View
222
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
1/57
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
2/57
A Tactical ProblemA Tactical Problem
Perceived and Real ObstaclesPerceived and Real Obstacles
How Attack Co, 1How Attack Co, 1--503D IN (ABN)503D IN (ABN)
Overcame themOvercame them
Long Term RecommendationsLong Term Recommendations
OutlineOutline
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
3/57
Experience is the ability to recognize aExperience is the ability to recognize amistake when you make it again. Four times inmistake when you make it again. Four times inthe last century the U.S. has to come to thethe last century the U.S. has to come to theend of a war, concluded that the future of manend of a war, concluded that the future of manand the world had changed for the better andand the world had changed for the better and
turned inward, unilaterally disarming andturned inward, unilaterally disarming anddismantling institutions important for ourdismantling institutions important for ournational security giving ourselves a sonational security giving ourselves a so--calledcalledpeace dividend. Four times we chose topeace dividend. Four times we chose toforget history.forget history.
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates,Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates,November 2007November 2007
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
4/57
The ProblemThe ProblemIt is dangerous to discount the vast andIt is dangerous to discount the vast and
salient tactical lessons provided by historicalsalient tactical lessons provided by historical
countercounter--insurgencies based on their eventualinsurgencies based on their eventual
politicalpoliticalcapitulation and defeatcapitulation and defeat
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
5/57
The ProblemThe Problem
One of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tacticalOne of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tactical insurgents have regained theinsurgents have regained the tacticaltacticalinitiativeinitiative
In order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamentalIn order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamentalshift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theatershift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theater
An overAn over--reliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to areliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to aprotracted conflict and an overall strategic defeatprotracted conflict and an overall strategic defeat
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
6/57
Perceived and RealPerceived and Real
ObstaclesObstacles
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
7/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles
The level of physical fitness required toThe level of physical fitness required tooperate dismounted in Afghanistan is notoperate dismounted in Afghanistan is notattainable or sustainableattainable or sustainable Too much gear to carryToo much gear to carry
Safest place to be is in the truckSafest place to be is in the truck
Insurgents are used to the altitude andInsurgents are used to the altitude andterrain and hence superior as dismountedterrain and hence superior as dismountedcombatantscombatants
ANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate thisANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate thismythmyth
Anything smaller than a platoonAnything smaller than a platoon--sizedsizedfriendly element will be overrun andfriendly element will be overrun anddestroyeddestroyed
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
8/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles
No matter how tough you think youNo matter how tough you think you
are, youll never get up thoseare, youll never get up thosemountains.mountains.
--Platoon Sergeant,Platoon Sergeant, from thefrom the
unit we replaced in sectorunit we replaced in sector
FitnessFitness
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
9/57
Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:
SovietSoviet--Afghan War (1979Afghan War (1979--1989)1989)
Within the first 3 years ofWithin the first 3 years of
combat most of the effectivecombat most of the effective
kinetic operations werekinetic operations wereshouldered by paratroopsshouldered by paratroops
and SPETSNAZ forces dueand SPETSNAZ forces due
to the unsuitability of theto the unsuitability of the
majority of the Soviet 40thmajority of the Soviet 40thArmy to dismounted warfareArmy to dismounted warfare
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
10/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles
Your physical fitness levels must be at aYour physical fitness levels must be at apoint where it is no longer a consideration.point where it is no longer a consideration.You are not fit in order to survive; you areYou are not fit in order to survive; you arenot fit to excel at a physical task; you are fitnot fit to excel at a physical task; you are fit
because it allows you to bring to the battlebecause it allows you to bring to the battlethat critical component of being athat critical component of being aCommander and a Leader. You are fitCommander and a Leader. You are fitbecause you must retain the greatest abilitybecause you must retain the greatest abilityto lead, command, to inspire, to think, toto lead, command, to inspire, to think, toplan, and to accomplish your mission.plan, and to accomplish your mission.Everything else is for show, and thereforeEverything else is for show, and thereforemeaningless.meaningless.
D.MD.M. Day. Day
FitnessFitness
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
11/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles
A Co, 1A Co, 1--503 IN (ABN) was503 IN (ABN) was
able to overcome thisable to overcome this
perception by training with aperception by training with a
combination of CROSSFIT,combination of CROSSFIT,body armor runs and roadbody armor runs and road
marching incorporating anymarching incorporating any
and all hills around postand all hills around post
We found the APFTWe found the APFTinadequate for gauging realinadequate for gauging real
world fitness requirementsworld fitness requirements
FitnessFitness
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
12/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived ObstaclesFitnessFitness
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
13/57
Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles
We adopted a tactic weWe adopted a tactic we
coined offensivecoined offensive
disruption utilizing squad todisruption utilizing squad to
sectionsection--sized elementssized elements
mutually supported inmutually supported in
traveling overwatch in thetraveling overwatch in the
high ground regardless ofhigh ground regardless of
mission type or objectivemission type or objective
We were able to outWe were able to out--march,march,outout--maneuver and outflankmaneuver and outflank
dismounted enemy elementsdismounted enemy elements
and always held the initiativeand always held the initiative
Insurgent SuperiorityInsurgent Superiority
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
14/57
Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption
Maneuver is the essence of every tacticalManeuver is the essence of every tacticaloperation. It is the use of movement inoperation. It is the use of movement incombination with fire (or fire potential)combination with fire (or fire potential)employed to achieve a position of advantageemployed to achieve a position of advantage
with respect to the enemy. The commanderwith respect to the enemy. The commanderemploys those techniques that avoid theemploys those techniques that avoid theenemys strength, focus on enemyenemys strength, focus on enemyweakness, and conceals the companys trueweakness, and conceals the companys trueintentions.intentions.
parapara 44--29, FM 3.2129, FM 3.21--10,10,The InfantryRifle CompanyThe InfantryRifle Company
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
15/57
Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption
In late September 2007, 1In late September 2007, 1stst and 2and 2ndnd PLT, AttackPLT, AttackCompany were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC,Company were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC,11--503503rdrd, and clear the high ground to the West of a, and clear the high ground to the West of aroad nicknamed Ambush Alleyroad nicknamed Ambush Alley over 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encounteredover 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encountered
dozens of hasty and semidozens of hasty and semi--permanent fighting positionspermanent fighting positionswithin as close as 100m of the roadwithin as close as 100m of the road
wellwell--used goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfilused goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfilto and from the ambush lineto and from the ambush line
Based on the relatively good upkeep of theseBased on the relatively good upkeep of these
positions and combat detritus, it was clear that thepositions and combat detritus, it was clear that thehigh ground had not been cleared by friendly forceshigh ground had not been cleared by friendly forcesany time recentlyany time recently units had been employing the same mounted TTP as theirunits had been employing the same mounted TTP as their
primary method of movement through the area time and timeprimary method of movement through the area time and timeagainagain
VignetteVignette
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
16/57
Moving Flank ScreenMoving Flank Screen
Throughout its 15Throughout its 15--month deployment, A/1month deployment, A/1--503503regularly used dismounted flank screens as itsregularly used dismounted flank screens as itsprimary method to protect vehicle convoys through:primary method to protect vehicle convoys through: areas that were historical ambush sitesareas that were historical ambush sites
where the terrain significantly facilitated that possibilitywhere the terrain significantly facilitated that possibility
Where IEDs were the most likely threat, theWhere IEDs were the most likely threat, theCompany would employ dismounts in front of theCompany would employ dismounts in front of theconvoy in a large V shapeconvoy in a large V shape clearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicleclearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicle
searching for possible paths for command wire leading fromsearching for possible paths for command wire leading fromthe initiation point to the roadthe initiation point to the road
Attack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehicleAttack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehiclebreakdowns to mask a dismount point or to drawbreakdowns to mask a dismount point or to drawSIGINTSIGINT the unit always operated under the assumption that thethe unit always operated under the assumption that the
convoy was being watchedconvoy was being watched
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
17/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
18/57
The UK approach to Cold WeatherThe UK approach to Cold Weatheroperations is to master theoperations is to master theenvironment and maintain tempo ofenvironment and maintain tempo of
operations. This is simply described inoperations. This is simply described inthe maxim Survive to Fight, ratherthe maxim Survive to Fight, ratherthan fighting to survive.than fighting to survive.
MAJ R.J.MAJ R.J. CantrillCantrill,,Royal MarinesRoyal Marines
Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesMentalityMentality
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
19/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
Quality gear and equipment that suitsQuality gear and equipment that suitsdismounted operationsdismounted operations Shortcomings of the ACU patternShortcomings of the ACU pattern
Shortage of helicopter assets to facilitate airShortage of helicopter assets to facilitate airassaultsassaults FixedFixed--wing Air Force platforms move too quicklywing Air Force platforms move too quickly
to adequately support infantry with overwatchto adequately support infantry with overwatch
Burden of rotary wing logistical support wasBurden of rotary wing logistical support wasplaced on private contractors in Russian Miplaced on private contractors in Russian Mi--8s8s
OverOver--emphasis on SIGINT and a lack ofemphasis on SIGINT and a lack ofspecific HUMINTspecific HUMINT
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
20/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
A/1A/1--503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack with503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack withTactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought MulticamTactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought MulticamTT rack systems for their equipment and ammunitionTT rack systems for their equipment and ammunition Not only are these systems more comfortable and efficientNot only are these systems more comfortable and efficient
during dismounted movements, their patterns were more suitedduring dismounted movements, their patterns were more suited
to the environmentto the environment ACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the fieldACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the field
The IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessorThe IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessorand the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksackand the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksack The construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldiersThe construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldiers
submersion in water but its quick release wire system issubmersion in water but its quick release wire system isEXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shouldersEXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shoulders
A/1A/1--503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket for503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket forcivilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigorscivilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigorsof dayof day--toto--day movement through the mountainsday movement through the mountains
EquipmentEquipment
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
21/57
Lethality vs. SurvivabilityLethality vs. SurvivabilityThe dynamic relationship between lethalityThe dynamic relationship between lethalityand survivability has existed in warfare forand survivability has existed in warfare formillenniamillennia it is a question of risk; but whenit is a question of risk; but whenthese two principles are in balance, threatthese two principles are in balance, threat
elimination becomes as fluid as water overelimination becomes as fluid as water overstone.stone.
Tactics, equipment and training that focusesTactics, equipment and training that focuses
on kinetic neutralization of enemy forces byon kinetic neutralization of enemy forces bydefinition delivers the highest level of truedefinition delivers the highest level of truesurvivability to friendly forces.survivability to friendly forces.
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
22/57
Components ofComponents of
Soldier LethalitySoldier Lethality ManeuverManeuver
SpeedSpeed
AgilityAgility
Accurate aim of the primary weapon systemAccurate aim of the primary weapon system Quick, smooth reQuick, smooth re--loadload streamlined kitstreamlined kit
configurationconfiguration
Situational AwarenessSituational Awareness
FriendlyFriendly EnemyEnemy
TerrainTerrain
AuditoryAuditory
MissionMission--specific combat conditioningspecific combat conditioning
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
23/57
Components ofComponents of
Soldier SurvivabilitySoldier Survivability Resistance to point and blunt traumaResistance to point and blunt trauma
Resistance to ballistic traumaResistance to ballistic trauma
Medical training and quality of lifesavingMedical training and quality of lifesavingequipmentequipment
Speed of first response medical treatmentSpeed of first response medical treatment Equipment must be easy to removeEquipment must be easy to remove
Speed of travel to advanced levels of traumaSpeed of travel to advanced levels of trauma
carecare
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
24/57
Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesEquipmentEquipment
The ACU in its natural environmentThe ACU in its natural environment
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
25/57
MOLLE RucksackMOLLE Rucksack
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
26/57
Army Issue IOTVArmy Issue IOTV
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
27/57
Army Issue BootsArmy Issue Boots
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
28/57
Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesEquipmentEquipment
A.L.I.C.E. packsA.L.I.C.E. packs
MulticamMulticam
RackRack
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
29/57
Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesEquipmentEquipment
MulticamMulticam
RacksRacks
CivilianCivilian
RucksackRucksack
TT modified ALICE packTT modified ALICE pack
w/ civilian sleep padw/ civilian sleep pad
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
30/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
Tact. Tailor MALICE PackTact. Tailor MALICE Pack
with civilian sleeping padwith civilian sleeping pad
Civilian bootsCivilian boots
Multicam RackMulticam Rack
SystemSystem
EquipmentEquipment
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
31/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
Coordination with Air Force atCoordination with Air Force atCompany level is difficultCompany level is difficult AirAirSupport often will not work with onSupport often will not work with onthe ground leaders and willthe ground leaders and willconsequently take commands fromconsequently take commands froman Air Force JTAC miles awayan Air Force JTAC miles away
Attack Helicopters:Attack Helicopters: terrain is easily covered by slowterrain is easily covered by slow
moving attack helicoptersmoving attack helicopters
ability to take fire commands fromability to take fire commands fromground commander makes it the bestground commander makes it the bestplatform for destroying the enemyplatform for destroying the enemy
Afghanistan needs more AttackAfghanistan needs more AttackHelicoptersHelicopters
Artillery is King in Afghanistan:Artillery is King in Afghanistan: ability to call for fire (CFF) evens outability to call for fire (CFF) evens out
any enemy ambush and causesany enemy ambush and causesenemy to break contactenemy to break contact
absence of indirect support is knownabsence of indirect support is knownto the enemy; regularly stage theirto the enemy; regularly stage theirattacks in areas with dead space inattacks in areas with dead space inartillery coverageartillery coverage
Joint FiresJoint Fires
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
32/57
Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles
11--503 IN (ABN) had to503 IN (ABN) had tofight for aviation supportfight for aviation support often there were not enoughoften there were not enough
birds or they did not arrivebirds or they did not arrive
in a timely manner, cedingin a timely manner, cedingthe initiative to the enemythe initiative to the enemy
A/1A/1--503 had to make the503 had to make themost of assets when theymost of assets when theygot themgot them
Company minus airCompany minus airassault in Aug 2007assault in Aug 2007resulted in the mostresulted in the mostsuccessful operation ofsuccessful operation ofthe entire deploymentthe entire deployment
Aviation AssetsAviation Assets
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
33/57
Operational VignetteOperational Vignette
1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarters1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarterselement Air Assault intoelement Air Assault intosuspected enemy staging areasuspected enemy staging area
1350z: A Co (1350z: A Co (--) begin to ascend the) begin to ascend themountain during darknessmountain during darkness
1600z: A Co (1600z: A Co (--) reaches Hilltop 2653) reaches Hilltop 2653and 2/A sets up OP in supportand 2/A sets up OP in supportof 1/A and HQ movementof 1/A and HQ movement
1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrol1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrolbase site on ridge east of A/2base site on ridge east of A/2
1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hears1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hearsnoises and observes threenoises and observes threepersonnel with weaponspersonnel with weapons
1845z: Small 1/A and HQ element1845z: Small 1/A and HQ elementmaneuvers to engage personnelmaneuvers to engage personnel
1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US
interpreter for a Taliban fighter;interpreter for a Taliban fighter;A Co engages the enemyA Co engages the enemycombatantscombatants
NEXT DAY: Sensitive SiteNEXT DAY: Sensitive SiteExploitation (SSE) finds threeExploitation (SSE) finds threeenemy KIA and the largestenemy KIA and the largestweapons and equipment cacheweapons and equipment cachefound in Eastern Paktika in OEFfound in Eastern Paktika in OEF
VIIIVIII
LEGENDLEGEND
1/A DESIGNATOR1/A DESIGNATOR
2/A DESIGNATOR2/A DESIGNATOR
DISMOUNTEDDISMOUNTED
MOUNTEDMOUNTED
CACHE SITECACHE SITE
Movement to Contact and Hasty AmbushMovement to Contact and Hasty Ambush
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
34/57
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
35/57
Lessons LearnedLessons Learned
Keys to success:Keys to success: Air Assault capabilityAir Assault capability
Mutually supportedMutually supported
Small unitSmall unitmovementsmovements
Dismounted nightDismounted nightoperationoperation
Result:Result: Discovery andDiscovery and
disruption of enemydisruption of enemytraining/staging areatraining/staging area
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
36/57
Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:Algeria (1954Algeria (1954--1962)1962)
General Challe sought to remove local support and safeGeneral Challe sought to remove local support and safe--havens from insurgent bands at all costs throughhavens from insurgent bands at all costs throughsaturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) andsaturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) andoperational areas by aggressive light infantry andoperational areas by aggressive light infantry andparatroopsparatroops
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
37/57
Lack of timely, accurateLack of timely, accurateintelligence is a notoriousintelligence is a notoriousproblem in Waziri tribalproblem in Waziri tribalareasareas
But A Co, 1But A Co, 1--503503rdrdssaggressiveness andaggressiveness andpursuit of combatantspursuit of combatantsanywhere they soughtanywhere they soughtsafesafe--haven diminishedhaven diminished
enemy morale and bredenemy morale and bredpsychological uncertaintypsychological uncertainty
Caused inCaused in--fighting andfighting anddisrupted recruitmentdisrupted recruitmentpotential among localpotential among local
populacepopulace
Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesIntelligenceIntelligence
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
38/57
Effects AchievedEffects Achieved
Oshakay in JUN07: These Americans are different.Oshakay in JUN07: These Americans are different.
Gayankhel in SEP07: Do not go there, you will beGayankhel in SEP07: Do not go there, you will bekilled.killed.
Spera in MAR08: These Americans look strong.Spera in MAR08: These Americans look strong. Spera in MAR/JUN08: The Americans are in theSpera in MAR/JUN08: The Americans are in the
mountains and we dont know where they are andmountains and we dont know where they are andthe ASG are setting up checkpoints. We cant move.the ASG are setting up checkpoints. We cant move.
Spera in JUN08: We are outside the village. We areSpera in JUN08: We are outside the village. We are
hungry. We asked the villagers for food and theyhungry. We asked the villagers for food and theywould not help. What should we do?would not help. What should we do?
SIGINTSIGINT
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
39/57
Effects AchievedEffects Achieved
Gayankhel in SEP07: Numerous SubGayankhel in SEP07: Numerous Sub--Commanders and insurgents seek out theCommanders and insurgents seek out theProgram for Strengthening Peace andProgram for Strengthening Peace andReconciliation (PTS) because they have lostReconciliation (PTS) because they have lostthe will to fightthe will to fight
Spera in MAR08: HUMINT source points outSpera in MAR08: HUMINT source points outthe location of a Taliban and foreign fighterthe location of a Taliban and foreign fightersafesafe--house just inside the border of Pakistanhouse just inside the border of Pakistan
resulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizesresulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizesmany high level leaders of Al Qaeda inmany high level leaders of Al Qaeda inAfghanistan. Several of these leaders wereAfghanistan. Several of these leaders wereforeign fighters.foreign fighters.
HUMINTHUMINT
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
40/57
EquipmentEquipment
RecommendationsRecommendations
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
41/57
Stuff That WorksStuff That WorksMulticamMulticam
MulticamMulticam in its natural environmentin its natural environment
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
42/57
Rucksacks/Assault PacksRucksacks/Assault Packs
Tactical TailorTactical TailorMALICE 3MALICE 3
EberlestockEberlestockSkycraneSkycrane
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
43/57
BDS Tactical Split FrontBDS Tactical Split Front
MolleMolle Chest RigChest Rig
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
44/57
ParacleteParaclete Special OperationsSpecial Operations
Hard Plate CarrierHard Plate Carrier
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
45/57
Tactical Tailor Basic 3LTactical Tailor Basic 3L
Hydration CarrierHydration Carrier
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
46/57
RaichleRaichle Ranger GTXRanger GTX
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
47/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
48/57
There needs to be a shift in focus and mentality: think like aThere needs to be a shift in focus and mentality: think like a
guerilla. Roadways and lines of communication equalguerilla. Roadways and lines of communication equal WesternWestern
development in the countryside. So regardless of arms anddevelopment in the countryside. So regardless of arms and
armament within a convoy, insurgents will always view them asarmament within a convoy, insurgents will always view them as
soft, easy targets. A big enough bomb can destroy an upsoft, easy targets. A big enough bomb can destroy an up--armoredarmored humveehumvee or flip an MRAPor flip an MRAP fixing a convoy in the killfixing a convoy in the kill
zone. Therefore,zone. Therefore, convoys are always vulnerableconvoys are always vulnerable either protecteither protect
them with CAS, CCA, and dismounts moving parallel to the roadthem with CAS, CCA, and dismounts moving parallel to the road
or use them as bait to conduct movements to contact onor use them as bait to conduct movements to contact on youryour
terms (with dismounts in the high ground). Unfortunately, weterms (with dismounts in the high ground). Unfortunately, we
have gotten to the point in this war where the last thing thehave gotten to the point in this war where the last thing the
enemy expects to see are U.S. Soldiers, with all their kit, in theenemy expects to see are U.S. Soldiers, with all their kit, in the
mountainsmountains use that to your advantage! As long as you keepuse that to your advantage! As long as you keep
your signature light and your movements discreetyour signature light and your movements discreet youare theyouare the
hunter!!hunter!!
Tactical Success inTactical Success in
Afghanistan in 150 words:Afghanistan in 150 words:
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
49/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
Units operating largely dismountedUnits operating largely dismountedneed equipment tailored to that end:need equipment tailored to that end:
Body armor or plate carrier that moreBody armor or plate carrier that more
comfortably facilitates a heavy rucksackcomfortably facilitates a heavy rucksack Better quality uniform that tears less easilyBetter quality uniform that tears less easily
Multicam has been fieldMulticam has been field--tested andtested andpreferred by combat infantry units inpreferred by combat infantry units inthe field as a superior patternthe field as a superior pattern
Light infantry units should be authorizedLight infantry units should be authorizedto make the switch to Multicam orto make the switch to Multicam orsomething similar to MARPATsomething similar to MARPAT
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
50/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
Expand the responsibility of lightExpand the responsibility of lightinfantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forcesinfantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forces standardize a functional fitness programstandardize a functional fitness program
modeled on CROSSFIT/road march combinationmodeled on CROSSFIT/road march combinationdesigned specifically for frontline, Combat Armsdesigned specifically for frontline, Combat Armssoldierssoldiers
give light infantry and standard line units a moregive light infantry and standard line units a moreaggressive and kinetic role in combataggressive and kinetic role in combat
Depart from the COP concept until increasesDepart from the COP concept until increasesin available manpower and return to thein available manpower and return to theAirmobile/LRRPAirmobile/LRRP--style unit and mission setstyle unit and mission set increase Army aviation assets significantlyincrease Army aviation assets significantly
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
51/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
Theater school teaching offensiveTheater school teaching offensivedisruption and its tactical advantagesdisruption and its tactical advantages
Precedent: Brits FTC in Malaya andPrecedent: Brits FTC in Malaya and
Americans Recondo in VietnamAmericans Recondo in Vietnam None of our current preNone of our current pre--deploymentdeployment
training centers are able to accuratelytraining centers are able to accuratelyduplicate Afghanistans altitude andduplicate Afghanistans altitude and
terrain so units arrive unpreparedterrain so units arrive unprepared A school in theater would better prepareA school in theater would better prepare
line infantry units for the rigors they willline infantry units for the rigors they willendure during their deploymentendure during their deployment
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
52/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
Improve BottomImprove Bottom--Up Information FlowUp Information Flow
Better unfiltered contact between soldiersBetter unfiltered contact between soldiers
at the tactical level and decision makers atat the tactical level and decision makers at
the strategic levelthe strategic level
Only a network can defeat a networkOnly a network can defeat a network
Better dissemination and promotion ofBetter dissemination and promotion of
tactical academiatactical academia--style journalstyle journalsubmissions from Captains and belowsubmissions from Captains and below
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
53/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
Sustainable ANSF training based on the levelSustainable ANSF training based on the level
of technology they will be relying uponof technology they will be relying upon
Who will provide air support and logistics after weWho will provide air support and logistics after we
are gone?are gone? Shifting their focus to dismounted, light infantryShifting their focus to dismounted, light infantry
missionsmissions their lighttheir light--skinned vehicle convoys areskinned vehicle convoys are
soft, easy targetssoft, easy targets
Strengthening their NCO corpsStrengthening their NCO corps Current Embedded Tactical Training TeamsCurrent Embedded Tactical Training Teams
(ETTs) are inconsistent in quality and level(ETTs) are inconsistent in quality and level
of knowledge and experienceof knowledge and experience
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
54/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
I didnt carry out my tactics in Malaya byI didnt carry out my tactics in Malaya by
raising masses of local troops and puttingraising masses of local troops and putting
them all in British uniforms and giving themthem all in British uniforms and giving them
enormous loads to carry so that they becameenormous loads to carry so that they becamecompletely immobile. We did it by equippingcompletely immobile. We did it by equipping
them and training them as near as possiblethem and training them as near as possible
to the enemy they had to compete with in ato the enemy they had to compete with in a
particular terrain. This applied not only toparticular terrain. This applied not only tolocal forces but also to British units.local forces but also to British units.
Field Marshal Templer, 1968Field Marshal Templer, 1968
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
55/57
Long TermLong Term
RecommendationsRecommendations
An Air Force platform that is designedAn Air Force platform that is designed
specifically to move slowly and supportspecifically to move slowly and support
infantry movementsinfantry movements
Need more ANeed more A--10C Warthogs or AC10C Warthogs or AC--130s in130s in
theatertheater
Greater focus on current conflict thanGreater focus on current conflict than
present allocations allowpresent allocations allow
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
56/57
The tactical war in Afghanistan is entirelyThe tactical war in Afghanistan is entirely
WINNABLE. The points discussed in thisWINNABLE. The points discussed in this
briefing are purposely apolitical and arebriefing are purposely apolitical and are
simply meant to highlight changes we cansimply meant to highlight changes we can
make right now with existing technology,make right now with existing technology,
resources, and personnel as the fightingresources, and personnel as the fighting
force built to win our Nations wars.force built to win our Nations wars.
ConclusionConclusion
8/8/2019 Afghan - Seizing the Initiative
57/57
QuestionsQuestions
Recommended