be included.
With high labour cost and low labour productivity it was not profitable
for the industrial entrepreneurs and agriculturists to produce goods. So they
wanted to introduce technological changes, which were resisted by the unions.
The inability to introduce mechanisation forced many empIoyers to opt either to
close their factories or to shift them to the neighbouring states where labour cost
was very low.
Trade unions had adopted the strategy of resisting the technological
change in order to protect the employment of the workers. The resistance to
technological changes was not confined to industry but extended to agriculture
also. Organised strength of the agricultural labourers against mechanisation of
agriculture led many farmers to adopt the strategy of crop substitution. Some
even stopped the cultivation itself due to low productivity. High Iabour cost and
resistance to mechanisation, in effect, reduced employment opportunities both in
agriculture and industry. Trade unions succeeded to persuade the state to
intervene in this context through labour co-operatives, but this attempt was not
successful except in the co-operatives formed to manufacture beedi.')
33 K.P. Kannan, "State and Union Intervention in Rural Labour: A Study of Kerala", The Indian Jour~~al of Labour Economics, vo1.38, no.3, 1995, p. 460.
It may, thus, be concluded that the failure of the government both in the
formulation of proper policies or in the inefficient implementation of the policies
taken has led to economic stagnation of the state. Since 1990, the state has
realised the necessity of coping with technological changes and private
investment, and this in turn has put the state in a dilemma. That is, the dilemma
has been to find out ways to accomplish technological changes without
negatively affecting the interests of the So the emerging challenge of
the state is to protect the interests of the employers with out sending the workers
to be subjected to exploitation.
There has been a controversy among academics on the causal relation
between labour cost and industrial stagnation in Kerala. Subrahmanian and PiIlai
state that high wage-cost hypothesis does not explain industrial backwardness
and that it has no empirical basis in the context of eral la.)^ But, there is another
argument which contests this finding and asserts that Iabour costs in Kerala are
very high and 'cost' is defined not only in terms of wage and welfare costs, but it
includes the losses and inconveniences due to strikes and disputes.'6 In a study of
small-scale industries in Kerala the high labour cost hypothesis is accepted.j7 In
this study both wage costs and psychic costs are considered while calculating the
labour cost.
It may be argued that since the 1980s there has been a steady decIine in
labour unrest in Kerala. "But the tragedy seems to be that the Iabour unrest
remains as a stigma that makes the private investment shy away from the state"38.
34 K.P. Kannan, "Political Economy. . . ," Op, cii., p.24. 35 K.K Subrahmanian and P. Mohanm Pillai, "Kerala's Industrial Backwardness: Exploration of
Alternative Hypothesis", Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 21, No. 14, April 1986, p.585. 36 M.A Oommen, Essays. . . , Op. cit., p.101. 37 M.M. Thampi, "Development of Organised Small Scate Industries: Some Issues", in
B.A Prakash, ed., Kerala's Economy . . . , Up, cit., pp. 279-297. 38 V. Nanda Mohan, "Recent Trends in the Industrial Growth of Kerala", in B.A. Prakash,
ed., Keraia 's Economy . . . , Op. cif. , p.235.
That is, whether the wage component in Kerala is relatively high or not, the
psychic cost argument, inclusive of isolation cost, is all the more relevant as the
stigma persists. Many academics in the state maintain the view that the role of
headload workers is cruciaI to project Kerala as a 'labour problem zone'. Their
role to perpetuate the stigma is also attributed to their behaviour in the labour
market. There have been different representations of labour militancy by
different scholars. "Headload workers have a positive role in discouraging
investment in the
The following observation focuses on the irresistible bargaining capacity
of the headload worker.
The 'obstructionist profile' of labour, perhaps, refers to the loading and unloading workers, who are groups of young, able-bodied men seen in all important trade and industrial centres and road junctions in both rural and urban Kerala, who exhort money as wages because of their power to obstruct the handling of materials. The growth of this particular segment of work force highly unionised and closely identified with political parties, is likely to have contributed to the not-so-favourable image of the Kerala labour from the point of view of prospective investors .'*
Another representation highlights the 'closed shop' strategy, which puts barriers
to entry of the 'outsiders' into the headload labour market.
In the case of headload workers, the unions were able to erect very strong barriers of entry of workers to the local market places or towns, thus blocking the mobility of labour from rural to urban areas. Thus the restrictive practices of the unions practically discourage all categories of economic activities which require frequent Ioading and unloading of cornmoditie~.~'
39 T.N. Krishnan, "Koottaya Vilapesalum Ulpadana Vardhanavum", in A Group of Writers Keralathinte Vikasana Prasthanangal (Mal) Thiruvananthapuram, Chintha Publishers, 1992, p 46.
40 K.P. Kannan, "Labour Institutions . . . , " Op, cir., p.77. 4 1 B.A. Prakash, "Kerala's . . . , " Op, cit., p.38.
The following quote brings to light the link between headload workers
and the major political parties and shows how this link gave the workers
opportunities to use their muscle power in the collective bargaining for extra-
~narket wages.
Headload workers in Kerala have a long history of serving as the musclemen (goondas) that are a part of every politicaI party in India. . . . They have in particular developed a reputation for extortionate practices and "irresponsible demands". They can and do paralyse large markets, disrupt the flow of goods, and close down fa~tories.~'
The foHowing observation puts labour militancy in the most unfavourable
light. "There is neither decency nor discipline in their (headload workers) case.
They actually practise 'organised robbery'. It is the behaviour of this group that
scares away all decent people in starting new industrial ventures in the state"').
The non-sustainability and non-replicability of Kerala's development
experience and the lessons learned from it are, therefore, deeply entrenched
in the schisms of its labour market and this, whether really existing or
reproduced as stigma, in turn, is perpetuated in the contemporary situations
through the metaphoric reduction of the labourers to the stigmatised 'headload
worker'. This reduction has been getting material repeatability because of the site
of operation of the headload workers. Their activities take place in the open and
thus the judgements about them are publicly noticed and circulated in public.
The opinions of these economists do testify the centrality of the headload
workers in creating specific representations about labourers of Kerala with
respect to their role in blocking economic advancement. At this juncture, we
42 Patrick Heller, "The Labour . . . ," Op, cii., pp. 192-94. 43 K.C. Sankara Narayanan and M Meera Bhai, "Industrial Development of Kerala:
Problems and Prospects", in B. A Prakash, ed., Keraia 's Economy . . ., Op. cit., p.3 12.
proceed to examine the emergence of headload workers as a unified entity in the
urban and semi-urban areas and their subsequent unionisation.
3.2 Background to Unionisation
Carrying of material articles from place to place has a history very close to
the history of mankind itself. With the development of trade and commerce the
need for transportation of goods increased. This engendered the use of more and
more inechanical power, animal power and human labour; and headload work
was an indispensable component in the expanded pool of work force engaged in
the transportation of goods, A study on headload workers describes them in the
following words:
Headload workers are not a new race or class of people and they have been in existence since time immemorial. They have grown with times, though largely uneducated, and forming a large section in the lower social strata, partaking in whatever organised or unorganised economic, commercia1 or social activity requiring their effort. It is more of muscular power than brainpower that is demanded of a headload worker.44
In Kerala headload workers began to be identified as a unified category in
the second half of the twentieth cent~ry. '~ In the binaty opposition between
manual and intellectual labour, headload work has been placed in the former one
and it occupies the lowest position in the hierarchical distribution of work and
labour. That is, for one to engage in this specific work only hard manual labour
is needed and the work soils the labourer. The manual labourer status of the
headload worker gave them a low esteem in the society. Only those people who
had no other alternative to earn their livelihood joined the pool of headload
44 M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op. Cit., p.22. " Patrick Heller, The Labour . . . , Op, cit., pp. 19 1-1 94.
workers, particularly before their unionisation. Unionisation and state-led
formalisation are the important stages in the evolution of the headload labour
market to its present state,
Kerala has a glorious past of flourishing trade and commerce. From
ancient times, headload workers had much to contribute to the transportation of
goods from the points of origin to different destinations. As business activity
expanded, increasing number of headload workers began to be employed in
industrial and business establishments and commodity markets. In most of the
industrial establishments, headload work was not distinguished from other jobs
for work organisation and therefore no separate category of headload workers
was identified. Both men and women were employed to carry out headload jobs.
There was no discrimination between headload work and other casual works.
Nevertheless, in some establishments there was a separate category of
headloaders and they were treated as inferior and received only lower wages.
There were instances of the denial of benefits to the headload workers while
other workers received them; for instance there were events of denial of bonus to
these workers while their colleagues received it,46
Commercialisation of agriculture and urbanisation together resulted in
rapid expansion of markets and markets depended heavily on headload workers
to carry commodities. Headload work proliferated mainly in market places and
this was their main site of activity; therefore, here onwards we will concentrate
on the headload workers of markets. As mentioned earlier, in markets also there
46 R.S Unni, a trade union leader at Kollarn spoke about headload workers in the industrial establishments like Harrisons & Cross Field (India), Parvathi Mills etc. at Kollarn, "The management once used to treat these workers with out any regard, what so ever. Whatever strenuous work be done, they never used to pay willingly. The workers were even denied their right to ask for more. . . . . The headload workers of Pmathi Mills were denied bonus stating that they were not involved in the manufacturing process" (Interview with R.S Unni, in M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op, cit., pp. 128-1 29.
was no separate entity identified as headload workers as any casual labourer
could undertake this job. For instance, lorry drivers and their men or the attached
workers in shops and other establishments could also do the loading and
unloading of goods. As the volume of business increased, demand for headload
labour also increased and it became a specialised job since the mid-twentieth
century. With specialisation, the usage 'headload worker' was coined and
gradualIy it gained wide popularity. In the following section we will briefly
portray the general character of the headloader.
3.2.1 The speciaIised headload worker: The beginning
From the beginning the term headload worker signified those who
physically carried goods from one place to another in the market and other public
places for remuneration. UsualIy employers made 'spot contract' with them. The
nature of work required able-bodied men, as they had to generally perform
speedy hard work. Employers wanted them to finish the work at the earliest.
Usually, at least two workers were needed to carry out a given piece of work.
Therefore, wages were given for the piece of work done by the workers and they
shared the wages equally among them. The physically intensive nature of the
headload work was a barrier to the entry of non-able bodied workers to the
market and the piece wage system accentuated the advantageous position of the
able-bodied persons.47 Speedy hard work, collective work, piece wage system
and wage sharing were the important features of the headload labour market.
Headload workers proliferated in market places, boat jetties, bus stands,
railway stations, warehouses, construction sites and factory premises. Since the
47 Louise Waite, "Kerala's Informal Labour Market Intetventions: From Work to Well Being," Economic andPoliiicaI Weekh, vo1.36, no.26, June 2001, p.2395.
beginning of the second half of the twentieth century small groups of these foot
loose workers could be seen in small and large markets, the main work site of the
headloaders, all over Kerala.
In the beginning headload workers were mainly migrants from far and near.
At least during the earlier period of the growth of the headloader community, those
who defied the local customs and norms migrated and became headload workers. To
become a headload worker was only a last resort of the already impoverished and
marginalised to survive. Socially they were denigrated, and self-esteem was almost
an impossible quality for them. An important characteristic of headload workers,
which has direct bearing on theii. social status, is their ties with the family and village
to which they belong. Most of them had only very remote and feeble kinship and
af f~na relations with the villagers.
One of the sociological aspects of this class of workers may be
highlighted here. There is a general impression that workers of this category are
'essentially' outlaws. Whether this is true or not, there are certain factors that are
related to the specificities of the work process that influence their behaviour. The
time gap between spot-contracts that headloaders made with the employers was
not fixed; therefore, during the waiting period between two contracts there was
hardly any possibility to engage in any other productive or income earning job.
The waiting time ranged from a few minutes to a few hours. This unpredictable
waiting period had significant influence on the behavioural pattern of the
headloaders. The discontinuity between work and leisure germinated in them
tendencies to engage in extravaganza that crossed the bounds of social norms.
There was another characteristic of the work process. It was the footloose
nature of the workers. This was manly because although they had specific sites
of work they were not fixed. It used to be so mobile that there were no fixed
places for them to converge during the leisure time. Quite often the sites they
resorted to were either wayside common property or any vacant place in the
market. These places where they converged used to be treated as precarious sites
by the society,
Another feature of the specialised headload work system was that there was
no fixed wage for work. The contracts never included any wage schedule, and wage
was determined by the employer at will. The bargaining capacity of the headload
workers was weak, as collective bargaining was virtually non-existent, As most of
the workers were othenvise unemployed, the minimum wage that they received itseIf
appeared to them as a relief. As the employers were powerful and the headloaders
weak, there was no labour unrest in the market.
Although there was no labour unrest, there were conflicts among the
headload workers. The tussle between them took place when they interacted to share
wages and work. Tussles and feuds took place during the leisure hours also.
3.2.2 Beginning of formalisation
Besides the specificities in the work organisation, which we discussed in
the previous section, one aspect that needs to be highlighted at this juncture is the
non-existence of regulatory mechanisms whic,h give form to either employer-
headloader relations or mutual relations among the latter category. This was the
situation prior to the formalisation process among this category of workers; that
is, prior to the turn of- the mid-twentieth century. Absence of regulatory
mechanisms did create problems to both the employers and the labourers. An
arbitrary arrangement came up. The workers who touched the lorry first were
given the work to unload the goods therein. This arrangement did not systematise
the work organisation or work sharing. Realising the situation, employers began
to respond and they devised certain procedures.
One of the procedures adopted by the employers was to issue work pass to
the headloaders whom they chose. There were no criteria except the personal
interests of the employer in the selection of individuals for headload work. The
work-pass was basically a contract between the employer and the employee
without any mediation. Such procedure prevailed in many markets and the
regular employers preferred it. Work-pass procedure differed from market to
market and employer to employer.
A more formal work permit procedure was to issue work pass to all the
headload workers of a particular market place by turn. There was sufficient room
for the discretionary power of the employer; the 'undisciplined' could be
controlled by denying work permit. In this procedure also the contract was
directly between the employer and the headload worker. In those markets where
the goods movement was very high and regular, for instance, in railway goods
sheds, stockyards etc, employers gave agents the responsibility of issuing work
permit and distributing work and wages. The agent was variously called in the
local parlance as Moopan, Kal-tkaank etc.
In this system, which can be called the moopan system4' of work
organisation, the traders assigned the job of selecting the workers and allotting
the work to the -loyal and efficient workers. The employer and the workers
48 T.M Thomas Lssac described the moopans in the Coir induslry in Alappuzha: "The Moopans were usually trusted skilled workers who had been in the employment of the Company for a long penod and were men of considerable influence among the workers. Given the situation of acute labur scarcity, the m o o p a and conmctors had to develop patronclient trpe of relations with the workers in order to ensure an a d q w Labour supply". (T.M. Thomas Issac, From Caste Consciousness to Class Consciousness: Alleppey Coir Workers during Interwar Period," Economic and Polirical Weekly, vol. 20, no.4, Review of Political Economy, 1985, p.7 ).
were mediated by the moopan. The moopan system differed from market to
market and with respect to the nature of work.
The moopan system came into existence in the market places, where the
quantum of work was large. Therefore, in all important markets in the state this
system came into practice. A moopan was a headload worker who had made
agreements with one or more employers to supply the necessary workers to them.
In return he received the total wages of the workers from the employers and from
this he took a good amount for himself and distributed the rest among the
workers. Even the distribution of wages among the workers was not equal. The
workers were not even aware of the amount of wages that the moopan received
for their work. Neither the employer nor the moopan cared about the right of the
worker to know about his wages. The share that was taken by the moopan for the
intermediation was commonly called 'Moopan Kasu' . Thus, the moopan system
exploited the workers to a great extent,
Moopans were powerful in the headIoad labour market, They concentrated
mainly in railway goods sheds, ports, factories, wholesale trading centres etc.,
where a large number of workers were needed. Moopans were really the
employers' men and kept good relations with them. The workers did not have the
courage to oppose the Moopans. The Moopans could be questioned by
the workers only at the expense of the loss of their work.
In short, both the work permit procedures and the moopan system did
mark the beginning of formaIisation. But they did not significantly alter the
relation between the direct employer and the labourers or that among the
labourers. Such formalisation began with the initiation of unionisation.
3.3 The Phase of Unionisation
We have observed that as the headload labour market was unorganised
and predominantly non-formalised, headloaders were put under such a condition
that they could not resist exploitation by the moopan and the employer. Apart
from the humiliation inflicted by the employers, policemen used to drive them
from pillar to post. Some old workers of Kollam and Ernakulam markets (the
markets where case studies were made) reported that they had to approach the
political leaders to get them organised, mainly to prevent police hara~srnent.~'
That is, the demand for self-organisation as a trade union emanated from the side
of the headloaders themselves. Formalisation began not so much in the relation
between the employer and headload workers but among themselves. The
unionisation was a process that enabled them to employ collective bargaining as
a strategy to demand just wages. The sarcastic comment of a veteran trade union
leader may be mentioned here. He said that it was not 'class consciousness' but
'case consciousness' (fear of likely police cases) that led workers to approach
him for organising a trade union. He meant that the workers had no ideological
inspiration behind unionisation. Zn Ernakulam and Kcrllam markets the initial
enthusiasm showed by the headload workers to get organised did not stay for
long and in both markets union activities discontinued after a short while. Yet, as
police harassment continued, they once again felt the need for unionisation and
49 Frorn the interviews with workers and trade union leaders it was evident that in both these markets market based headload workers unions were organised due to the fear of police. Police treated these workers as outlaws and very often these workers were caught and petty cases were charged. In order to escape from police harassment workers in both these markets approached the leaders to get them organised. In the trade union history in Kerala it i s the widely held belief that the unorganised workers in Kerala were organised due to the initiation and radicalisation made by the political and trade union leaders. Here it is found an exceprion that this infor~nal group of workers approached the leaders to ger them organised.
as a result they got unionised. The main factor that prompted unionisation was
fear about the activities of governmental institutions such as the Police
Department. In other words, it was the relation between headload workers and
government that spurred them to think of unionisation. Since the 1960s trade
union activities continued unabated. The spread of the union activities was quite
rapid in the 1970s. 50
3.3.1 The Process of unionisation
The unionisation of headload workers can be analysed only in the context
of the wider political mobilisation of the labouring class of the state since 2920.
British plantation and factories had created a working class unity in Kerala, and
Kerala had a remarkable number of committed and self-sacrificing organisers
and leaders." The sufferings of the workers at the hands of the employers had
paved the way for the generation of such unity. The working class unity was a
very favourable factor for the unionisation process of the workers in the state.
The leaders inflamed the smaIl sparks. As a result, a strong and widespread
unionisation took place among the working class of the state.
The working class in Kerala has a long history of mobilisation and the
workers are more organised in Kerala than in any other Indian states.s2 The
unionisation of the workers began in 1922. It is believed that Bava Mooppan was
the founder of the trade union movement in the state. He founded the Travancore
Labour Association (TLA). The union was established in the coir belt in
Alleppey (Alappuzha). He organised the workers on humanitarian grounds
50 S. Mohanan Pillai, "Social Security . . . , " Op. cit., p.36. 5 1 Richard W, Franke, and Barbara H Chasin, Kerala . . . , Op. cil., pp. 52-53. '' Patrick Heller, The Labour. . . , Op.cit., p. 160.
against the severe exploitation by the employers. In the beginning, the labour
movement had strong links with the Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana (SNDP)
and later communism and radicalism of the work force became dominant forces
in the organisation of worker^.^' In the early years of TLA there was no capital-
labour conflict and the Association set out to eradicate the miseries of the
workers with the help of benevolent capitalists." Travancore Labour Association
was renamed as the Travancore Coir Factory Workers Union when it got
registration under the Travancore Trade Union Act of 1937. Quilon (Kollam)
was another major industrial centre in Travancore. It was famous for cashew nut
processing and tile making. At Quilon, a separate Labour Union was formed.
lust as it happened in the case of Labour Union of Alleppey, the Quilon Labour
Union was also renamed as Quilon Factory Workers Union. In Kuttanad,
agricultural labourers got organised in 1938. The Cochin Labour Union was
founded in 1933. In Trichur (Thrissur) the Labour Brotherhood was formed in
1935. In Cochin and Malabar the spread of unionisation gained momentum
during the 1940s.The progressive group in the Congress party, which disagreed
with the Gandhian principles, left the State Congress in its Quilon Session.
This group organised workers under the All Travancore Trade Union Congress.
(ATTUC). The Punnapra-Vayalar revolt of 1946 was a significant landmark in
trade union history though it is remembered mainly as a political struggle.
"From the outset, then, the making of Kerala's working class stretched across the
organised factory sector (coir manufacturing), work shop industries (beedi),
services (boatrnei), traditional agro-processing (cashew, toddy tapping), and
agriculture"55. Unionisation had been spreading to agriculture, plantation and
53 T.J Nossiter, Marxist State Governments in India: Politics, Economics and Sociey London, Printer Publishers, 1988, pp.52-53.
54 T.M Thoimas Issac, "From Caste .. .", Op. ccit , p. PE-8. '' Patrick HeIIer, The Labour. . . , Op. cit. p. 173.
service sectors with the beginning of the 1950s. All India Trade Union Congress
(AITUC), Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), United Trade Union
Congress (UTUC), Hindu Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), Swathanthra Thozhilali Union
(STU) were the important trade unions of this period.
Weadload workers, as already noted, were generally not an identifiable
group till the 1950s. Yet, it is true that the organisation of unorganised workers
in the state, which began in the 1920s, had covered headload workers also, not as
a distinct category but as workers among the category of casual workers in
plantations and factories. Moreover, in the fifties, when the distinction between
headload workers and shop employees was rather thin, both these categories of
workers were organised together in many markets.
3.3.2 Unionising the headload workers
In Kozhikode, one of the nerve centres of trade in Kerala, the unionisation
of the headloaders took place among the workers centred on the Port in 1948,
and the process of organising the workers had spread to the main market centres
by the 1950s. In Ernakulam, 'The Ernakulam Chumattu Thozhilali Union' was
formed in 1956, and in Thrissur, 'The Thrissur Chumattu Thozhilali Union' was
formed in 1957. It should be remembered here that the Labour Brotherhood, the
first working class organisation in Thrissur, founded in 1935, was the result of
the feeling of the workers for an organisation when they had to collect money for
the funeral expenses of a deceased headload worker.s6 1n Alappuzha separate
unions tbr headload workers began to flourish from the 1960s. In Kollam, the
first trade union for headload workers in the market was started in 1967.
5 h P. S Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual . . ., " Op, cil., pp. 40-4 1
In Kottayarn, the organisation of headload workers in the market area began
at the beginning of the 1970s only.
The headload workers were initially organised in the cities and important
municipal towns only, but by the second half of the twentieth century, with the
intervention of political parties in the labour market, the headload workers union
turned out to be a powerful entity through out the state. With the expansion of
the headload labour market and with their unionisation, the struggles between the
unions and the employers and also between unions arrayed under different
political parties became very common. The industrial relations in Kerala, which
were fairly better than in any other states in India, changed dramatically since the
mid-sixties and there after certain disturbing trends emerged in the trade union
The main consequence of this change was an unprecedented hike in
the collective bargaining power of the headload workers and this, in turn, created
conflicts between the employers and the headload workers.
From the foregoing discussion we can state that the unionisation of
headload workers started at the beginning of the 1950s and continued intensively
during the sixties and seventies. It progressed to a turbulent trade union scenario
in every economic sector. Thus, unionisation of the headloaders adversely
affected the general industrial relations and created paranoia about labour
militancy in Kerala.
3.3.3 The Attimari system
The paranoia was such that though the employers had no unwillingness to
employ the headloaders during the pre-unionisation period, they now began to
57 K. Ramachandran Nair, "Trade Unionism in Kerala," in B.A. Prakash, ed., KeraIa S Ecor?omy. . , Op. ci ! . , p. 33 1 .
avoid the unionised headloaders and revealed their preference to employ their
own attached workers. The reason for this was that the unionised headloaders
had begun to demand higher wages and better working conditions.
Collective bargaining power, in its extreme form, can be discerned from a
system of headload work organisation, namely 'attimari system'5s. This was an
important development in the headload labour market during the middle of the
1960s. This attimari system can be found only in Kerala and it is most powerful
in ~ o l l a m . ~ ~ The leader of the famous 'Pathinettara the former
attimari group in Kollam, told us about the origin of the attimari system and the
formation of the headload workers union in Kollam. The merchants in Kollam, a
well known port town of Kerala, who engaged in illegal trade in rice, sugar and
other food articles from other states during the food scarcity of 1967, transported
these without being sighted by the police and revenue officials. To unload these
articles into their warehouses they had to depend on daring and able-bodied men.
This clandestine activity was conducted at night in order to escape from the gaze
of the government officials concerned. The lorry drivers and their men thus
undertook the unloading of these goods at different shops. Taking advantage of
the situation, ten able-bodied workers at Kollam prevented the unloading work
and demanded the work assignment to be transferred to them, As the goods were
58 The term attimari is derived from the words 'atti' and 'rnarippu'. 'Atti' means arranging goods in vehicles and 'marippu' means lifting of goods from the atti and placing them on the heads of workers who stand near the vehicle. Usually two workers in a vehicle do atti and marippu, whereas the number of headloaders varies according to the quantity of goods and the availability of workers.
59 M. Sreenivasan, "Project Report . . . , " Op. cil., p. 122 60 Two years before the formation of the trade union, the workers found a child discarded in front
of their ofice. They entrusted the child to a woman and paid Rs. 5 daily for looking after it. When the child was five years old, the inauguration of the union had taken place. Along with the 18 memkrs of the union the five years old child aIso garlanded the leader at the time of the inauguration of the union. Afterwards the 1 8 atrimari workers and their adopted were called ' Palhinetwara Company. '
brought illegally and the company of ten was too strong to be defeated easily, the
lorry drivers had to allow these local workers to unload goods into different
shops. The workers in average got Rs. 65 per day, which was five times the
normal rate in 1967. This daily earning was enormously high when compared to
the earnings of other casual workers during those days.
As black marketing became rampant with the active participation of the
attimari headloaders, the age-old clash between workers and the policemen
reappeared. As it happened in the past, workers wanted to get political protection
in order to escape fiom the surveillance of the police. The idea of forming a
union had arisen in their minds and they arranged a secret meeting in a house of
the prominent member of the 'Company of Ten'. In that meeting, they decided to
form a union to strengthen their position in the labour market. These ten workers,
along with eight other workers who specialised in the fruit market, formed a
trade union in Kollam in 1969. This event extended legitimacy to the claims, as
if justifiable, of the atdimari headloaders.
3.3.4 Rights in dispute
The headload workers' claim for monopoly of headload work in the market
had no legal backing and had no sanctity from the point of view of public interest.
Nevertheless, they had certain favourable factors to secure it; the most significant
factor was the fact that the workers were formed as gangs in the market with muscle
power and no individual employer could resist their demands. The pro-labour
governments in 1957, I967 and 1980 brought about a political environment for the
establishment of trade unionism in the state. Since 1957, the orientation of the
government labour policy was non-interference of the Police Department in disputes
between the employer and headload workers. The non-interference of the police in
labour disputes unless 'law and order problem' arose gave a green card to the
headload workers for aggressive bargaining. The reasons for the struggles between
the employers and the unions were more or less the same in all markets. Unions
struggled with the employers to secure job, better wages, ex-gratia payments and
favourable working conditions. While unions argued that they had the right to decide
who should be a headload worker and that they had their say over the distribution of
the available work among them, the employers argued that they had these rights and
not the unions. This was a cardinal issue, which remained unresolved till the 1980s.
The unionisation of the headload workers gained momentum with the split
of the AITUC and the formation of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) in
the year 1970. TiH then, AITUC, INTUC, UTUC, HMS, and STU were the trade
unions that had worked among headload workers and organised them in main
market places. The CITU came to prominence through aggressive organisation
of the headloaders wherever it could find them in Kerala.
The first half of the 1970s witnessed the proliferation of unionisation of
the headload workers, mainly under the aegis of the CITU. The INTUC got
strengthened in the headload labour market during the 'National ~ r n e r ~ e n c ~ ' ~ ' .
This led to frequent conflicts among the unions in many market places. Wherever
other unions were active and the INTUC wanted inroads there, they fought
against the already existing unions to gain a share of the total available work of
particular markets. Under the patronage of the government, they could go a long
way in strengthening the union.
-
" P.S. Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour. . . , " Op, cir., p 60. The President of India declared emergency on 25 June 1975 due to 'internal disturbance threat'. During the period the Indian National Congress to which the INTUC was affiliated was a major partner in the coalition ministry in Kerala.
The emergence of different unions gave rise to a situation where the issue
of work-sharing could not be resolved without entailing inter-union rivalry;
no rivalling unions could secure their demands for work easily. The emergence
of rival unions and their demand for work usually led to street frghk6' Work
sharing among different unions depended on the inter-union power situation.
The unions of headload workers had organised the largest number of
struggles in the state, when compared with other categories of workers, by the
early 1980s. The resistance of some powerful employers against the coercion of
the unions created a disturbed situation in the market. Owing to the high wage
level in the headload labour market, casual workers showed a tendency to enter
into the market by forming separate unions, This created inter-union disputes,
which added fuel to the fire. All these made the headload labour market an arena
for frequent quarrels and the resultant tension.
3.4 The Period of Struggles
At this juncture, we shall turn our attention to certain struggles waged by
different unions, which will bring to light the aggressive nature of unionisation.
We do not intend to give an account of all the struggles that have taken place in
the state. One peculiarity of the struggles in general was that they were short
lived, as settlements were arrived at within st few days. But some struggles lasted
for weeks. For instance, the strike conducted in Kozhikode in 1977 lasted for
eighteen days. It was organised for getting identity cards to the existing workers
and, thus, restricting free entry into the headload labour market, The 23 day long
strike in Palakkad in 1983 was for securing different demands of the workers.
62 A.C K Nambiar, "Unorganised . . . . , " Op, cil., p. 738.
A nearly two month long strike was conducted in Thrissur in 198 1 to secure the
rights of the union. It is important here to focus on the strike in Thrissur and to
elaborate the nuances involved in it.
In 1980 a dispute arose at Thrissur market on who had the authority to recruit
the headload workers-the employer or the union. The employers, mainly traders,
arranged a harial of 15 days in September 1980 against the union activities.
A settlement was arrived at on 25 September on condition that merchants could
choose workers From the existing pool of workers in the In the settlement,
neither the traders nor the workers got an upper hand. The employer did not get
the power to recruit the workers from outside and the unions did not get the right
to allocate work. So, both the parties were discontented and looked for an
opportunity to get a sweeping victory.
As a response to the stalemate situation that the employers had to face, the
Thrissur traders ventured to organise an all Kerala union called Kerala Vyapari
Vyuvasayi Ekupana Samiti. It was formed to protect the interests of the employers,
under the initiative of the wholesale merchants of Thrissur. Unionisation of headload
workers was, thus, reciprocated by the unionisation of the employers. The organised
traders became Inore confident in their fight with the kade unions. A wage related
dispute prepared the ground for a strike by the headloaders in Thrissur; and an
indefinite strike began on 22 August 198 1. About 600 workers participated in it.
Several levels of discussions were held to settle the strike, and the final settlement
was arrived at through the efforts of Bishop Poulose Mar Poulose of the Caldian
Syrian Church of Thrissur." The strike was called off on 14 October 1981, without
any definite solution to the vital issues of the regulation of work allocation and the
63 P.S Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour . . , " Op, cit., p. I 08. M The Kerala Institute of Labour and Employment, Keralu Headload Workers Strike at Trichur,
1981: A Landmark in Kera1a.s Industrial Relations Scene. Thiruvananthapuram, The Kerala Institute of Labour and Employment, 1982, pp. 2-3.
managerial powers enjoyed by the unions." The struggles in Thrissur were historic
because they led to the emergence of the Kerala Vyapari Vyavasayi Ekopana Samiti,
the state-wide merchants' organisation. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the
headload labour market has been a stage for the conflict between the militant
workers' unions and a powerful merchants' organisation.
3.5 Difficulties of Unionisation
We have seen that in the earlier period headload work was a part of the casual
work in the commercial and industrial establishments. Therefore, headload workers
were not an identifiable group at large, though in some establishments such a
category of workers was employed. Therefore, it is quite natural that their
unionisation took place some decades after the beginning of trade unionism in
the state. Even after the appearance of headload workers in the major markets, since
the beginning of thel950s, their unionisation in the radical line, as was done in the
case of many unorganised categories of workers, did not take place. Though
headload workers were getting organised since the beginning of the 1950s, it was
only in the 1970s that the unionisation became a part of the wider political
mobilisation of the workers. As pointed out by Vijayasankar, no attempt had been
made until the middle of the 1970s for the horizontal mobilisation of the headload
workers of various urban centres at an all Kerala
It is worthwhile to make an enquiry into why unionisation of the headload
workers and their federations at an all Kerala level got delayed compared to other
trade unions and also into the problems that had to be faced by the organisers
during the process of unionisation.
- -
(15 P.S. Vijayasankar, "Urban Casual Labour . . . , " Op cit., p.112. 66 Ibid., p.104.
The unionisation of informal workers was undertaken in the state as a part
of the general political mobilisation of the workers, which gained momentum
since the 1920s. The contributions of the dedicated and philanthropic leaders
during the earlier period of mobilising workers for collective action and
unionising them on the basis of their trade, cannot be overlooked. The headload
workers were reluctant to join such collective action and they were not accessible
to the leaders. Unlike workers of other trades, this specific group had not gained
any political visibility and they could not identify themselves as a unified group
of workers. They had in mind no such political strategy, but only survival
strategy. Congregating them on one platform was also difficult as they were
mutually quarrelling for different reasons, which influenced their relative
earning capacity.
Many trade union leaders were reluctant to organise the headloaders in
markets because of the 'problem making' nature of the workers." Political leaders
considered educational backwardness a blessing as well as a curse in the process of
unionisation. It was a blessing because workers made their submission to the leaders,
which was a favourable factor for their unionisation. It was a curse because
politicisation of the uneducated was difficult. The leaders also suspected and feared
that they would be stigmatised as one among them. One trade union leader shared his
experience about the problems involved in organising the headloaders. While he was
convening a meeting of headload workers at work, a few workers displayed their
non-attachment to unionisation by preferring to work instead of listening to the
speech. That is, when a lorry arrived with a load, they went to the lorry and started
67 During our field study in Ernakulam and Kollam market areas we were told by some trade union leaders and workers that political leaders had shown not much interest in organising headload workers due to workers' 'lumpan status'.
unloading goods from it. To them the arrival,of a lorry was more important than the
arrival of the union leader.
Many local leaders were hesitant to organise headloaders, as this would be
tantamount to opposing the merchants, who were the main employers and rivals
of the headloaders. The local leaders maintained close ties with the employers,
which they did not like to break. As a result, the leaders restrained themselves
froin organising headload workers.
One serious problem with the unionisation of headload workers as a class
arose froin the restricted entry of new unions in the headload labour market. The
closed shop tactics adopted by unions was a hindrance for new unions to
establish themselves in the market. It was only through confrontations that new
unions could enter into the market and share the work that had been handled by
the existing unions.
3.5.1 Schism between headload workers'and the unions
Before we conclude this chapter, it may be worthwhile to recount some of
the observations that we have already made. Headload labour inarket in the pre-
unionisation period was characterised by unregulated labour market
environment. Free entry of headload workers into the market was allowed.
Employers were vested with the managerial power and they employed only those
workers who were loyal to them. The recruitment decisions were also influenced
by religious/caste/regionallkinshiplaffinal considerations. As the supply of
headloaders was greater than demand for them, employers could freely choose
the required number of workers from the pool of workers in the market. There
were also instances in which employers issued pass to the workers and the
workers had to show it to the lony drivers and country boatmen to get the work.
In markets where the rnoopan system was in practice, he was the recruiting
agent. In this system also the real power of the recruitment of the workers and
the allocation of the work was vested in the employers as the moopans were their
men, who always protected the interests of the employers.
With the emergence of unionisation the major issues of confrontation
between the employers and the workers centred on the question, who had the
right to recruit workers and allocate work among individual headload workers?
Though the employers had not transferred the right to the unions, in effect, the
unions had secured and enjoyed it through their collecticre bargaining strength
and militancy. Employers' resistance to the encroachment on their right was not
effective in many markets. Several employers in the case study areas opined that
the losing of managerial power was the major problem that they were facing in
the post unionisation period.
Trade unions were successful in improving the conditions of work
through collective bargaining, particularly in earning rightful wages. As a result
of the unionisation, wage schedules came into being in different markets; it
specified the piece rates for various types of works. Another remarkable
achievement of the trade unions was their success in establishing an employer-
worker relationship, particularly between the traders and the headload workers.
The employers tried to insist that there was no employer-employee relationship
in the headload labour market. They argued that no employer had a particular
worker and no worker had a particular employer. But through continuous
struggles trade unions had succeeded to secure fringe benefits such as bonus and
other allowances to their workers. The wage rates and fringe benefits differed
from market to market, depending mainly on workers' militancy and the quantity
of work in the market. Therefore, the unionisation among headload workers
could claim to its credit a number of success stories, In many respects the unions
succeeded in making their voice heard and in realising their demands. Besides
these positive impacts of unionisation on headloaders, the organisation of even
these foot loose workers and their unionised strength opened possibility for the
spread of unionisation among hitherto unorganised groups of workers.
Though the achievements of union intervention in the headload labour
market were many, there were also shortfalls and failures of trade unionisation.
They are discussed in three heads: its failure in disciplining the workers,
shortfalls in extending the welfare measures, and failure in creating a favourable
environment for the development of commodity production in the state.
Along with the prevalence of unionisation, labour militancy and general
unrest among the headloaders became rampant. Gangs of fearless able-bodied
men instilled fear among employers in the market place. Usually they used to fix
the wages exparte and extorted them from the employers and the customers. Any
attempt to resist the militancy of the workers led to the delaying of work,
destruction of goods, and some times violence. Majority of the workers were
drunkards and there were many instances of harassment and physical
manhandling during the time of bargaining for higher wages. This took place
mainly when they bargained with foot loose employers in the bus stand, railway
station, boat jetty etc., the worker-employer relationship got severed quite often.
An important objective of trade unions was to improve the life style of the
workers by extending different welfare measures to them. However, barring a
few exceptional cases in certain areas, trade unions had not taken serious efforts
to improve the general life style of the workers. Quite often, due to the absence
of any accountability on the part of the leaders, misappropriation of union funds
was not difficult. It is true that the trade unions did not show any serious interest
in ameliorating their life world. Also the welfare measures extended by the trade
unions were inadequate.
In practice, there were all the conditions to perpetuate their deplorable life
worlds. Not only were those welfare measures not forthcoming; they were often
dragged into the world of offences. There is a strong opinion among the headload
workers that they had been utilised by the unions and the political parties to which
they were afiliated, for their survival. An agitated worker stated: "Trade unions have
been exploiting us and in order to hide the exploitation they project us before the
public as rowdies". This had been so before state intervention in the headload labour
market; that is between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1 980s.
The headload workers had no other way but follow the commands of the
leadership. This was mainly because they feared trade union leaders, as they
were socially, economically and politically stronger. Another reason was that
headloaders had no alternative but take protection under trade unions to sustain
their employment status. Weadload workers of a union were not united as a single
body. There were inner groups that received patronage from the leadership and
followed their dictates. Usually a single worker or a small group could not
oppose the leadership.
Often the Trade unions, particularly unions of headload workers, were
accused of excessive militancy. The image of Kerala labour market that gained
wide popularity was that it was militant. Such an image dissuaded potential
investment in industrial production. The ideology that got inculcated among
workers was that they were to consider employers as mere exploiters who took
away the blood and sweat of the workers and returned only tears, The role of the
employers in providing employment was often overlooked. The spread of such
an ideology created the labour market imperfections, which made potential
investors be shy of investing in Kerala,
Union intervention in the headload labour market was successful to the
extent that it could increase wages and improve the working conditions, though
this did not improve their life world considerably. The headload labour market in
the nineteen seventies and early eighties was an arena of conflicts and
confrontations. What is most glaring in the history of the unionisation of
headload workers is the close bond between unionisation and labour militancy.
3.6 Growth of Workers' Militancy: Some Reflections
We have observed that trade union militancy in Kerala ti11 the 1980s had
negative influences on the economy in general and on manufacturing in
particular. Although militant' wage bargaining enhanced their earnings, their
place and position in the society and polity remained more or less the same as
before due to severaI reasons. An important question arises at this juncture.
Is militancy among the headload workers entirely a product of unionisation?
I t is generally held that unionisation is the sole reason for workers'
militancy. If it were true, then, all unionised workers would have been militant.
This is far from the truth and hence the militancy of headload workers cannot
be attributed entirely to the unionisation of the workers.
It was the specificities of the headload labour market that generated labour
militancy with unionisation. This can be brought out by studying the circumstances
92
that led to the situation and by focusing on the main players of the market such as
employers, workers and union leaders, and non-market bodies such as the Police
Department. Before focusing on these agents, we shouId focus on the structure of the
market, mainly the nature of employment and work there.
One of the main structural components that enabled workers to be militant
was the nature of their work. The work involved collective and intensive manual
labour, which was indispensable to the employer. The indispensability gave strategic
privileges to the unionised workers. The strategies that they adopted gave them
critical control over employment relations. The critical control placed them in such a
privileged position that they could even create losses to the employers. The strategies
included obstruction of work, delaying of work and making damages to the objects
they handled. Thus, the nature of their work paved way for their militant relation
with the employer, particularly their aggressive wage bargaining.
Another structuraI feature of the labour market can be found in the nature of
employment of the headload workers. Employment of headloaders was through spot
contract. This gave the workers freedom to choose their employers and this, in turn,
enhanced their bargaining power. Added to this was their fkeedom to engage in
multiple contracts in a day. This became further strengthened when the union
controlled the supply of labourers. With the help of trade unions, headload workers
could effectively implement the closed shop system, through which the entry of new
workers into the market was strictly restricted. Therefore, the empIoyers had no
alternative but to employ the existing workers.
As already mentioned, the character and behaviour of the players in the
market and their interaction have also influenced the growth of militancy. The
most important players in the labour market, from the point of view of
unionisation, are the workers. The social origin of the workers and the stigma
attached to their work has contributed to their militancy. As headload work was
socially construed as a low status occupation, it was socially and educationally
backward people who joined this work force. Their family and social ties were
also weak. All these made them feel that they were at the bottom of the social
hierarchy and they lost even their self-esteem. This made them vulnerable to
militant action without caring for its consequences.
Before unionisation, as mentioned in the foregoing discussions, the headload
workers were at the margins of the society and the market. As a result, the employers
had been exploiting and humiliating them. But unionisation helped them to bargain
with the employers and to gain market wages. Sometimes the helpless workers were
assigned excessive workload. This history of exploitation influenced the attitude of
the headloaders and often revengeful activities were opted. One Ernakulam based
worker observed that intimidation and threatening were part of the job itself, as
wages could be increased only by instilling fear among the employers. Employers, on
certain occasions, manoeuvred the militancy of the workers. Some employers used
the workers against their rivals in the business field. Employers were also forced to
accommodate the militancy of the workers and their demands for abnormally higher
wages when they were engaged in black marketing and other illegal transactions.
In the beginning, the employers overlooked the growth of militancy
among the headload workers and succumbed to their demands for higher wages.
There was no resistance against the militancy as the traders were also reaping
abnormal profits due to absence of stiff competition among them. Besides,
they felt that the burden of higher wages could be shifted to the shoulders of
the consumers.
Militancy of the workers gave advantage for the unions. We have already
noted the benefits that the workers gained from the unions. What we have to
examine is the benefits accrued by the unions due to the militancy. Trade unions
collected a fixed portion of the workers' earnings for the conduct of union
activities. When the workers began to aggressively claim higher wages from the
employers, the leaders remained silent although they knew that they were
demanding abnormal wages. The main reason was that as the earnings increased
the revenue of the unions also increased. Again, trade unions began to use these
workers as militant gangs, and the political parties giving patronage to the unions
gained from their muscle power. The workers were used for various political
activities ranging from pasting posters on the walls to spreading violence in the
street. In return to this, trade union leaders provided certain facilities to them.
Politicians gave unreserved support even to their unreasonable action^.^' The
failure of trade unions in disciplining the workers might also be attributed to the
existence of multiple trade unionism, increased inter-union rivalry and flow of
workers from one union to another. Under such circumstances, the trade unions
could not forcefully impose discipline among the workers.
A new generation of trade union leadership having neither ideological
commitment nor any sense of social concern is utilising workers for gaining
political 1everagen6' The headload labour market is not an exception to this
general trend. Only a few trade union leaders are from among headload workers.
In most cases the control is vested with leaders belonging to other occupations or
to no specific trade at all.
The worsening anarchy in the headload labour market due to investor-
intimidating labour militancy forced the state government to discontinue its
passive role in settling labour disputes. By the end of the 1970s the government
began to think seriously of intervening in the arena through proper Iegislation.
68 A .C. K. Nambiar, "Unorganised . . . . ," Op, cib., p. 738. h9 K. Ramachandran Nair, "Trade Unionism . . . . ," Op, cil., pp. 340-4 1
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