A unitary Neo-Piagetian/Neo-Eriksonian model of development: Fundamental assumptions and meta-issues

e at SciVerse ScienceDirect

New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249

Contents lists availabl

New Ideas in Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/newideapsych

A unitary Neo-Piagetian/Neo-Eriksonian model of development:Fundamental assumptions and meta-issues

Gerald Young*

Department of Psychology, Glendon College, York University, 2275 Bayview Ave., Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4N 3M6

Keywords:PiagetEriksonDevelopmentChangeStages

* Tel.: þ1 416 247 1625.E-mail address: gyoung@glendon.yorku.ca.

0732-118X/$ – see front matter � 2011 Published bdoi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.11.002

a b s t r a c t

The article briefly reviews a stage model of change in human development that integratesa Neo-Piagetian model and a Neo-Eriksonian model into one unitary stage model acrossthe lifespan (as presented in Young, 2011). The model suggests a generic model of stages inchange. The article explores the fundamental assumptions underlying the model as well asconsidering meta-issues. The article adds to the book by describing the Neo-Eriksonianstages as reflections of a social “participatory” process. It adds to the change process indevelopment by describing it as possibly reflecting “punctuated disequilibrium.” Finally, itadds a “multiple psychodynamics” model.

� 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

The present article describes a unitary model of steps indevelopment across the lifespan that integrates revisions ofthe work of Piaget and Erikson, as presented in Young(2011). In particular, I describe a 25-step model of devel-opment based on five Neo-Piagetian stages containinga cyclic recursion of five substages within each stage.Moreover, I elaborate a parallel Neo-Eriksonian model. Interms of processes in development, I emphasize fractali-zation, and also I underscore the generic nature of thechange process involved in the model. This is the first timethat a model that has been presented that covers the life-span at the cognitive level in terms of stages and substagesand the first time that a model integrates correspondingcognitive and affective stages and substages across thelifespan. In this regard, many of the developmental acqui-sitions proposed to derive from the stage model are unique,as well. However, In Young (2011), I did not have a concisesummary and discussion of the fundamental assumptionsand meta-issues that underlie the model, as presented inthe following.

Miller (2011) reviewed Piaget’s theory of cognitivedevelopment and its impact. Piaget’s major argument wasthat cognitive development proceeds through stages that

y Elsevier Ltd.

reflect particular ways of thinking, types of underlyingmental or logical structure, sets of mental actions, ordifferent views of the world. The series of stages areinvariant and universal. The change process is adaptive andinvolves cycles of assimilation and accommodation.Knowledge is acquired through an active, complex, self-organizing construction of concepts in the system.

Reactions to Piaget’s theory included evidence againstbroad stages. Rather than it proceeding in uniform waysacross individuals and rapidly from one stage to the next,cognitive development appears more individual, anddomain-specific or local, but there appear to be interme-diately complex structures such as central conceptualstructures (Case, as described in Young, 2011). Also,cognitive competencies seem to be acquired earlier thanPiaget had maintained and they can be trained. Contem-porary research is examining these issues, as well as otherdevelopmental areas, such as mechanisms, executivefunction, theory of mind, and neuroscience. Miller referredto the influence of Piaget in the field of cognitive devel-opment as pervasive but often invisible. However, shementioned only briefly the work on stages of the majorNeo-Piagetians.

Piaget’s model of stages involves the sensorimotor, pre-operational, concrete operational, and formal periods.However, Neo-Piagetians have added a postformal stage,

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249242

substages that cyclically recur within stages, and a betterunderstanding of the mechanisms of change, such ashypercognition (Barrouillet & Gaillard, 2011; Demetriou,Spanoudis, & Mouyi, 2011).

In Young (2011), I presented a stage model of develop-ment that integrates Neo-Piagetian and Neo-Eriksonianmodels into one stage structure consisting of five stagesin development and a cyclic recursion of five substages (25steps). I referred to this stage structure as the product ofdevelopment, and referred to causal mechanisms indevelopment as the processes that underlie the develop-mental stage and substage acquisitions. The proposed stepsin development are considered universal scaffolds thatallow rich individual differences, depending on biological,personal, and social influences, as per a “biopersonalsocial”model, which is akin to the biopsychosocial one.

The nonlinear dynamical systems approach wasproposed as the major process influence in development.Given its generalized nature – it applies to nonlivingsystems, as well – I proposed a five-step change processthat could underlie multiple change phenomena, bothliving and nonliving. I showed how the model could beunderwritten by changes in underlying attractor formsfrom step to step, leading from cyclic and chaotic attractorsto complex and superordinate complex adaptive systems.Finally, fractals were considered essential to the proposedmodels of systems and their change processes. Forexample, the nature of the five substages of the proposedmodel relative to the five stages could reflect fractalizationprocesses at work. Similarly, the environment mightserve as fractal buffering processes, involving activation-inhibition coordination.

In the following, I review the arguments made in Young(2011) about these core postulates of the model, amplifythem because they constitute fundamental assumptions tothe model that were not fully developed in the book, andreview recent literature consistent with them. In addition,I review the origins of the model according to thesefundamental postulates as found in my prior publications(e.g., Young, 1997) leading to the book.

Therefore, the paper explores the fundamentalassumptions/ questions: (Ia) development can be describedin terms of a universal scaffold of stages and substages thatallows for individual differences in development; (Ib) thestages can integrate more cognitive and more affectivemodels under one umbrella framework, in this presentcase, respectively, Neo-Piagetian and Neo-Eriksonian stageprogressions; (Ic) what types of data have to be gathered insupport of the model; and (Id) to what extent can onegeneralize the model to other areas of human changeproducts and processes.

In addition, the paper examines meta-issues related tothe fundamental postulates of the proposed model, such aswhether: (IIa) stages can be shown to exist; (IIb) whatmodel do they follow, i.e., do they reflect the model ofpunctuated equilibrium in which there are rapid points ofchange in stage transitions, or otherwise; (IIc) is it prema-ture to propose a five-step generic change model that cutsacross living and nonliving systems; and (IId) can stagesreflect fractal processes at work at more than the meta-phorical level.

1. Initial outlines of the fundamental assumptionsof the model

1.1. Stages-substages

In Young (1997), I hadwritten, “the stages and substagesintegrate the cognitive and the socioaffective acquisitionsin development . by describing parallels in their emer-gence; they are spurred by multiple developmental tran-sition mechanisms.” (p. vi). Although I had proposed thatthere is one uniform developmental progression of steps indevelopment across the cognitive and affective domains, Icautioned that the 25 cognitive substages in developmentdescribed in the present model bring corresponding“emergent socioemotional potentials” that need to be“parlayed into mastered skills,” partly through externalfactors, such as a “supportive environment,” and partlythrough internal factors, such as an absence of lingering ofremnants of “prior crises” (p. 9).

The present Neo-Piagetian model consists of five stages(reflexive, sensorimotor, perioperational [or representative,combining pre-operations and concrete operations],abstract, or formal, and collective intelligence, or post-formal) that cyclically recur over five substages (coordina-tion, hierarchization, systematization, multiplication,integration; see Table 1 for definitions). The correspondingNeo-Eriksonian model consists of the eight classic stages ofErikson, and 17 other stages that I had created to completethe hypothesized 25-step progression.

Although in prior publications I had not presentedthis proposed 25-step Neo-Eriksonian progression indevelopment in terms of socioaffective stages andsubstages, Table 2 illustrates that they can be differen-tiated this way, with the names of the stages chosen toreflect their corresponding cognitive one as well as theiressential socioemotional quality. In addition, I used theBaldwinian concept of a succession of developmentalstages that are more or less “logical” in nature, asdescribed in Young (2011) for certain elaborations of thepresent model (e.g., quasilogical, hyperlogical). For theapplication to the socioaffective side of development,I framed the stages around the concept of “participation”instead of the use of logic (i.e., quasi-participatory,hyper-participatory).

In this regard, the five recursive substages remainthe same in name and the five Neo-Eriksonian stagesthat are embedded in the present model can be termed: (a)Non-participatory reflexive socioemotions; (b) Pre-participatory socioaffects; (c) Peri-participatory socialcognitions (consisting of quasi-participatory and partici-patory social cognitions, which correspond to the pre-operational and concrete operational stages of Piaget); (d)Hyper-participatory social mutualities; and (e) Superordi-nate participatory collective socialities. Note that asidefrom altering the type of participation involved in thesuccessive steps in Neo-Eriksonian development from onestage to the next, I described the stages in terms of anincreasing social engagement (e.g., from socioemotions tosocioaffects to social cognitions to social mutualities tocollective socialities; see the Table Note to Table 2 fordefinitions).

Table 1Substages: definitions of substages in model.

Substage Definitions

Coordination In the present model, the substage of coordination refers to an interrelation of two different component schemas or cognitivecontrol units (for example, acquired in the previous substage). However, the interrelation does not specify which of the unitshas a hierarchical ascendancy in terms of either a temporal order or a dominant-subordinate relationship. Rather, the unitsexist in a reciprocal balance (pairing, addition, juxtaposition, opposition, etc.) of a back and forth nature. If hierarchies areestablished, they are tentative, tenuous structures.

Hierarchization With development of the substage of hierarchization, the deficiencies in the just-described coordinations are accommodated.Paired cognitive schemas or control units evidence a strengthened dominant-subservient relation and/or a fixed sequencein time.

Systematization In the substage of systematization, there is both expansion and simplification of hierarchized cognitive schemas or controlunits. On the one hand, component units add (recruit) refinements (feedback, extra adaptive behaviors) that permit betteron-target adjustment at the onset of the behavior, at its end-point, etc. On the other hand, the new structure meshes intoa smoothly operating, more unified whole through a less fixed, hierarchical and more complementary coordination of thecomponent units.

Multiplication Multiplication is a substage that refers to the spreading of the newly-acquired system structures in the prior substage throughthe whole system. Or, it refers to the combination of systems (even more than two at a time). This is accomplished both bychaining them over time (either repetitively, but more important, by using different ones in each slot), and/or by embedding,where primary systems are subserved by secondary ones (less elaborate than the primary ones).

Integration The last substage of integration is characterized by: multiple cognitive units that are more precisely differentiated in flexiblebranching as they are applied. This produces linear sequences or chains comprised of strings of component systems differentfrom each other, with some embedded in others. An embedded component system may be just as elaborate as any constituentsystem of the main string. Moreover, it might unfold in parallel with movements or behaviors of the main string, i.e., it and themain string might unfold simultaneously. In short, the reversibility evident in the organization of this substage is a mature,efficient one compared to its nascent beginnings in the prior substage. For example, elements of subsets can be paired withoutcompromising the integrity or continuity of the subsets.

Adopted from Young (2011, pp. 84–85).

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249 243

The major socioaffective acquisitions that wereproposed to develop in parallel with the cognitive steps inthe present model focused on Neo-Eriksonian correspon-dences. However, the model includes other correspon-dences, such as in the cognitive (mis)perception of theother, which I had first presented in Young (1997), andsocial self-working schemata in attachment, as presentedin Young (2011). Other innovations in Young (2011) includeexpansion of Maslow’s model of a five-step hierarchy ofneeds so that it is consistent with the present five-stagemodel.

1.2. Fractals

In Young (1997), I noted that “the current model alsomanifests a deep respect for the notion that fractalspermeate the psychological developmental field” (p. 1).Fractalization is defined as “fractal generation and propa-gation in behavior” (p. 26). With respect to development,the process is called “co-developmental fractalization.” Iused the prefix of “co-” at multiple junctures in my work,fitting the relational frame (Lerner, 2006) that I haveadopted for the proper understanding and study of devel-opment. I added that “self-similarity across different levelsmay mark development and psychology, in general”(Young,1997, p. 29). In this context, developmentally, levelsrefer to self-similarity or isomorphisms at the stage andsubstage level, for example, and for psychology in general, Ihave posited that the process of activation-inhibitioncoordination could serve as a common underlying organi-zation principle at multiple levels of brain and of behavior(elaborated below).

Therefore, a proper definition of fractalization inpsychology concerns “the generation-construction andreplication-propagation of self-similar patterns in

psychological processes either within or across individuals”(Young, p. 269). I indicated that both the product andprocess of development and psychology can be character-ized partly in terms of fractals. In terms of product, I hadwritten that the substage level, which appears to reflecta fractal representation of the stage level, itself appearsdifferentiated into five steps, and moreover there isa “fractal geometry in the developmental process.” Thissuggests or perhaps even assures that there are “fivesublevels within each of the substages” (p. 9).

In terms of process, I elaborated the concept of fractal-ization to include the environment and not only thedeveloping individual. Vandervert (1991, 1992, 1995a,1995b) had maintained that there is a homotopic isomor-phism over the domains of the world, brain, and mind interms of fractals. I indicated that the commonmetric in thisregardmight be activation-inhibition coordination and thatparents serve as buffers this way, at least when parentingwell, for example, by damping the flow of activations andinhibitions in the environment to coordinate them betterfor the child.

In Young (2011), I expanded on these concepts. Ireferred not only to “parental activation-inhibition coor-dination fractal buffering mechanisms” but also to devel-opment as “co-developmental cofractalization” (p. 827).Similarly, in psychotherapy, the therapist might be servingas a “therapeutic activation-inhibition coordination fractalbuffering mechanism” (p. 828). Finally, evolution might beconsidered as a process of dynamic “coevolutionarycofractalization” (p. 755).

2. Fundamental assumptions elaborated

In the following, I describe in depth the major funda-mental assumptions underlying the present developmental

Table 2A model of 25 steps in Neo-Piagetian cognitive development and Neo-Eriksonian social-affective development.

Level Neo-Piagetian stage Substage Age range Neo-Eriksonian stage Neo-Eriksonian substage

1 Reflexive Coordination Earlier fetal life Non-participatoryreflexive socio-emotions

Distance acts vs. no acts2 Hierarchization Quite premature Nursing vs. rootless acts3 Systematization Somewhat premature Outcome vs. outcast acts4 Multiplication Full-term newborn Caregiving vs. careless giving acts5 Integration 0–1 Month Emotional vs. malemotional acts

6 Sensorimotor Coordination 1–4 Months Pre-participatorysocio-affects

Dyadic vs. dysdyadic acts7 Hierarchization 4–8 Months Trust vs. mistrust acts8 Systematization 8–12 Months Sociability vs. unsociability acts9 Multiplication 12–18 Months Autonomy vs. doubt acts10 Integration 18–24 Months Interdigitational vs. dedigitational acts

11 Perioperational Coordination 2–3.5 Years Peri-participatorysocial cognitions

Superordinate vs. discoordinate acts(quasi-participatory)

12 Hierarchization 3.5–5 Years Initiative vs. guilt acts13 Systematization 5–7 Years Identification vs. problematic identification acts14 Multiplication 7–9 Years Industry vs. inferiority acts (participatory)15 Integration 9–11 Years Role vs. role confusion acts

16 Abstract Coordination 11–13 Years Hyper-participatorysocial mutuality

Conscious vs. contraconscious acts17 Hierarchization 13–16 Years Identity vs. identity diffusion acts18 Systematization 16–19 Years Nurturing vs. misnurturing acts19 Multiplication 19–22 Years Intimacy vs. isolation acts20 Integration 22–25 Years Universal vs. self-singular acts

21 Collectiveintelligence

Coordination 25–28 Years Superordinateparticipatorycollective sociality

Metacollecting vs. disillusionment acts22 Hierarchization 28–39 Years Generativity vs. self-absorption acts23 Systematization 39–50 Years Catalytic vs. midlife crisis acts24 Multiplication 50–61 Years Ego integrity vs. despair acts25 Integration 61 Years Cathartic vs. abandonment acts

Erikson did not group the description of his eight stages in psychosocial development into clusters or categories. The eight stages were presented one afterthe other in detail. The present Neo-Eriksonian model has added 17 steps that have been interjected into his sequence, yielding a new psychosocial stagemodel of 25 steps in socioaffective development. They are considered to parallel the 25 steps in Neo-Piagetian development of the model. In the originalversion of the present model in Young (2011), I had grouped the 25 cognitive steps into five stages having 5 substages each, but I did not undertake theequivalent organization for the 25 Neo-Eriksonian steps of creating five stages with five substages each.In the present table, I group the 25 Neo-Eriksonian steps of the present model into clusters of 5 stages that correspond to the 5 stages of the Neo-Piagetianmodel. I organize the definitions of the 5 groups of Neo-Eriksonian steps according to the concept of “participation” in social relations. In particular,I consider as the cornerstone in the development of more genuine participation in socio-affect relations when the child reaches the cognitive substagerelated to Piagetian concrete operations, which takes place at about 7–9 years of age in the multiplication substage of the third cognitive stage of the model,called peri-operations. Given this logic about participation in socioaffective interactions in the child, I created labels using the concept of participation for the5 groups of Neo-Eriksonian steps in the present model. In creating the labels, I also considered the nature of the corresponding Neo-Piagetian cognitivestages related to the Neo-Eriksonian groups.Therefore, for the first Neo-Eriksonian stage, or group of 5 steps, corresponding to the first reflexive cognitive stage of the present model, I considered themas “non-participatory” and “reflexive.” That being said, I also considered them as socioemotional because the stage ends with the Neo-Eriksonian steps ofcaregiving acts and emotional acts.As for the second grouping of the Neo-Eriksonian steps, I considered that they reflected their sensorimotor correspondences and that appear to bemore thanemotional expressions in that they serve to intercoordinate the baby and the caregiver in longer andmore complex social interactions and linkages. In termsof the original Eriksonian stages that are incorporated into the new 25-step Neo-Eriksonian sequence, they are consistent with this formulation, as there arethe two stages in the grouping and in them infants are considered to express trust acts and autonomy acts. Nevertheless, despite these social advances at thisstage, there is a lack of the genuine participation acts that characterize the socioaffective exchanges of the older child. Therefore, the label for this stageincludes the notion that it is “pre-participatory.”In the third grouping of the Neo-Eriksonian steps in the present model, I chose a label that corresponded to the Neo-Piagetian cognitive one of peri-operations and also that included the notion that the child is reaching more genuine participatory socioaffective social coordinations. The concept ofa stage of cognitive peri-operations that has been incorporated in the present model includes the Piagetian cognitive stages of pre-operations and concreteoperations. Therefore, for the equivalent grouping of steps in the Neo-Eriksonian stage, I referred to “peri-participatory” socio-affectivity and includedwithin the stage the steps of quasi-participatory and full participatory socio-affectivity. These two steps on the Neo-Eriksonian side of the present modelthen correspond to its Neo-Piagetian steps in which Piaget’s pre-operations and concrete operations are considered to develop. In addition, the label for thethird grouping or Neo-Eriksonian stage includes the concept of socio-cognition because of the extensive development in this age period of aspects of socio-cognition, such as theory of mind and self-regulation. Finally, the label for this third stage is consistent with original Eriksonian stages that are part of thisgrouping, those of initiative acts and industry acts, as well as the three steps that I added to create the five steps involved, such as identification acts and roleacts.The fourth grouping of the Neo-Eriksonian steps in the present model reflects socioaffective development that goes beyond basic interactive participationsin several ways. First, the socioaffective interchanges of adolescents and adults can be considered “hyper-participatory” in that they include the developmentof conscious awareness, identity, nurturing, intimacy, and more universal acts. The social networking of the adult along these lines reflects especiallyErikson’s concept of mutuality and underscores the abstract cognitive nature of the thought processes corresponding to and consistent with it.In the fifth, penultimate grouping of the 25 Neo-Eriksonian steps into 5 higher-order stages, the 5 steps involved in the long-term development of the adultcorrespond to the Neo-Piagetian cognitive stage of the present model of collective intelligence. The latter is considered to include superordinate abstractsystems. Therefore, the label that I have given for this phase of development includes the terms “super-ordinate participatory” as well as “collectivesociality.” The original Eriksonian stages that are part of the adult period concern generativity, in particular, as well as ego integrity toward the end of life.I have added three steps in this sequence that include catalytic and cathartic acts, and these additions fit the superordinate participatory trajectory beingascribed to the adult period.

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249244

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249 245

model. I acknowledge that different sets of assumptionsabout development are possible, but the evidence supportsthe possibility that the present set, and the developmentalmodel that I have proposed that is consistent with it, havea certain validity, and perhaps moreso than for other setsand models.

(Ia) Development can be described in terms of a universalscaffold of stages and substages that allows for indi-vidual differences in development

Piaget and the Neo-Piagetians adhere to a stage modelof development. They might differ in the particularconceptualizations of themodel that they propose, but theyshare the fundamental assumption that there are qualita-tively distinct epochs in development that are universal inthe scaffold they permit individuals for the development ofindividual differences. Piagetians and Neo-Piagetians havedescribed these epochs as a progression in developmenttoward increasingly logical thought, from reflexes andsensorimotor acquisitions to abstract and even moremature forms of thought. The stages are not magicaltransformations that suddenly bring more advancedthinking across all areas of cognition once they appear, norare they divorced from environmental influences andconstraints. Nevertheless, they are valid inferences fromthe pattern of observations and empirical studies of chil-dren’s thinking and thinking across the lifespan.

Moreover, the stages in the model might be cognitive intheir formation and titles, but they reflect an associatedsocioaffective sequence. This is the first developmentalmodel that has expanded both the cognitive and socio-affective stage and substage sequences as found in themajor proponents of the models along these lines (Piagetand Erikson, respectively) in order to show how they couldreflect a common lifespan developmental program fromchildhood on and throughout the adult period.

That the proposed model includes both cognitive andsocioaffective components speaks to its stated goal offurnishing a common framework on which individualdifferences can develop. The model is based on a relationalmetaframe and a “biopersonalsocial” or biopsychosocialone, so that the individual differences in behavior thatdevelop are considered multifactorial in origin. Forexample, the cognitive (mis)perceptions of the other thatdevelop based on their passage through the stages andsubstages of the present model are intimately entwinedwith the caregiving-parental experiences and socioculturalexperiences that individuals must navigate in theirdevelopment.

(Ib) The stages can integrate more cognitive and moreaffective models under one umbrella framework, inthis present case, respectively, Neo-Piagetian andNeo-Eriksonian stage progressions

The present model constitutes the first one to integratejudiciously parallel steps in cognitive and socioaffectivedevelopment. It can be argued that there is little gainedconceptually, theoretically, empirically, and heuristically bya unitary stage model of development. However, the cross-domain parallelism in the model reflects the underlying

assumption that cognition is not a process distinct fromsocio-affectivity but is co-active with it and fueled by it,even to the point that socioaffective experiences providethe substance, ground, or extant problems primarily uponwhich the cognitions act.

Moreover, the particular manner in which the matchbetween the 25-step cognitive (Neo-Piagetian) and socio-affective (Neo-Eriksonian) developmental sequences wasconstructed illustrates the coherence and unitary stature ofthe model over the two domains. First, the eight alreadyexisting Eriksonian steps in socioaffective developmentwere found to match well the cognitive characteristics ofthe cognitive steps in the Neo-Piagetian sequence withwhich their age ranges suggested that they are associated.Second, the 17 others that I had to create were constructednot only to accommodate the eight stages already existingin the Eriksonian sequence (and allow for a coherenttransition over the 25-step socioaffective model created)but also to the corresponding cognitive characteristics ofthe cognitive steps with which they were to be associated.

At the microlevel of development, it is increasinglyrecognized that cognitive structures are cognitive-affectiveor cognitive-emotional ones at the core, and that the twocomponents are indissociable, i.e., cannot be separated orcarved at the joints. No matter what the level or stage ofdevelopment, cognitive schemata are at once social, affec-tive, emotional, and experiential ones.

Therefore, at the macrolevel of development, theproducts, contents, or outcomes of the cognitive and socio-affective processes in development also should be intrin-sically and simultaneously cognitive and affective. That ithas not been until my work, that the cognitive and affectivestages/substage models have been hermetically sealedfrom each other in developmental model building, indi-cates a lack to be resolved rather than justification for itscontinuation.

(Ic) What types of data have to be gathered in support ofthe model

Typically, stage sequences in development are testedempirically using Guttman, Rasch, or other types of longi-tudinal and sequential analyses. In the present case,because there are two parallel domains in developmentbeing proposed having a unitary structure, the task isrendered more difficult. What is the exact nature of thetemporal correspondences across the domains at any onestage or substage, and how does that relationship vary withtask, context, individual differences, and so on? Moreover,a host of complicating factors might arise, such as thedeveloping individual encountering nonbuffering ordisturbed environments and consequent development,with resulting inordinate décalages in development acrossthe domains when this arises.

Note that recent research is beginning to examine therelationship between cognitive measures related to Pia-getian concepts and socioaffective ones related to Erikso-nian ones. For example, Zhang and He (2011) investigatedthinking styles in relationship to a measure of identity inuniversity students and Yezzi (2011) early adolescents onmeasures of stage in formal reasoning and psychosocial

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249246

development. However, the research was limited to findinghow individuals fared on the measures and not on thetheoretical linkages across the models. Given that thepresent model has elaborated both the Piagetian andEriksonian models, linkages that might be found based onthe original models should be missing the components thatI have added.

(Id) To what extent can one generalize the model to otherareas of human change products and processes

In both Young (1997) and Young (2011), I soughtparallels with other change models of human behavior. Theclearest correspondence concerned the work of (a) Clinchy(1993, 1995) on voices in development, and how they aresilenced or controlled at earlier levels and (b) Prochaska’sand colleagues generic or “theoretical” model of change,which has been applied to multiple types of behavior,mostly in the clinical setting (Prochaska, Norcross, &DiClemente, 1994; Prochaska, Wright, & Velicer, 2008). Ineach case, I showed how the levels described are consistentwith the present model. (c) The reader might find fasci-nating the Maslovian model that I described in Young(2011), because Maslow had considered his hierarchy ofneeds model a developmental one, and I revised it to fitthe present developmental model. (d) Also, consider that Ideveloped a change model of chronic pain that fit thepresent model, so that regressive change as well asprogressive change appears to fit it. (e) Finally, for certaingroup activities, the model was used to construct a changesequence (e.g., in marital changes, in societal changes).

Note that other workers in psychology are attempting tocreate generalized models that integrate seemingly dispa-rate phenomena. For example, Barlow et al. (2011) havedescribed a general theory of therapy for affective disordersand Shaffer et al. (2004) have presented a model ofaddictions that integrates biological and nonbiologicalvarieties. The dangers, of course, lie in extending the reachtoo far, in shoehorning concepts and data into a too tighttheoretical box, and in not appreciating the complexity ofthe different phenomena addressed. However, my work ongeneral stages and the cited work on more general modelsof psychotherapy and addiction share the characteristic oftrying to see the common larger picture or the forestbetween the trees, and thus they inform each other in thisregard.

Note that in Young (2011), I emphasized the distinctionbetweenproduct, or content, and process, or mechanism, indevelopment. For developmental products, I focused on thepresent 25-step model of development. It is as if I wasconsidering the various stages and substages as states inthe system. For mechanisms, I referred to the model ofnonlinear dynamical systems as probably one that under-writes the various mechanisms, such as the biological,social, and personal. It is as if I considered the pattern ofchanges in states as different types of attractors. However, Idid not refer to the stages, states, or products in develop-ment as attractors. However, van Geert (2009) consideredstages as attractors, a proposal which is a plausible alter-native, for example, because changes related to stagescould have so-called attractors basins, or scripts in domain

skills that are acquired, that mark attractor forms. Morework is needed to untangle the conceptual bases of theapplication of attractors to development. Nevertheless, thework should keep the distinction between product andprocess.

3. Meta-issues considered

(IIa) Stages can be shown to exist

The best data that indicates the presence of cognitivestages, or structures that cut across multiple areas ofdevelopment, is found in the work of Case (1998), whodescribed central conceptual structures, for example,numerical social, and narrative. Similarly, Demetriou andcolleagues have found consistencies over different domainsof development (Demetriou, Mouyi, & Spanoudis, 2010).However, researchers have stopped seeking support forstrong versions of stage theory, in which all domainsemerge more or less at the same time at new stage acqui-sitions, or at least have exceptions explained by task orcontext. Today, it is acknowledged that there are individualdifferences in attainment of stages, even in the degree thatthey cohere, the domains that coalesce, and the skills thataccelerate due to support, scaffolding, or training, and soon, although there are still developmental constraints atwork that are associated with the initial proposals aboutstages, such as stages being qualitatively different, occur-ring in an invariant order without being skipped, etc. Also,as per point Ic above, the nature of the investigationsneeded to test the present model should be quite complex,given that it incorporates both cognitive and affectivesteps in development, along with pervasive individualdifferences.

(IIb) What model do stages follow – punctuated equilib-rium or otherwise

A reviewer cogently asked whether the proposedmodel reflects change according to punctuated equilib-rium patterns. This latter model refers to periods of steadystate in a system marked by moments of rapid change.Moreover, there is no temporal pattern to when thechanges might occur. Because of the enormous individualdifferences that characterize development, it is unlikelythat a punctuated equilibrium model applies uniformlyacross stage or substage changes in development. More-over, in the Piagetian tradition, cognitive developmentinvolves a sequence of steps in which skipping a stepcannot take place but in the Eriksonian tradition, patternssuch as fixation and regression can take place, even to veryearlier levels in the sequence.

Therefore, it is unlikely that a punctuated equilibriummodel can be found even in any one individual undergoingstage and substage changes. However, it could be that foran individual skill for any one child, the model might applyin part.

This being said, most likely, given the multiple skills,domains, modules, and family of schemata that might bechanging in any one child in the same temporal frame

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249 247

within sublevels of substages let alone in terms of stagesand substages, the change process should present asunregulated and perhaps as one of “punctuated disequi-librium” rather than punctuated equilibrium. The nonlineardynamical systems view has been proposed as providingthe best way of understanding the change process indevelopment, and its further application to the presentmodel should investigate the proposed punctuateddisequilibrium model of change.

(IIc) Is it premature to propose a five-step generic changemodel that cuts across living and nonliving systems

The nonlinear dynamical systems point of view wasapplied to nonliving systems prior to living ones. In Young(2011), I described how its evolution through five stepsinvolving attractors and complex adaptive systems mightunderlie the five-step change process suggested in thepresent model. In this regard, in the generic change modelthat I present, I am not generalizing from patterns foundin development, other human systems and other livingsystems to nonliving systems. Rather, I am findingcommunalities in the pattern of changes over thesedifferent areas that suggest a common underlyingdynamical change process.

In a certain sense, there is never a lack of change in anysystem, at least ones that are open to input. All systems ofthis nature undergo constant change. By this, I mean thateven the process of conserving a steady state in equilibriumrequires energy or information entering the system andwork to keep it in equilibrium, whichmeans there is alwayschange when system and context are considered together.Moreover, system states are always constructed de novofrom the coalition or ensemble of system elements, so thata system in steady state really means a system thatreconfigures itself in approximately the same manner frommoment to moment, or in a sequence of equal or similarstates. What is steady in the system, then, is change, per se,in one way or another. In this regard, both living andnonliving systems that are open to input are “changemachines,” and are liable to similar patterns in the changeprocess (and perhaps in the specific ways that I havesuggested).

Note that in Young (2011), I found multiple domains inwhich a five-step change model seemed evident, includingin psychology, business, and societies. Further review of theliterature indicates that the evolution of groups often ischaracterized as a five-step process (Halverson, 2008; Levie& Lichtenstein, 2010). Moreover, the terms used in thisliterature for the different stages resemble my own.However, it is acknowledged that other models have moreor less stages, or devalue the role of stages.

(IId) Can stages reflect fractal processes at work at morethan the metaphorical level

A reviewer asked “Why fractals?” I hope that I haveanswered this question. Granted, in their description,isomorphic structures at different levels of a hierarchy donot necessarily require use of rigid formalisms such asfractals. However, as Flam (1991) indicated, nature “loves”

fractals. They provide an elegance, economy, or efficiency indesign that surpasses particular domains. In the presentcase, I have used them metaphorically, for the ideasproposed are not yet amenable to explicit operationaliza-tion and measurement of its underlying fractal “dimen-sions” and calculation of exact Lyapunov exponents. AsGuastello and Liebovitch (2009) have indicated, theconcept of fractals has not penetrated much into psycho-logical research. A recent literature survey found that theconcept of fractals continues to be applied especiallymetaphorically in the psychological literature (e.g.,Galatzer-Levy, 2011; Marks-Tarlow, 2011).

Therefore, it can be argued that “development lovesfractals” and if we look carefully for them they should beubiquitous in its unfolding. They can help describe both theproducts of development and the process underlying them.The self-similarities evident in its different levels should beevident not only in the stage, substage, and sublevel orga-nization that I have described in the proposed model, butelsewhere, as well. For example, I have argued that acti-vation/inhibition coordination is a widespread metric inbrain, behavior, development, mind, and the environment,and fractalization processes might govern the distributionof these processes across its multiple zones of penetration.The future study of fractals in development should lead toappropriate empirical investigation, including with respectto the proposed model of steps in development.

Despite my defense of the fractal nature of develop-ment, at least in terms of the types of stages and substagesbeing proposed and the ubiquity of processes such asactivation-inhibition coordination in development, thereviewer’s contention could be correct – that the conceptsof self-similarity and isomorphism might be a sufficientand thus more elegant manner in describing the variousequivalences in product and process over different devel-opmental levels and domains.

4. Conclusions

The present article has reviewed the unitary Neo-Piagetian/Neo-Eriksonian stage model of Young (2011),and discussed its foundational assumptions and relatedmeta-issues. It provides analysis in support of the modeland its underlying processes, such as fractalization. To thispoint, it makes two contributions to the model not previ-ously presented in Young. First, it suggests that the Neo-Eriksonian series can be divided into stages and substageslike the Neo-Piagetian one, by focusing on the individual’sdeveloping social “participation” instead of developinglogic in thought. Second, it suggests that the multiplicity ofchanges taking place in development must present rela-tively constant change rather than equilibrium. Therefore,instead of a change model that reflects “punctuated equi-librium,” the present model suggests the converse ofdevelopment as “punctuated disequilibrium.”

In the end, the value of the present model will rest on itstestability and empirical foundations, and its ability togrow itself with the data gathered and the new ideas thathave been formulated based on them. However, theconcepts in the model are sufficiently defined to allow foroperationalization of valid measures, as with other work in

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249248

areas of development related to Piaget and Erikson, andthis program now has sufficient basis to mature given thework of Young (1997, 2011, and the present article).

One way of testing the present model is to determine itsapplicability to different evolutionary and developmentalstage and sequencemodels. For example, the implication ofthe model that Neo-Piagetian and Neo-Eriksoniansequences inform and build on each other in develop-ment is that for populations to which the Piagetiansequences have been applied, the present model of Neo-Piagetian and Neo-Eriksonian sequences might also apply(e.g., development in people with intellectual deficiency,development in nonhuman primates).

Another possibility is that the proposed sequences applyto disturbed development. Themodel includes the concept ofthe cognitive (mis)perception of the other based on the Neo-Piagetian sequence. Although the model ascribes importanceto the environment in development, for example, as a buff-ering mechanism, I have not given a psychodynamic expla-nation of how difficulties traversing the proposed Neo-Eriksonian stages can complicate perception of the otherand lead to the proposed misperceptions. In the following,I elaborate on the linkage between the Neo-Piagetian andNeo-Eriksonian sequences from a psychodynamic ordisturbed developmental perspective.

At the cognitive level, I have proposed that theperson might use more than one stage or substage in theNeo-Piagetian sequence at any one time, depending onthe nature of the task and context (Young, 2011).Therefore, the model proposes a type of “multipleintelligences”, in which the cognitive working of eachstage or substage in development potentially is availablefor use in adaptation, and the manner in which they arelinked depends on the yoking needed in the adaptation.There is no a priori reason that the highest stage avail-able is the one that serves best in an adaptation at anyone time.

Analogously, it can be argued that the best model forhow the various Neo-Eriksonian stages and substages inthe present model work is through an adaptationalframework, with a yoking mechanism cohering the onesneeded for the best ongoing adaptation, in a “multiplepsychodynamics” network. Developing individuals mightdeploy a continuously changing mix of psychodynamicperceptions depending on the evolution of contexts, andtheir predominant Neo-Eriksonian modes as per thepresent model.

Given the problematic environments and self unfoldingthat might be involved in any one person, perception ofthe best adaptation possible in a particular context mightbe highly specific and misperceived. For example, pastdifficulties might have led to fixations, regressions, andalterations/deformations of Neo-Eriksonian developmentaccording to the proposed stage-substage sequence,leading to accompanying limitations in optimal and flexiblecontextual adaptation. This developmental process mightpreclude using more advanced stages and substages thatmight be available, or they might have been curtailed ormodified in development and be quite problematic in theiractivation. Abnormal development and psychopathologymight ensue.

In short, the proposed Neo-Eriksonian model mightallow new descriptions of developmental difficulties andpsychopathology from a “multiple psychodynamics” stage-substage framework. This proposal constitutes the thirdway that the present article has elaborated the proposedNeo-Piagetian/Neo-Eriksonian model of development pre-sented in Young (2011).

Moreover, the fluid nature of contextual adaptation toa rapidly changing internal and external psychodynamicthat would be shown through the proposed stage-substageanalysis would further illustrate that development is highlypunctuated by disequilibrium for developing individuals atwhatever level of their psychological integration, as per thepresent conjecture. Finally, analyses such as these, forexample, on individual patients in psychotherapy, mightoffer rich data on the validity of the proposed model,preparing the way for further study by more objectivemeans on particular developing populations.

In the following, I provide an example of how multiplepsychodynamics can come into play according to theproposed Neo-Eriksonian 25-step sequence of the presentmodel. I choose part of the sequence that uses some of theoriginal eight stages proposed by Erikson, but also includessome of the new ones that I have added to the sequence.Moreover, I choose a context for their expression thatallows for constant shifting in the yoking of the Neo-Eriksonian steps involved, including the one(s) that mightbe primary at any one moment. This illustrates theconstant, online shifting of Neo-Eriksonian psychody-namics that takes place as we navigate important issues inour lives and how that constant reshuffling and re-organization might reflect nonlinear systems theory self-organization processes. That being said, in case of abuseand other negative impacts on development, the core Neo-Eriksonian steps that have been the domain of dominantchallenges, crises, or dangers in development might serveas powerful attractors that limit the flexibility of coalitionsin multiple psychodynamics that is being described.

University students face major challenges in develop-ment as they proceed through their studies at the under-graduate and graduate levels. According to the presentmodel, at the cognitive level they go through steps relatedto abstract thought and collective intelligence. In the sameage period, Erikson had described stages involving identity,intimacy and generativity. However, the present Neo-Eriksonian model adds steps related to the developmentof conscious acts before this sequence and nurturing andwider personal and social acts before and after the step ofintimacy. As students face the demands of their studies andpersonal lives and approach and enter into their 20s, theynot only confront the challenges/crises/dangers inherent inthe development of new socioaffective steps but also thepull or constraints of any past steps that had not been wellnavigated. Moreover, any one context might require themto deal with it according to the psychodynamics of paststeps or multiple ones rather than uniquely the present onemarking their development.

For example, the question of identity is a constant onefor young people and does not disappear with early adult-hood as other steps, such as involving intimacy, take hold.Also, in dealing with intimacy as described by Erikson, it

G. Young / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 241–249 249

could be that issues of nurturing impede proper navigationof the challenge, and these in turn might have beenimpacted by a series in conscious awareness in earlyadolescence that had affected the developmental chain ofsteps leading to it. The young adult might be in a socialsituation eliciting multiple psychodynamics and Neo-Eriksonian steps of the past coming to the fore to guidebehavior, thinking, and mood, with multiple past crisesbeing compounded by the context. There could be simul-taneous issues related to consciousness, identity, nurturing,intimacy, and wider personal and social concerns, and evengenerativity acting in concert and presenting a majorpsychosocial crisis, for example, with differing yokings andpredominant Neo-Eriksonian foci in the yokings, dependingon what is transpiring at this important crossroad in life.

References

Barlow, D. H., Farchione, T. J., Fairholme, C. P., Ellard, K. K., Boisseau, C. L.,Allen, L. B., et al. (2011). Unified protocol for transdiagnostic treatmentof emotional disorder: Therapist guide. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Barrouillet, P., & Gaillard, V. (2011). Cognitive development and workingmemory: A dialogue between Neo-Piagetian and cognitive approaches.New York: Psychology Press.

Case, R. (1998). The development of conceptual structures. In W. Damon,D. Kuhn, & R. S. Siegler (Eds.), Cognition, perception & language(5th ed.).. Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 2 (pp. 745–800) NewYork: Wiley.

Clinchy, B. M. (1993). Ways of knowing and ways of being: epistemologyand moral development in undergraduate women. In A. Garrod (Ed.),Approaches to moral development: New research and emerging themes(pp. 180–200). New York: Teachers College Press.

Clinchy, B. M. (1995). Commentary. Human Development, 38, 258–264.Demetriou, A., Mouyi, A., & Spanoudis, G. (2010). The development of

mental processing. In R. M. Lerner, & W. F. Overton (Eds.), Cognition,biology, and methods. The handbook of life-span development, Vol. 1(pp. 36–55). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Demetriou, A., Spanoudis, G., & Mouyi, A. (2011). Educating the developingmind: Towards an overarching paradigm. Nicosia, CY: University ofCyprus.

Flam, F. (1991). Beating a fractal drum. Science, 254, 1593.Galatzer-Levy, R. M. (2011). Commentary. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 21,

140–151.Guastello, S. J., & Liebovitch, L. S. (2009). Introduction to nonlinear

dynamics and complexity. In S. J. Guastello, M. Koopmans, & D. Pincus(Eds.), Chaos and complexity in psychology: The theory of nonlineardynamical systems (pp. 1–40). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Halverson, C. B. (2008). Team development. In C. B. Halverson, & S. A.Tirmizi (Eds.), Effective multicultural teams: Theory and practice(pp. 81–110). New York: Springer Scienceþ Business Media.

Lerner, R. M. (2006). Developmental science, developmental systems,and contemporary theories of human development. In W. Damon,& R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Theoretical models of human development(6th ed.). Handbook of child psychology, Vol. 1 (pp. 1–14) Hoboken,NJ: Wiley.

Levie, J., & Lichtenstein, B. B. (2010). A terminal assessment of stagestheory: introducing a dynamic states approach to entrepreneurship.Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 317–350.

Marks-Tarlow, T. (2011). Merging and emerging: a nonlinear portrait ofintersubjectivity during psychotherapy. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 21,110–127.

Miller, P. H. (2011). Piaget’s theory: past, present, and future. In U. Gos-wami (Ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of childhood cognitivedevelopment (2nd ed.). (pp. 649–672) New York: Wiley.

Prochaska, J. O., Norcross, J. C., & DiClemente, C. C. (1994). Changing forgood: The revolutionary program that explains the six stages of changeand teaches you how to free yourself from bad habits. New York:Morrow.

Prochaska, J. O., Wright, J. A., & Velicer, W. F. (2008). Evaluating theories ofhealth behavior change: a hierarchy of criteria applied to the trans-theoretical model. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 57,561–588.

Shaffer, H. J., LaPlante, D. A., LaBrie, R. A., Kidman, R. C., Donato, A. N., &Stanton, M. V. (2004). Toward a syndrome model of addiction:multiple expressions, common etiology. Harvard Review of Psychiatry,12, 367–374.

Vandervert, L. R. (1991). A measurable and testable brain-based emergentinteractionism: an alternative to Sperry’s mentalist emergent inter-actionism. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 12, 201–220.

Vandervert, L. R. (1992). The emergence of brain and mind amidchaos through maximum-power evolution. World Futures, 33,253–273.

Vandervert, L. R. (1995a). Chaos theory and the evolution of conscious-ness and mind: a thermodynamic-holographic resolution to themind–body problem. New Ideas in Psychology, 13, 107–127.

Vandervert, L. R. (1995b). Chaos theory and neurological positivism –

clarifications: a reply to Newman, Bickhard, Alexander, and Globus.New Ideas in Psychology, 13, 143–148.

van Geert, P. (2009). Nonlinear complex dynamical systems in develop-mental psychology. In S. J. Guastello, M. Koopmans, & D. Pincus (Eds.),Chaos and complexity in psychology: The theory of nonlinear dynamicalsystems (pp. 242–281). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yezzi, L. M. (2011). A cognitive and social-emotional profile of middlelevel students in transition. Dissertation Abstracts International SectionA: Humanities and Social Sciences, 71, 2755.

Young, G. (1997). Adult development, therapy, and culture: A postmodernsynthesis. New York: Plenum Press.

Young, G. (2011). Development and causality: Neo-Piagetian perspectives.New York: Springer Scienceþ Business Media.

Zhang, L. F., & He, Y. F. (2011). Thinking styles and the Eriksonian stages.Journal of Adult Development, 18, 8–17.