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QRA
CFD
OPT
A New Approach for Facility Siting using Mapping Risks on the plant and
Grid Selection Optimization
Seungho Jung, Dedy Ng, Hans J. Pasman, and M. Sam Mannan
11
Contents
2
Introduction
Problem statement
Motivation
Research objectives
Flowchart of the Proposed Methodology
Overall theme
Consequence analysis –
Building type
Case study with CPQRA example (distillation column)
Description for case study
Optimization formulations
Constraints (Recommended separation distance)
Results & Discussion
Conclusion & Future work
Problem Statement
Process Design
Equipment Layout
+ Piping Route
Facility Layout
3
Motivation
BP Texas city (2005) Trailers
Pasadena (1989)
control room
Bhopal (1984)
affecting to nearby residential area
San Juanico disaster (1984)
residential areadomino effect
Separation DistanceHazardous point vs. Occupied buildings
Residential Area
4www.abc.net.au/news/photos/2007/10/26/2070854.htm http://www.acusafe.com/Incidents/PasadentTexas1989/incident-pasadenatexas1989.html www.ens-newswire.com/.2004-11-30-10.asp upload.wikimedia.org/.../250px-Gaskessel_gr.jpg
Research Objectives
Combine economic concept and safety concept
Facility layout optimization using QRA
Aim for realistic prediction!
Help in a decision-making for safer siting & layout
Develop a layout optimization model
Optimization (MINLP, MILP)
GAMS, AMPL
5
Flowchart of the Proposed Methodology
ReleaseFrequency
Event Tree Analysis
ConsequenceAnalysis
Building
Type Risk(Hazard)
Score on Grids
Cost Optimization
PipingManagementLand
FLACS‐CFD code
Price of Buildings Risk Cost
http://www.gexcon.co.uk/products_explo.html
Selection of
the grid
Protection Device
6
Consequence Analysis
Jet fire
D. C.
• Receptor
Iso-ovepressure
0 500 1000 1500
Integrate these scenarios to get the Risk Map7
Vapor Cloud Explosion(VCE)
Boiling Liquid Expansion
Vapor Explsion(BLEVE)
* Building Type – Different Probit
Models
Event Tree Analysis
ConsequenceAnalysis
Building
Type Risk(Hazard)
Score on Grids
ReleaseFrequency
(Salzano, 2006)
Example Classification of Buildings
CCPS, Guidelines for
Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and Fires
)ln(Pr opBA
8
Incident outcome frequency X Lifetime of the plant X Probability
of structural damage X W.F.
Risk Score =
Risk(Hazard)Score on Grids
Case Study – C6
distillation column
Description‐ A distillation column is used to separate hexane and heptane Incident outcome frequency via ETA
9
AICHE/CCPS (2007) Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis
Grid selection method
G01 G02 G03 G04 G05 G06 G07 G08 G09 G10
G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19 G20
G21 G22 G23 G24 G25 G26 G27 G28 G29 G30
G31 G32 G33 G34 G35 G36 G37 G38 G39 G40
G41 G42 G43 G44 G47 G48 G49 G50
G51 G52 G53 G54 G57 G58 G59 G60
G61 G62 G63 G64 G65 G66 G67 G68 G69 G70
G71 G72 G73 G74 G75 G76 G77 G78 G79 G80
G81 G82 G83 G84 G85 G86 G87 G88 G89 G90
G91 G92 G93 G94 G95 G96 G97 G98 G99 G100
100 grids
10m x 10m for each grid
The center of map (marked in black) indicates the location of
hazardous process units (process plant building)
Given:
• a set of facilities, indexed as i = 1,2,…,n
• a set of available locations, Gk ,
k = 1,2,…,K
• RDk
: Rectilinear Distance of “k”
grid from the center
• RSk
: Risk Score of “k”
grid caused from center
• cost data (piping, connection, construction, protection device)
Determine:
• the location of each facility
Total of 7 facilities
100 m
100 m
10
Risk Score (RSk
)
RS for BLEVE RS for VCE
• Receptor
Iso-ovepressure
50 years lifetime was assumed
Probability of Structure
Damage )ln(92.28.23Pr op
Incident outcome frequency X Lifetime of the plant X Probability
of structural damage X
W F
RS= 11
Risk Score (RSk
)
1E‐05 8E‐05 4E‐04 1E‐03 0.002 0.002 1E‐03 4E‐04 8E‐05 1E‐05
8E‐05 6E‐04 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.003 6E‐04 8E‐05
4E‐04 0.003 0.011 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.003 4E‐04
1E‐03 0.007 0.022 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.022 0.007 1E‐03
0.002 0.011 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.011 0.002
0.002 0.011 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.011 0.002
1E‐03 0.007 0.022 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.022 0.007 1E‐03
4E‐04 0.003 0.011 0.022 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.003 4E‐04
8E‐05 6E‐04 0.003 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.003 6E‐04 8E‐05
1E‐05 8E‐05 4E‐04 1E‐03 0.002 0.002 1E‐03 4E‐04 8E‐05 1E‐05
0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.022 0.02 0.018
0.026 0.029 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.018
0.027 0.03 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.018
0.028 0.031 0.034 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.029 0.024 0.021 0.018
0.027 0.03 0.034 0.037 0 0 0.029 0.024 0.02 0.018
0.027 0.03 0.033 0.037 0 0 0.028 0.023 0.02 0.017
0.026 0.028 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.023 0.02 0.017
0.025 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.025 0.022 0.02 0.017
0.023 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.02 0.017
0.022 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.02 0.019 0.017
RS for BLEVE RS for VCE
+
Incident outcome frequency X Lifetime of the plant X Probability
of structural damage X
W.F.
RS=
12
Risk Score (RSk
)
0.026 0.027 0.028 0.03 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.02 0.018
0.026 0.029 0.032 0.038 0.041 0.04 0.033 0.026 0.021 0.018
0.027 0.032 0.043 0.055 0.059 0.058 0.05 0.035 0.023 0.018
0.029 0.038 0.056 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.057 0.046 0.028 0.019
0.029 0.041 0.06 0.066 0.057 0.05 0.032 0.019
0.029 0.041 0.059 0.065 0.057 0.05 0.031 0.019
0.027 0.036 0.053 0.061 0.06 0.06 0.055 0.045 0.027 0.018
0.025 0.03 0.04 0.051 0.055 0.054 0.047 0.033 0.023 0.018
0.023 0.026 0.029 0.034 0.037 0.037 0.031 0.025 0.021 0.017
0.022 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.02 0.019 0.017
Integrated Risk Score
Incident outcome frequency X Lifetime of the plant X Probability
of structural damage X
W.F.
RS=
13
Objective function
Minimize Total cost {Risk cost + Piping cost}
• FCi : Facility or Building Cost of “i”
• UPi : Piping or relationship cost between i and the center in $ / m
14
i Type Building Cost ($) UP (Relationship) cost
1 Main control room 1,000,000 10
2 Office 300,000 0.1
3 Maintenance Building 200,000 2
4 Large volume storage (> 38 m3) 150,000 100
5 Small volume storage 1 (< 38 m3) 100,000 100
6 Small volume storage 2 (< 38 m3) 100,000 100
7 Utility 500,000 50
Cost Data
Constraints
Minimum, maximum separation distances
Non‐overlapping
15
Recommended separation distances
On‐Site Building Utilities
Atmospheric & Low
Pressure Flammable &
Combustible Storage
Tanks (up to 1 atm)< 38 m3
Atmospheric & Low
Pressure Flammable &
Combustible Storage
Tanks (up to 1 atm) >
38 m3
High Pressure
Flammable Storage
Office, Lab,
Maintenance,
Warehouse
30 15 76 107
Control Room‐Main
30 30 76 107
Control Room‐One Unit
30 15 76 76
4 (Large
storage)
5 (Small
storage)
6 (Small
storage)
7 (Utility)
1 (Main control room) 76 m 30 m 30 m 30 m
2 (Office) 76 m 15 m 15 m 30 m
3 (Maintenance building) 76 m 15 m 15 m 30 m
present case study
AICHE/CCPS (2003). Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout.
16
G01 G02 G03 G04 G05 G06 G07 G08 G09 G10
G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19 G20
G21 G22 G23 G24 G25 G26 G27 G28 G29 G30
G31 G32 G33 G34 G35 G36 G37 G38 G39 G40
G41 G42 G43 G44 G47 G48 G49 G50
G51 G52 G53 G54 G57 G58 G59 G60
G61 G62 G63 G64 G65 G66 G67 G68 G69 G70
G71 G72 G73 G74 G75 G76 G77 G78 G79 G80
G81 G82 G83 G84 G85 G86 G87 G88 G89 G90
G91 G92 G93 G94 G95 G96 G97 G98 G99 G100
Optimization Results
17
L.
Storage
S.
Storage Utility
S.
Storage
ControlRoom
Office M.B.
Conclusion
18
Propylene plant case study
Multiple hazardous process plants
Different size of facilities
Different probit functions
Fire & Explosion Simulation using FLACS
Combination of Risk Mapping and Grid Optimization: advance facility layout
methodology (safety & economics)
Case study for Hexane‐Heptane separation plant was demonstrated to
obtain the optimal layout of 7 facilities around the hazardous process unit
Adaptable for numerous facilities with swift calculation (MILP)
Future work
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References
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QRA
CFD
OPT
Thank you!
20
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