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The Financial Management Campaign PlanBuilding “Log Nation” in the U.S. Central Command
Evolution of Petroleum Support in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility
WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2010
A Logistician’s Legacy Comes to ALU
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited. PB700-10-5Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy
LogisticsOfficerCorpsUpdate:BlendingFunctional andMultifunctionalExpertise —LieutenantColonelMarshallN.Ramsey andLieutenantColonelTimGilhool
Building“LogNation”intheU.S.CentralCommand —MajorGeneralKennethS.Dowd
TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan:RaisingtheBar toAchieveSustainmentExcellence —LieutenantGeneralEdgarE.StantonIII
TheNewFM1−0,HumanResourcesSupport —ThomasK.Wallace,Jr.
MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgram —DavidJ.Sherriff
EvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheU.S.CentralCommand AreaofResponsibility —ColonelJeffreyB.CarraandChiefWarrantOfficer4 DavidRay,USMC(Ret.)
ExtractingArmyForcesFromtheField—ALogistician’s Perspective —LieutenantColonelJerryB.Steinke,MNARNG
FosteringaGoodRelationshipWithContractors ontheBattlefield —MasterSergeantArthurHarris,Jr.,USA(Ret.)
ConductingGlobalContainerManagementTrainingOnline —ThomasCatchings
InteragencyLogisticsTraining:Perpetuatingthe WholeofGovernmentApproachtoDisasterLogistics —Dr.BillyJ.Davis
GulfWarLogisticsRecordsDonatedtothe SustainmentCommunity —StaffFeature
“SupportatAltitude”foraMultifunctionalAviationTaskForce —CaptainMichaelR.Miller
PB700–10–05VOLUME42ISSUE5SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER2010www.alu.army.mil/alog
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Cover:LieutenantGeneral(Ret.)WilliamG.“Gus”PagonisposesamidthepersonalarchiveshedonatedtotheArmyLogisticsUniversity(ALU)Libraryon17May2010.GeneralPagoniswastheleadlogisticianduringthePersianGulfWarof1990to1991.HiscarefullypreservedrecordofhisroleinthatconflictwillallowALUstudentsandresearcherstostudyandbenefitfromhislessonslearnedinoneofthemostcomplicatedlogisticsoperationsinArmyhistory.Thearticlebeginningonpage32discusseshisdonation,whichwillbethefoundationofALU’snewSeniorSustainer’sCollection.(Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)
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EquippingtheCombatSupportHospital:ACaseStudy —LieutenantColonelCharlesH.Strite,Jr.
Cold-ChainManagementandtheUseofTempTaleTechnology —ColonelMitchellE.Brew,MajorMichaelRonn, andPettyOfficerFirstClassSummerWebb,USN
TheOrdnanceSchools’MovetoFortLee —GayleA.Olszyk
Coblenz1919:TheArmy’sFirstSustainmentCenter ofExcellence —AlexanderF.Barnes
Commentary:CollaborativeManagementWillImprove WeaponSystemSustainment —RickConlinandJimMcIntosh
Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition: TooManyEggsinOneBasket? —MajorMarkW.Siekman,USAR,Dr.DavidA.Anderson, andAllanS.Boyce
JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1018707
BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman
Major General James L. HodgeCommander
ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand
MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson
DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy
Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy
totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology
Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral
ArmyMaterielCommand
Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget
AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller
Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral
Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross
TheQuartermasterGeneral
Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance
Brigadier General Brian R. LayerChiefofTransportation
Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander
ArmySoldierSupportInstitute
Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral
ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand
Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral
ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand
ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY
Colonel Mark McCormickPresident
Barbara G. MroczkowskiVicePresident
STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor
Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor
Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant
GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.
ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.
ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:
GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy
ChiefofStaff
Official:
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Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isabimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.
Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.
Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede
officialArmypublications.Themasculinepro-nounmayrefertoeithergender.
Reprints:ArticlesmaybereprintedwithcredittoArmy Sustainmentandtheauthor(s),exceptwhencopyrightisindicated.
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Postmaster:Sendaddresschangesto:EDITORARMYSUSTAINMENT/ALU/2401QUARTERSRD/FTLEEVA23801–1705.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
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SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
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WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
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LogisticsOfficerCorpsUpdate:BlendingFunctionalandMultifunctionalExpertise
by Lieutenant CoLoneL MarshaLL n. raMsey and Lieutenant CoLoneL tiM GiLhooL
n1January2008,theLogisticsCorpsasabranchbecameareality.Longbefore2008,quartermaster(QM),ordnance(OD),andtransportation(TC)officershadservedforagenera-tioninmultifunctionallogisticspositionsinlegacyfor-ward,main,andcorpssupportbattalions.Today,afterapproximately9yearsofsustainingdeploymentsandcombatoperationsacrosstheglobe,theplanning,coor-dination,synchronization,andexecutionofmultifunc-tionallogisticsisdefinitelywellwithinthecomfortzoneforthiscurrentgenerationofofficers.
Withthatsaid,confusionseemstoaboundinthefieldastowhathappenstothefunctionallogisticsskillset(QM,OD,andTC)thatanofficerbringstothetable.Afterbeinginculcatedfortheirfirst3to5yearsasaproudmemberofoneoftheregiments—QM,OD,andTC—doesthatknowledgevanishaftergraduationfromtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse(CLC3)?
EveryLogisticsOfficerHasaFunctionalAreaTheanswertothatquestionisaresounding
“No!”DespitetheadventoftheLogistics(LG)branchandtheproliferationofforwardsupportcom-panies(FSCs)acrossourformations,arequirement,
codifiedinnumerousmodificationtablesoforgani-zationandequipmentandtablesofdistributionandallowances,stillexistsforfunctionalQM,OD,andTCofficersatthecaptain,major,lieutenantcolonel,andevencolonelranks.
WhatthismeansforcareerpathandprofessionaldevelopmentpurposesisthatLGofficersmustbeaggressiveinself-studyandlookfordevelopmentalopportunitiestosharpentheirfunctionalskills.HumanresourcesmanagersattheArmyHumanResourcesCommandandtheSeniorLeaderDevelopmentOfficecanhelpbyensuringthatofficershaveopportunitiestorotatebetweenmultifunctionaljobsandfunctionaljobsasmuchaspossiblethroughouttheircareers.Thisbecomesmuchhardertodothemoreseniortheofficeris,butbasedonanofficer’sowndesiresandtheneedsoftheArmy,itmustbeafactorinfutureassignments.
CareerPathsofLogisticsOfficersLogisticsofficers,regardlessofwhatregimentthey
wereaccessedfrom,becomeLogisticsCorpsofficersupongraduationfromCLC3—period.Theintent,asdevelopedbyLieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevensonduringhistenureasthecommandinggeneralofthe
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COMMENTARY
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The Logistics Corps• Enlisted Soldiers (outer ring)Quartermaster (QM), Ordnance (OD),and Transportation (TC) branches
• Warrant officers and lieutenants (middle ring between dashed circle and inner circle) Three separate branches and partof the Logistics Officer Corps
• Captains to colonels (inner circle)Logistics branch of the Logistics Officer Corps. Officers also hold one specialty within the Logistics branch.
How officers are inducted into the Logistics branch: Lieutenants are accessed into one of three branches (OD, QM, TC). Upon graduation from Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CCLC3) or Reserve Component Captains Career Course (RC CCC) (as captains), they are inducted into the Logistics (LG) branch.
Logistics Officer Corps
QM Corps
TC Corps
OD Corps
Logistics Branch
continued on page 54
65%
43%57%
70%
ColonelL ieutenant C olonel
Captain Major
90A 88A/B/C/D 89E 91A 92A/D 92F
Current Logistics Officer Authorizations(Updated 2010)
The requirements for a multifunctional logistician increase as an officergains rank and have grown significantly at the captain level.
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91% of centralized selection list lieutenant colonel command and key billets availableto all Logistics officers
85% of centralized selection list colonel command and key billets available to allLogistics officers
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ervingattheU.S.CentralCommand(CENT-COM)asDirectorofLogistics(CCJ4)for36months(June2007toJune2010)hasbeenbothanhonorandapleasure.Inafast-pacedenvironmentwiththecombatantcommandatwar,thechallengeshavebeenhuge.MypreviouspositionastheU.S.PacificCommandDirectorofLogisticswasagreatbilletthatpreparedmewellfortheleadershipchal-lengesthatconfrontedmeatCENTCOM.Manyles-sonslearnedtheretranslateddirectlytoCENTCOM,butCENTCOMpresentedmanymoreuniquechal-lengestoovercome.
NothingiseasyaboutlogisticsinAfghanistan,Iraq,oranyofthe20countriesthatmakeuptheCENT-COMareaofresponsibility.Insurgentviolence,politi-calinstability,andcomplexethnicandreligiousissuesallcombinetochallengeeventhebestlaidplans.Conductinganeffectivelogisticsoperationintheseenvironmentswouldhavebeenimpossibleifnotforthecooperation,communication,anddedicationofcountlessprofessionalsacrossseverallargeandcom-plexlogisticsorganizations.
AsIlookbackovermy36monthsastheCCJ4,Iamoverwhelmedandhumbledbythesenseofteamwork,dedication,andpridethatIhaveconsistentlywitnessedacrossthelogisticsenterprise.FromtheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)rightdowntothetactical-leveltruckcompaniesandsupplysquadrons,theSol-diers,Marines,Sailors,Airmen,andDepartmentofDefense(DOD)civilianshaveallworkedtogethertodocument,track,andmovemoun-tainsofcriticalresources.AlongwiththededicatedpersonneloftheJointStaffandournationalpartnersoftheU.S.TransportationCom-mand(TRANSCOM),theDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),andourservicecomponents,allconstitutewhatIliketocall“LogNation.”
Inthisarticle,IwillattempttosharemypersonalinsightsintohowIsawthejointoperatingareasofIraqandAfghanistanaswellastheCentralandSouthAsianStates
progresstowardourcommander’sintentthroughthetirelesscollaborationandcooperationofLogNation.
TheSituationUponArrivalTrustinginmylongstandingbeliefthatthemost
effectivewaytosynchronizeplansandoperationsacrossseverallargeandcomplexorganizationsistocultivaterelationshipsanddialog,Isetouttodojustthat.Iestab-lishedaseniorlogisticsleaderforumtopulltogetherthekeyleadersfromthewarfightingsub-unifiedcombatantcommands,servicecomponents,andnationalpartners.Wemetbysecurevideoteleconferenceeverymonthandface-to-facetwiceayeartodevelopacommonsightpicture,discussupcomingchallenges,andbrainstormsolutions.Thisadhocvenuecreatedanetworkofwork-ingrelationshipsthatcontinuestogainmomentum,andtheinviteelistcontinuestogroweveryyear.Similarly,IformedagroupofseniorlogisticsleaderscomprisedofourcoalitionpartnersoftheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF).
Eachweek,IpublishedanupdatetotheCENT-COMcommander,whichIsubsequentlysharedacrossLogNation.Thisweeklyupdatebothinformedandstirreddiscussion,alwaysresultinginproductivecross-talkthatkeptusallsynchcronized.Establishingthesekeyrelationshipsearlyinmytenure,acrossalleche-lonsofcommand,provedtobeextraordinarilyvaluableinthedemandingtimestocome.
Building“LogNation”intheU.S.CentralCommand
by Major GeneraL Kenneth s. dowd
S
Major General Dowd visits with Afghanistan Na tional Police recruits.
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WhenIarrivedatCENTCOMinJune2007,ourmaineffortwasOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF).Thecommandhadover5yearsofexperiencesystemati-callyrotatingforcesintoandoutofIraqandsustainingthoseforceswithawell-oiledlogisticsnetworkhubbedoutofKuwait.The2007surgeofforcesinIraqwasunderway,andbySeptemberofthatyear,thedesiredeffectsofthesurgewerebeingrealized.GeneralDavidH.Petraeus,thenthecommandinggeneralofMulti-NationalForces-Iraq(MNF−I),recommendedtohischainofcommandinSeptember2007thatagradualdrawdownofU.S.forcesfromIraqbegin,withagoalofreachingpre-surgetrooplevelsbyJuly2008.Forthefirsttimeinyears,therewasapalpableoptimismaboutachievingademocraticandstableIraqand,sub-sequently,anopportunitytoconsiderareducedU.S.andCoalitionForcesfootprint.
OperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)inAfghanistanremainedaneconomy-of-forceeffort,withthevastmajorityofforcesandsustainmentreachingAfghanistanthroughthelandroutetraversingPakistan.Thiswasthegeneralstateofplayinthecommanduponmyarrival.
ResponsibleDrawdownofU.S.ForcesThesecurityachievementsof2007andearly2008
formedafoundationforthegradualestablishmentof
sustainablesecurityinIraq.U.S.partnershipshavebeenfundamentaltothisprogresssince2003.On27Feb-ruary2009,PresidentObamaconfirmedthatU.S.forceswouldbeoutofIraqbytheendof2011.ThetwomainimplicationsofthisforLogNationwereposturingforaresponsiblewithdrawalofU.S.forcesandsupportingthetrainingandequippingofIraqiSecurityForces(ISF).
ToassistMNF–Iinthemonumentalefforttodrawdownmillionsofpiecesofequipment,theArmydeployedteamsintoKuwaitandIraqtooverseetheprocessesandplansforredistributinganddisposingoftheexcess.DLADefenseReutilizationandMarketingServiceteamsledthewaywiththeresponsibleremov-alofhazardousmaterialandscrapfromIraq.DLAremovedmorethan400millionpoundsofscrapmetalin2009and2010.Armyteamsensuredthatequip-mentinIraqwasnotdeclaredexcessandavailableforredistributionuntilthecommanderonthegrounddeterminedthattheequipmentwasnolongerrequiredtosupportthemission.
ThepriorityforredistributionofexcessequipmentinIraqistopushittoU.S.forcesinAfghanistan.DODsponsoredaprogramtotransferequipmenttoIraq.Col-laboratively,withtheservicesinthelead,wedeterminedwhatequipmentwouldbetransferredtotheISF,whatwouldbetransferredtotheAfghanNationalSecurityForces(ANSF),andwhatwouldbeshippedbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS).EquipmentwasalsomadeavailabletoothergovernmentagenciesthroughtheNationalAssociationofStateAgenciesforSurplusPropertyforlocalgovernmentuse,shouldastateorlocalgovernmentdesiretopaythetransporta-tioncostforreturningittoCONUS.AsofDecember2009,over1.9millionpiecesofstandardArmyequip-mentinIraq,valuedat$12billion,werescheduledtoreturntoCONUS.Thiscomprisedapproximately63percentoftheequipmentinIraqtoday.
TheArmyestablishedtheEquipmentDistributionReviewBoardcochairedbytheViceChiefofStaffoftheArmyandthecommanderoftheArmyMaterielCommand.ThisboardfacilitatedthedistributionofequipmentbystreamliningexistingForeignMilitarySales(FMS)programpoliciesandprocesses.Muchoftheboard’sworktodatehasbeentosupportfillingAfghanNationalArmyrequirements.NATO[NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization]TrainingMission-Afghanistan/CombinedSecurityTransitionCom-mand-Afghanistan(NTM−A/CSTC−A)isanactiveparticipant,andtheboardrecentlyaccelerateddeli-veryofequipmenttomeetNTM−A/CSTC−AtrainingrequirementsfortheAfghanNationalArmy.
MNF–Iimmediatelybeganexaminingwhatmini-mumessentialcapabilitytheISFwouldneedinordertomaintainanacceptablelevelofsecurityagainstbothinternalandexternalthreats.MNF−Ideter-mineditwasimportantfortheISFtohaveatleast
Top 10 Highlights
1. Teamwork and development of Log Nation, from infancy to enduring partnerships.
2. Establishing the Northern Distribution Net work.
3. Developing a second route for Pakistan ground lines of communication (Chaman route).
4. Partnering with Jordan to increase materiel volume and velocity through that strategic location.
5. Spearheading “AFG & CASA First” [Afghan istan and Central and South Asian States] in itiatives.
6. Developing quarterly cost savings report for the CENTCOM commander.
7. Organizing biannual logistics general of ficer/flag officer (CENTCOM Senior Logistics Advisory Board) sessions in theater for all partners.
8. Developing a concept to expand our Joint Contracting Command to a theaterwide com mand.
9. Developing a multinational logistics section to synchronize foreign military sales and coali tion logistics efforts.
10.Developing a logistics forum with NATO general officer/flag officer partners.
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afoundationalcapabilitytoprotectitsland,mari-time,andairsovereigntyanddeterminedthattheISFwouldnotfullyachievetherequiredcapabilitiesbeforetheendof2011withouthelp.
InJuly2009,MNF−IsubmittedalistofequipmentrequirementsfortheISFtoachievetheessential,sus-tainablecapabilitiesneededtomaintainsecurityafterU.S.forcesdepartIraqattheendofDecember2011.Oftheapproximately3.3millionpiecesofequipmentinIraq,Multi-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC−I)identifiedapproximately53,000pieces—thevastmajorityexcesstoserviceneeds—requiredbytheISFtomaintaininternalstabilityandsecurity.
TocontinuethemomentumandfurtherassistintheprogressoftheISF,withtheJointStaffinthelead,weworkedcloselywiththeservicestodevelopsourcingsolutionsfortheequipmentidentifiedbyMNSTC−I.Weappliedamixofauthoritiestofacilitatethetransferofequipment,property,andservicestotheboththeISFandtheANSF.ApplicableauthoritiesincludedtheFMSprogram,Section516oftheForeignAssistanceActauthorizingtransferofexcessdefensearticles,andSection1234oftheNationalDefenseAuthoriza-tionActof2010,knownastheLevinAmendment.AsofMarch2008,theIraqigovernmenthadpurchasedover$2billionworthofU.S.equipmentandservicesthroughFMS.SinceSeptember2008,deliveryhasimprovedastheFMSsystemstrivedtosupporturgentwartimerequirements.
MuchhardworkremainstobedoneinassistingtheISFtoassumefullresponsibilityforsecuritybyDecember2011,whentheSecurityAgreementcomestoanendandthedrawdownofU.S.forcesissched-uledtobecompleted.AchievingcriticalISFcapabili-tiesasU.S.forcesdrawdownisthebestwaytoensurethatweremainontracktodrawdownAmericanforcestoroughly50,000andendourcombatmissionbyAugust2010.
growthinAfghanistanThedecisiontoauthorizeanadditional21,500
U.S.forcesinAfghanistaninearly2009,followedbythePresident’scommitmentofadditionalforcesinDecember2009,settheconditionstoreverseAfghanTalibangains.Theseadditionalforcesarejoiningsome68,000U.S.forcesand30,000CoalitionForcesalreadyinAfghanistan,allofwhichhaveundertakenafundamentalshiftinhowtheyarebeingemployedacrossthecountry.
AsoflateJanuary2010,wehadalreadymovedsome5,000troopsandexpectedthat18,000ofthePresident’s1December2009commitmentwouldbeincountrybylatespring.Theremainderofthe30,000willarriveasrapidlyaspossibleoverthesummerandearlyfall,makingamajorcontributiontoreversingTalibanmomentumin2010.
AscomplexasthenewstrategyinAfghanistanwas,thelogisticsofgettingthetroopsandequipmentinplacewasanequallycomplexundertaking.Ourmainconcerngoinginwasensuringthatwesetthetheaterwiththeearlydeploymentofcriticalenablers.TheseenablersincludedDLA’spushofmorethan4,000con-tainersofconstructionmaterial,whichhelpedenabletheconstructionofcriticalforwardoperatingbases(FOBs);analysisofthefeasibilityofmovingforcesaccordingtothePresident’stimeline;andsuccessfullyexpeditingthefieldingofthemine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)familyofvehicles.
Inearly2009,webegantorefineandfulfilllogis-ticsrequirementtosupportdeploymentoftheinitial21,500personnelintoRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.Mostcriticaltosettingthetheaterforsuccesswastheearlydeploymentofengineeringteamsandequipment.ThroughsignificantcoordinationandeffortwiththeArmyCorpsofEngineers,theservices,andothers,weexpeditedthedeliveryofthousandsofpiec-esofcriticalengineeringequipment.ByearlyAugust2009,eightbasecampswerecompleted,enablingacombataviationbrigade,Strykerbrigade,andMarineexpeditionarybattaliontobegincombatoperations.
Militaryconstructionprojectsscheduledforcom-pletionoverthenext12monthswilldeliver4newrunways,rampspacefor8C−17transports,andpark-ingfor50helicoptersand24closeairsupportand26intelligencesurveillanceandreconnaissanceaircraft.Thisrepresentsroughlyone-thirdoftheairfieldpavingprojectscurrentlyfundedintheAfghanistantheaterofoperations.Additionalminorconstructionplanscalledfortheconstructionofover12newFOBsandexpan-sionof18existingFOBs.
Afghanistanisalandlockedcountrywithverylittleinfrastructure.Thetaskofexecutingthedeploymentandsustainmentoftheadditionalforceswasviewedbymanyasperhapsthegreatestlimitingfactortotheplan.Myplanningstaffcalledtogetheramajorplanningefforttoidentifyandrecommendpossiblesourcingsolutionstosatisfyforcerequirements.IncoordinatingwithTRANSCOMandtheservices,weconductedaforceflowconferencetodeterminethefeasibilityofmovingtherequiredforcesintoAfghan-istaninaccordancewiththePresident’stimeline.Theanalysisshowedthatthemovementplanwasfea-siblebutcarriedhighrisks.Inotherwords,wecouldaccomplishthemissionaslongasadditionalemergentrequirementswerekepttoaminimum.Weknewtherequirementswouldgrow,sowehadtothinkoutsidetheboxtodevelopcreativesolutions.
Ourbusinessrulescallforallsensitiveorclassi-fiedcargotobeflownintoAfghanistanonmilitaryorcommerciallycontractedaircraft.Allothercargoisshippedviasurfaceroutes.OurprimarysurfacerouteusestheseaportofKarachi,Pakistan,wherewehave
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noU.S.forcepresence.Equipmentisdisembarkedandthentransportedbycommerciallycontractedvehicles,knownas“jingletrucks,”alongtwoprimaryroutes.OneroutecrossesintoAfghanistanthroughtheCha-mangate,whiletheothercrossesintoAfghanistanalongtheKhyberPassthroughtheTorkhamgate.Bothoftheseroutestakeourcargostraightthroughtheheartofinsurgentterritory.DespitetheGovernmentofPakistan’stremendoussupportandpartnership,werecognizedtheneedtoexpandouroptionsforsurfacemovementintoAfghanistan.
NorthernDistributionNetworkWebeganinearnesttoestablishanortherndistribution
routeinearly2009.WedevisedastrategicengagementstrategythatleveragedleadershipfromCENTCOM,TRANSCOM,OSD,andtheDepartmentofState.Throughseniorleadervisitsandnegotiations,theNorthernDistributionNetwork(NDN)becameareality.
WenowhaveaseriesofrobustroutesthattraverseEurope,theCaucasus,andtheCentralandSouthAsianStatesintoAfghanistan.WehavealsoestablishedasurfaceroutetotransportmilitaryequipmentfromIraqthroughTurkeythatmergeswiththeNDNforonwardmovementtoAfghanistan.AsJune2010,theMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mandhasbookedover50percentofallsustainmentheadingtoAfghanistanontheNDNandhasdeliveredover11,00020-footcontainersofcargotoAfghanistanthroughthesenewnorthernroutes.
Atpresent,thetransitagreementswithmostofthecountriesthroughwhichtheNDNrunslimitthetypeofcargoeligiblefortheNDNtononlethalcargoonly.Asaresult,thelandroutethroughPakistanisstillusedfornearlyallunitcargo.Wehopetoexpandthecat-egoriesofcargopermittedontheNDNandtoretainandexpandlogisticshubsinCentralAsia.
ThesuccessoftheNDNisatestamenttothecoop-erationandcommitmentofseveralorganizations.We
allstayedsynchronizedthroughbiweeklyflagofficer-levelandO6-levelsecurevideoteleconferenceshostedbyTRANSCOMandCENTCOM.ExpansionoftheNDNthroughEurope,theCentralandSouthAsianStates,andTurkeylessensourrelianceonthesurfaceroutethroughPakistanandprovidesthelogisticsflex-ibilityneededtodeployandsustaintheincreasedforceinAfghanistan.Today,theNDNhasproventobefarmorethanalogisticsinitiative.Itis,infact,adiplo-maticengagementtool.
CentralandSouthAsianStatesOurrelationshipwiththeCentralandSouthAsian
StatescontinuestoimproveasaresultoftheNDN.WeareactivelyworkingtoexpandourpartnershipswiththesenationsbylocallyprocuringsuppliesforOEFforcesfromNDN-supportingcountries.Wesoughtspeciallegislation,Section831ofthe2010NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,toprovideenhancedauthoritytoacquireproductsandservicesproducedintheCentralandSouthAsianStatesthatsupportmili-taryandstabilityoperationsinAfghanistan.
ThislegislationdirectlysupportstheeconomicdevelopmentoftheCentralandSouthAsianregion.WithDLAservingasCENTCOM’sleadforthisinitiative,theeconomicimpactsinceJuly2008hasexceeded$400million.ThislevelofeconomicactivityrepresentsasubstantivecommitmentbytheU.S.Gov-ernmenttothecountriesofthisregion.
MRAPVehiclesSaveLivesIhaveseenMRAPvehiclesinIraqandAfghanistan,
battledamagedbeyondrecognition,fromwhichourtroopershavesafelywalkedaway.MRAPvehiclessavelives.Theyofferaprovencapabilitytoreducecombatdeathsandcasualtiesassociatedwithroadsidebombsandotherexplosives.TheSoldiers,Marines,Sailors,andAirmenwhousethesevehicleshavegreatconfi-denceintheMRAP’sabilitiestodefeatenemyattacks.
TheMRAPfamilyofvehiclesisthebestvehicleprotectionwehavetodate,withtheirV-shapedarmoredhullsandraisedchassis.Asof1March2010,25,561vehiclesintheMRAPfamilywereundercon-tractoutofanacquisitionobjectiveof26,882.Ofthose,17,457wereMRAPsand8,104werethelighter,moremaneuverableMRAPall-terrainvehicle(M−ATV).Asof1March2010,wehadfieldedjustover37percent(approximately5,338)oftheapproximately14,331vehiclesrequiredinAfghanistan.
Toexpeditedeliveryofthislifesavingweaponsys-tem,wehaveworkedwithTRANSCOM,OSD,andtheDepartmentofStatetoestablishamultimodalship-pingconceptofoperations.VehiclesaretransportedbyshiptoaseaportofdebarkationintheCENTCOMregionandthencross-loadedontoaircraftatanearbyaerialportofembarkationforfinaldeliverybyair
Major General Dowd signs a transit support agree ment with Jordan for support of the Iraq drawdown.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 7
intoAfghanistan.Thecreativethinkingandproblem-solvingbymyverytalentedandpersistentstaffhaveensuredthatcargo,includingMRAPvehicles,isflow-ingintoAfghanistantosavelivesandmeetthePresi-dent’stimeline.
LeveragingNATOandISAFContractsIncontrasttooperationsinIraq,operationsin
AfghanistanarecommandedbyNATOandISAF.Wedeterminedearlyontheimportanceofleveragingsup-portwithourNATOpartners.Forexample,throughthecollaborationachievedduringourNATOseniorlogis-ticsleadersessions,wewereabletocommittosharingcontractsforfuelandreallifesupportatFOBswherewehadamultinationalpresence.SincethecapacityforsupportinAfghanistanwaslimited,wesharedwhereitmadesensetodoso.Thishelpedcontrolthecostofcon-tractedsupportandalsolessenedthenationalburdenoneachparticipantbylimitingthenumberofFOBsrequir-ingsupport.ThecollaborationwithNATOandISAFincreaseddramaticallythroughoutmytourastheCCJ4.
ContractorsontheBattlefieldThedeployedcontractorforceisakeycomponent
tothesuccessofthewarfightermissionandanindis-pensiblesourceforessentialtechnicalsupport,main-tenance,transportation,security,basesupport,andconstructioncapability.Accountingfortotalnumbersandlocationsofcontractorsallowsthecommandersthevisibilitytobetterforecastlogisticsandforcepro-tectionrequirements.
TheJointContractingCommandIraqandAfghan-istan(JCC−I/A)servesasthecentralizedmanagementandenforcementorganizationforcontractsinIraqandAfghanistan,butitawardsonly25to30percentofthecontractsinthetheater.Itdoes,however,veteachcon-tractinthetheatertoensurethatallapplicableclausesareincludedinthecontract.CENTCOMwillsoonexpandtheJCC−I/AintoaJointTheaterSupport
ContractingCommandtosynchronizecontractingeffortsinPakistanandKuwaitaswellasIraqandAfghanistan.
Athoroughoversightprogramensurescontractcompliancetomeetwarfighterrequirements.Thisbecomesespeciallyimportantwhenoverseeingprivatesecuritycontractorsonthebattlefield.Privatesecu-ritycontractorsprovideuniqueskillsandcanquicklymeettheincreasedneedsforsecuritywhenmilitaryforcesarestretchedthin.Severalhigh-profileincidentsinvolvingseriousmisconductbyprivatesecuritycon-tractorshaveledCongressandDODtomandateman-agementframeworksandstrictlegalaccountabilityspecificallyforthesecontractors.
TheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,theDODInspectorGeneral,andotherinspectingorganizationshaveincreasedtheirassessmentsofcontractingoper-ationsfrom6in2007to54in2009.Withthehelpoftheseorganizations,LogNationhasmadesignificantprogressintheareaofcontractoroversight.Itmustcontinuethattrend.
AstheDirectorofLogisticsatCENTCOM,Ihavehadthepleasureofworkingwitharemarkablytalentedgroupofofficers,noncommissionedofficers,Gov-ernmentcivilians,andcontractors.Theireffortsandsacrificeshavesustainedusthroughmy36monthsinthejob,butmorebroadly,overalmost9yearsofcontinu-ouswar.Thankstothem,wearepositionedtofinishwellinIraqandcanbegintoturnacornerinAfghanistan.Ourdeputycommander,MarineCorpsLieutenantGeneralJohnR.Allen,oftensaysthatthehistorianswillonedaywritebooksabouttheNDN.Iamconvincedtheywill.
Attheendoftheday,itisthejobofthelogisticiantoensurethatthewarfightingcommandersneverhavetolookbackforsupport.AsIdepartCENTCOMtotakecommandofthe1stTheaterSustainmentCommand,IampleasedtobeentrustedwithnewchallengesthatwillallowmetocontinuetoplayapartinthisuniquetimeinthehistoryofDODlogistics.Mostofall,IamtrulyhonoredbytheopportunitytoplayasignificantroleinLogNation’scontinuedfutureinthiscomplexregion.
Major General Kenneth S. DowD waS the Director of loGiSticS, j−4, U.S. central coM ManD, when he wrote thiS article. he iS ex ceptionally proUD of hiS part in the “loG na tion” teaM anD acroSS the reSt of the loGiSticS enterpriSe. he iS now the coMManDer of the 1St SUStainMent coMManD (theater) at fort BraGG, north carolina, where he looKS for warD to continUinG hiS Service alonGSiDe the DeDicateD perSonnel of loG nation.
General DowD thanKS colonel linDa MarSh, USaf, for her aSSiStance in the writinG of thiS article. colonel MarSh iS chief of Staff of Stra teGic coMMUnicationS for the U.S. central coMManD j−4 Directorate. She previoUSly ServeD at centcoM aS chief of the air Branch, DepUty chief of the MoBility DiviSion, anD aSSiStant Director of the loGiSticS Direc torate. She holDS an M.S. DeGree in StrateGic StUDieS froM the air UniverSity.
Bottom Line Up Front: My Top 5
1. Top priority: Understand senior leader intent and translate that into feasible courses of ac tion.
2. There are no “silver bullets.” Think big and allow solution creativity and operational lati tude.
3. Target an objective. Build broad joint consen sus to achieve it. Act decisively in pursuit.
4. Build a team. Leverage leaders and units to maximize unique experience and capabilities.
5. Pass praise freely. Quickly recognize and re ward contributions, especially from young leaders.
8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
stheArmycontinuesthetransformationofouroperationalforces,9yearsofprolongedconflictandacontinuousdemandfortrainedandreadyforcesrevealacorrespondingneedtotransformourgeneratingforcestoeffectivelysupporttheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycleandmeettherequire-mentsofa21stcenturyArmy.
TheArmy’sFinancialManagement(FM)commu-nityisfullyengagedinadoptingArmy-wideend-to-endprocessesanddevelopingaculturethatencompassesenterprisemanagement,costandperformance,andleaderscapableofmakingresource-informeddecisions.Tomethodicallyreachtheseobjectives,theFMcom-munityrecentlydevelopedtheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan(FMCP).TheFMCPrepresentsthecommunity’srealizationthatourcurrentprocessesforsupportingtheARFORGENcyclerequirerevisiontomeetthesustainmentdemandsoftheOperationalForceengagedinfull-spectrumoperations.
TheFMCPprovidesamethodologyforimprovingfiveFMfocusareas:warriortrainingandeducation,forcedesign,FMsystemsrequirements,doctrine,andcommunication.EnhancingeachoftheseareasimprovesFMcapabilitiesembeddedwithintheaterandexpeditionarysustainmentcommandsandsustainmentbrigadesbyprovidinghighlyagileandadaptiveFMwarriorswhoaretrainedandreadytoexecutefull-spectrumoperations.
TheCatalystforChangeTwosignificanteventsjump-startedtheinitial
developmentoftheFMCP:adetailedwhitepaperandawell-plannedleaderstrainingsummit.InOctober2009,ColonelTroyA.Clay,whoisnowthecommanderoftheArmyFinanceCommand,wrote“StrategytoDevelopandSustainFinan-cialManagementCapabilityinSupportofOurExpeditionaryArmy.”ThiswhitepapersurveyedtheFMlandscape,definedtheFMcommunity’schallenges,andproposedsomepossiblesolutionstothosechallenges.
Toexplorethesepossiblesolutions,thecommandantoftheArmyFinancialManagementSchool,ColonelMiltonL.Sawyers,hostedanFMtrainingsummitinmid-December2009that
broughttogethermorethan60FMleadersfromkeyorganizationsthroughouttheFMcommunity.Duringthesummit,theparticipantsdevelopedandrefinedthefivefocusareasinaccordancewiththewhitepaper,theArmyCapstoneConcept,andemergingFMdoc-trine.ThesefiverefinedfocusareasservedastheunderpinningsfordevelopingtheFMCP.
TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlanAftersignificantcontributionsfromacrossthe
entireFMcommunity,theArmyFinancialManage-mentSchoolreleasedthecompletedFMCPinJanuaryofthisyear.The“MissionStatement”and“EndState”serveastheanchorpointsforalllinesofoperationandsupportingtasks.(Seechartbelow.)
TheFMCPemployslogicallinesofoperations(LOOs)tolinkmultipledecisivepointsandtaskstoachievethedesiredendstate.TheLOOsarebeingexe-cutedthrough14supportingtasks,whichareassignedtoFMresponsibleorganizations(ROs)thatdevelopedandarenowexecutingtheirimplementationplans.Each
TheFinancialManagementCampaignPlan:RaisingtheBartoAchieveSustainmentExcellence
by Lieutenant GeneraL edGar e. stanton iii
A
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 9
theArmySoldierSupportInstituteandtheSustain-mentCenterofExcellence,contin-uestoserveastheoperationalele-mentformonitor-ingandreportingexecutionoftheFMCPtoseniorFMleaders.
Regardlessofwhichorganiza-tionsfulfillROresponsibilities,thesuccessofthecampaignplanreliesonthecoor-dinatedeffortsoftheentiresustain-mentcommunity.WiththeFMCPnowinfullswing,theArmyFMcommunityisbet-terposturedto
respondtothecontinuouscycleofadaptiveinnovation,experimentation,andexperiencewithinourArmy.
TheFMCPisalivingcampaignplanwiththepotentialtoexpandandcontractassupportingtasksarecompletedandnewsupportingtasksareidentified.Theplandemonstratesourcommitmenttomeettheneedsofthe21stcenturyArmyengagedinfull-spectrumopera-tions.TheFMCPrequirescontinuousassessmentoftheFMlandscape.Thechallengeistoanticipateandidenti-fythenextparadigmshift,whetherthatshiftemergesasaresultofanewsystem,avariationinstructure,oranyothersignificantchangeintheoperationalenvironment.
Regardlessofthechallenges,oursuccessdependsonourpartnershipwiththesustainmentcommunity.Work-ingtogether,wewillbuild,train,andsustainacampaignqualityforceabletoprovidefull-spectrumfinancialman-agementandsustainmenttowarfightingcommanders.
lieUtenant General eDGar e. Stanton iii iS the Military DepUty for BUDGet to the aSSiS tant Secretary of the arMy for financial ManaGeMent anD coMptroller. he previoUSly ServeD aS coMManDer of the 18th finance GroUp (airBorne) at fort BraGG, north caro lina; coMManDant of the arMy finance School at fort jacKSon, SoUth carolina; Dep Uty chief of Staff for reSoUrce ManaGeMent for the arMy traininG anD Doctrine coM ManD; coMManDinG General of the arMy Sol Dier SUpport inStitUte at fort jacKSon; anD coMManDinG General of the 336th finance coMManD in SUpport of operation iraqi free DoM at caMp Doha, KUwait.
implementationplanconsistsofachievable,results-driventasks.AsROsprogressontheirassignedsupportingtasks,theyarereachingouttothenumerousstakeholders,suchastheDefenseFinanceandAccountingService,U.S.ArmyCentralCommand,theArmyForcesCom-mand,andHeadquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy,toensurethatallconcernsareaddressedfullyandcommu-nicatedtotheFMleadership.ThechartaboveshowsthesupportingtasksforeachLOO.
AchievingthegoalsoftheFMCPisamonumentalundertakingthatrequirescollaborativeplanningandaresponsiveexecutionarchitecturewithintheFMcommu-nity.TheArmyFinancialManagementSchool,through
LegendARFORGEN =ArmyForceGenerationCP =CiviliancareerprogramC2 =CommandandcontrolDFAS =DefenseFinanceandAccountingServiceFM =FinancialManagementFMCP =FinancialManagementCampaignPlanHR =HumanResourcesLOO =LineofoperationsMILPAY =MilitarypayMTOE =Modificationtableoforganization andequipmentSRC =StandardrequirementscodeSSI =SoldierSupportInstituteTTP =Tactics,techniques,andproceduresUSAFINCOM=U.S.ArmyFinanceCommand
10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
stheArmyproceedswithitstransformationtoamodularforcebuiltforexpeditionaryandjointoperations,ourvariousdoctrinalbuildingblocksmustbereviewedand,quitefrequently,revisedtomatchthenewoperationalreality.Aspartofthisprocess,inApril2010theArmyreleasedanupdatedFieldManual(FM)1–0,HumanResourcesSupport.Althoughthefundamentalsofthehumanresources(HR)disciplineremainthesame,signifi-cantchangesinorganizationsanddefinitionshavebeenincorporatedintothenewFMtoreflecttoday’s,andouranticipatedfuture,environment.TherevisedFMalsoconsolidatesFMInterim(FMI)1–0.01,S–1Operations,andFMI1–0.02,Theater-LevelHumanResourcesSupport,tocreateasingle-sourcedoctrinalpublicationforHRsupport.
HRsupportenduresasthebackboneoftheArmy.IftheSoldieristhecenterpieceoftheforceanditscapabilities,thensupporttotheSoldierconstitutesthemostbasic,yetmostessential,ofArmyactivities.Withthisinmind,theoverridingobjectiveofHRsupportistoexecutepersonneldecisionsthatmaximizetheoperationaleffectivenessofthetotalforceandsustainoptimalreadiness.ThisrequiresthatHRsupportbeintegratedacrossthestrategic,operational,andtac-ticallevels;thatittakeintoaccountthemissionsofsupportedandsupportingunits;andthatitaddresstheneedsofallcustomers.
FM1–0outlinesspecificfunctionsandtasksthattheHRprofessionalmustbecompetentinandknow-ledgeableabouttoensurereliable,responsive,andflexiblesupporttocommanders,Soldiers,Depart-mentofDefense(DOD)civilians,contractorsautho-rizedtoaccompanytheforce,andfamilies.TheFMcontainssixchaptersandfourappendices,whichthisarticlesummarizes.
MajorChangesinHRDoctrineChapter1highlightsthemajorchangesmadeinHR
doctrineandprovidesanoverviewofHRsupportatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.Italsoidenti-fiesHRobjectives,enduringprinciples,corecompe-tencies,keyfunctions,andthecommandandcontrolrelationshipswiththesustainmentcommunity.Signifi-cantchangestoHRdoctrineincludethefollowing:
Separating the task of personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR).ThisseparationwasnecessarybecausePASRisactuallytwodistincttasksthataremanagedorexecutedbydifferentelementsabovebrigadelevel.PersonnelaccountabilityisanHRunitfunctionexecutedbyS–1sandHRunits.StrengthreportingisacommandfunctionandisexecutedbyS–1sandG–1s.
Reducing the HR core competencies from 10 to 4 tasks.AllpreviousHRtasksarenowalignedunderoneofthefollowingfourcorecompetencies:mantheforce,provideHRservices,coordinatepersonnelsupport,andconductHRplanningandoperations.Thepreviouscorecompetenciesofcasualtyreporting,personnelinforma-tionmanagement,personnelreadinessmanagement,postaloperations,bandoperations,andPASRhavebeenchangedtofunctionsandalignedunderoneofthenewcorecompetencies.(Seethechartatright.)
Adding HR enduring principles. ThesixHRenduringprinciplesareintegration,anticipation,respon-siveness,synchronization,timeliness,andaccuracy.Eachoftheseprinciplesmustbeweightedandappliedduringtheplanning,execution,andassessmentofHRsupportforcurrentandfutureoperations.Whiletheprinciplesareindependent,theyarealsointerrelatedtobuildandsustaincombatpower.Theprinciplesofinte-gration,anticipation,andresponsivenessarealsosus-tainmentprinciplesoutlinedinFM4–0,Sustainment.
Eliminating the term R5 (replacement, reception, return to duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment). R5hasbeenreplacedwithpersonnelaccoun-tability(PA).R5waseliminatedbecauseitcausedconfusionintaskexecutionandPArolesandrespon-sibilities.
Redesigning the HR company. ThecompanyhasbeenreorganizedtoconsolidatethePAplansandoperationsteamandthepostalplansandoperations
TheNewFM1–0,HumanResourcesSupport
by thoMas K. waLLaCe, jr.
A
Postal operations is one of the functions of the HR core competency of provide HR services. (Photo by PFC Daniel M. Rangel)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 11
teamatthecompanylevelundertheoperationssection.Thiscon-solidationstreamlinestheHRcompanyandmakestheoperationssectionmoreefficientinperform-ingfull-spectrumHRoperations.
Chapter1alsodescribeshoweffectiveandefficientHRsupportreliesonmultifunctionalHRleaderswhomustthinkstrategically,workcollaboratively,andbecapableofproducingandexecutingagileandclearHRpolicies.HRprofession-alsmustalsouseeffectivepracticestopursueoutcome-orientedactionsandhavethecompetency-basedskillsandknowledgerequiredandexpectedofthem.
Chapter1emphasizestheneedforHRprofessionalstounderstandtheimportanceofnotonlytheireffortsandunitmissionsbutalsothemissionsofsupportingandsupportedunits.SupportedunitsincludethedivisionandcorpsG–1s/adjutantsgeneral,battalionandbrigadeS–1s,andHRopera-tionsbranchwithinthesustainmentbrigadeorexpeditionarysustainmentcommand.Sup-portingunitsareHR-specificunitsandincludetheHRsustainmentcenter,militarymailterminal,theatergatewaypersonnelaccountabilityteams,andHRcom-panieswithsupportingpostalandmultifunctionalHRplatoons.
CoreCompetenciesandFunctionsHRsupportconsistsofthefourcorecompetencies,
eachofwhichincludessubordinatekeyfunctionsthatdirectlysupportthecompetency.Thecorecompeten-ciesandtheirsupportingkeyfunctionsareasfollows:
Man the force. Thiscompetencyincludesallfunc-tionsandtasksthataffectthepersonnelaspectofbuildingthecombatpowerofanorganization.Keyfunctionsarepersonnelreadinessmanagement,per-sonnelaccountability,strengthreporting,retentionoperations,andpersonnelinformationmanagement.
Provide HR services. HRservicescoversfunctionsconductedbyHRprofessionalsthatspecificallyaffectSoldiersandorganizations.Thesefunctionsincludeessentialpersonnelservices,postaloperations,andcasualtyoperations.
Coordinate personnel support.Personnelsupportencompassesthosefunctionsandactivitiesthatcon-tributetounitreadinessbypromotingfitness,buildingmoraleandcohesion,enhancingqualityoflife,andpro-vidingrecreational,social,andothersupportservicesto
Soldiers,DODcivilians,andotherpersonnelwhodeploywiththeforce.Personnelsupportencompassesthefunc-tionsofmorale,welfare,andrecreation(MWR)opera-tions,commandinterestprograms,andbandoperations.
Conduct HR planning and operations.HRplan-ningandoperationsarethemeansbywhichHRleadersenvisionadesiredHRendstatethatsupportstheoperationalcommander’smissionrequirements.PlanningcommunicatestosubordinateHRprovid-ersandunitleadersthecommander’sintent,expectedrequirements,anddesiredoutcomesintheformofanoperationplanororder.Planningalsoprovidesaprocessfortrackingcurrentandnear-term(future)executionoftheplannedHRsupporttoensureeffec-tivesupporttotheoperationalcommander.
HROrganizationandEmploymentChapter2discussesthemission,organization,and
employmentofHRorganizationsandHRstaffele-mentslocatedatthetheater,corps,division,brigade,andbattalionlevels.FM1–0identifiesanddescribestherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachHRorganiza-tionandHRstaffelement.TheFMincludeschangesresultingfromtherecentforcedesignupdate,whichconsolidatedtheHRandcasualtyplatoonintoamultifunctionalHRplatoon.Detaileddiscussionisincludedontheplatoon’scapabilitytoformpersonnelaccountabilityteamsandcasualtyliaisonteams.
C ore C ompetenciesand K ey F unctions
P rovide Human R es ourc es (HR ) S upport
Manthe F orc e
P ers onnel R eadines s
Management
P ers onnel Ac c ountability
S trength R eporting
R etention Operations
P ers onnel Information
Management
P rovide HR S ervic es
E s s ential P ers onnel S ervic es
P os tal Operations
C as ualty Operations
C oordinate P ers onnel
S upport
Morale, Welfare, and R ec reation
Operations
C ommand Interes t
P rograms
Army B and Operations
C onduc t HR P lanning and
Operations
HR P lanning and Operations
Operate HR C ommand and C ontrol Nodes
C oreC ompetenc y
K eyF unc tions
FM 1–0 reduces the number of HR core competen cies from 10 to these 4. Each competency is executed through several key functions.
12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ThechapteralsoprovidesrecommendedperformanceindicatorsfortheHRoperationsbranch.Theseindicatorswillenablethebranchtoidentify,track,andsynchronizeHRsupportintotheoverallsustainmentplan.
MantheForceInchapter3,thecorecompetencyof“manthe
force”isdescribedasanyactionorfunctionthatimpactsthestrengthorreadinessofanorganization.Manningcombinesanticipation,movement,andskill-fulpositioningofpersonnelsothatthecommanderhasthepersonnelwiththerightskills,capabilities,andspecialneedsrequiredtoaccomplishthemissionandtomeetchangingoperationalneeds.
Thekeyfunctionofmantheforceispersonnelrea-dinessmanagementasitdirectlyrelatestotheotherkeyfunctionsofpersonnelaccountability,strengthreporting,andpersonnelinformationmanagement.TheFMsummarizestherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachman-the-forcefunctionbycommandlevel,fromthe-atertobattalion,andbyHRunits.
ProvideHRServicesChapter4discussesthecorecompetencyofprovide
HRservices,whichincludesthosefunctionsthatdirect-lyaffectaSolder’sstatus,assignment,qualifications,financialstatus,careerprogression,andqualityoflifeandthatallowArmyleaderstoeffectivelymanagetheforce.Includedarethekeyfunctionsofessentialperson-nelservices,postaloperations,andcasualtyoperations.
Essentialpersonnelservicesincludepromotions,awardsanddecorations,leavesandpasses,evaluationreports,citizenshipandnaturalization,andotherrelated
functionsthatareinitiatedbySoldiers,unitcommand-ers,unitleaders,G–1sandS–1s,orfromthetopofthesystem.CasualtyoperationsandpostaloperationsarediscussedindetailandincluderolesandresponsibilitiesbyeachlevelofcommandandbyHRunits.
CoordinatePersonnelSupportThecorecompetencyofcoordinatepersonnelsup-
portiscoveredinchapter5.Personnelsupportactivi-tiesincludethosefunctionsandactivitiesthatimproveindividualfitness,increasemoraleandcohesion,fosterabetterqualityoflife,andfurnishrecreational,social,andothersupportservicesforSoldiers,DODcivilians,andotherdeployingpersonnel.Alloftheseactivitiesareconductedwiththegoalofincreasingunitreadi-ness.TherolesandresponsibilitiesofeachcommandlevelandHRunitsforMWR,commandinterestpro-grams,andbandoperationsareidentified.
HRPlanningandOperationsChapter6discussesthecorecompetencyofHRplan-
ningandoperations.ItemphasizestoHRproviderstheneedtohaveacompleteunderstandingofthefullcapa-bilitiesofHRorganizationsanddiscusseshowtoplanandemployHRdoctrineincurrentandfutureopera-tions.Eachstepinthemilitarydecisionmakingprocess(MDMP)isclearlyidentified,alongwithspecificHRactionsthatmustbeconsideredwhendevelopinganoperationorderorplan.Theplanningprocessalsoiden-tifiestheneedforthecompositeriskmanagementpro-cesstobealignedwitheachstepoftheMDMP.
FM1–0containsfiveappendicesthatprovideplan-ningandmanagementtoolsforHRoperations.TheseincludeHRreardetachmentoperations,HRtheater-openingandredeploymentoperations,casualtyestima-tion,civiliansupport,andadivisionofHRlabortaskmatrix.Eachappendixidentifiesrolesandresponsibili-tiesforHRprofessionalsinHR-specificunitsandsup-portedorganizations.
FM1–0promotesacommonunderstandingofHRsupportfundamentals.Themanualdoesnotdictatepro-ceduresforanyparticularoperationalscenario,nordoesitprovidespecificsystemproceduresforHRenablers.Itprovidesthedoctrinalbasefordevelopingoperationplansandstandingoperatingprocedures.LeadersandHRoperatorsatalllevelsmustapplythesefundamen-talsusingArmyplanninganddecisionmakingpro-cesses.TheFMisanauthoritativeguidethatrequiresjudgmentinapplication.
thoMaS K. wallace, jr., iS chief of the Doc trine Branch, conceptS anD Doctrine Divi Sion, capaBilitieS DevelopMent anD inteGra tion Directorate, at the arMy SolDier SUpport inStitUte at fort jacKSon, SoUth carolina. he iS a retireD arMy noncoMMiSSioneD officer.
Major Changes in FM 1–0,Human Resources Support
l Reduces FM 1–0 from over 300 pages to 165.l Reduces core competencies from 10 to 4.l Establishes human resources (HR) enduring
principles.l Separates personnel accountability and strength
reporting (PASR) into two separate and distinct functions.
l Eliminates the term R5 (reception, replacement, return to duty, rest and recuperation, and redeployment) and replaces it with personnel accountability.
l Incorporates HR force design updates for a multifunctional HR platoon.
l Incorporates fullspectrum operations.
FM 1–0 makes significant changes in human re sources (HR) doctrine to create a singlesource doc trinal publication for HR support.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 13
ustainabilityisaconceptthatishavingamajoreffectonthecommercialfoodserviceindustry.Manufacturers,collegesanduniversities,foodservicedistributionandmanagementcompanies,andGovernmentagenciesarealltalkingabout“sustain-ability”andwhattheyaredoingtopromoteitwithintheiroperationsandbusinesspractices.TheArmyneedstoanswerseveralquestionsregardingsustain-ability:Aspartoftheoverallfoodserviceindustry,wheredoessustainabilityfitintotheArmyFoodPro-gram?Whatexactlydoessustainabilitymean?Shouldwebeusingsustainablepractices?Howdoweknowifwearebeingsustainable?Ifwearenot,howcanwestart?Whyshouldweevencare?
DefiningSustainableBeforeansweringthesequestions,weshoulddefine
theword“sustainable.”Merriam-Webster’s Diction-arydefinessustainableasawayof“usingaresourcesothattheresourceisnotdepletedorpermanentlydamaged.”Sustainabilityistypicallyusedtodayin
MovingTowardaMoreSustainableArmyFoodProgram
S anenvironmentalorecologicalsense.Inthiscontext,Wikipediadefinesitasthe“abilityofanecosystemtomaintainecologicalprocesses,functions,biodiversity,andproductivityintothefuture.”
ThiscertainlyisnotaworkabledefinitionforArmypurposes.Theproblemisthatsustainabilityisacom-plextermthatcanbeappliedtoanyecosystemonEarth(suchasoceans,forests,orwetlands)andcanbeincludedinhumanendeavorssuchasagriculture,architecture,andenergyproduction.Furthermore,nodefinitionisuniversallyacceptedandtermslikesus-tainable,sustainability,sustainabledevelopment,andsustainablepracticesareoftenusedinterchangeably.Sustainabilityhasbeenregardedasbothanimportantbutunfocusedconcept,like“liberty”or“justice,”andafeel-goodbuzzwordwithlittlemeaningorsubstance.Howcansuchanebulousandvaguetermhavesuchanimpactonsociety?
ForthisdiscussionofsustainabilityandtheArmyFoodProgram,Iwillusethemostwidelyaccepteddefinitionofsustainabilityandsustainabledevelopment,
by david j. sherriff
The Army will purchase or lease neighborhood electric vehicles (NEVs), like these being delivered to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to reduce the amount of fossil fuel being used by installation vehicles.
14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
providedbytheWorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment:“tomeettheneedsofthepresentwithoutcompromisingtheabilityoffuturegenerationstomeettheirownneeds.”
LivingSustainablyTolivesustainably,wemustusetheEarth’s
resourcesatareplenishablerate.However,scientiststellusthat,asawhole,humanbeingsarenotlivingsustainably.Instead,weareusingresourcesfasterthantheycanbereplenished.Sustainablepractices,developments,andconceptsarethoseactionstakenanddecisionsmadetoattempttoreversethistrend.
Moreimportantthanthetechnicaldefinitionofsustainabilityisanunderstandingofhowsustainabil-ityaffectstheArmyFoodProgramandgraspingthehowandwhyofoperatinginmoresustainableways.Let’sstartwiththewhy.
Youdonothavetobeacertifiedtreehuggerorcar-bon-creditspeculatortoseethevalueofsustainability.Infact,manyaspectsofsustainabilitymerelyinvolveusingbetterbusinesspracticesandhavemultipleben-efits.IseethreemajorcategoriesofreasonswhytheArmyFoodProgramshouldattempttooperateinmoresustainableways:environmental,social,andfinancial.
Environmental reasons. Regardlessofwhetheryouareaskepticoryoubelievethatmanmadeglobalwarmingandclimatechange,itshouldbeobviousthat,fromanenvironmentalstandpoint,usinglessenergyispreferabletousingmore.Changingambi-enttemperaturerequirestheuseofenergy—energythatmustbetransferredfromanothersourceorform,oftenpollution-creatingpowerplants.Busi-nesspracticesthatleadtoincreasedvehicletrafficusemoregasolineandcreatemoreexhaustpollution.Trashmustbetransferredanddiscarded,requiring
additionalvehicletrafficandlandfillspace.Certaincleaningandoperatingsuppliescanbeharmfultotheenvironment.Sustainablebusinesspracticesthatreduceenergyusageandtrashgenerationanduseless-damagingcleaningandoperatingsupplieswillreducenegativeeffectsontheenvironment.
Social reasons. Associetyplacesagreateremphasisonsustainability,theArmywillbeexpectedtofollowsuitorperhapseventakealeadingrole.SustainableoperatingpracticeswillhelptokeeptheArmyinapositivelight.SincetheArmytriestolooselymodelitsgarrisondiningfacilityoperationsaftercollegeanduniversityfoodserviceoperations,itfollowsthatastheyplacegreateremphasisonsustainability,theArmywoulddothesame.SincetheArmyandcollegesanduniversitiestargetthesamedemographic(18-to24-year-oldsawayfromhomeforthefirsttime),sus-tainablepracticeswillbeincreasinglyimportanttoboth.
Financial reasons.Manyoftheenvironmentalbenefitsofsustainablebusinesspracticesalsomakefinancialsense.Forexample,reducingfoodwasteisnotonlybetterfortheenvironmentbutalsoreducesfoodcosts,whichhelpsadiningfacilitymaintainitsaccountstatus.Reducingenergyandwaterusagerep-resentsacostavoidancetotheinstallation.Reusingitemsforsomeotherpurposeeliminatestheneedforpurchasingadditionalitems.
TheArmy’sMoveTowardSustainabilityTheArmyisalreadyembracingsustainability.Sev-
eralexamplesofhowtheArmyismovingtowardmoresustainableoperationsinclude—o TheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA)StrategicPlan
forfiscalyears(FYs)2007to2013includesagoaltoincreaseDLA’sofferingof“green”productsby25percentthroughtheendofFY2011.AsamajorcustomerofDLA,theArmywillbegintopurchasemoregreenproductssimplyasaresultofchangesinthesupplysystem.
o InFY2007,78percentofArmymilitaryconstruc-tionprojectsweredesignedtomeettheU.S.GreenBuildingCouncil’snewconstructioncertificationstandards.
o AlmosteveryArmyinstallation(ifnotall)hasanactiverecyclingprogram.Thisisanimportantpartofsustainabilitythathasbeenaroundsolongthatitisoftenoverlooked.
o On12January2009,theArmyreceiveditsfirst6neighborhoodelectricalvehicles(NEVs)andplanstopurchase4,000morebyFY2012.Thesevehiclesarestreetlegalinnearlyall50statesonroadswithspeedlimitsof35milesperhourorlessandcantravelabout30milesononecharge.TheNEVswillreplacepartoftheArmy’sfleetofnearly68,000nontacticalvehiclesandwillreducetheArmy’sfuelconsumptionbyalmost2milliongallonsperyear.
Three primary overlapping factors—social, environment, and economic—identify sustainable operations. Any business or operational practice that is socially equitable, environmentally bearable, and economically viable is a sustainable practice and should be incorporated to the fullest extent possible.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 15
o TheJointCulinaryCenterofExcellenceisworkingwiththeDefenseSupplyCenterPhiladelphiaandtheotherservicesthroughtheJointSubsistencePolicyBoardtodeterminethefeasibilityofpromotingtheuseofcertifiedhumanecage-freeeggsthroughtheSubsistencePrimeVendorprogram.
o TheArmyhasitsownwebsitededicatedtosustaina-bilityandsustainableoperations:www.sustainability.army.mil/.
FoodServiceIndustryPracticesHereareseveralexamplesofhowthefoodservice
industryisembracingsustainability.NotallofthesewouldbefeasibleinArmydiningfacilities,andinclu-sionoftheseideasinthisarticledoesnotmeananendorsementofthem.Thegoalistoidentifypotentialsustainablepracticesandproductsforconsiderationandpossibleadoption.
Divert food waste from a landfill tomoreenviron-mentallyfriendlyoptions,suchasdonationorcom-posting.Anestimated4to10percentofallfoodpurchasedendsupaspre-consumerwaste.Thefocusshouldthereforebefirstonreductionofwasteandnextondiversionsincereducingtheamountoffoodwastegeneratediscleanerandmorecosteffectivethanproperlydisposingofit.Onewaytodothisisthroughtheuseoffoodwasteaudits,whichinvolveidentifyingandanalyzingfoodwaste,bothpre-andpost-consumer,todeterminethevolumeandtypesoffoodbeingwasted.Thiswillhopefullyleadtowaystoreducefoodwastebothinthefrontandbackofthehouse.
Compost food wastetoreducewaste,cutwaste-han-dlingfees,andpotentiallyhelplocalgrowers.Manycompostingsystemsrecommendonlycompostingvegetabletrimmingsandavoidingmeatanddairyitemsandalsotablescrapstokeepoutunwantedfoodandnonfooditemssuchasstraws.Othercompostingsystemscantakeeverything,toincludetablescraps,bones,andcompostablewareallatonce.
Use compostable takeout containers and cups. Thesearebecomingmorepopular.Compostableglovesarealsoavailableforuseinthekitchen.
Use refillable water containers.Theseareslowlyreplacingbottledwater,whichhasbeenaprimetargetforenvironmentalists.Atleastonecompanyoffersacompostableplasticwaterbottlethatwillcompletelybreakdowninaslittleas60days,andanotherismar-ketingitsplasticwaterbottlesasusing50percentlessplasticthanthecompetition.(BottledwaterisnotauthorizedforpurchaseusingMilitaryPersonnel,ArmyappropriatedsubsistencefundsperArmyReg-ulation30–22,TheArmyFoodProgram.)
Switch to ecoclamshells,madeoutofsturdymela-mineandplastic,aswashable,microwavable,andreus-ablealternativestoStyrofoamtake-outcontainers.
Adopt trayless dining,whichisagrowingtrendincollegeanduniversityfoodservicesettings.Althoughcustomerdissatisfactionisakeychallenge,studieshaveshownthatgoingtraylesscanreducefoodwastebyasmuchas25percentsincedinersnolongerhavetraysonwhichtoconvenientlystackexcessfood.Goingtraylessreducestheamountofwaterandchemi-calsusedinthediningfacilitybyeliminatingtheneedtowashtrays.
Buy local.Anothergrowingtrend,thisconceptnotonlyreducestheamountoffuelusedtohaulproduceacrossthecountrybutalsoprovidesafinancialbenefittothelocalcommunity.
Reduce waste on the service line byusingsmallerservingvesselsatsaladbarsandforotherself-serveoptionsandrefillingthemmorefrequentlyorbystart-ingwithlargervesselsatthebeginningofthemealperiodandrefillingprogressivelysmallercontainersasthecrowdthins.
Use an employee reward programtorecognizethosewhoidentifysourcesoffoodwastereductioninthediningfacilityorwhodonottakeshortcutswhenusingestablishedwastereductionmethods.
Avoid preheating all food service equipmentjustbecauseitistimetostartcooking.Instead,carefullydeterminewhichpiecesofequipmentshouldbeturnedon(andoff)andatwhattimesothattheydonotrunlongerthannecessary.
Reduce energy consumptionbyensuringthatprop-ermaintenanceisperformedonfoodserviceequip-mentandinstallinglow-wattagelightingandlow-flowplumbingfixtures.
Install bulk cooking oil tankstoreducefoodcostsandpackaging.
Thefollowingwebsitecontainsmoreideasandinformationonhowtorunmoresustainablefoodser-viceoperations:www.sustainablefoodservice.com/.
SomeArmyfoodserviceoperationshavealreadybeguntoadoptsustainablepractices.IhopethatyouwillconsideradoptingsomesustainablepracticesofyourownandthatyouwillshareyourexperienceswithusattheJointCulinaryCenterofExcellence.ContactDavidSherriffbytelephoneat(804)734-4862(DSN687)orbyemailatdavid.sherriff@us.army.milformoreinformationonsustainablefoodservicepracticesortoshareyourideasandexperiences.
DaviD j. Sherriff iS the chief of the conceptS, SySteMS, anD policy DiviSion in the arMy center of excellence, SUBSiStence operationS Directo rate, at the joint cUlinary center of excellence at fort lee, virGinia. he holDS a B.S. DeGree froM the UniverSity of toleDo anD a M.B.a. DeGree froM coloraDo State UniverSity. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy ManaGeMent Staff colleGe’S SUS tainMent BaSe leaDerShip anD ManaGeMent proGraM.
16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
incetheentryofU.S.forcesintoAfghanistan in2001andthroughthesimultaneoussupport oftwocampaigns—OperationsEnduringFree-domandIraqiFreedom(OEFandOIF)—since2003,theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)hasexpand-edair,land,andmaritimepetroleumsustainmentfrom300,000gallonsperdaytomorethan5milliongallonsperday.Ithasaccomplishedthisexpansionovercon-testedandundevelopedgroundlinesofcommunication(GLOCs)and,inthecaseofAfghanistan,inaland-lockedcountrywithlittlemoderninfrastructure.U.S.forceshavenotfacedsuchchallengessincetheirsup-portofthe“BurmaRoad”ofWorldWarII.
OEFandOIFpetroleumsustainmenthasreliedonanintricatenetworkofnationalandinternational
petroleum,political,andpolicystakeholders,includ-ingtheDepartmentofState,regionalcountrypartners,theDefenseEnergySupportCenter(DESC),theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),CENTCOM,combinedandjointcommands,servicecomponentcommands,andmilitaryservices.Thisworld-classpetroleumoperationhasleveragedcommercialenergymarketsandintegratedcommercialdistributionnet-workstosupportthemilitary’s“lasttacticalmile”hub-and-spokedistribution.Intheprocess,ithasdevelopedhistoriccapabilitiesandachievedhistoricresults.
TheStrategicPetroleumChallengeTheCENTCOMareaofresponsibility(AOR)is
131percentofthesizeofthecontinentalUnitedStates,
EvolutionofPetroleumSupportintheU.S.CentralCommandAreaofResponsibility
by CoLoneL jeffrey b. Carra and Chief warrant offiCer 4 david ray, usMC (ret.)
S
GLOC=Groundlineof communication
GPD=GallonsperdayIZ =Iraq
K =ThousandM=Million
Q = QayyarahTQ=Taqaddum
Legend
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 17
encompassing4.6millionsquaremilesand20coun-tries.Bycontrast,thecontinentalUnitedStatesconsistsof3.5millionsquaremiles.AfghanistanislargerthanthestateofTexasandhasnoorganicpetroleumrefiningcapability,whichmeansthatallpetroleumsupportmustbeimportedfromoutsideitslandlockedterritory.
OnanygivendayinitsAOR,CENTCOMreceivesmorethan5milliongallonsoffuelthroughacombinedfleetofmorethan2,000contractedcommercialfueltrucksandmanages200milliongallonsofcontractedpetroleumstoragespreadacrosstheAORinsupportofland,air,andmaritimeforces.CENTCOM,inpartner-shipwithitsstrategicnationalpartner,DESC,acquires99percentofitspetroleumrequirementsfromregionalcommercialsuppliersandrefineriesintheGulfandCentralAsianStates,Turkey,andPakistan.
Theseregionalcommercialenergyenterprisesareeitherownedorcontrolledbyhost-nationgovernments.Asaresult,political-militaryengagementwiththosegovernmentsisneededforDESCpetroleumregionalacquisitionsandforservices(distribution)contractsinsupportofCENTCOMrequirements.AprimeexampleistheestablishmentandmaturingofDESCcontractsforCENTCOMforcesinIraq.
OIFStrategicFuelInitiativesAttheonsetofOIFin2003,theonlysourceof
regionalpetroleumsupportwasthepost-OperationDes-ertStormlegacyarrangementwiththeGovernmentofKuwait.Underthissystem,DESCcontractedwiththeKuwaitPetroleumCorporationtoprovidepetroleumsup-porttoU.S.forces.ThecommercialmovementoffueldidnotextendbeyondtheKuwait-IraqborderbecauseofthesecuritychallengesposedbydrivinginIraq.AllinternaldistributionwithinIraqwasprovidedbyorganicmilitaryservicecapabilities,withU.S.ArmyCentralhavingTitle10inlandpetroleumdistributionresponsi-bilitiesfortheCombinedJointOperationsArea(CJOA).
By2006and2007,theIraqCJOApetroleumconceptofsupporthadevolvedintothreestrategicpetroleumGLOCsenteringIraqfromTurkey,Jordan,andKuwait.DESCcontractedcommercialfueltruckstodeliverup
to2milliongallonsoffuelperdayintoIraqasfarfor-wardasmilitarygeneralsupporthubs.
ToaccomplishthissamemissionwithArmyunitswouldhaverequired9,103SoldiersassignedtoatleastoneArmyquartermastergroup(petroleumandwater)with12transportation(truck)battalions,onequartermas-terbattalion(petroleumsupply),and46petroleum,oils,andlubricantstruckcompaniestoprovidetheneededthe-ater-levelfuel-handlinganddistributioncapabilities.Putanotherway,itwouldhaverequired2,760oftheArmy’s7,500-gallontankers—4timestheentireArmyinventory.
TheIraqCJOApetroleumconceptofsupportsetthestageforsuccessinthe2007OIFsurgeandremainsthebaselineforadjustingenduringsupportduringandaftertheresponsibledrawdownofU.S.forcesfromIraq.
Contractor-OwnedBaseOnebaseinsouthwestAsiaconsumes,onaver-
age,morethan1milliongallonsoffueleveryday,supportingairlift,aerialrefueling,reconnaissance,andstrikemissionsthroughouttheCENTCOMAOR.Until2006,allfuelhandlingatthisbasewaspro-videdbyU.S.AirForcesCentral(AFCENT)organictacticalcapabilities(receipt,handling,andstorageinfabricfuelbags).
InresponsetoaCENTCOM-validatedrequire-ment,DESCin2004contractedfor8milliongallonsofstoragecapacityatacommercial-standardDefensefuelsupplypoint(DFSP)ownedandoperatedbyacontractorandlocatednearthebase.TheDFSPbeganoperationsin2006,anditssuccessallowedthenumberofAirmendeployedtosupportAFCENToperationstobereduced.
In2009,throughasecondcontractor-ownedandcon-tractor-operated(COCO)initiative,DESCestablisheda22-milepetroleumpipelinetoconnecttotheDFSP.TheCOCODFSPreceivesaviationfueldeliveredtotheAORbycommercialtankerships(theaveragetankerloadis12milliongallons)fromregionalworldsuppli-ersunderDESCcontracts.Thepipelineincreaseddailyreceiptcapabilityatthebasefrom1milliongallons(alldeliveredbytruck)tomorethan1.5milliongallons.
ThesetwoCOCOinitiativesenabledAFCENTtoreducethetacticalfuelterminal’ssizeandassociatedmanpower(approximately65personnel),increasedthebase’sreceiptcapabilityby50percent,andcreatedamoredependable,dedicatedpipelineoperation.Sev-eralmonthsofnegotiationswithgovernment-ownedor
From a logistics perspective, Afghanistan may be the most challenging area [in which the] United States has ever conducted combat operations.
—Major General Kenneth S. Dowd, CENTCOM Director of Logistics, 2009
Fuel support in Iraq used three strategic petroleum ground lines of communication entering from Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait (at left). Contracted commercial fuel trucks delivered up to 2 million gallons per day in Iraq as far forward as military general support hubs.
18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
-affiliatedenergycompanieswererequiredtogainthepermissionstopursuethesestrategicinitiatives.
OEF—TheUltimateChallengeDefenseLogisticsAgencypersonnelbelievethat
AfghanistanisthemostchallengingCJOAtosupplywithfuel.NotonlydoesAfghanistanhavenoorganicoilproductionorrefiningcapability,butitisaland-lockedcountrywithanausteredistributioninfrastructure.Onaverage,theorder-shiptimeforpetroleumoriginatingfromCentralAsiansourcesis21to30days.
FuelentersAfghanistanbyrailtankcarsandisdeliveredtoaterminal6kilometersinsidetheborder;thisistheterminusofthecountry’sonlyrailline.Thefuelisthencarriedbycommercialtrucksoverunim-provedroads,wherethetrucksfaceexposuretobadweather(theSalangPassisnotoriousforsnow)andenemyattacksandmusthurdleashadownetworkoflocalandnationalcustomsandsecurityrequirements.
Since2002,CENTCOManditsstrategicpetroleumsupportpartners(DESCsince2002,NATOsince2007)haveincreasedfuelstoragecapacityinAfghanistanfromroughly100,000gallonstomorethan30milliongallons(withupto12millionofthosegallonsincontractedcommercialsteel-tankfacilities)tomeetademandthathasgrownfrom40,000gallonsperdayin2002tomorethan1.1milliongallonsperdayin2009.
PartneringWithDESCStartingin2007,CENTCOMpartneredwithDESC
toshiftmostpetroleumsustainmentinAfghanistanawayfromtheSouthernGLOC,whichentersAfghani-stanfromPakistan,towhatisknownastheNorthernDistributionNetwork(NDN),whichentersfromtheCentralAsianStates.ThischangeincreasedtheamountofpetroleumenteringbytheNDNfrom30percentto70percentofallpetroleumsustainment.CoupledwiththeshifttotheNDN,DESChadtheforethoughttoiniti-ateacontractprovisionwithitspetroleumsuppliersto
holdupto9milliongallonsofcontractor-ownedfuel(asa“commercialreserve”)withinAfghanistantomitigateanyebbandflowinregionalfueldistribution.
DESCalsoincreaseditsGovernment-owned“stra-tegicreserve”inandaroundKabulfrom2to5milliongallons.Thestrategicreserveandthecommercialreservetogetherprovideashockabsorbercapableofwithstand-ingmajordisruptionstopetroleumsustainment.
DESC’scontractorsestablishedacommercialfuelterminaloutsideofBagramAirBasein2007andbuilta2-milepipelinetostreamlineBagram’sfuelresup-ply;thisreducedfueltrucktrafficcomingontothebase.DESChasalsoinitiateddirectdeliverytomajordirectsupporthubsatforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)Fenty,Sharana,andShank,therebyreducinghub-and-spokefueldeliveriesfromBagramtotheotherFOBsinRegionalCommandEast.
Bagramisinthemiddleofaneight-phasepetroleummasterplanmilitaryconstructionefforttoreplacealltacticalbagstoragewithanindustry-standardsteel-tankfuelfacility.Thiseffort,whichbeganin2007andisscheduledtobecompletedin2012,willprovideBagramwith12milliongallonsofstoragecapacityandmodernfuelfacilities.
Finally,DESCissolicitinganadditional10milliongallonsofcontractedstorageandenhanceddeliveryservicesforRegionalCommandEastandformutualsupportofotherregionalcommands,basedonaCENTCOM-validated2009to2010requirement.ThecombinedeffectoftheseactionswillexpandCJOAfuelstorageanddistributioncapabilitywhilecontinuingtosupportcurrentcombatoperations.
NATOAllianceCooperationTheAfghanistanCJOAisaNATO-ledoperation
undertheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF).ThiscommandstructurerequiresanewlevelofstrategicpetroleumcoordinationandcooperationbyCENTCOMandU.S.stakeholderswiththealliance.
CENTCOM,incoordinationwithDESCandCJOAstakeholders,hasmetthegrowingOEFfuelrequirementsincethefirstarrivalofU.S.forcesatBagramAirBase.
QM P OLG roup
(90)
QM P OLS upply B N(T F S /B U)(615 pax)
S outhernG LOC
(2912 pax)
T C B N#1
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
W es tG LOC
(2743 pax)
T C B N#2
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#3
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#4
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#5
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#6
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#7
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#8
(3x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(559 pax)
NorthG LOC
(2743 pax)
T C B N#9
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#10
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#11
(4x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(728 pax)
T C B N#12
(3x7.5K P OL T rk C o)
(559 pax)
Impact of OIF C ontracted S olutions
A ll C ontrac ted
9,103 S oldiers13 B attalions
46 7.5K P OL Truck C ompanies2,760 7.5K Tankers
Delivering fuel without using contractors would have required the Army to use 9,103 Soldiers and 2,760 of its 7,500gallon tankers—4 times the entire Army inventory.
LegendBN =BattalionBU =BuehringGLOC =GroundlineofcommunicationOIF =OperationIraqiFreedompax =PersonnelPOL =Petroleum,oils,andlubricantsQM =QuartermasterTC =TransportationCorpsTFS =TruckfillstandTrkCo=Truckcompany
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 19
In2002,Bagram’sdailycon-sumptionwas40,000gallonsperday;today,Bagramaccountsforapproximately500,000gallonsperday.Tomeetthisgrowingdemandinamultinationaloperatingenvi-ronmentinoneofthehardestgeo-graphicallocationsforimportingfuel,CENTCOM,incooperationwithitsstrategicpartners,hasestablishedanAfghanistanpetro-leumcapabilitiesposture,mutuallysupportedbytheUnitedStatesandNATO,tomeetthesustainmentrequirements.
PartneringWithJFC-BrunssumIn2008,CENTCOMpartnered
withNATO’sJointForcesCom-mand-Brunssum(JFC−B)tolever-agetheNATO-contractedcapabilitytosupportU.S.forcesinRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.ISAF,asaNATOcommandelement,remainsthesenioroperationalcom-mandinAfghanistan.Thecountrywasthendividedintofiveregionalcommands(North,South,East,West,andCapital/Center).[RegionalCommandSouth-Westhassincebeenadded.]
WhenitestablishedISAF,NATOtaskedJFC−BtoestablishafuelsupportplanforNATOforcesinAfghanistan.InsupportofthedeploymentofadditionalU.S.forcestoAfghanistanin2009,theCENTCOMdirectoroflogisticsdirectedtheuseoftheexistingJFC−BcontractstosupportU.S.forcesinRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.Thisdecisionwasbasedonseveralfactors,including—oTheneedtodemonstrateU.S.supportofthealliance
effort.oTheneedtoprovideflexibilityinsustainment
(employingmultiplecommercialsuppliers).oTheinclusionofcontractor-providedstorageinthe
JFC−Bcontract.oThepre-existingNATOcontractorpresencein
RegionalCommandsSouthandWest.oTheofferoftheNATOcontractortodistributetobat-
talionFOBs,therebyreducingtherequirementformilitaryfueltrucks.Thisalliancerelationshipensuredthatthe300-per-
centincreaseinU.S.fuelrequirementsduring2008and2009wasmetwithoutaffectingtheverydynamicopera-tionalpostureforRegionalCommandsSouthandWest.CENTCOM’smutuallysupportingCJOApetroleumarrangementwithDESC(theU.S.nationalprovider)andJFC−B(theNATOprovider)combinedthebest
ofeachagency’scapabilitiestomeettheever-shiftingpetroleumrequirements.ThisnationalandinternationalstrategicpetroleumconstructwillcontinuetoevolveandchangeovertimetomeettheU.S.andNATO/ISAFcommanders’strategicgoalsandposture.
CENTCOMwillcontinuetoseekadditionalsemi-permanentandpermanentU.S.andcontractedfuelstorageinordertomitigaterisksfromdisruptionofthedistributionsystemandimprovequalitycontrolofstoredfuel.CENTCOMhasbegunthisprocesswithDESCandJFC−Bandwillcontinuetohoneitsbattle-fieldsupport.AstheresponsibledrawdownofU.S.forc-esinIraqcontinues,CENTCOMwillcapturelessonslearnedandapplybestpracticesinfuelsupply,storage,anddistributiontoensureoutstandingsupporttotheSoldiers,Marines,Sailors,andAirmeninAfghanistan.
colonel jeffrey B. carra waS the chief of the joint petroleUM office, j−4, U.S. central coMManD, when he cowrote thiS article. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy war colleGe anD holDS a MaSter’S DeGree in aDMiralty law froM tUlane UniverSity.
chief warrant officer 4 DaviD ray, USMc (ret.), iS the DefenSe loGiSticS aGency liaiSon to the U.S. Special operationS coMManD. he previoUSly ServeD aS a DefenSe enerGy SUpport center planner anD liaiSon aSSiGneD to the U.S. central coMManD j−4 anD the U.S. pacific coMManD j−4.
In 2007, U.S. Central Command partnered with the Defense Energy Support Center to shift most Afghanistan petroleum sustainment from the southern ground line of communication (GLOC), which enters Afghanistan from Pakistan, to the Northern Distribution Network, which enters from the Central Asian States.
20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ieldManual3–0,Operations,definesretrogradeasan“organizedmovementawayfromtheenemy.”Inordertosettheconditionsforasuccessfulretrograde,Armyforcesmustreduce,ordrawdown,theiroperationsandlogisticsfootprintstothemaximumextentandasearlyintheprocessasfea-sible.Inastabilityoperation,whenArmyforcesleaveatheater,backfillbyacoalitionforcemaynotalwaysbepossible.Inthosecases,responsibilityforsecuritymaytransfertothehostnation’ssecurityforces,wheth-ertheyarearmy,police,orbordersecurityforces.Thistransferofsecurityresponsibilitymaytakeplaceinanunstableorfragilesecurityenvironment.
Withtheseconsiderationsinmind,Iwouldliketoaddressthelogistics-relatedtasksArmyforcesmustundertaketoconductasuccessfuldrawdownandretrograde.Specifically,Iwilldiscussthefollowingactionsfromalogisticsplanner’sviewpoint:avoid-ingnegativeimages;determiningwhattoretrograde;reducingcommodities,vehicles,andweaponssystems,both“white”and“green”;cleaningupbases;disposing
ofpersonalproperty;managingcontractor-controlledequipment;coordinatingtransportation,maintenance,andportoperations;disposingofbarriermaterials;andmanagingcontainers.Thebottomlineforthelogisti-cianisthattheconceptsdiscussedinthisarticleareeasytodescribe,buttheyareextremelydifficulttoimplementontheground.
AvoidingNegativeImagesThefirstandforemostconsiderationduringamili-
taryretrogradeistheriskofcreatingnegativeimages.Oneexampleofnegativeimagesgeneratedbyaretro-gradeoperationwastheabandonedvehiclesandwea-ponsystemsleftbehindinAfghanistanbytheSovietmilitaryattheendoftheiroccupationduringthelate1980sthatcontinuedtolitterthecountryside.
Toavoidsuchnegativeimages,logisticsplannersmustconsideramoreresource-intensiveretrogradeoperation.Theymustconsiderexpendingresourcestorecoverandretrogradeequipmentandsupplies,evenincaseswhereitisnoteconomicallyprudenttodoso,in
ExtractingArmyForcesFromtheField—ALogistician’sPerspective
by Lieutenant CoLoneL jerry b. steinKe, MnarnG
F
Spray foam is applied to the roof of a tent at the Contingency Operating Base Basra medical center in Iraq. Sprayfoamed tents are left in place upon base tranfer to the Government of Iraq. (Photo by SFC Jeffrey S. Mullet)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 21
ordertoavoidleavingabandonedmilitaryequipmentandsuppliesstrewnacrossthecountrysidethatwouldprovideourenemieswithapropagandaopportunity.
DeterminingWhattoRetrogradeAnothercriticaltaskisidentifyingwhattoretro-
grade.Notwithstandingtheriskofnegativeimagescreatedbyabandonedequipmentandsupplies,theplannermuststillconsiderthecost,inresourcesandmanpower,ofacompleterecoveryandretrograde.
Tothemaximumextentpossible,unitsshouldcon-sumesuppliesandnotreplenishtheminthemonthsleadinguptothefinalretrograde,includingclassesI(subsistence),II(clothingandindividualequipment),III(petroleum,oils,andlubricants),V(ammunition),andIX(repairparts)andbottledwater.Leadersmustensurethattheirunitsareaggressivelyreducingstock-agelevelsandallowingnormalconsumptiontodrawdowntheremainingsupplies.
Whenunitsaremaintainingsupplysupportactivi-ties(SSAs),carefulconsiderationshouldbegiventoconsolidatingandclosingthem.LinesmaybedrawndowntozerobalancesandexcesssuppliesretrogradedduringthetimeleadinguptotheclosingoftheSSA.EvenasanSSAhasitslinesreducedtozerobal-ances,usingunitscanstillordertheirsuppliesandpartsthroughtheSSA’sStandardArmyRetailSupplySystemcomputer,withsuppliescomingfromacen-tralSSA.Insuchcases,theSSAcontinuestoactasarequisitionandturn-inpoint,acceptingnon-mission-essentialsuppliesandequipmentfromcustomerunitsforretrogradeandreceivingsuppliespushedfromthecentralSSAtotheusers.Thepolicyforturn-inofsup-pliesmustbeliberal—thatis,easytocomplywith—inordertoencouragecustomerunitstobringtheirexcesssupplyitemstotheSSAratherthanabandonthem.
Commandersmustbewillingtoacceptsomeoper-ationalriskduringthesupplydrawdown.Onesuchriskisacceptingalongerresponsetimeinreactingtoinsur-gentactivityorhost-nationrequestsforlogisticsassis-tancebecausefewersuppliesareontheground.Lowerstockagelevelsforcommoditiessuchasfuelandammu-nitionmaybeacceptable,providedthosecommoditiescanbepushedquicklyintheeventofanemergency.Toreducerisk,U.S.forcescanmaintainacentralizedlogisticsbaseinthevicinityoftheportofembarkationthatcanprovideemergencyairresupply.Thekeyistoreducestockagelevelstothemaximumextentpossibleandasearlyaspossiblebeforefinalretrograde.
Reducing“White”EquipmentThenextconsiderationisidentifyingwhatequip-
mentmaybeleftbehindbasedoneconomicconsider-ations.“White”(commercialoff-the-shelf)equipmentmaybemanageddifferentlyfrom“green”(specificallydesignedformilitarypurposes)equipment.Examples
ofwhiteequipmentincludecomputers,televisions,washingmachines,andnon-tacticalvehicles(NTVs).Becausewhiteequipmentdoesnothavedistinctmili-tarymarkings,itcanbetransferredtothehostnationwithoutcreatingthenegativepublicperceptioncausedbyleavinggreenequipmentbehind.
Plannersmustconductacost-benefitanalysisofwhiteequipment.ShouldU.S.forcesconsumetheirlimitedtransportationassetstoretrogradesuchequip-ment,whichmayalreadybeneartheendofitslifeexpectancy,tothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)oranothertheater?Orshouldtheytransferittothehostnation?Inadditiontothecostsofrepairing,pack-aging,andtransportingwhiteequipment,anotherfac-torisitscompatibilitywithU.S.electrical,safety,andenvironmentalstandards.InthecaseofNTVs,assum-ingthevehiclesmeetU.S.safetyandenvironmentalstandards,thecostofretrogradeandresetwillmostlikelyexceedthevehicles’fairmarketvalue.
Plannersneedtotakeahardlookatcostversusbenefitwhenitcomestodecidingwhatusedwhiteequipmentshouldberetrograded.Ifthecosttoretro-gradeapproachestheequipment’sresidualvalue,thenitshouldbetransferredtothehost-nationgovernment.Leaderscanworkwiththehostnationtocoordinatewherethisequipmentcanbestagedforsubsequenttransfer.Contractedlabor,drawntothemaximumextentfromthehostnation’slaborpool,canprovidesecurityandmaintenanceservicesforthesesystemsinstagingareastoensuretheyarefullymissioncapa-bleonthedateoftransfer.Thehostnationshouldberesponsibleforanymaintenanceaftertransfer.
Reducing“green”EquipmentInthecaseofclassV,unitsshouldconductinspec-
tionsforserviceability.Ifammunitionisunservice-able,itshouldbedisposedofinplaceratherthanretrograded.Ifthelocaldefenseforcesusethesametypeofammunitionandareconsideredreliable,transferringserviceableammunitiontothemshouldbeconsidered.RatherthanretrogradingserviceableammunitiontoCONUS,considerationshouldbegiventoestablishingatheaterammunitionholdingareaorretrogradingittoanothertheater.Finally,aswithotherclassesofsupply,theflowofclassVintothetheatershouldbeturnedoffasearlyaspossibleandammu-nitionconsumedtodrawdownstockagelevelsandavoidhavingtoretrogradelargequantities.
ClassVII(majorenditems)requiresspecialcon-siderationinretrogradeplanning.Forgreenequipment,caremustbetakentopreservesufficientcombatpowerthroughthecloseoftheretrogradeoperationinordertoprovideadequateforceprotection.ClassVIIsystemsthattheplannershouldconsiderkeepingintheateruntilthefinalechelonsdepartincludematerials-handlingequipment(MHE),transportationassets,andforce
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protectionequipment.However,commandersmustbewillingtotakesomeoperationalriskinordertodrawdownthe“mountain”ofequipmentU.S.forcestypi-callyhavewiththem,aswasthecaseinIraqatthecloseof2009.
Sincewheeledweaponsystems,suchasmine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclesandM1151up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles,canmoveontheirown,plannersshouldconsiderret-rogradingthebulkoftheirheaviertrackedsystemsearlierintheoperation.Areserveofheavyweaponsystems,suchasAbramstanks,Bradleyfightingvehicles,andhowitzers,maybestagedinthevicinityoftheportofembarkationtomitigaterisks.Forthesesystemstobeavailableinanemergency,plannersmustensurethatadequateheavyequipmenttransportersareavailabletomovethem.
ClassVIIgreenequipmentcanbesortedforretro-gradebasedonwhetherornotitwillreturntohomestation(earlyretrogradeequipment)orenteranArmy-managedresetprogram.TheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)managesresetprogramsandmaybetaskedtoaccepttheseselectedsystemsintheater,takingthemofftheunit’spropertybook.ItisthenAMC’sresponsi-bilitytoretrogradethisequipment.
Unitscanturnintheater-providedequipmenttoanin-theater,AMC-operatedredistributionpropertyaccountabilityteam(RPAT)“yard”fordisposition.Forlargeunits,amobileRPATcantraveltotheunit’slocationandtakepossessionofthetheater-providedequipmenttobeturnedinonsite.AMCisthenresponsibleformaintenanceandretrograde.
Duringthisretrogradeprocess,leadersmustbeflex-ibleconcerningthemaintenancereadinessofequip-mentbeingturnedin.“Asiscomplete”shouldbeconsideredasthestandardforunitsturninginequip-menttoanRPATyardforretrograde.ClassIIIleaksshouldbeapriorityinordertogetequipmentthroughU.S.Customsandontosealift.
MHEiscriticaltoasuccessfuldrawdownandretrogradeandmustbekeptforwardtotheveryendofoperationsineacharea.Sincekeepingthisequipmentmissioncapablemaybedifficultbecauseofalackofrepairparts,unitsmayhavetoresorttocontrolledsubstitutionorcannibalizationtomaintainaminimumquantityoffunctionalMHE.Anotheroptioniscon-tractingforMHE,ifavailable.
Myfirsthandexperienceisthatwarfightersareloathtosurrenderanyoftheirrollingstockandweaponsystems.Theygenerallywanttokeepthisequipmentuntiltheirunitsredeployratherthanretrogradingittomeetaschedulethatdoesnottaxavailabletransportationassets.
However,classVIIitemscannotallbetransportedonthefinaldayofoperations;theymustbedrawndownoveraperiodoftimethatavailabletransportationassetscansupport.Logisticiansmustadvisetheirleadersof
theimportanceofenforcingaretrogradescheduleforclassVIIthatissupportable—whichmeansenforcingtimelyturn-inofequipmentbywarfighters.Leaders,withassistancefromplanners,mustsetbothnear-term(monthly)goalsandend-stategoalsforthedrawdownofequipmentandsuppliesandthenholdsubordinatecommandersresponsibleformeetingthosegoals.
ClassIXitemsrepresentachallengeforthelogis-ticsplannerduringretrogradeoperations.Itisimper-ativetodrawdownsupplies.However,asstockagelevelsaredrawndown,systemsthatbecomenotmis-sioncapable(NMC)awaitingpartswillremainNMCforlongertimeperiodsbecauseofthelongerleadtimesrequiredtoreceiverepairparts.
Threemethodsareavailabletomitigatethisprob-lem.First,atransportationprioritysystemcanbeimplementedthatallowsleaderstoplaceahigherprior-ityoncertainrepairpartsrequiredforcriticalsystems.Second,themaintenanceactivitycanbeauthorizedtomaintainalargeramountofshopstockforcertaincriti-calsystems,suchasMHEandtransporters.Third,thevarietyofsystemsthathavethesamecapability,suchasdifferentversionsoftheMRAP,canbedrawndown.
CleaningUpBasesAsapartoftheretrogradeprocess,logisticians
workcloselywiththeengineerswhohaveprimaryresponsibilityforbaseclosureandtransfer.“Baseclo-sure”occurswhenU.S.forcesrelinquishcontrolofthelandtothelandowner,withnohost-nationforcesoccu-pyingit.“Basetransfer”occurswhenU.S.forcesrelin-quishcontrolofthebasetohost-nationforces,whowillcontinuetooperatethebase.Itisprudenttoreturnabasethatisfullyfunctionaltothehostnation’ssecurityforces.Inthisway,thehost-nationforcescanimmedi-atelyconductoperationsinsupportoftheU.S.forces,whichareconcentratingondrawdownandretrograde.
Becauseofthenumberofstepsandthetimeinvolvedinclosingortransferringabase,plannersmustadoptaclosureortransferscheduleasearlyaspossible,givingthebattlespaceowner(BSO)timetoproperlycompletetheprocess.TheBSOshouldsched-ulebaseclosuresortransfersoveraperiodoftime—severalmonths,forexample—ratherthanconductingallofthematonce.Thisavoidstherequirementtosurgetransportationassets;availabilityoftransporta-tionisalwaysalimitingfactor.
Engineersleadthebaseclosureortransfereffort,andlogisticiansworkcloselywiththemtoprovidesupport.Baseclosureortransferrequiresthefollowingmajorstepso Determininglegalownershipoftheland.o Completinganenvironmentalsurveyofthesite.o Removinganddisposingofsolidwaste.o Closinganyhazardouswastewaterlagoons.o Closinganyincinerators.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 23
o Closinganyfiringranges.o Conductinganinventoryofrealproperty
(permanentstructures).o Conductinganinventoryofpersonalproperty.o Accountingforandremovingcontainers.o Removingpersonalpropertythatwillnotbetrans-
ferredtothehost-nationgovernment.Theamountoftimeinvolvedincompletingthese
stepswillvarydependingonthesizeofthebaseandenvironmentalissues.U.S.policyistoturnoverabasethatmeetsapplicableenvironmentalstandards;anyenvironmentalremediationtakestimeandresources.Plannersshouldconsidergranting“amnesty”tounitsandindividualsduringthebasecleanupperiodtoencouragetenantunitstoturninallexcesssuppliesandequipmentthathavenotbeenbroughttorecord.
DisposingofPersonalPropertyLogisticiansmanagedispositionofpersonalprop-
ertyonbasesbeingclosedortransferred.Ifabaseistobeclosed,100percentofthepersonalpropertymustberemoved.Ifabaseisbeingtransferredtothehostnation,leadersmustdeterminewhatpersonalpropertywillbetransferredtothehostnationandwhatwillberetrogradedorotherwisedisposedof.Ifthebaseisbeingtransferred,itisprudenttotransferasufficientamountofpersonalpropertysothehost-nationforcescancontinuetooperatethebasewithoutinterruption.
Typicalexamplesofpersonalpropertytobeconsi-deredfortransferwiththebaseincludeconcretebun-kers,concreteT-walls,otherbarriermaterials,guardtowers,troophousingsuchastentsorcontainerizedhousingunits,latrines,showerunits,generatorsandpowerdistributionsystems,structuresandscannersusedatentrycontrolpoints,otherportablebuildings,heating,airconditioning,andventilationsystems,fueltanks,watertanks,waterdistributionsystems,waterheaters,andfurniture.
InIraq,itisimpracticalanduneconomicaltomovetentsthathavebeen“sprayfoamed”toaddinsula-tion,reduceenergyconsumption,andimprovetrooplivingconditions.Thesetentsareconvertedfromper-sonalpropertytorealpropertywhenthesprayfoamisinstalledandremainwiththebaseuponthebase’stransfertothehostnation.
Beforeconductingajointinventorywithhost-nationrepresentatives,theBSOresponsibleforbasetransfermustconductathoroughinventoryofthebaseandverifythatallpersonalpropertyisdocumentedontheBSO’spropertybook.Ifnot,theBSOmustbringallfound-on-installation(FOI)propertytorecord.
FOIpropertyrepresentsahugeproblemfortheBSOresponsibleforbaseclosureortransfer.Incasesofoperationsthathavebeenconductedforanumberofyears,asinIraq,largeamountsofunclaimedequip-mentmayneedtobebroughttorecord.Leadersmust
becomeinvolvedinthisissueandensurethatsubordi-natecommandersarebringingFOItorecord.
Oncethishasbeencompleted,leadersthencandeterminewhichpersonalpropertyshouldbenomi-natedfortransferwiththebasetothehost-nationforces.Thispropertymaybelabeledasforeignexcesspersonalproperty(FEPP).TheBSOmustthensubmithislistofnominatedFEPPthroughthechainofcom-mandandsecureapprovalforitstransfer.
Beforeconductingtheinitialjointinventorywiththehost-nationrepresentativebeforeabasetransfer,theBSOshouldretrogradeallpersonalpropertythathasnotbeenapprovedasFEPP.Inthecaseofexpen-sive,high-demandequipmentsuchasgenerators,theBSOshouldconductanyplannedexchange(replacingnewornearlynewequipmentwitholdersubstitutes)beforeconductingthejointinspection.
Itisimportanttonotcreateanexpectationintheeyesofhost-nationofficialsconductingthejointinspectionthattheywillbereceivingnewerequipmentthattheBSOplanstoreplacebeforetransfer.Leadersmustensurethathost-nationofficialsunderstandthatanyequipmentmaintenancerequiredaftertransferissolelytheresponsibilityofthehostnation.Ifthehost-nationentitythatwilltakeoverthebasehaslittleornoknowledgeorexperiencewithbasemaintenanceoperations,theBSOshouldoffertrainingonhowtomaintainthebaseaftertransfer.
Atthispoint,alloftheequipmentidentifiedasexcess—thatis,equipmentnolongerneededandnotnominatedasFEPP—mustbeeitherretrogradedordisposedofonsite.TheBSOthenwillhavetoundertakeafinancialliabilityinvestigationforprop-ertylosstodocumenttheFEPP,recognizeitslosstotheUnitedStates,andremovethoseitemsfromtheBSO’spropertybook.Duringonedeployment,com-mandersinIraqwereauthorizedtotransferupto$30millionworthofFEPPtotheGovernmentofIraqforeachbasebeingtransferred.Thisprocessisrepeatedoneachbaseasthedrawdowncontinuesandbasesaretransferred.Depreciatedvalue,notacquisitionvalue,isusedincalculatingthevalueofFEPP.
ConductingacompleteandaccurateinventoryofallofthepersonalandrealpropertyonabasemostlikelywillbebeyondthecapabilityofaBSO.Thelogisticsplannershouldconsiderorganizinganddeployingteamsofpropertybookandsupplysubject-matterexpertstothebasessubjecttoclosureortransfertoassisttheBSOwiththisprocess.InIraq,thiscapabilityhasbeencon-tracted.Theseteamshavebeenatremendousassetinthebaseinventoryprocess,speedinguptheprocessandprovidingaccurateandcompleteinventories.
ManagingContractorEquipmentOnepotentialproblemisdeterminingtheownership
ofequipmentcontrolledbycontractorsonabase.This
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equipmentmaybeownedbythecontractor,oritmaybecontractor-managedGovernment-owned(CMGO)equip-ment.Toproveownership,thecontractorshouldmaintainpropertybookslistingequipmentownedbytheU.S.Gov-ernment(CMGO)andequipmentownedbythecontractor.Anycontractor-controlledequipmentnotappearingonthecontractor’spropertybookshouldbebroughttorecordasFOIpropertybelongingtotheU.S.Government.
Thelogisticsplannermustalsoexaminebaselifesupportservicecontractsonthebases,suchaslaundryandsecurityservices(ataskoftenoverlookedbytheBSO.)ThisistruewhetherthebaseisservicedthroughtheLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramorindi-vidualcontractsoriginallyinitiatedthroughthepur-chaserequestandcommitmentprocess.Ineithercase,theBSOmustidentifyallcurrentservicecontracts,includingtheunitmanagingthecontract,thescopeofservices,andtheserviceterminationdates.
TheBSOmustrevieweachcontracttodeterminethemethodfornoticeofterminationandthenpro-videthisnoticetothecontractors.ThepurposeofthisreviewistoavoidobligatingtheU.S.GovernmenttocontinuetopayforservicesonabasethattheUnitedStatesnolongercontrolsoruses.
Duringpreparationsforclosureortransfer,therelikelywillbeasurgeofwork,toincludepreparingandupload-ingequipmentthatwillberetrogradedandbasecleanup.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatcontractsareinplacetosupportthismanpowerandequipmentsurge.TheBSOmustensurethatanysolidwasteisproperlydisposedofbeforeclosureortransfer.Tosynchronizethethemesandmessagesofanorderlytransfer,thebasemustappearinacleanandorderlystateonthedateofclosureortransferinordertoavoidnegativemediaattention.
Tothisend,theBSOmustdocumentthefinalcon-ditionofthebasebytakingphotographsofthebuildingsandgroundsjustbeforetransferandeveninvitingmediatothebasetotakephotographsandviewitscondition.Then,ifthehostnationdoesnotcloselycontrolthebaseafterthetransferandthebase’scontentsareransackedbylocalnationals,U.S.forcescanprovethatthishap-penedafterthetransferandnotbefore.
Forforceprotectionreasons,itmaybenecessarytoevacuatecontractedlaborinphases,andinadvanceofU.S.forcesleaving,sothatonthedateoftransferorclosure,allcontractorshavealreadybeenevacuated.LogisticsplannersmustdevelopandexecutelogisticssupportplanstousemilitarypersonneltosupportthetroopsremainingonabasetotheverylastdayofU.S.occupation.Thiswillcauselogisticssupporttobecomeveryaustere(thatis,“expeditionary”)inthefinalstag-esofU.S.occupation.
CoordinatingTransportationTransportationisclearlythelimitingfactorforbase
closureandtransferandretrogradeoperations.The
closuresandtransferswilltakeplaceonlyasfastasthetransporterscanretrogradecontainersandequip-menttotheportsofembarkation.PlannersmustensurethatadequatetransportationandMHEassetsareavailablethroughtheconclusionofretrogradeoperations.Onthefinaldayofabase’soccupation,U.S.forcesmustbeabletomoveoutinasinglelift.
Leadersmustrequiretheirsubordinatecommand-erstoestablishandexecuteaggressiveplans,includingmonthlyandend-stategoals,forretrogradingexcessclassVIIequipmentandsuppliesasearlyaspos-sible.Waitinguntilthelastminutetoretrogradelargeamountsofrollingstockandheavypiecesofequip-mentinvitesmissionfailure.Commanderscanmiti-gatesomeoftheoperationalriskbymaintainingrapidreactionforcesandacloseairsupportumbrellaandbycoordinatingwithhost-nationforcestoprovideatleastsomeoftherequiredforceprotection.
Evenduringadrawdown,themaintenancemissionmustcontinue.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatade-quatemaintenancesupportisavailableinordertokeepequipmentmissioncapable.Self-containedmobilemain-tenanceteamscansetupintemporaryshelterswiththeirownpowersupply,tools,benchstock,andshopstocktoconductmaintenanceoperationsasrequired.Oneseri-ousissuewillbetheinabilitytosecurerepairpartsinatimelymanner.Controlledsubstitutionandevencanni-balizationmayhavetobeauthorized.
Becausethelogisticsplannermaybefacingavir-tual“mountain”ofsupplies,vehicles,weaponsystems,containers,andotherpiecesofequipmenttoretrogradebysealift,developingadequateportfacilitieswillbecriticaltoretrogradesuccess.Theplannerthereforemustidentifyallpotentialseaportsthatcanbeusedandthenrequestuseofthoseportsthroughthehostnation.Morethanoneportforretrogradewillimprovethroughputandreduceoperationalrisk.Afternegotia-tionsfortheseportsarecomplete,plannersthenmustallocatetimeandresourcestoimprovetheportsandstagingareas,includingsecurityinfrastructure,sterileyards,maintenancestructures,communications,powergeneration,washracks,andloadingequipment.
Plannersmaylooktousingcontractors,includinglocalnationalcontractors,formaintenanceofthestagedequipment,portsecurity,andportoperations.BecauseofthebottleneckU.S.forceswillfaceattheseaportsbecauseofalackofsufficienttransportationassetsandportfacilities,itmaytakeseveralmonthsorevenyearstoretrogradealloftheselectedequipmentandsuppliesbacktoCONUSforresetandredistribution.
DisposingofBarrierMaterialsDispositionofclassIVconstructionandbarrier
materialsisaspecialproblemintheretrogradepro-cess.Thesematerialsincludeprecastconcretebunkers,T-walls,andotherbarriermaterials.Thecostofhandling
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 25
andtransportingtheseitemswillfarexceedtheirfair-marketvalue;sufficienttransportationassetsmostlikelywillnotbeavailabletoretrogradethem;andbecauseofimportrestrictions,theseitemsprobablywillhavetoremainincountry.Themostpracticalcourseofactionistoturntheseitemsovertothehostnation,leavingthemintheircurrentlocationsorasclosebyaspossible.
Asanalternative,technologydoesexisttocrushprecastconcrete.Therebarfoundinsidecanberecycled,andthecrushedconcretecanbeusedforroadwaysandotherconstructionapplications.Themachineryforcrushingtheprecastconcretecanbemovedfrombasetobasetocompletethismission.Suchaneffortwilltakeasignificantamountoftimeandexpenseandwillhavetobeundertakenandcom-pletedbycontractorsafterthedepartureofU.S.forces.
Usinglocalnationallabortothemaximumextentpossibleforthistaskwillprovidejobsandhaveaposi-tiveimpactonthelocaleconomy.However,thiswillonlybefeasibleifthesecuritysituationallowsit.Con-sideringthecostofmanufacturingthesestructures,host-nationleadersmaywanttostageorstorethemforpossiblefutureuseinforceprotection.
ManagingContainersNodiscussionofretrogradeoperationswouldbe
completewithoutaddressingcontainers.Containerman-agementtakesconsiderablemanpowerandresources.Asbasescloseandtransfer,theBSOwillhavetodealwithallofthecontainersinhisbattlespace.TheBSOmusthaveproceduresinplace,alongwithadequatetrainedmanpower,toaccomplishthefollowingtasks:
Identify all containers on each base.Enterthisinformationintothecontainermanagementsystemtodeterminestatusandownership(militaryowned,leasedfromcontractor,contractorowned).Ensurethatleasedcontainershavepriorityforretrogradetoavoidorreducepenalties.
For containers with no discernable owner, open them and inventory the contents. Sort,package,andretrogradeallserviceablesupplyitemsforreturntotheArmysupplysystem.TurninallunserviceableitemstothedesignatedDefenseReutilizationandMarket-ingServicesite.InIraq,mobileredistributionteams(MRTs)visitbasestoassisttheBSOswiththismas-sivejob.Theteamsincludespecialistsintheareasofsupply,maintenance,andtransportation.Whencombinedwithanofferof“amnesty,”theMRTisanextremelyeffectivetoolforpolicingupandturninginexcesssupplies,equipment,andcontainers.
Inspect each container to determine its condition, including whether or not it is seaworthy.TeamstrainedinaccordancewiththeInternationalConventionforSafeContainerscarryoutthismanpower-intensivetask.Inthecaseofacontainerthatisnotseaworthy,theinspectorsdetermineifitcanberepaired.Ifitcannotbe
repaired,itisacandidateforlocaldispositionwhennolongerrequiredformilitaryuse.Ifthecontainercanberepairedeconomically,itmustberetrogradedtoacon-tainerrepairpoint.Thisrepairmissionmaybeaccom-plishedusinglocalnationalcontractedsupport.
Empty, serviceable containers must be retrograded to an empty container control point for further use.
ThesetasksareusuallymanagedbytheBSO’scontainercontrolofficer.Containersrequireintensivemanagement.Aswithrollingstock,theBSOmaynotbemotivatedtogooutintohisbattlespaceandidentifyandinventoryallofthecontainersfoundthere.ThemorecontainerstheBSOfinds,themoreworkhecre-atesfortheSoldiers—becauseallofthismaterielmustbeinventoried,sorted,packaged,anddisposedof.ThisiswhyemploymentofMRTsissoimportant.
TheBSOmustverifythatalltenantunitsonthebasehaveadequatenumbersofserviceablecontainerstoretrogradetheirequipment.ThelogisticsplannermustensurethateachBSOisgrantedtheauthoritytorequirealltenantunitsonthebasetofullyparticipateinthecontainermanagementprogram.Thisauthorityisneces-sarytoavoidgapsincoverageonthebaseandtoensurethatallcontainersareinventoriedandinspected.
Equipmentandsupplyretrogrademustbesynchro-nizedtopersonnelflow.Logisticsplannersmustensurethatlogisticsunitsandteamsareadequatelymannedtosupportongoinglogisticsservicesduringthedrawdown,includingmaintenanceassistanceteams,containerrepairteams,mobileredistributionteams,propertyaccountabilityteams,transporters,andU.S.Customsinspectionteams.
Plannersandleadersmustbeflexibleinhowtheyusethismanpower.Oneapproachistomovetheseteamsbasedonthebaseclosureortransferschedule.Plannersshouldconsiderusinglocalnationalcontractsupporttosurgealloftheseservices.
Thebottomlineisthat,inordertoensurethatthemaximumamountofArmymaterielispreservedandretrograded,transportationassetsarenotoverwhelmedinthefinalphaseoftheretrograde,andU.S.forcesprojecttotheworldaresponsibleandorderlyretro-grade,leadersatalllevelsmustaggressivelyexecutethedrawdownofmaterielinanorderlyanddisciplinedmannerandasearlyintheprocessaspossible.
lieUtenant colonel jerry B. SteinKe, MnarnG, waS the aSSiStant chief of Staff, G−4, of the 34th in fantry DiviSion, DUrinG hiS DeployMent to iraq. he iS a GraDUate of the arMor officer BaSic coUrSe, the coMBineD arMS anD ServiceS Staff School, the SUp port operationS coUrSe, anD the coMManD anD General Staff officer coUrSe. an attorney in private practice, he holDS a B.S. DeGree in eDUcation froM BeMiDji State UniverSity, a MaSter of ManaGeMent anD aDMiniStration DeGree froM Metropolitan State UniverSity, anD a jUriS Doctor DeGree froM williaM Mit chell colleGe of law.
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incethebeginningofOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)7yearsago,contractorshaveparticipatedasforcemultiplierstooffsetthelogisticsbur-dencreatedbycontinuousU.S.militaryoperations.Throughouttheoperation,skepticshavearguedthatcontractorsdonothingmorethanwastemoneyfromtaxpayersandourGovernment.Thismisconceptionandalackofproperunderstandingoftheroleofcon-tractorsultimatelyslowsdownandinterruptssupporttothewarfighter.TheArmyneedstheexpertiseofcontractorsmorethaneverduringtheOIFdrawdown.Thisarticleprovidesasnapshotoftherelationshipbetweenmilitarypersonnelandcontractorsandunder-scorestheimportanceofreconcilingtherelationshipbetweenthetwo.
AgoodWorkingRelationshipApartnershipisformedwhencontractorsaccompa-
nyU.S.forcesduringcontingenciesandhumanitarianmissions.FieldManual(FM)3–100.21,ContractorsontheBattlefield,states,“Whilecontractorsconsistentlysupportdeployedarmedforces,commandersneedtofullyunderstandtheirroleinplanningforandmanag-ingcontractorsonthebattlefieldandtoensurethattheirstaffistrainedtorecognize,planfor,andimple-mentcontractorrequirements.”Thisstatementistrue;however,maintainingagoodworkingrelationshipwiththecontractorshouldbekeptinmind,too.
Workingwithcontractorsisnotrocketscience,butunderstandingtheirpurposeandtreatingthemasiftheyarepartofamilitaryunitissignificant.Failingto
FosteringagoodRelationshipWithContractorsontheBattlefield
by Master serGeant arthur harris, jr., usa (ret.)
S
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 27
understandtheimportanceofcontractorsupportcanleadtopotentialproblems.
Intheir2005book,Resolving Conflicts at Work: Eight Strategies for Everyone on the Job,KenClokeandJoanGoldsmithoutline“unclearrolesandresponsibilities”asasourceofworkplaceconflict.ClokeandGoldsmithwritethatthefirststrategyinresolvingconflictistotransform“thecultureandcontextofconflict”intheorganization.TheArmyneedschangeagentstoalterthemindsetofSoldierstowardworkingwithciviliancontractors.Chang-ingthismindsetwillrequireSoldiersandleaderstounderstandtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesaswellasthoseofcontractedlogisticians.
UnderstandingRolesInorderforSoldierstoknowthecontractors’cur-
rentroleinatheaterofoperations,theymustunder-standthedifferencebetweenaugmentationsupportandoperationalcontrol(OPCON).Undertheaugmentationsupportrole,militaryfunctionalareasaresupplement-edwithciviliancontractorswhoperformfunctionsandservicesspecifiedbytheGovernment.However,thecontractormaintainssupervisionofallprimeandsub-
sidiarycontractedemployees.InanOPCONenvironment,thecontrac-torhastotaloperationalcontrolinperformingfunctionsandservicesspecifiedbytheGovernment.Thecontractorisresponsibleforalltechnicalaspectsofthemissionaswellasadministrativemattersforallcivilianemployees.
WhatSoldiersoftenfailtounder-standisthatcontractoremployeesaresupervisedbycontractorman-agersandnotbythemilitary.Thisadministrativecontrolofemployeesisprobablythemostsignificantmisunderstandinginmilitaryandcontractorrelationships.
WhiledeployedtoIraq,IfoundtheOPCONroleofcontractorsdif-ficultforSoldierstohandle.Theydidnotapproveofhavingcontrac-torsinchargeofmostsustainmentfunctionalareas.Egoshavenoplaceinanenvironmentthatsup-portsongoingcontingenciesand
combatoperationsbecausetheywillsurelycauseadelayinsupporttothewarfighter.Failuretocommuni-cateproperlywithcontractorsinOPCONrolescreatesadditionalworkandunwarrantedworkplaceconflicts.Theseactionscanalsocausethecancellationofgoodsandservices.
UnderstandingResponsibilitiesDuringOIF09–11,Isawmultiplechangestoa
LogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP)requirementbecausemilitaryleadersrefusedtoaccepttheadviceofcontractorsinahighlyvisiblefunctionalarea.Failingtoallowcontractorstoper-formwithintheperformanceworkstatement(PWS)causedresistance,whichresultedinunfulfilledrequirementsformultipleunitrotations.Muchtime,money,andmanpowerwerewastedwhenmilitaryleadersrefusedtolistentocontractors.
Inordertoavoidmisunderstandingsthatcancauseproblemsincontractoversight,leadersshouldspendmoretimefamiliarizingthemselvesandtheirSoldierswiththecontractor’sPWS.FM3–100.21statesthataPWS“definesthegovernment’srequirementsinclear,conciselanguageidentifyingspecificworktobeaccomplishedandincorporatedintothecontract.The...[PWS]isthecontractor’smissionstatement.”AlthoughaPWScanbevague,unitsmustnotreadintocontractorperformancerequirements.Thecus-tomercannotdirectthatthecontractorperformtaskswithoutauthorizationfromawarrantedcontractingofficeroradministrativecontractingofficer.
ThebiggestchallengetheArmyfacesisgettingunitstoreadandcomplywiththelargestPWSintheater,LOGCAPTaskOrder159.Thetaskorderstatesthatthecontractorwillprovidebaselifesup-port,corpslogisticsservicessupport,andtheatertransportationthroughouttheMulti-NationalForce-Iraqareaofoperations.FailuretounderstandthePWScanleadunitstosubmitunfoundedviolationsthatstraintheirrelationshipswithcontractors.Thisstrainedrelationshipisamajorareaofconcerninthetheaterofoperations.
Educationisthefoundation;theprocessmustbeginwithcommandersandfilterdowntotheresponsiblepersonnel.Ascustomers,Soldiersshouldhaveasolidunderstandingofwhatservicesthecontractorprovides.WhereSoldiersgowrongiswhentheydecidetotellthecontractorhowtodothework.Theresultiscon-flictbetweentheparties.
ContractOversightandEvaluationSoldiersseekingcontractors’supportshouldnever
tellthecontractorhowtoperformaserviceorfunc-tion.However,ifthecontractorisnotperformingwith-inthePWS,toolsareavailabletoassistorganizationsinproperlyevaluatingcontractorperformance.
A KBR subcontractor with Prime Project International begins his shift at the main laundry facility at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. (Photo by Galen Putnam, 402d Army Field Support Brigade.)
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ImproperoversightofcontractperformancehascosttheGovernmentmillionsofdollars.Itisimperativethatcontractingofficer’srepresentatives(CORs)pro-videproperoversightforthecontractstheyarerespon-sibleforandthattheyevaluatecontractorsbasedonperformanceandnotpersonalfeelingsorbiasestowardaparticularcontractor.TheGovernmententrustsCORstoproperlyassessanddocumentcontractorperfor-mance.Propermilitaryoversightminimizesconflictandistheonlywaythatthecontractorbecomesfullyintegratedinsupportingthewarfighter.
ThekeytothissuccessistheCOR,whoshouldbeasubject-matterexpertinthefunctionalareathathascontractorsupport.WhatIhavefoundisthatleadersareplacingunqualifiedpersonnelasCORsinareasthatwarrantsomeonewithanunderstandingofthatfunction.WhyplaceamechanicinasupplysupportactivityastheCORtooverseetheperformanceofacontractorwhenhisskillsetdoesnotmatchthecon-tractedfunction?Thisisadisasterwaitingtohappen,whichusuallyleadstoconflictbetweenthemilitaryandthatcontractorandultimatelyslowsdownorevenstopscertainoperations.
Basedonmyexperiences,Ibelievetheunitfailswhenitdoesnotappointtherightpersonattherighttimetooverseethatparticularfunctionalarea.ThatfailureworsenswhenCORslackbasiccontractingknowledgeormisinterpretthePWS,whichleadstoevaluationsthatarenotproperlyconstructed.Ultimate-ly,failingtoproperlyevaluateperformanceplacesanadditionalstrainontherelationshipwithcontractors.Thishasproventruewhenindividualshavetheirownagendasandrefusetounderstandtheimportanceofproperoversight.
EducationTheoneresourcethatcanmitigatepotentialissues
inmilitaryandcontractorrelationshipsiseducation.
Inthecomplexworldofcontracting,educationisimperativetoeffectivecontractoversight.Under-standingcontractsandcontractingprovidesopera-tionalcommanderswiththeflexibilitytodeterminewhenandwherecontractingisaviablewaytosatisfyunitneeds.Havingafullyeducatedunderstandingofcontractingpreventsaleaderfromcreatingsituationsdetrimentaltotheunit’srelationshipswithcontrac-tors.Leaderswhofailtoeducatethemselvesonthecontractingprocessruntheriskoflogisticsfailure.Inacontingencyenvironment,properlogisticssupportcanbeadecidingfactorbetweenthelifeordeathofourSoldiers.
Incontracting,unknownrolesandresponsibilitiescandamagetheworkingrelationshipbetweenmilitaryunitsandcontractorsonthebattlefield.Withoutsomeformofresolution,organizationsmayfailtoreachtheirintendedgoals.Themisconceptionofcontrac-tors’rolesandresponsibilitieshasoverwhelmedcom-mandersandotherleadersforyearsandhascreatedunduestressonthecontractorsobligatedtosupportthem.Confusionhasalsocausedseriouscost-controlandoversightissues.However,ifmilitaryleadersandcontractorsmitigatepotentialproblemsthroughopencommunicationandeducation(technicalandPWS-specific),abetterworkingrelationshipwillresult.
MaSter SerGeant arthUr harriS, jr., USa (ret.), ServeD aS the operational contractinG SUpport Branch noncoMMiSSioneD officerincharGe for the 10th SUStainMent BriGaDe DUrinG operation iraqi freeDoM 09–11. he holDS an M.a. DeGree in procUreMent anD acqUiSition froM weBSter UniverSity anD iS a Doctor of BUSineSS aDMiniStration canDiDate with northcentral UniverSity anD a GraDUate of the SerGeantS Major acaDeMy. he iS DeSiGnateD aS a DeMonStrateD MaSter loGiStician By Sole—the international Society of loGiSticS anD holDS certificationS in lifecycle loGiSticS, proGraM ManaGeMent, anD pUrchaSinG anD contractinG.
A KBR convoy leaves the convoy support center at Joint Base Balad, Iraq. (Photo by SPC Michael Camacho)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 29
nitiativesdevelopedbyMajorGeneralJamesL.HodgewhilehewasthecommandinggeneraloftheMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistribu-tionCommand(SDDC)identifiedtheneedtoprovidedeployingSoldiersandunitswithcriticalcontainermanagementtrainingbeforedeployment.SDDC’sGlob-alContainerManagementDivisionlaunchedadistancelearningmoduleinAugust2009toprovide“justintime”containermanagementtrainingtodeployingunits.
ThemodulewasbuiltthroughacollaborativeeffortamongtheArmyMedicalDepartmentCenterandSchool’sProductionandDevelopmentDivisionCenterforDistributedLearningatFortSamHouston,Texas;theArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand’sTrain-ingSupportDirectorateatFortLee,Virginia;andSDDC.ItwaslaunchedontheArmyTransportationCenterandSchoolwebsite.
PuttingthetrainingontheTransportationCenterandSchoolwebsitemakesitavailableatalllevelsacrosstheArmyandallowstheprogramtobereachedbymoreSoldiersfromawidervarietyofmilitaryoccupationalspecialties.Web-basedtrainingalsoreducestheneedtosendoutglobalcontainermanagementtrainingteamsorbringdeployingpersonneltoFortEustis,Virginia,tomeetdeploymenttrainingrequirements.
ConductingglobalContainerManagementTrainingOnline
I LeadersassignedtotheU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)areaofresponsibilityhavebeenusingtheprogramasatrainingtoolforSoldiersneedingaccesstotheIntegratedBookingSystem-ContainerManagementModule(IBS–CMM).IBS–CMMisaweb-basedtooldesignedforeasyentryandretrievalofcontainermanagementinformation.Itisalsotheprogramusedtoprovideleaderswithvisibilityofcon-tainersinthetheaterandthroughouttheirlifecycle.
“Inthefield,thosewhohavealreadyconductedthetrainingciteitasavaluabletoolintheirexecutionandmanagementofcontainerassetsinthetheater,”saidKennethQueensberry,atraininganalystfortheTrainingSupportDirectorate.“ItwillsaveSoldiersvaluabletimeinpreparingfordeployment,”saidRobertFriedman,formersupervisoroftrafficmanagementforSDDC.“Nowunitscanspendmoretimewiththeirfamiliesbeforetheydeploywhilestilllearningtheskillsneces-sarytosuccessfullymanagetheircontainerassets.”
Amobilitynoncommissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC)tooktheonlineglobalcontainermanagementcourseandnotedthelackoftrainingthathasbeengiventoSoldierswhohavedeployedtotheCENT-COMareaofresponsibilitybeforethistrainingwasavailable.TheNCOICalsocommentedontheuseful-nessandSoldierfriendlinessofthetrainingmodule.
TheContainerManagementCourse,551_CMC–101N,canbeaccessedthroughtheArmyTransportationCenterandSchoolBlackboardwebsitelocatedathttps://trans.ellc.learn.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp.UsersmusthaveanAKO/DKOusernameandpassword.Afterloggingintothewebsite,clickthe“Community”tabandthentype“Container”intothe“OrganizationSearch”boxtotheleftsideofthescreentoaccessthetraining.Toenroll,selectthe“Enroll”button.
Soldierswhoenrollmustcompletea40-hourseriesofmodulesthatculminateswithanexam.FurtherinformationabouttheonlineContainerManagementCoursecanbeobtainedbysendinganemailtothomas.catchings@us.army.mil.
thoMaS catchinGS iS the proGraMS anD SySteM proGraM ManaGer for GloBal container ManaGeMent with the Military SUrface DeployMent anD DiStriBUtion coMManD. he holDS a B.a. DeGree froM alaBaMa State UniverSity anD iS a lean Six SiGMa BlacK Belt. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe’S civilian aDvanceD coUrSe, anD the civilian eDUcation SySteM foUnDation anD BaSic coUrSeS.
by thoMas CatChinGs
The Container Management Course is now available online through the Army Transportation Center and School Blackboard portal. The course provides information on the management and tracking of all containers carrying Department of Defense cargo moving in or outside of the Defense Transportation System from origin to destination and the return of emptied assets to their owners.
30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
uringtimesofnaturalandmanmadedisasters,effectiveandefficientlogisticsoperationsbecomethelifebloodofsurvivorsandservetodirectlymitigatepain,suffering,andcollateraldam-age.Inalogisticallyperfectworld,interagencylogisti-cianswouldarriveatthesceneofadisasterandworktogetherseamlesslytoprovidehumanitarianassistancetosurvivors.Unfortunately,thatisnotthecasebecauseeachresponderorganization(largeandsmall)hasitsownwayofdoingbusiness.Thesedifferencesinoper-atingproceduresoftenresultinredundancy,supply-chainbottlenecks,andreducedorexcessservicesandsuppliestosurvivors.Trainingandworkingtogetherbeforethedisastercanimprovelogisticsprocessesandmakeinteragencylogisticiansmoreeffectiveinaidingsufferingpopulations.
Toimprovetrainingfordisasterlogistics,theArmyLogisticsUniversity(ALU)andtheFederalEmergen-cyManagementAgency(FEMA)havecollaboratedtodeveloptheInteragencyLogisticsCourse(ILC).Thiscoursefillsamuch-neededtrainingvoidindisasterlogisticsbyembeddingthe“wholeofGovernment”approachintoalogistics-basedcurriculumdesignedtotrainkeylogisticianstoworktogetherbeforeaneventtakesplace.FEMAisthecoursesponsor,andtheJointStaffJ–4istheseniormentor.
ChallengesofAgencyInteractionDisasterevents,suchasHurricaneKatrina,this
year’searthquakeinHaiti,andtsunamisinthePacificislands,haveshowntheworldthatlogisticsismosteffectivewhenservedwithahealthydoseof“unityofeffort.”WhenmilitaryandciviliandepartmentsandagencieswithresponsibilitiesforreactingtoFederal,State,andlocalemergencies(naturalandmanmade)traintogetherbeforetheevent,theresultismoreeffec-tiveandefficientlogisticsoperations.
Inaninteragencyenvironment,understandingthecapabilitiesandpracticesofparticipatingorganiza-tions—bothgovernmentalandnongovernmental—istantamounttosuccess.Pasteventshaveshownthatfric-tionandmistrustamongorganizationscanbemitigatedintheinteragencyenvironmentthroughearlycommuni-cation,collaboration,andcooperation.ThisisaculturechangefortheDepartmentofDefense(DOD),whichisaccustomedtostrictcommandandcontrol.
ThisisespeciallytruewhenoneconsidersthatnongovernmentalorganizationsareoftenthefirsttoarriveonthesceneofaneventandhistoricallyhaveworkedseparatelyfromGovernmentagencies.Separa-tion,mistrust,andmisunderstandingofoneanother’scapabilitieshavecausedmassivewasteofresources,bottlenecksinthesupplychain,andgenerallogisticsdysfunctionamongagencies.Thatdoesnotmeanthatsurvivorshavenotbeensavedorrescued;itmeansthatoperationscouldhavebeenexecutedmoreefficientlyandpossiblemoreeffectively.
InteragencyLogisticsTraining:PerpetuatingtheWholeofgovernmentApproachtoDisasterLogistics
by dr. biLLy j. davis
D Key Disaster Response Authorities
l Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
l Homeland Security Act of 2002l Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996l Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002l Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006l Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7, 8,
9, 10, 20, and 21l Executive Orders 12148, 12472, and 12656
The future of national and international security lies in interoperability and cooperation among the Services, the interagency, international partners and non-governmental organizations.
—Admiral Mike Mullen
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 31
ImprovingInteragencyLogisticsPerhapsthemostimportantdynamicforimproving
interagencylogisticsisanopendialogbeforeaneventthatallowseachagencytoclearlyarticulateitscapabili-tiesandthebestpointofentryintoanevent.Dialogamongagencieswillidentifyoutdatedpolicies,overlapsinresponsibilities,andgapsinlogisticssupport.Opendialogsupportstheidealofinterdependencyandhelpsagenciestomoveawayfromstovepipesupportthatcanhampertheoverarchingmissionofsupportingsurvivors.
ILCprovidesatactical-throughstrategic-leveloverviewofinteragencydisasterlogisticsandidenti-fiesparametersforanationallogisticscoordinator.Thecourseoffersaforumandlogisticsexercisesfortheexchangeofbestlogisticspracticesfromtheinteragen-cycommunity.ILCprovidesparticipantswithinsightsthatareuniquetoresponsepartners.Throughinterac-tionbeforeadisaster,ILCcanestablishanunderstand-ingofthepracticesandpoliciesamonginteragencypartners.Thisunderstandingcanimproveandfacilitateamoreunifiedresponsetonationalandinternationaldisastersandemergencies—smallorcatastrophic.
ILChasproventhatwhenyoubringlogisticianstogetherfromGovernmentandnongovernmentalorga-nizations,theylearnfromoneanother.Theycollec-tivelyunderstandappropriatepointsofentrytosupportanevent,betterunderstandorganizationalcapabilities,andidentifylogisticspoliciesandpracticesthatcause
inefficienciesandredundanciesintheinteragencysup-plychain.
IfinteragencylogisticsisthefutureofDODlogis-tics,agenciesmustcollaboratebeforeaneventtobuildknowledgeandtrust.InHomelandSecurityPresidentialDirective–5,ManagementofDomesticIncidents,thePresidentdirectedthedevelopmentofaNationalIncidentManagementSystemandaNationalResponsePlantoalignFederalcoordinationstructures.Thismandatedcollaborativeapproachhelpselimi-nateseamsandtiestogetheracompletespectrumofincidentmanagement.InteragencylogisticstrainingthatbuildscooperationamongDOD,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,FEMA,andfirstrespondersbeforeaneventoccurswillhelpfurtherremovebarri-ersofmisunderstandingandmistrust.
ItisoftensaidthatDODisthethousand-poundgorillaofinteragencylogistics.However,despiteallitscapabilities,DODisseldomthefirstrespondertoarriveonthesceneofadisaster.Fornationalandstateemergencies,themissionoflogisticssupporttosurvivorsisgenerallyaccomplishedfirstbyvol-unteers,theNationalGuardBureau,andstate,local,andtribalorganizations.
Theinternationalprocessofsupportingdisastereventsissimilartothenationalprocess,exceptthattheUnitedNations,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,volunteerorganizations,andothernongovernmentalorga-nizationsarelikelythefirstatthescene.
ParticipantsinthefirstILCclassincludelogisti-ciansandoperatorsfromtheArmy,Navy,AirForce,CoastGuard,FEMA,J–4,ArmyCorpsofEngineers,DefenseLogisticsAgency,GeneralServicesAdminis-tration,U.S.NorthernCommand,AmericanRedCross,U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,andstateandlocalemergencymanagementandvolunteers.
BeginninginNovember2010,theInteragencyLogisticsCoursewillbeofferedquarterlyinresidenceatALUoronsiteifrequired.DODandFEMApar-ticipantsmayregisterforthecoursethroughtheArmyTrainingResourceRequirementsSystem(ATRRS).OtherpersonnelshouldcontacttheILCcoursedirec-torbyphoneat(804)765−4503orbyemailatbilly.davis4@us.army.milforregistrationinformation.
Dr. Billy j. DaviS iS the chair of the loGiSticS operationS coMMittee at the arMy loGiSticS UniverSity. he holDS a B.S DeGree in BUSineSS aDMiniStration froM Saint leo UniverSity, an M.S. DeGree in SeconDary eDUcation froM olD DoMinion UniverSity, anD a ph.D. in eDUcation aDMiniStration anD policy DevelopMent froM virGinia coMMonwealth UniverSity.
The jumble of items in this container demonstrates how poorly executed logistics coordination hampers the mission of getting needed items to the survivors.
32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
uringOperationDesertStorm,LieutenantGeneralWilliamG.“Gus”Pagoniswasknownasthe“logisticspointman”fortheU.S.ArmedForces.NotonlywasheresponsibleforthelogisticsplanforDesertStorm,GeneralH.NormanSchwar-zkopf,Jr.,alsoputhiminchargeofexecutingthatplanontheground.GeneralPagonishelddailypressbriefingsduringoperationsandkeptnotes,after-actionreviews,andotherdocumentsfromthePersianGulfWar,creatingalargepersonalarchive.Duringarecog-nitionceremonyheldinhishonor,LieutenantGeneral(Ret.)PagonisdonatedhisarchivetotheArmyLogis-ticsUniversity(ALU)LibraryatFortLee,Virginia,on17May2010.HisdonationisthefirstadditiontoALU’snewSeniorSustainmentCollection.
PersiangulfWarLogisticsIntroducingGeneralPagonisattheceremony,Major
GeneralJamesE.Chambers,thecommandinggeneraloftheArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand,citedPagonis’smostrecognizedaccomplishments.(GeneralChambersisnowtheJ–4fortheU.S.CentralCom-mand.)“Asthecommandinggeneralofthe22dSup-portCommand[theArmy’stheaterlogisticscommand],GeneralPagoniswasresponsibleforthereceptionandonwardmovementoftroopsandequipmentandtheir
sustainmentinSouthwestAsia,”saidChambers.“Itwasduringthisassignmentthathesuccessfullymastermind-edthelogisticsfortheGulfWar.Hislogisticsstrategyduringthewarhasbeenwidelyregardedasoneofthegreatestachievementsofmilitaryhistory.”
Pagonissharedsomeofhisexperiencesfromthistimeframe,outliningtheadaptabilityneededinthefirst4monthswhenthefewlogisticiansavailabletookchargeoflogisticsoperations.“Wehadsergeantsdoingthejobsofcaptains.Itwasatremendouseffort,”saidPagonis.HeseesDesertStormasthebeginningsofthelogisticsbranchthatistodayareality.“Itdidn’tmat-terwhatyourbranchwas;youwerealogistician,”saidPagonis.“Wetailoredonthebattlefieldtomeetthesitu-ation,andthelogisticalcorpsmadeallthedifference.”
DesertStormoperationsweremodeledonthereturnofforcestoGermany(Reforger)exercise—troopswereflownin,equipmentwasinplaceontheground,andotherequipmentarrivedbyship.Thegoalwastosus-taintroopsandequipmentandmovethemforwardonthebattlefield.
In“ObservationsonGulfWarLogistics,”anarticlethatGeneralPagoniswrotewithColonelMichaelD.KrauseintheSeptember–October1992issueofArmy Logistician,theauthorswrite,“Thecreationoflogis-ticsbaseswasessentialtosustainingthegroundcam-
paign.Thebaseswereintendedtoholdenoughfuel,food,water,andammunitiontosustaintheXVIIIAirborneCorpsandVIICorpsdur-ingtheirpunchintoIraq.”Theselogisticsbasesweresetaheadofcombatarmsforcesonthebattle-fieldandprovided,forthefirsttime,flexiblesupporttomodernmaneuveroperations.
DuringhisALUvisit,GeneralPagonisnotedanotherlogistics
gulfWarLogisticsRecordsDonatedtotheSustainmentCommunity
D
Major General James E. Chambers, the commanding general of the Army Combined Arms Support Command; Lieutenant General (Ret.) William G. “Gus” Pagonis; and Barbara Mroczkowski, the acting president of the Army Logistics University (ALU), unveil a painting honoring Pagonis for his donation to the ALU Library. (Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 33
success—OperationDesertFarwell.“WealwaysforgetDesertFarewell,”saidPagonis.“Whenthewarwasover,Iwasabletosendpeoplehome,butIstayed.Theygaveme6,000individualreadyreserves[IRRs]whoneverdreamedthey’deverbecalledup.”ThoseIRRSoldiersworkedtofulfillanagreementmadebetweenPresidentGeorgeBushandtheKingofSaudiArabiathatallequipmentwouldbesentbacktotheUnitedStatesafterthewar.“Weweregiven2years,”saidPagonis.“Itwasdonein8months.Themottowas,‘Assoonasthisjunk’soutofhereyougettogohome,’andthat’sallthelogisticiansneededtoheartomakeitwork.”
PreservingandSharingKnowledgeDuringthePersianGulfWar,Pagonisconducted
about2,000interviewsandhadeverypressconfer-enceandinterviewvideotaped.Hekeptvideooraudiorecords,photographs,books,magazines,operationorders,after-actionreports,maps,monographs,andaplethoraofbriefingpapersandhistoricaldocuments.Theresultingcollectionisapproximately1,100linearfeet.“Theserecordsreallyweren’tmine,”saidGeneralPagonisduringthepresentationtoALU.“TheyweretheUnitedStatesArmy’sthatIheldandcollected.”
PagonishadalreadyreceivedauthorizationtodonatetherecordstoPennsylvaniaStateUniversityandtheArmyMilitaryHistoryInstituteatCarlisleBarracks,Pennsylvania.HeinsteadchoseALU,wheretherecordscanbeputtocontinuedusebythesustainmentcommu-nity.“I’mhopingbybeing[stored]herewherelogisti-ciansaregoingtobecomingtogether,wewon’tmakethesamemistakesoverandover,”saidPagonis.
“Thisistrulyanexcitingdayforourlibraryandfortheuniversity,sincethisisthefirstcollectiontobeaddedtoournewlogisticslibrary,”saidBarbaraMroczkowski,theactingpresidentofALU.“Wethankyou[GeneralPagonis]verymuch,andknowthatwewilltakeverygoodcareofthematerialsthatyouhaveentrustedtous,whileatthesametimemakingthemavailabletothegreatercommunityasaprimarysourceoflogisticsinformationontheArmyandontheArmy’sinvolvementintheGulfWar.”
“Thegiftprovidesanessentialresourceforsus-tainmentSoldiers,historians,andourresearchersthatwillbroadentheirunderstandingofthisverypivotaltimeinourhistory,”saidGeneralChambers.“Theyarearchiveitemsthatweredonewithgreatdetailfromamanwiththeinsighttorecordwhatwashap-pening,knowingthatsomedaywewouldwanttorecallandlearnfromthoselessons.”
ChambersnotedthesignificancetherecordswillholdforstudentsatALU.“Forcesustainerswillhaveaccesstoimportantpapersthatilluminatethelogisti-calpushintoKuwaitduringOperationDesertShield/DesertStorm,”saidChambers.“Theywillbeabletoseewhatwastried,whatworked,whatdidn’twork,andthenwhatcorrectionsweremadetomakethemwork.ThesepapershaveasignificantplaceinourNation’shistoryandinourNation’smilitaryhistory,anditisamajorhonorforthislibrarytohousethem.”
JohnShields,referencelibrarian,formallyacceptedthePagonisdonationonbehalfoftheALULibrary,wherethecollectionwillbearchivedandavailableforofficialandresearchpurposes.Torecognizethedona-tion,abustofGeneralPagonishasbeencommissionedfromVirginiaStateUniversityfordisplayinthelibrary.
Donationsofpapersandotherarchivalmaterialsfromothersustainmentleadersarebeingsolicitedtoaddtothecollection.AnyoneinterestedinmakingadonationcancontacttheArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommandhistorianbyemailatsteve.anders@us.army.milorbytelephoneat(804)734–0082.
—Story by Julianne E. Cochran
General Pagonis signs a copy of Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, which he coauthored with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, for a Korean officer attending the Army Logistics University. (Photo by James Fortune, Fort Lee Visual Information Service Center)
Some of the many artifacts donated by General Pagonis to the Army Logistics University Library. (Photo by James
Fortune, Fort Lee Visual Information Service Center)
34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
hedoctrinalmissionofaforwardsupportcompany(FSC)istoprovideagile,multifunc- tionallogisticssupporttoitsmaneuverbattalion.Whenthesupportedunitisageneralsupportaviationbattalion(GSAB)withorganicCH–47FChinook,UH–60BlackHawk,andmedicalevacuation(MEDE-VAC)helicopters,theFSCmustdemonstrateflexibilityandresponsivenessasitprovidesorganicgroundmain-tenance,fuel,anddistributionsupport.
Thatflexibilityandresponsivenessbecameexpo-nentiallymorecriticalwhenthealreadydiverse7thBattalion,101stAviationRegiment(7–101AviationBattalion),159thCombatAviationBrigade,trans-formedintoamultifunctionalaviationtaskforce3monthsbeforedeployingtoOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)09–11.TheformationandmissionexpandedsignificantlyastheorganicGSABabsorbedAH–64ApacheandOH–58KiowaWarriorhelicoptersandpreparedtosupportall15provincesofRegionalCommand-EastinAfghanistan.
Thefivemajormissionsetsthatthebattalionsup-portedwereairassault;aerialdignitarymovementsandaerialresupply;reconnaissance,security,andattack;quickreactionforce;andMEDEVAC.Throughoutthisdramatictransformation,ECompany,the7–101Avia-tionBattalion’sFSC,wasrequiredtodevelopcreative
solutionstoaccomplishitsdoctrinalmissionswhiletakingonadditionalmissionsnecessarytoprovideagile“supportataltitude”tothisnewformationknownasTaskForceEagleLift.
ECompanyAccomplishments
Inits12-monthOEFtour,ECompanysupportedTaskForceEagleLiftacrossthefullspectrumofavia-tionsupportastheunitexecutedover215airassaults,transportedover85,000personneland4,800tonsofcargo,launchedover1,200reconnaissanceandsecu-ritymissions,andsupportedover900MEDEVACcalls.Bytheendofitstour,ECompanyhadissued1.2milliongallonsofaviationfueland100,000roundsofammunitionandhadconductedover100sling-loadmissionswhilethetaskforceflewover4,500missionsand39,000combatflighthours.DueinnosmallparttotheagilesupportprovidedbyitsFSC,TaskForceEagleLiftflewmorehoursacrossamorediversemis-sionsetthananyotheraviationtaskforcepreviouslydeployedtoAfghanistan.
Tosupportitstaskforce’sdiversemission,ECom-panysuccessfullyrestructureditstaskorganizationtomeetnewchallengesduringitscombattour.Inaddi-tiontoitsnormalfuelandmaintenancemissions,thecompanyassumeddutiesasthetaskforce’sclassV
“SupportatAltitude”foraMultifunctionalAviationTaskForce
by Captain MiChaeL r. MiLLer
T
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 35
(ammunition)manager,wastaskedwithprovidingaconsolidatedarmsroom,andbecamethebattalion’sprimaryproviderforforceprotectionpersonnel.Thesenewmissionsrequiredthecreationofnewsectionswithinthecompany,intensivecross-trainingtofillnewpersonnelvacancies,andultimately,thedevelopmentofnewtactics,techniques,andprocedures(TTP)foraccomplishingthemission.
AmodularapproachtotaskorganizationallowedECompanytopullSoldiersfromeachsectiontofillpersonnelrequirementsnotdoctrinallyorganictotheformation.Bycross-trainingtomeetthesepersonnelshortfalls,SoldiersinECompanycouldbesuccess-fullypluggedinandrotatedasneeded.Thisapproachpreventedmentalburnoutandfacilitatedmidtourleaveschedulingbyminimizingtheadverseimpactonmis-sionaccomplishment.ThedevelopmentofnewTTPgavetheSoldiersofECompanyownershipoftheirmis-sionswhilemaximizingflexibleandresponsivesupporttothetaskforce’smaneuvercompanies.
TaskOrganizationECompany’screativetaskorganizationenabledit
toaccomplishavarietyofnewtasksinadditiontoitsdoctrinalmissions.UnlikeFSCsinsupportofheavyorinfantrybrigadecombatteams,ECompanyisdoc-trinallyorganictothe7–101AviationBattalion.ThebattalionconsolidateditsformationatBagramAirfieldwhiledeployedandassumedageneralsupportmissiontogroundforcesinitsareaofoperations.
Despitebeingcentrallylocated,themissionofthebattaliontaskforcerequiredittooperatenearlyevery-whereineasternAfghanistananditsFSCtooccupytwooutlyingforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)topro-videclassIII(petroleum,oils,andlubricants)andVsupport.Todothisafterlosing10personneltoasistertaskforce,ECompanytransformeditsdistributionpla-toonbycreatingthreesquadsof10Soldierseach.
Thisplatoonorganizationallowedtwosquadstosupport24-houroperationsatitstwoforwardarmingandrefuelingpoints(FARPs),whilethethirdsquadremainedatBagramtosupportcontingency“jumpFARP”missionsandcoldfueloperations.[AFARPisusedbyaviationunitstoplacefuelforwardonabattlefieldinordertoextendahelicopter’srangeormaximizeitstimeoveranobjective.Byplacingfuelandammunitionasclosetothehelicopter’sobjectiveasthetacticalsituationallows,itsturn-aroundtimeforfuelandammunitionisreducedanditssupportoftroopsismaximized.AjumpFARPistemporaryinnatureandreferstoaFARPthatcanbesetupandtorndownquicklyandisableto“jump”fromlocationtolocation.]Squadsrotatedevery3to4weeksduringsteady-stateoperationsandasnecessaryduringperiodsofincreasedoperatingtempo(OPTEMPO).
ClassIIIWhileatthecompany’soutlyingFARPs,refueling
personnelwererequiredtoworkhand-in-handwiththeFOBlandowners,whichincludedbothU.S.groundunitsandNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationforces.RelationshipsatbothFARPsbecamemutuallysupport-ive.ECompanyrefuelersoftenprovidedgroundunitswithfuelandgroundmaintenancesupportinexchangeforlife-supportenhancements.
AH–64 Apache and OH–58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters from Task Force Eagle Lift await fuel and ammunition at one of E Company’s forward arming and refueling points in Afghanistan.
E Company Soldiers prepare to sling load 500gallon collapsible fuel drums on a CH–47F
Chinook. The fuel drums were prestaged to shorten response times during replenishment missions.
36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
AtoneECompanyFARP,locatedataFrenchout-post,refuelpersonneloftenrefueledFrenchaircraftand,becauseofitsausterelocation,assistedwiththepost’sforceprotectionbyestablishingfightingposi-tionsaroundtheFARPandtheFrenchtaskforce’sclassVstoragearea.ThesemutuallybeneficialrelationshipseffectivelydemonstratedECompany’sapproachtounitsupport.Bybuildingstrongpartner-shipsatoutlyingFARPsandhelpingunitsatthoseFOBsaccomplishtheirmissions,ECompanywasultimatelybetterabletoprovideagilesupporttoTaskForceEagleLift.
ClassVTofulfillitsclassVmission,ECompanyformedan
ammunitionsectiontoperformadministrative,storage,handling,andissuingfunctionsforclassV.Theammu-nitionsectionmaintainedday-to-dayaccountabilityofthetaskforce’sauthorizedbasicloadandreplenishedclassVstocksasneeded.Thesectionconsistedoffourschool-trainedmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)89-seriesammunitionpersonnel(oneMOS89Aammu-nitionstockcontrolandaccountingspecialistandthreeMOS89Bammunitionspecialists)whowereaug-mentedbytwoadditionalpersonnel(bothMOS91Bwheeled-vehiclemechanics).
LackingatraditionalclassIII/VplatoonandoperatingpredominantlyatBagram,theammunitionsectionwasassignedtotheheadquartersplatoonandwasdirectlysupervisedbythecompany’sexecutiveofficer,anord-nanceofficer.Thissubject-matterexpertisemitigatedtheeffectsofhavingnonammunitionpersonnelassignedtothesectionandstrengthenedthesectiontothepointthatammunitionoperationsbecamearelativestrength.
ECompanymaintaineditsmodularapproachtotaskorganizationwiththeconsolidatedarmsroom.Atotalof10Soldierswerepulledfromassignmentsinotherplatoonstoserveasarmorers.Withthreetoashiftandanoncommissionedofficer-in-chargetofloatbetween
shifts,thearmorerswereabletoprovide24-hoursup-port.Theyusedasign-outsystemtoaccountforthetaskforce’sweaponsandsensitiveitemsthatwereusedduringflightsandday-to-dayoperations.
ArmsroompersonnelofallMOSsweretrainedtoperformsmall-armsmaintenanceattheunitlevelandpost-flightweaponscleaning,effectivelyrelievingflightcrewsofthatchoreandallowingthemtofocusonmissionpreparationandpost-flightaircraftmain-tenance.Thissupportshortenedthe12-to14-hourdutydaysofcrews.ECompanyarmsroompersonnelmaintainedandcleaned426weaponsassignedtoTaskForceEagleLift’sflightcompanieswithoutasingleweaponmalfunctionwhenitcountedmost.
Byrotatingpersonnelevery3to4months,theconsolidatedarmsroomwasabletomaintainarobustsupportcapabilityduringrestandrecuperationleavesandperiodsofincreasedOPTEMPO,muchlikethedistributionplatoondid.
Cross-TrainingECompany’screativetaskorganizationwasmade
possiblebywidespreadcross-training.Thecompanyleaders’goalbeforedeployingwastotraineachSoldierinasecondMOS.Bydoingthis,personnelshortagescreatedbynewmissionscouldbefilledfromabroadpooloftrainedSoldiersandthelackof“appropriate”MOSsforthesenewmissionscouldbeovercome.
ThecompanyknewitwouldassumenewmissionsinAfghanistan,soleadersplacedastrongfocusontrainingSoldiersinsimilartasksinordertoachievetheclosestpossiblematchofskills.Forexample,oneFARPfunctionistoprovideclassVrearmament;withoutorganicMOS15Jand15Y(OH–58DKiowaWarriorandAH–64DApacheLongbowarmament,electrical,andavionicssystemsrepairers,respectively)Soldierstoperformthisduty,ECompanyreliedoncross-trainedpetroleumsupplypersonneltoaccom-plishthismission.
Trainingwasprovidedbyarma-mentpersonnelassignedtothebat-talion’sattackandreconnaissancecompanyandcertifiedbyapilotincommand(PC).Thetrainingresult-edinFARPpersonnelbeingcertifiedtohandleand“hot”load.50-caliber
An E Company Soldier with military occupational specialty (MOS) 88M, motor transport operator, is supervised while rearming an OH–58 Kiowa Warrior. E company’s 88M Soliders were crosstrained and worked alongside its 92F petroleum supply specialists at the company’s forward arming and refueling points.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 37
rounds,30-millimeterrounds,and2.75-inchrockets.Bypairingcloselymatchedskillstogetherandcertifyingrefuelpersonneltoperformmultipletasks,noadditionalpersonnelwererequiredtomanthecompany’sFARPs.
Cross-trainingwasequallyemphasizedinthemain-tenanceplatoon.Recognizingthatmaintenanceperson-nelwouldmostoftenbepulledtofulfillothertaskswithinthebattalionandwereECompany’sprimarysourceofarmsroompersonnel,apremiumwasplacedonhavingawidevarietyofmaintenancecapabilitiesatalltimeswithasfewpeopleaspossible.RatherthanlimitingautomotivemaintenancetojustMOS91BSoldiers,allmaintenancepersonnelweretrainedtoperformwheeled-vehiclemaintenance.
Thissameapproachwasalsousedwiththecom-pany’s91Bs,whoweretrainedtoperformmaintenancetasksnormallyassignedto91Cs(utilitiesequipmentrepairers),91Ds(powergenerationequipmentrepairers),and91Js(quartermasterandchemicalequipmentrepair-ers).Thecompany’sMOS91Ws(metalworkers)and92As(automatedlogisticalspecialists)weretrainedtoperformmaintenancetasksonallgroundequipment.
Bycross-trainingallpersonnelwithinthemaintenanceplatoon,ECompany’smaintenancesupervisorsmaxi-mizedtheirsupporttothetaskforcewithlimitedperson-nelwhileavoidingincreasedrepairtime,nomatterwhattypeofvehicleorequipmentrequiredmaintenance.
NewTactics,Techniques,andProceduresECompanynotonlycreativelyreorganizeditselfto
accomplishnewmissionsbutalsodevelopednewTTPtoaccomplishdoctrinalmissions.Aircraftrefuelingisadoctrinalmission,butitwasbyfarECompany’smostrobusttaskanddemandedthemostcreativeTTPtobeaccomplishedsuccessfully.
FARPsoperatedbyECompanywereoriginallytem-poraryinnature.Fuelwassling-loadedasnecessaryusing500-galloncollapsibledrumsforadesignatedtimeandpumpedintoaircraftusingtheadvancedaviationfor-wardarearefuelingsystem.Thismethodoftenrequiredadditionalfueldrumsonshortnotice.Toremedythisburden,ECompany’sdistributionplatoonensuredthatadditionaldrumswerefilledandriggedforslingloadatalltimes.Asoperationsincreased,sodidthenumberofdrumsthattheplatoonstaged.Abattledrillwasdevel-opedtoquicklyalerttheplatoon’ssling-loadteamswhenadditionaldrumswererequiredonshortnotice.
ThedistributionplatooneventuallytookthisbattledrillastepfurtheranddevisedawaytoprepackageitsjumpFARPequipmentinaJohnDeereGatorandaccompanyingtrailer.Thisroll-on,roll-offcapabilityensuredthatminimaltimewasdedicatedtopack-ing,loading,andoffloadingtheaircraftduringtime-sensitivesupportmissions.OnceloadedaboardtheChinook,preriggedfueldrumswerepickedupandtheentirepackagewasenroutetoitsobjective.Thebattle
drillforthissupportcapabilityincludedfuelsamplingandtesting,equipmentchecks,andpersonnelnotifica-tioninadditiontoequipmentupload.Byconfiguringallnecessaryequipmentintoareadilyavailablepack-age,theplatooncouldquicklyloadaChinook,deploytothesiteofitsjumpFARP,andbeoperationalinaslittleas12hoursfollowingnotification.
Atonepointduringitsdeployment,fueloperationsexceededECompany’sabilitytomaintainenoughfueldrums.Toovercomethisshortfall,thecompanyobtainedthenecessaryequipmentandemplacedaper-manentfuelsystemsupplypoint(FSSP)atoneofitsassignedFARPs.TheFARPretaineditsrearmamentcapabilityandremainedapredominantlyKiowafuelpoint.However,theFSSPgaveitthecapabilitytosup-portallU.S.aircraftandmanycoalitionaircraftwithoutthedangerofoperationaldemandsexceedingresources.
Thisincreasedfuelcapacityandtheavailabilityofarobustammunitionpackageenabledreconnaissanceandattackaircrafttomaximizestationtimeinsupportofgroundforcesandreducetheirturnaroundtimewhenfuelandammunitionwereneeded.Byexpandingcapabilitiesbeyonditsdoctrinalmission,ECompanydirectlyandpositivelyaffectedTaskForceEagleLift’stacticalmission.
ExpandedSupportMissionECompanyassumeditsclassVsupportmission
becauseoftheaviationtaskforceconfigurationthebat-talionassumedbeforedeploying.Bynecessity,themis-sionnormallyexecutedentirelybythebrigade’saviationsupportbattalion(ASB)felltoFSCsindirectsupportoftheirlinebattalions.DuringTaskForceEagleLift’sOEFrotation,itsApachesandKiowaswereheavyconsumersofclassV(specifically30-millimeterand.50-caliberroundsand2.75-inchrockets)andconstantattentionwasrequiredtoensurethatsufficientstocksofthesemunitionswereavailableatalltimes.
ECompanyensuredthatammunitionhandlerswereonsiteatpeakhourstokeepthereadyammunitionstorageareastockedwiththreefullloadsofclassVforeachaircraftinadditiontotheammunitionthatwasalreadyplacedateachaircraft’sparkingpad.Ammuni-tionpersonnelindirectsupportoftheseaircraftworkedwithcrewchiefstorestockparkingpadseachmorningandidentifywhichammunitiontypeswererequiredingreaterquantities.
AmmunitionpersonnelconductedroutinepickupsfromBagram’sammunitionsupplypointbasedoncon-sumptionratesduringsteady-stateoperations.WhenOPTEMPOspeakedduringAfghanistan’snationalelections,havingpersonnelandsufficientammunitionstocksonhandbecameparticularlyvital.
UrgentresuppliesofclassVwererequiredatECompany’soutlyingFARPs.Workingonsitewiththetaskforce’sApacheandKiowaWarriorhelicoptersandmaintainingclosecontactwiththetaskforce’s
38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
tacticaloperationscenterenabledammunitionper-sonneltoquicklyloadwaitingaircraftwithadditionalclassVformovementtoECompany’sFARPs.TheammunitionpersonnelsuccessfullyrestockedoneFARPinunderanhour,allowingattackaircraftintheareatomaintainvaluablesupporttoagroundunitincontactwiththeenemy.
Tomorecompletelymeettheneedsofitsflightcompanies,specificallyduringrearmingandrefuelingstopsatitsFARPs,ECompanycreatedclassI(sub-sistence)sustainmentpacksthatcouldbequicklyandeasilyhandedtopilotsandcrewswhiletheywereontheground.These“brownbaglunches”usuallycon-sistedofconsumableitemsthatcouldbeeatenquicklyorstowedawayforconsumptionduringflight.Duringthecolderseasons,sustainmentpacksincludedther-mosesofcoffeeorhotchocolate.Duringnightopera-tions,theyusuallyincludedRip-Itcaffeinatedenergydrinks.ECompany’sgoalinprovidingthese“creaturecomforts”atitsFARPswastomakeitsbattalion’scombatmissionthesolefocusofitspilotsandcrewswhiletheywereinthecockpit.
BecauseoftheruggedterrainandtheresultingisolationofsomecoalitionFOBs,Afghanistanisanair-centrictheater.ThisrealitymadeitessentialthatECompanypersonnelbecomeexpertsatslingload-ingduringtheirOEFdeployment.ManyECompanySoldierswerealreadyair-assaultqualified,butbecausepreviousdeploymentstoIraqdidnotrequirearelianceonsling-loadmovements,manyofECompany’sper-sonnelrequiredadditionalsling-loadtraining.
PathfinderSupportECompanyoftenworkedwithTaskForceEagle
Lift’spathfinderplatoontorigloadsfororganicandsupportedunits.Manyloads,suchastriplecontainers
(TRICONs)andBobcatearthmovers,wereconsid-erednonstandardandrequiredextraattentiondur-ingrigging.Duringhookupoperations,ECompanyreliedonair-assaultqualifiedpersonneltoattachriggedloadstoChinooksformovement.Thesling-loadpersonnelandthepilotsmovingtheloadsdevel-opedacloserelationshipandalevelofcomfortbyworkingtogetherdaily.
ECompanyapplieditscreativesupportapproachtopathfinderoperationsaswell.TheprimarymissionofTaskForceEagleLift’spathfinderswastherecoveryofflightcrewsandpassengersinthecaseofadownedaircraft.Thesemissionsusuallyaccompaniedadownedaircraftrecoveryteamandwereoftenlonginduration.
Tosupportthesecontingencymissions,ECompanyusedthe“speedball”conceptandbuiltasustainmentpackagethatcouldbeloadedaboardaBlackHawkhelicopterbyabuddyteam.Thepackageconsistedofwaterandmeals,readytoeat,tosupport20Soldiersfor24hours,sunscreen,workgloves,andadditionalradiobatteries.
Abattledrillwasdevelopedinwhichthepath-finderteamleaderwouldcallbacktothetaskforce’stacticaloperationscenterandrequestthepackage.ECompanywouldbenotifiedandcouldloadthepackageontoawaitingaircraftfordeliverytothepathfindersontheground.This“speedball”reducedtheamountofclassItakenbythepathfinderteam,effectivelyreducingtheSoldiers’combatloadandincreasingtheirmissionreadiness.
ECompany’ssuccessinprovidingflexibleandresponsivesupportduringOEF09–11waslargelyduetoitscreativeproblem-solving.Itsapproachtotaskorganization,cross-training,andmissionsupportulti-matelymaximizedECompany’ssupportcapability.
ReorganizingitsformationtomeetnewtasksinadditiontoitsdoctrinalmissionsenabledECom-panytoprovideflexiblesupport.ThisreorganizationrequiredECompanytocross-trainitspersonneltofillgapscreatedbythesenewandexpandedmissions.Thecompanyleaders’originalgoalwastogiveeachSol-dierinECompanyasecondMOS,andthisprovedtobeasuccess.NewapproachestomissionsupportandthedevelopmentofnewTTPcompletedtheirapproachtoresponsivesustainmentforthe7–101AviationBat-talionwhiledeployed.
captain Michael r. Miller iS aSSiGneD to the arMy hUMan reSoUrceS coMManD at fort Knox, KentUcKy. he waS the coMManDer of e coMpany, 7th Battalion, 101St aviation reGiMent, 159th coMBat aviation BriGaDe, DUrinG itS operation enDUrinG freeDoM 09–11 DeployMent. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in exerciSe Science froM MarqUette UniverSity anD iS a GraDUate of the arMy orDnance officer BaSic coUrSe anD the coMBineD loGiSticS captainS career coUrSe.
An E Company Soldier refuels an OH–58 Kiowa Warrior at one of the company’s FARPs. In the foreground, 2.75inch rockets are staged for rearming attack and reconnaissance aircraft.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 39
heU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielAgency(USAM-MA)atFortDetrick,Maryland,issubordinatetotheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandandservesastheArmy’slife-cyclemanage-mentcommandforclassVIII(medicalmateriel).ThemissionofUSAMMAistoplan,synchronize,andprovidemedicallogisticsforhealthservicesupporttoforcesconductingjointandfull-spectrumopera-tionsbymanagingmedicalmateriellife-cycleprojects,equippingandsustainingthemedicalforce,managingmedicalstrategiccentralizedprograms,andadvancingperformanceexcellence.
USAMMAperformsitsmissionwiththeArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)inareassuchasArmypre-positionedstocks(APS),left-behindequipment(LBE),andreset.Asthelife-cyclemanagementcommandforclassVIII,USAMMAisresponsibleforequippingandsustainingmedicalunits,whichmustbedoneusingtheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)model.TheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandandUSAMMAmakeupthemedicalgeneratingforceasitrelatestoequippingunitsundertheAFRORGENmodelformedicalunits.
Toaccomplishthistask,USAMMAhasdevelopedtheMedicalMaterielReadinessProgram(MMRP)tosupporttheArmy’smostcomplexmedicalunit,thecombatsupporthospital(CSH).TheMMRPsolu-tionforaddressingARFORGENCSHequippingissuesfocusesonthreetenets:o DefineaCSHbaselineequip-
mentsettobemaintainedathomestation.
o Equipthegeneratingforcemedi-caltrainingbase.
o Controlequipmentnotathomestationthroughawell-defined,centralizedmedicalequipmentmanagementprogrammaintainedbyUSAMMAbyapplyingmanyoftheconceptsassociatedwiththeAPSprogram.
EquippingtheCombatSupportHospital:ACaseStudy
T ThisarticlewilldiscussmanagingmedicalmaterielinaCSHandtheMMRPsolutiontoassistinaddress-ingmedicalmaterielreadinessissuesinARFORGEN.
EquippingChallengesOnanygivenday,USAMMAmustbalancethe
equippingrequirementsofdeployingunit,reset,LBE,modernizationofequipmentandsets,kits,andoutfits(SKO),andtheaterdemands.Theresourcesrequiredtomeettheseequippingdemandsareoverwhelmingatbest,buttheArmy’sTitle10responsibilitiesmustbemet.Iftheycannotbemet,stepsmustbetakentomitigatetherisksassociatedwithunitmaterielrequire-mentsnotbeingfullysatisfied.
DuringtheearlydaysofOperationIraqiFreedom,USAMMAandHeadquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy(HQDA),realizedthatthemandatetoequipallunitsto100percentwasnolongerviableunlessmil-lionsofdollarswerepouredintotheequippingandsustainmentaccounts.Notonlywouldfundinghavetoincrease,sowouldtheforcesmaintenanceandsustain-mentprograms,asdemonstratedbytheLBEprograminitiatedinfiscalyear2008.
AsUSAMMAjoinedhandswithAMCtoassistwiththeLBEprogram,bothorganizationsfoundthatthe
by Lieutenant CoLoneL CharLes h. strite, jr.
This operating room suite in a combat support hospital (CSH)
demonstrates the complexity of the equipment required for the CSH.
40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
forces’equipmentwasnotbeingmaintainedproperly.Infact,USAMMAlearnedoveraperiodofmorethan2years(2008to2010)thatin6Activecomponent248-bedCSHs,approximately50percentofthemedicalequip-mentwasnotmissioncapable.ThisvalidatedalreadyperceivedanecdotalevidenceandcameasnogreatsurprisetoUSAMMA.ItprovidedthefactsUSAMMAneededtomoveforwardwithitsMMRPinitiative.
ReducingUnitEquipmentOvertheyears,theArmyMedicalDepartmenthas
foundthatattainingunitreadinessuponmobilizationcreatesmanychallenges.DuringtheearlydaysofOperationDesertStorm,medicalprophylaxesmedica-tionssuchastheMARKI(nerveagentantidote)kitwerefoundtobeexpiredormissing.Similarly,medi-calexpendableitemswithashelflifeandexpirationdatewerefoundtobeexpiredornotonhanduponmobilization.TheOfficeofTheSurgeonGeneral(OTSG),alongwithUSAMMA,madethecasetoHQDAinthemid-1990stocentralizethestorageandmaintenanceofMARKIkitsandexpendablemedi-calitems.Generally,unitswerenolongerrequiredtomaintaintheseitemsathomestation;USAMMAwouldtakeonthisresponsibility.
DuringtheearlydaysofOperationsEnduringFreedomandIraqiFreedom,thosedecisionsproved
tobeinvaluable.NotonlydidUSAMMAdelivertothedeployingunits,thesecentralizedprogramssavedtensofmillionsofdollarsandallowedforrapidunitdeployment.Mostimpressive,manyoftheproblemsthatwereidentifiedfrommedicalunitdeploymentsforOperationDesertShieldwerenotrepeated.Simplystated,medicalcentralizedstorageprogramsareeffi-cientandeffective.
Thefiscalyears2008to2013ProgramObjec-tiveMemorandum(POM),whichwasdevelopedin2006,appliedlessonslearnedandmitigatedtheissuesassociatedwithunitmaintenance,withthegoalofequippingunitsto100percentoftheirmodificationtablesoforganizationandequipment(MTOEs).Thisdevelopedaradicalparadigmshiftinequippingmedi-calunits.Specifically,USAMMAfocusedonitsmostcomplexorganization,theCSH,whichincludesover1,700medicalequipmentitems.AnActivecomponentCSHincludesan84-bedcompanyattheunit’slocationanda164-bedcompanylocatedatSierraArmyDepot,California.Thisparadigmincludedaconcepttodelib-eratelyreduceunit-ownedequipmentwhileincreasinguseoftheunit-leasedconceptthroughprovenbusinessprocesses,suchasAPS.
Alongwithreducingunit-ownedequipment,USAMMA’sconceptincludedimprovingthegen-eratingforce’strainingbaselocationsandcentrally
These containers at Sierra Army Depot, California, store an MMRP combat support hospital.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 41
managedmedicalequippingprograms.ThisconceptwouldbecomeoneofUSAMMA’skeyinitiativesintheirstrategicplan—theMMRP.Formanyreasons,USAMMAwasnotpermittedtoincludetheMMRPinitiativeinits2006POM,butitwasaskedtofurtherdeveloptheconceptwiththeArmyForcesCommand(FORSCOM),HQDA,OTSG,andotherstakeholders.
RefiningMMRPTenetsInfiscalyear2006,USAMMAparticipatedina
studywiththeArmyProgramManagementOfficeStudyProgramCoordinationCommitteeWorkingGrouptofurtherdevelopitsMMRPinitiative.ThisstudyservedasthecatalystforthefundingthatallowedUSAMMA,inconcertwithOTSG,toprogramsomeofUSAMMA’sMMRPinitiativeintotheequippingPOMsforfiscalyears2010to2015and2012to2017.The2010POMrecognizedthethreeMMRPtenets.
In2007and2008,USAMMAmetwithanumberofstakeholderstodeveloptheMMRPconceptandquick-lyrealizedthedifficultyofdefiningthefirstMMRPtenet:Whatshouldbemaintainedathomestation,andwhatisthepurposeofthisequipment(trainingonlyortrainingandmissionsupport)?
Anothermajorchallengewastoestablishthesec-ondtenet:Whataretheorganizationsinthemedicaltrainingbase,andwhatequipmentisneededtoappro-priatelymeetthetrainingrequirements?Forexample,forhospitalization,USAMMAismandatedtosup-porttheArmyReservegeneratingforceregionaltrainingsites-medical(RTSs–MED)locationsatFortGordon,Georgia;FortMcCoy,Wisconsin;andCampParks,California,alongwiththeU.S.ArmyMedicalCommand’s(USAMEDCOM’s)hospitaltrainingsitelocatedatCampBullis,Texas.Additionalundocu-mentedrequirementswerenoted,withthelargestonebeingtheFirstArmy,whichneededequipmentforvalidatingunitsbeforemobilization.Unfortunately,formanyreasons,USAMMAcouldnotgainanytrac-tionondevelopingaholisticmulticomponentmedicaltrainingbase.
ModernizingCSHsAsabridgingstrategytoequipthethirdMMRP
tenet,theArmyprovidedapproximately$30millionforequipmentandoverheadcoststomodernizefourCSHsunderOTSG’sandUSAMMA’scontroltosup-portU.S.ArmyReserveCommand(USARC)hospi-tals.ThesefourCSHsbelongtotheUSARCReserveComponentHospitalDecrement(RCHD)programlocatedatSierraArmyDepot.Essentially,USAMMAmodernized4antiquated248-bedCSHswithintheRCHDprogramtothelatestMTOEauthorizationandSKOavailableforanydeployingCSH,regardlessofcomponent.USAMMAalsopartneredwithSierraArmyDepottoupdatealargewarehousetofacilitate
themaintenance,storage,andsustainmentoperationsofthesehospitals,whichreplicatestheirAPSfacilitiesandprocessesaroundtheworld.
Thedecisionin2007tomodernizefourhospitalsintheUSARCRCHDprogramastheintroductiontothethirdMMRPtenetmanagedbyUSAMMAprovedinvaluablebecauseaCONUS-basedCSHwasdirectedtodeploytoAfghanistaninOctober2009.ThedeployingCSH’sequipmentwaslessthanadequatefromamodernizationandsustainmentperspective.Attheunit’srequest,OTSGsupportedtheuseofaMMRPCSHfromthemedicalcentral-izedstorageprogramfortheCSH’sdeploymenttoAfghanistan.HadtheMMRPCSHnotbeenavail-able,thedeployingCSHwouldhaverequiredmonthsofpreparations,includinginventories,maintenanceservices,equipmentpurchases,modernizations,andupgrades,beforedeployingtoAfghanistan.HavingtodothiswouldhaveputtheCSH’sarrivaldateinjeopardy.Thisisnotanindictmentoftheunitbutanindicationoftheequippingmodelcurrentlyestab-lishedforCSHs.
MergingHospitalAssetsAlthoughitwassuccessfulinmodernizingthefour
CSHsandtheinfrastructureatSierraArmyDepot,USAMMAstillneededadecisiononreducingunit-assignedequipmentathomestation—MMRP’sfirsttenet,theCSHbaselineequipmentset.USAMMA’srecommendationonreducingunit-assignedequip-mentincludedreexaminingwhatwasathomestationandwhatbelongedtotheunitbutwasstoredatSierraArmyDepotintheFORSCOMHospitalOptimiza-tionStandardizationProgram(HOSP).TheHOSPwasdesignedtotakethe164-bedCSHsatFORSCOMlocationsandcentralizethematSierraArmyDepot,usingamemorandumofagreementwithAMC.ThememorandumofagreementbetweenFORSCOMandAMCprovidedforthestorageandmaintenanceoftheunits’164-bedCSHsonareimbursablebasis,whiletheunitsmaintainedtheir84-bedCSHsathomestation.
Specifically,USAMMArecommendedthattheUSARCRCHDandtheFORSCOMHOSPassetsatSierraArmyDepotbemergedintooneprogramman-agedbyUSAMMAtocreateefficienciesandreducethemaintenanceburdenonowningunits.Ultimately,manyfeltthisbridgingstrategytomergethetwodisparateprogramswouldprovideamoreresponsivehospitalsettodeployingforces,bothathomeandabroad.Infact,thecommanderofthe18thMedicalCommand(MEDCOM)andthe121stCSHinKorearequestedthatUSAMMAmaintainitsCSHbasedonUSAMMA’ssuccesswithsimilarunitswithintheAPSprogramlocatedatCampCarroll,Korea.USAMMAacceptedthisrequest,andthereadinessofthe121stCSHhasimprovedimmensely.The121st
42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
CSH’smaintenanceservicesarenowontrack,dozensofequipmentitemshavebeenreplaced,andtheunitwasfullymodernizedinfiscalyear2010.
AddressingMMRPConcernsDuringaFORSCOMCSHcommanders’meetingin
2008,USAMMAbriefedonthethreetenetsofMMRP,themergingofHOSPandRCHD,anditspartnershipwiththe18thMEDCOMandthe121stCSHinKorea.Thisbriefingreceivedmixedreviewsbythoseinattendance;however,everyoneagreedthatthediscus-siontopicshadtobeaddressed.FORSCOMleadersattheconferencewereopposedtoreducingunit-ownedassetsathomestation,whileUSARCapplaudedtheconcept.FORSCOMleaderswereconcernedthatiftheydidnothaveadequateequipmentonhandathomestation,theirtrainingwouldsufferandtheirabilitytorespondtoalocalneedwouldbechallenged.
Toaddresstheseissues,OTSGandUSAMMAaskedtheRANDCorporationtostudythetenetsoftheMMRPconcept.Inthisstudy,RANDexploredmanyofFORSCOM’sconcernsandUSAMMA’srec-ommendationsingreatdetailwiththestakeholders.In2009,USAMMAandRANDrepresentativesattendedanotherFORSCOMCSHconferenceandprovidedanupdatedMMRPconceptbriefthatwascommendedbymostoftheconferenceattendees.AlthoughthedetailsontheCSHbaselineequipmentsetwerenotfullysolved,theFORSCOMG–3organizationintegratorandG–4medicallogisticsplanneragreedtoexploretheconceptindetail.TheCSHcommandersunani-mouslyagreedtomergeRCHDandHOSP,butthisconceptstillrequiredtheapprovaloftheUSAMED-COMandFORSCOMcommanders.ThecommandersofUSAMEDCOMandtheArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommandgavetheirstaffsandUSAM-MAapprovaltoworkcloselywithFORSCOMtofullydeveloptheMMRPinitiative.
TheArmyEquippingStrategyInSeptember2009,theDeputyChiefofStaff,
G–8,DepartmentoftheArmy,publishedawhitepapertitled“TheArmyEquippingStrategy,”whichdescribedhowtheArmyplanstoachieveequippingbalancebytheendof2011.ThisstrategyseeksanendstateinwhichSoldiershavetherightamountandtypeofmodernizedequipmenttomeettheirmissionrequirements,whetherincombat,trainingathomestation,orsupportingthehomeland.
LikeUSAMMA’sMMRPinitiative,thewhitepaperstatesthatunitswillbeequippedtoaccomplishthemis-sion.GiventherealitiesoffundingandthecomplexitiesoftheCSH,USAMMA’sconcepttodevelopastandardmedicalbaselineequipmentsetiscritical.UnitsgoingintotheARFORGENresetphasewillbeequippedtoapercentageoftheirMTOEbasedonbasicindividualand
limitedcollectivetrainingrequirementssotheywillbepreparedtoentertheirtrain/readyphase.
TheMMRPconceptworksinparallelwiththeArmyARFORGEN“waysmodel”discussedinthewhitepaper.OnceaunitreceivesitsmissionintheARFORGENtrain/readyphase,theCSHwillreceivetheequipmentrequiredforitsmission.ThemedicalequipmentforthedeployingCSHcouldbesourcedfromvariousstockpiles,toincludeUSAMMA’ssug-gestedmedicalcentralizedmanagementequipmentprogramatSierraArmyDepot(whichwouldultimate-lycombinetheUSARCandFORSCOMCSHsets)orothersourcingprograms(suchastheater-providedequipmentandAPS).Usingthe“ways”toequipCSHsisverychallengingbutgenerallyfollowsthespiritofthemodeldiscussedintheG–8whitepaper.
Ultimately,theG–8whitepaperdiscusses“friction”pointsintheArmy’sprocessforequippingunits.“Fric-tion”inthiscontextreferstoinadequateequipmentinventoriesavailabletoequiptothefullAcquisitionAuthorityObjective(AAO).InthecaseofaCSH,thecontinuousandunfundedrequirementsofrapidtechnologyturnoverandinadequatetimetomaintainhundredsofequipmentitemsmakeequippingindi-vidualCSHstothefullAAOwastefulandultimatelyburdensometoCSHleaders,users,andmaintainers.Unitsrarelydeploywithalloftheirequipment.Theydonotneeditorhavethecapabilitytomaintainit.USAMMAandRANDsuggestamodelthatequipsunitsinitiallytowhatisminimallyneededtotrainand,iftheyhavereceivedthemissiontosupportquick,localthreats(homelanddefenserequirements),theywouldbetrainedaccordingly.
ImprovingEquipmentforTrainingAsunitsmovethroughtheARFORGENphases,the
MMRPconceptsuggeststhatadditionalequippingbeprovidedfromvariousinventoriesasdiscussedear-lier.TomitigatethetrainingrisksassociatedwithlessthanfullAAOequipping,USAMMAwouldincreasethepriorityplacedonequippingthegeneratingforcemedicaltrainingsites,suchastheRTSs–MEDman-agedbytheUSARCbutavailabletobothActiveandUSARCunits.TheselocationswouldreceiveadequatemodernizedmaterielandSKOstomeetlarge-scalecol-lectivetrainingrequirementsnotavailableathomesta-tion.ThismodelworksverywellwithUSARCCSHsbecausetheytrainattheRTSs–MEDduringtheirannualtrainingandonlymaintainasmallamountofequipmentathomestation.
Inmanycases,ActivecomponentCSHstrainattheRTSs–MEDaswell,basedontheexpertiseandcapabilitiesoftheRTSs–MEDstaffs.Otherefficien-ciestheUSAMMACSHequippingmodelprovidesaretransparencyandassetvisibilityofcentrallyman-agedmedicalequipmentsets,basedontheday-to-day
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 43
controlandmanagementUSAMMAwouldprovide,similartotheAPSprogramUSAMMAmanagesalongwithAMC.
TheLBEprocessthatUSAMMAconductswithAMChasrevealedthat50percentofmedicalequip-mentinCSHswasnotfullymissioncapable.Theequippingwhitepaperinsiststhatunitsmustfindwaystofostermoreeffectivestewardshipofunit-ownedequipment.USAMMAfullysupportsthiswithonecaveat:Realistically,thevolumesofCSHmedicalequipment(thisincludesover1,700medicalequipmentitemsandthousandsofsuppliesandpharmaceuticalitems)andtechnologiesareoverwhelming.Granted,theCSHscouldimprovetheirsustainmentprograms,butwithoutadditionaltrainingtoaddressthecom-plexitiesoftheequipmentassignedtoaCSHandmoremedicalequipmentrepairersassignedtoaCSH,unitreadinesswillalwaysbelessthanacceptable.
USAMMAsuggeststhatthebasis-of-issueplansbereducedearlyintheARFORGENprocessandprudentequipmentdecisionsbemadeasaCSHreceivesitsmissionintheARFORGENtrain/readypool.UndertheMMRPmodel,unitleaderswouldhavemoretimetofocusonactualtrainingandnottheburdensomemaintenancetasksassociatedwiththelargequantitiesofmedicalequipmentitems.
ThesuggestionsoftheMMRPconceptanditstenetsastheyrelatetoequippingCSHsareanobvi-ousparadigmshiftandrequirethereexaminationofdecades-oldequippingprogramsandpolicies.Lead-ersmustopenthemselvestothe“Armyowned,unitleased”equippingconcept.TheArmymustalsorecon-siderhowbasis-of-issueplansareappliedandhow
unitsreportreadinessaspartoftheirmonthlyunitstatusreports.ManywouldarguethatUSAMMA’ssuggestedequippingstrategyforaCSHinvolvesmanyrisks;however,abetterargumentwouldsuggestthatfailuretoexploreUSAMMA’sMMRPequipmentstrategyisevenriskier.WiththelessonslearnedbytheLBEprogramandthedecisiontodeployaCSHtoAfghanistan,theMMRPconceptfostersamoreavail-able,lesscostly,andlessburdensomeequippingsolu-tionforourunits.
TheArmyshouldconsiderthesuggestedUSAM-MAMMRPequippingstrategyforCSHsbecausethecurrentwaysofequippingtheArmy’sCSHsarestruggling.CSHsdeservesmalleronhandequipmentinventories.Theyneedonlythetechnologiesandequipmentitemsminimallyrequiredfortraining,withtheunderstandingthatthemedicalgeneratingforcetraininglocationswillbeequippedtomitigateanyrisksfromreducedequipmentathomestation.Finally,astheCSHreceivesamission,USAMMAmusthavemedicalSKOsavailabletomeetunitmissionrequire-mentsastheyprogressthroughtheARFORGENphas-es.OncetheUSAMMAMMRPmodelisvettedanddemonstratesitsvaluetoaCSH’sreadiness,itcouldbeappliedtoothermedicalunitsandbeyond.
lieUtenant colonel charleS h. Strite, jr., iS the DepUty coMManDer for operationS of the arMy MeDical Materiel aGency at fort DetricK, MarylanD. he holDS a Bachelor’S DeGree froM MoUnt St. Mary’S colleGe in MarylanD anD a MaSter’S DeGree in BUSineSS aDMiniStration froM reGiS UniverSity.
the viewS expreSSeD in thiS article are thoSe of the aUthor anD May not Be enDorSeD By the U.S. arMy.
A combat support hospital employed in Iraq.
44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
hippingclassVIII(medicalmateriel)suppliesoverseascanbeatrickyoperation.Sendingthemoverseasandrequiringthattheybemain-tainedattherighttemperaturethroughoutthejourneyisanevengreaterchallenge.Tryingtogettemperature-controlledshipmentsofclassVIIItoIraq,Afghanistan,ortheHornofAfricainthedeadofsummeristhegreatestchallengeofall.
AttheU.S.ArmyMedicalMaterielCenter,Europe(USAMMCE),theDistributionandTransportationDivi-sion(D&T)receives,repackages,andshipshundredsofthousandsofrefrigerateditemsperyear,includingvaccines,pharmaceuticals,andlaboratoryandimagingreagents.RefrigeratedpackagesrangefromassmallasanofficetelephonetoaslargeasaXeroxprinter.Specificguidelinesdictatehoweachpackageistobepacked,dependingontheestimatedoutsidetemperaturethatthepackagewillbesubjectedtoandtheamountoftimethepackageislikelytobeintransit.
EachpackageisloadedwithaTempTaleRF[radiofrequency]monitor.(Themonitorisproducedby
Sensitech,abusinessunitofCarrierCorporation.)Thesemonitors,whichareslightlysmallerthanadeckofcards,periodicallyrecordthetemperatureinsidethepackage.Whenaproductarrivesatitsfinaldestination,therecipientisabletoseeifthetemperatureinsidethepackagehasremainedwithinthetemperaturerangesetforrefrigerateditems.Ifapackagearrives“outofrange,”theinformationissenttoUSAMMCE’sClinicalAdvisoryDivision(CAD)whoseclinicalstaffdetermineswhetherornottheproductisstillviableforuse.Theprocessishighlyeffectiveandhasbecomeamechanismforconfidentlymanagingthecold-chaincontinuityrequiredtosuc-cessfullyshiptemperature-controlleditems.
WithhundredsofTempTalemonitorstravellingtodestinationsthroughouttheworld,asystemhadtobedevelopedthatwouldcomprehensivelytrackandrecordthereadingsanddispositionofeachtem-perature-controlledpackagethatwasshippedfromaUSAMMCEdock.LeadersfromD&TandCADmetwithUSAMMCE’swebsitedesignerandlaidouttherequirementsforaTempTaleMonitorControlsystem.Inshortorder,thedesignerproducedacomprehensiveprogramthatwasintroducedtoUSAMMCE.
TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemisaMicro-softAccess-basedprogramthatallowsUSAMMCEtomonitor,track,andprovideclinicaldispositiononallcold-chainmaterialreceivedbyandshippedfromtheUSAMMCEdistributioncenter.Themainmenuofthedatabaseisdividedintothreesections:thereceivingsection,refrigerationsection,andCAD.Thougheachsection’sportalcontainsdifferentdata,theyinteracttoprovideanoverallpictureoftheshippingandstoragetemperatureoftemperature-managedmaterialwhileenroutetoandfromUSAMMCEfacilities.
Theabilitytomonitoratransportationorsupplyvendor’sandUSAMMCE’scold-chainmanagementsuccessrateisnowonlyamouse-clickaway.Thiscapa-bilityallowsD&Ttotracktheamountoftemperature-controlledpackagingmaterialitneedstomaintainthe
Cold-ChainManagementandtheUseofTempTaleTechnology
by CoLoneL MitCheLL e. brew, Major MiChaeL ronn, and petty offiCer first CLass suMMer webb, usn
S
TempTale is a monitor used to record the temperature of coldchain supplies as they travel to their customer. Once the supplies arrive at their destination, the customer can determine if the proper temperature was maintained throughout the trip. The device is distributed by Sensitech, a business unit of Carrier Corporation.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 45
properenvironmentandtoadjustpackagingforfutureshipmentstosimilarareaswithsimilarweathercondi-tions.TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemprovidesUSAMMCEwiththecapabilitytoanticipatepackagingneedsbylearningfromthehistoricaldatacollectedandempowersittofurtherbenefititscustomers.
Whenaskedabouttheimportanceofensuringthattemperature-controlleditemsarrivewithinthecor-recttemperaturerangeattheirdestination,LieutenantColonelJohnBailey,USAMMCE’sD&Tchief,stated,“USAMMCEshipsover25,000poundsofcold-chainmedicalproductsandvaccinesannuallythatmustbedeliveredtoourcustomerswithin72hours.Forrefrig-eratedandfrozenmedicalproducts,itisimperativethatourpackingandshippingprotocolsarefollowedexactlytoensureourcustomersarereceivingviableproducts.USAMMCEhasalwaysbeenonthefore-frontofdevelopingcold-chainpackingprotocols.”
TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemprovidesamechanismtomeasureandreporttemperaturedatatoensurethatpackagingprotocolsareeffective.Asmedicalmaterieladvancesinsophistication,itoftenrequiresgreaterenvironmentalcontrol,andtheimpor-tanceofaccuratelytracking,recording,andprocess-ingdatafortemperature-sensitiveitemscontinuesto
increase.TheTempTaleMonitorControlsystemisessentialtomanagingthislogisticsrequirement.
Futureupdatesandaddedfeatureswillcontinuetokeepthissystemoperatingasadynamicresourcethataddsanewcomponenttothetransportoftemperature-controlledmedicalmateriel.Itgivestheuserconfi-dencethattheproducthasbeenpackaged,shipped,andreceivedinanenvironmentthatmeetsthestrictrequirementsofthemanufacturersothattheproductcanbeusedtohelpthefightingforcedownrangeandbeneficiariesservingoverseas.
colonel Mitchell e. Brew iS the coMManDer of the U.S. arMy MeDical Materiel center, eUrope (USaMMce), in pirMaSenS, GerMany. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in BUSineSS ManaGeMent froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at BUffalo, an M.S. DeGree in inforMation SySteMS froM the UniverSity of SoUthern california, an M.h.a. DeGree froM Baylor UniverSity, an M.B.a. DeGree froM GeorGe waShinGton UniverSity, anD an M.S. DeGree in national reSoUrce StrateGy froM the inDUStrial colleGe of the arMeD forceS. he iS a MeMBer of the coUncil of SUpply chain ManaGeMent profeSSionalS anD a fellow in the aMerican colleGe of healthcare execUtiveS.
Major Michael ronn iS the chief of the clinical aDviSory DiviSion at USaMMce in pirMaSenS. he holDS a Doctor of pharMacy DeGree froM the Mercer UniverSity SoUthern School of pharMacy.
petty officer firSt claSS SUMMer weBB, USn, iS a hoSpital corpSMan firSt claSS aSSiGneD to the naval MeDical loGiSticS coMManD DetachMent at pirMaSenS. She ServeS aS the noncoMMiSSioneD officerincharGe of the clinical aDviSory DiviSion at USaMMce. She iS a GraDUate of the navy pharMacy technician School anD waS honoreD aS the navy’S Senior pharMacy technician of the year in 2008.
Employees at the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center, Europe, reice and box up H1N1 vaccine for shipment to the U.S. Central Command. Delivering pharmaceutical supplies requires coldchain management to monitor the temperature of sensitive medical materiel.
The TempTale Monitor Control system is a Microsoft Accessbased program that manages the radio frequency data gleaned from TempTale monitors. These data are analyzed to ensure the safety of coldchain medical materiel.
46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heChiefofOrdnanceandCommanding GeneraloftheArmyOrdnanceCenterand Schools,BrigadierGeneralLynnA.Collyar,andtheRegimentalCommandSergeantMajor,CommandSergeantMajorDanielEubanks,presidedoverthecas-ingoftheregimentalcolorsattheoriginalHomeofOrdnanceatAberdeenProvingGround,Maryland,attheconclusionoftheOrdnanceWeekactivitiesinMay2009.ThisfinalceremonywasfittinglyconductedinfrontoftheOrdnanceHeadquarters,affectionatelyknownas“theStones.”InSeptember2009,theunfurl-ingceremonywasheldinconjunctionwiththe9/11memorialserviceatFortLee,Virginia,notonlyestab-lishingthenewHomeofOrdnancebutalsocallingattentionto,andreflectingon,ourfallenOrdnanceSoldiers.
Manyarticleshavebeenwrittenaboutthestate-of-the-artfacilitiesonthenewOrdnancecampus.Thisarticlefocusesonthepeopleandorganizations,espe-ciallytheschoolbaseclosureandrealignment(BRAC)teams,thatforthepast5yearshavebeendesigning,building,equipping,andmovingtomakethenewOrd-nanceSchoolcampusareality.
PreparingtoMovetoFortLeeTheOrdnanceCenterandSchoolsbeganpreparing
forthemovetoFortLeeaftertheBRACCommission
announceditscongressionallymandateddecisionsinMay2005.ThecommissiondirectedthattheOrdnanceMechanicalMaintenanceSchoolatAberdeenProvingGroundandtheOrdnanceMunitionsandElectronicMaintenanceSchoolatRedstoneArsenal,Alabama,consolidateintooneOrdnanceSchoolandmergeatFortLeeby15September2011.
Whenthemovewasannounced,MajorGeneralVincentBoleswastheChiefofOrdnance.Underhisdirection,eachschoolquicklyorganizedteamstoimplementtheBRACdirective.TheBRACteamsrespondedtohundredsofdesigndetailsandrequestsforinformation;designedandpopulatedequipmentspreadsheets;designedroomdatasheetsdetailingend-userrequirementsfromsquarefootagetoaudio-visualdetails;andmanagedequipmentinventories,movements,anddeliveries.WhiletheycontinuedtotrainSoldiers,instructorsdevelopedcoursemovementstrategiesbasedontheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand(TRADOC)mandatethatschoolscontinuetotraintheirannualloads.
Inadditiontotheschoolteams,MajorGeneralBolesassignedmetoleadtheOrdnance“torchparty,”whichstartedwithonepersonbutovertimegrewwiththeassignmentofseveralwarrantoffi-cers,noncommissionedofficers,andcontractors.ThetorchpartyworkedatFortLee,teamingwithNorfolk
TheOrdnanceSchools’MovetoFortLee
by GayLe a. oLszyK
T
This aerial photo shows the north range at Fort Lee, where recovery training and ammunition training will be conducted. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 47
DistrictCorpsofEngineersrepresenta-tives,ArmyCombinedArmsSup-portCommand(CASCOM)BRACcon-structionandsynchroniza-tionteams,FortLeegarrisonstaff,TRADOCandAssistantChiefofStaffforInstallationManagementBRACrepre-sentatives,andsevenconstruc-tioncompanies.Muchofoursuccesscanbeattributedtotheendlesshoursofdedicatedeffort,constantandfrequentcommunication,andattentiontodetailsoftheseteamsthatallworkedwiththegoalofrepresentingend-userrequirementsandensuringthenewfacilitiesmeetOrdnanceCorpsmissionsforthenext50years.
In2006,withnomanualsinhandonhowtoexecuteBRAC,thenewlyarrivedChiefofOrdnance,BrigadierGeneralRebeccaS.Halstead,directedmetobuildastrategyaroundlinesofoperation.Theselinesofoper-ation—construction,funding,personnel,transportation,andequipment—continueastheareaswetrackandbrieftotheOrdnanceSchoolleadersduringmonthlyBRACin-processreviews.
In2006,thefocuswasonthe“charrette”process.Duringthesemeetings,representativesfromeveryorganizationimaginable,includingutilities,firedepart-ments,forceprotection,environmental,theNationalParkService,informationtechnology,architects,engi-neers,andendusers,mettotranslateandvalidateuserrequirementsintoindividualbuildingdesignsandacampuswithmorethan20facilities.WhilelookingatthedayinthelifeofaSoldierandstandardizingclass-roomsandbaystructures,wecompiledlessonslearnedthatquicklybecamethefoundationsofthecharrettesthatfollowedourworkthroughthedesignreviews.Fromthesecharrettes,architectureandengineeringfirmsproducedrequestsforproposals,architectural
renderings,andfloorplans,givingusthefirstglimpseofthebuildings,theschools,andthefuture.
PreparingforConstructionIntheearlysummerof2007,treeswerefelledasthe
infrastructure,utilities,androadgridsbegantakingshapeonthe300-acrecampus.InNovember,ColonelMichaelT.McBride,OrdnanceCenterchiefofstaff,plantedtheregimentalflag,establishingtheOrdnanceCenter’spres-enceatFortLee.Duringthissameperiod,theBRACteams,workingwiththeCorpsofEngineersandColonelEdwardGully,specialassistanttotheCASCOMcom-manderonBRAC,beganthecontractawardprocess.ThefirstcontractwasawardedfortheTacticalSupportEquip-mentDepartment(TSED)facility,thefirstthreeofsixbarracks,andthebattalionandbrigadeheadquarters.
ThenextawardwasforthesecondlargestdiningfacilityintheArmy,withacapacitytofeed3,600Sol-diersin90minutes,followedbytheawardofthenorthrangevehicle-recoveryrangefacilitiesandfiveweld-ingandtrainingclassroom-and-bayfacilities.Con-structionawardscontinuedthrough2010.AsofMay2010,theonlyremainingawardswerefortheexplosiveordnancedisposalrangeandclassroomcomplex,theclimate-controlledstoragefacility,thechapel,andthefitnesscenter.
Brigadier General Lynn A. Collyar and Command Sergeant Major Daniel Eubanks case the Ordnance Center and School colors at the original Home of Ordnance at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in May 2009.
48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
At left: In September 2009, the Ordnance Center and School commanding general and command sergeant major unfurled the Ordnance Center and School colors at the Sustainment Center of Excellence headquarters at Fort Lee. (Photo by Julianne E. Cochran, ArmySustainment)
Above: The new Army Ordnance School has 15 training facilities, like these, with training bays. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)
At Right: In 2007, Army Ordnance Center and School staff planted the Ordnance Center and School flag to establish the Ordnance Center’s presence at Fort Lee. (Photo by Gayle Olszyk)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 49
Thecampuslandscapecontinuedtochangeascon-structioncompaniesestablishedtheirpresencewithtemporaryofficestructuresandlay-downareasfortheirconstructionequipmentandbuildingmaterials.Soonafterconstructionwasunderway,theBRACteamsre-engagedwithreviewsandawardsoffurnishingandequipmentpackages.
BeginningInstructionattheNewCampusInJune2009,theTSEDfacilitywasthefirstbuild-
ingtoreachitsbuildingoccupancydate.Thispresent-ednewchallengestotheBRACteams,whichhadonly90daystofurnishandequipthebuildingfortrainingaccordingtoschool-developedcoursemoveschedules.Theoutcomewasathumbs-upforallastheTSEDtrainingstartedinAugust,rightonschedule.Sincethen,wehavecontinuedtorefineouroccupancypro-cess.On6July2010,trainingbeganinthefivecentralcampusphase-1buildings,withSoldiersbeinghousedinbarrackstwoandthree.
Fromthestart,theBRACstaffsatbothAberdeenandRedstonehavebeeninvolvedinaccuratelyiden-tifyingrequirements,design,contractreviews,equip-mentmovements,andestablishingnewproceduresfortheconsolidatedOrdnanceSchool.
Specialthanksmustgotothemilitaryandcivilianteamassignedtotheschool—thosewhochangeddutylocationandjobsandeventhosewhoretiredinlieuofmovingtoFortLee.Throughouttheseyears,withBRACasanadditionalduty,theOrdnanceSchoolcadreandinstructorshavedemonstratedtrueprofes-sionalismbycontinuingtoremainengagedthroughoutthelengthyprocessandworkingtoensurethefacilitiessupportedthedesiredendstate.
Savingthebestforlast,IwouldberemisswithoutofferingaveryspecialthankstoColonelDanReilly,commanderofthe61stOrdnanceBrigadeandOrd-nanceMechanicalMaintenanceSchool,whoforthepast2yearshasbeentherightleadertoexecutethefirstmoves,establishingthebrigadepresenceforcom-mandandcontrolandthefirsttrainingdepartment.Hisleadershipandmanagementskills,aswellashiscan-doattitude,areclearlythereasonswhythetrainingatthenewOrdnanceSchoolcontinuesonschedule.
Gayle a. olSzyK iS the DepUty to the coMManDer at the arMy orDnance School at fort lee, virGinia. She holDS a MaSter’S DeGree in eDUcation anD iS a GraDUate of the arMy ManaGeMent Staff colleGe anD the continUinG eDUcation coUrSe for Senior leaDerS.
An M1A2 Abrams tank arrives at the Ordnance School at Fort Lee, where it will be used to train ordnance Soldiers to maintain this weapon system. (Photo by Albert Cruz, BRAC Construction Office)
50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
nOctober2009,theArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommandatFortLee,Virginia,wasdesignatedastheSustainmentCenterofExcellence(SCoE),bring-ingtogetherallaspectsoftheOrdnance,Transportation,andQuartermasterCorpsandtheirassociateddoctrine,concepts,andtraining.Althoughthisisaninterestingconcept,itishardlyoriginal.In1919,inCoblenz,Ger-many,andthesurroundingareas,theU.S.ThirdArmy,outofnecessity,developedacompletemultifunctionalsustainmentoperation.ItnotonlysupportedalargeU.S.combatforcebutalsofoundcreativewaystotrainitsSoldiers,commonlyknownas“doughboys,”inlogisticsoperations.
EveryoneintheArmytodayisawareofthelong-standingdeploymentofU.S.militaryforcestoGer-many.SincetheendofWorldWarIIin1945,U.S.
ArmyandAirForcepersonnelandtheirfamilieshaveworked,traveled,andlivedinGermany.WhatmostpeopledonotrealizeisthatfromDecember1918toJanuary1923,anotherU.S.occupationforcewasinGermany,anditslittle-knownstoryisequallyascom-pellingasthestoryofthepost-WorldWarIIforce.
WorldWarIArmisticeThearmisticeof11November1918wasnotactu-
allytheendofWorldWarI;itwasmerelyatrucethatallowedthepeacenegotiationsneededtoendthewartotakeplace.Thoughvictorious,theU.S.,British,French,andBelgianarmieswerenotallowedtorestinplace.
Thetermsofthearmisticewereclearandfairlyprecise.ConditionVofthearmisticeagreementof11November1918stated,“Theareasoftheleftbankof
theRhineshallbeadministeredbythelocalauthorities,underthecon-troloftheoccupationtroopsoftheAlliesandtheUnitedStatesArmiesofOccupation.”ThismeantthattheAmericanExpeditionaryForces(AEF),commandedbyGeneralJohnJ.Pershing,stillhadworktodo.GeneralPershingknewthathehadtobuildtheU.S.portionoftheoccupyingforcefromtheforcesunderhiscommandandthatthisforcewouldhaveamissionunlikecurrentcombatoperations.
Granted,thismissionwasonetheyhadallbeenwaitingforbecauseitsassignmentsignifiedtheendofthefighting.Italsomeant,however,thatthedoughboysinselectedunitswouldbestayinginEuropewhiletheirbuddieswenthome.
ThirdArmyEstablishedDecidingthat,becauseofopera-
tionalconstraints,itwouldnotbe
Coblenz1919:TheArmy’sFirstSustainmentCenterofExcellence
by aLexander f. barnes
I
Soldiers prepare bread in the 90th Division’s quartermaster bakery in Bernkastel, Germany, in January 1919. (Photo courtesy of the Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania)
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 51
possibletouseeithertheFirstorSecondArmyasthearmyofoccupation,Pershinghadanotheroption.WiththerapidinfluxofdoughboysfromtheUnitedStatestothefrontlinesinFrance,planshadbeenmadebeforethearmisticetoorganizeathirdArmy.On14Novem-ber1918,thisarmywasdesignatedastheThirdArmywithMajorGeneralJosephT.DickmanascommanderandbecameknownastheArmyofOccupation.Today’sThirdArmyshoulderpatch,withitssymbolicAinsideanO,reflectsthatheritage.
Tostructurethenewarmy,Pershingchosethe1stDivision,the2dDivision(whichhadonebrigadeofMarinesandoneofSoldiers),the3dDivision,andthe4thDivisionfromhisActiveArmyunits.FromtheArmyNationalGuard,heselectedthe42dDivi-sionandthe32dDivision.FromhisNationalArmydivisions,headdedthe89thDivisionandthe90thDivision.[TheNationalArmywasavolunteerArmy(almostanalogoustotoday’sArmyReserve)thatwasestablishedin1917anddisbandedin1920.]Alltogether,theseeightdivisionswouldmakeupthemaincombatstrengthoftheThirdArmy.(Mostreaderswillbemorefamiliarwiththeseunitsasinfantrydivisions,suchasthe1stInfantryDivision,butduringtheperiodinquestion,theArmyhadonlyinfantrydivisions;therefore,theywerecalledthe1stDivision,2dDivi-sion,andsoforth.)
Pershinglateraddedthe5thDivisionandthe33dDivisiontosecurethelineofcommunicationthatwouldrunfromFrancethroughLuxembourgandintoGermany.Healsoincludedanumberofpioneerinfan-tryregiments,corpssupportunits,truckcompanies,andaviationunitstoroundouthisforce.[Pioneerinfantryregimentsperformedanumberofvaluabletasks,suchasequipmentrecoveryandsalvageoperations.Theyalsodidengineer-typework,suchasroadrepair.]
Intotal,Pershingsentover250,000doughboysintoa2,500-square-milesectionofGermanyinhabitedbyslightlylessthanamillionGermans.Healsodeployedalmost50,000ofhistroopstoLuxembourg.Sendingaforceofthissizeintoarelativelysmallareahadseri-ousimplicationsforThirdArmylogisticians.
ThirdArmy’sMissionTheThirdArmy’smissionwasquitecomplexand
evolving.ThefirstphaserequiredtheselectedunitstoleavetheirpositionsintheMeuse-ArgonneareaofFrance,movebyroadthroughLuxembourg,crosstheGermanborderon1December1918,andtakecontroloftheRhineRiverbridgesinthedesignatedU.S.occu-pationsectorofGermany.Forsomeunits,thismeanta300-kilometerhiketotheoccupationsites.ThebridgesinquestionincludedapontoonbridgeandarailroadbridgeatCoblenzandtherailroadbridgesatEngersandRemagen.TheThirdArmyhadtomaintainsecureaccesstoallofthesebridgesonbothsidesoftheRhine.
TheBritishArmytothenorthandtheFrenchArmytothesouthhadsimilarmissionsandtheirownbridgestoseizeandguard.TheBelgianArmy,farthestnorthoftheAlliedArmies,occupiedtheareaaroundAachen,Ger-many,butdidnothaveabridgeheadacrosstheRhine.
Thesecondphaseoftheoperationwastousetheoccupationsectorsasadministrationzonesforacceptingandprocessingthewarmateriel(guns,machineguns,aircraft,andvehicles)thatGermanywasrequiredbythearmisticetohandovertotheAllies.Thedeliveryofthismaterielwasamajorprojectthatwasnotcompleteduntillateinthesummerof1919.Afterallmaterielwasdelivered,themissionfocuswasensuringthatGer-manyprovidedtheAllieswiththefinancialreparationsrequiredbythearmisticeandsubsequenttreaties.
TheAllieswerekeenlyawarethattheGermanArmyhadmovedacrossthesesamebridgesenroutetotheirstartingpointsfortheinvasionofBelgiumandFrancein1914.Shouldpeacenegotiationsbreakdown,theAlliescouldusethesestronglydefendedbridgeheadsacrosstheRhinetoquicklymovetheirforcesintotheheartofGermanyandcontinuethewar.
Allthiswasinthefuture,though,becausePershingfirsthadtogethistroopstotheiroccupationsitesonbothsidesoftheRhineRiver.
MarchFromFranceThelongmarchthroughtherainandmudofa
EuropeanwinterfromFrancethroughLuxembourgtoGermanywasadifficultone.MostofPershing’sdivisionshadcomestraightoutofcombatandwereinseriousneedofrefurbishingandresupply.TheArmyof1918stilldependedheavilyondraftanimalsfortransportation,andtheyhadsufferedasmuchastheSoldiershadintheOctobertoNovembercam-paignintheArgonneForest.
ThirdArmylogisticianshadlessthan2weekstopreparetheselectedunitsforthemovetoGermany.However,thelogisticiansweregiventheauthoritytotakewhateverwasavailablefromnon-ThirdArmyunitstomakeupequipmentshortagesforthedeploy-ingunits.Keepinginmindthatmanyofthetroopswerestillwearingthesamesinglecombatuniforminwhichtheyhadstartedthecampaign,thesizeofthetaskwasdaunting.
Fortunately,towardtheendofthewar,theU.S.ServicesofSupplyhadmadesomeimprovementsinitsabilitytosupplythefrontlineSoldierwithwhatheneeded.Nonetheless,asthe250,000doughboyscrossedtheGermanborderon1DecemberandheadedtotheRhine,theirequipmentandphysicalconditionstillleftmuchtobedesired.Notonlywereboots,rifles,gasmasks,artillerypieces,signalcarts,andkitchentrailerswornout,atleast90percentofthetroopswereinfestedwithlice.SpanishfluandmumpsepidemicsalsowreakedhavoconindividualSoldiers.
52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Tomakemattersworse,Pershing’sSoldierswereheadedintoenemyterritorythatpromisedlittleinthewayoffood,supplies,ormedicaltreatment.Germanyhadbeenblockadedfor4years,andtheinhabitantsoftheareastobeoccupieddidnothaveenoughfoodandmedicineforthemselves,muchlessforanoccupyingforce.Sustainingtheforcewasgoingtorequirecre-ativity,anditwasgoingtohavetobefast.
SustainingtheTroopsTheinitialplanforlogisticssupporttotheThird
ArmyhadcalledformovingsuppliesandequipmentbyroadandrailfromthedepotsinFrancethroughLux-embourgandthenintoGermany.However,theFrenchrailsystemhadbeenthoroughlywornoutduringthewarandrequiredsignificantrepair.Francedesperatelyneededtheavailablerollingstocktogetitsindustrialbasebackonapeacetimefooting.Therefore,theFrenchGovernmentaskedtheAEFtoconsideranothermeansofmovingsuppliestotheoccupationzone.
Thisrequestmeantthatshortlyafterarrivingintheoccupationzone,theThirdArmyhadtocompletelyredoitslogisticssupportplan.Afterashortstudy,theArmydecidedtobringwhatitcouldbytruckfromtheAEFdepotsinFranceandtohavethebulkoftheirsuppliesshippedfromtheUnitedStatestoeitherAntwerp,Belgium,orRotterdam,TheNetherlands.Fromtheseports,thecargowouldbeloadedontoriverbargesandtoweddowntotheRhineriverportsintotheU.S.occupationzone.Bendorf,Germany,ontherightbankoftheriver,wasusedtosupportthe1st,2d,and32dDivisions.
AndernachandCoblenz-LützelontheleftbankoftheRhinewereselectedtosupporttheotherunits.Intime,largerationdumpswereestablishedatAnder-nachandBendorfandaquartermasterdepotwassetupatCoblenz-Lützel.AllofthesedepotsiteswerechosennotonlyfortheirproximitytotheRhineforreceivingtheinboundcargobutalsoforthenearbyroadjunctionsandrailheadsthatallowedeasyonwardmovementtothetroopsites.
Armylogisticiansalsolookedaroundtoseewhatwasavailablelocallytosupporttheforce.WorkingintheThirdArmy’sfavorwasthefactthattheareaaroundCoblenzhadbeenahubofsupporttotheGer-manArmy,sowithalittleinnovation,somelogisticsfunctionscouldgetafaststart.Thelogisticiansfirsthadtoworktheirwaythroughthegreatpilesofaban-donedGermanwarmaterielstillinthearea.Inonewarehouse,theyfound140,000blankets,whichtheyplacedonbargesandshippeduptheRhinetoRotter-damforusebyrefugeesinwar-tornBelgium.BalesofclothformakingGermanArmyuniformswerefoundinaCoblenzfactoryandsentbacktoFrancetohelpmakeandrepairtheuniformsofthethousandsofGer-manprisonersofwarbeingheldthere.
AmongthefacilitiesfoundinLützel,atownonthenorthsideoftheMoselRiver,acrossfromCoblenz,wasacompleteshoeanduniformmanufacturingplant.OwnedbytheGermanGovernmentandpreviouslyamajorsupplierofuniformsandshoesfortheGermanArmy,theplantwaswelllaidoutandequippedwithelectricallypoweredmachines.Operatingthefacility,ThirdArmyquartermastersrepaired13,348pairsofshoesinJanuaryandFebruary1919.Bymid-February,thedailyoutputwasbetween800and1,000pairs.
Afterthelong,muddymarchtotheRhine,theThirdArmymovedquicklytoprovidelaundryservicestotheU.S.forcesintheoccupationzone.TheArmytookoverseveralGermanlaundriestowashandcleanthetroops’uniforms.Armymobilelaundryunitsthathadmadethemarchsoonjoinedintoaugmentthisdes-peratelyneededservice.AlargeGermanlaundrywithsixwashingmachineswaslocatedclosetotheLützelshoefactory,soitwasalsoappropriated.AstheThirdArmylaterreportedontheoperation,“BythemiddleofFebruaryanoutputof30,000piecesadaywasbeingmaintainedwithaforceof45Germanciviliansworkingintwoshifts,andthesystemwasworkingsowellthatlaundryreceivedinthemorningwaswashed,repairedandironedbynight.”ThesalaryforeachoftheseGermanemployeeswaspaidforbytheGermanGovernmentaspartofthecostofoccupation.
AmmunitionStoresDuringthefirstdaysoftheoccupation,inaddition
tosalvagingGermanmilitaryequipmentandmonitor-ingthewarreparationefforts,theThirdArmylogisti-cianshadanotherequallyimportant,andpotentiallymoredangerous,mission.WhentheThirdArmySol-diersarrivedintheirdesignatedoccupationzone,theyfoundlargequantitiesofammunitionthathadbeenleftbehindbytheGermantroopswhentheyevacuatedRhineland-Pfalz.MostofthisammunitionwasfoundatTrier;Neuwied;Mülheim(nearCoblenz),wheretheGermanshadmaintainedaplantforassemblingammunitionofvariouscalibers;andattheold19th-centuryfortssurroundingCoblenz.
ThestocksincludedGermanammunitionandammu-nitionthathadbeencapturedfromtheAlliedarmies.Theyfoundshellsofeverycaliberandlargenumbersoffuses,aerialbombs,grenades,emptyshellcases,andsmall-armsammunition.Theyalsofoundlargequanti-tiesofgunpowder,zinc,lead,andbrassusedintheman-ufactureofammunition.MuchoftheammunitionwasunserviceableandtoodangeroustojustifycontinuedstorageorshipmenttotheUnitedStates.
ThirdArmyordnancespecialistsquicklydemili-tarizedordismantledthedangerousmaterials.Theywereabletosalvagesomeofthemunitionsforfutureuse,experimentation,andstaticdisplaysandman-agedtorecover135,000artilleryshells,400,000
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fusesforartilleryshells,morethan22millionroundsofsmall-armsandrifleammunition,3,000heavyartillerybrasscartridgecasings,36,000navalshells,and2,000tonsofGermangunpowder.MuchofthisammunitionwaslaterusedinannualArmyofOccu-pationwargamesthattookplaceeachautumnandinvolvedlargenumbersoflive-fireexercises.
WhiletheThirdArmywasworkingtosolvemanylogisticsissueslocally,thedistributionpipelinecomingfromtheUnitedStatesslowlystartedtomovemate-riel.Suppliesforthedoughboyswerefirsttoweddowntheriveron23March1919andcontinuedtoarriveatanaveragerateof1,216tonsperweekatAndernachand1,912tonsperweekatBendorf.ThenewdepotatCoblenz-Lützelreceived977tonsofquartermasterstorestobemaintainedastheThirdArmy’sstocks.Inaveryshorttime,theRhineRiver,controlofwhichwasthemainreasonfortheArmytobeinGermany,hadbecomeitssupportlifeline.
MeetingOtherSoldierNeedsTheneedforsomeofthesesupplieswascritical.
Theliceinfestationofapproximately90percentofthedoughboyshadtobeaddressed.Oncethetroopswereintheirbilletsintheirassigneddivisions’sectors,themedicsstartedamassivecampaigntodelousethetroopsandfreethecommandofvermin.
Atfirst,onlyonetruck-mountedsteamsterilizingmachinewasavailableandthebathingfacilitiesinthesmallertownswereinadequate.Inresponse,theThirdArmymedicsandmechanicsworkedtogethertobuildseveralsteam-powereddisinfectingmachines.Withthisequipmentandsomestandardsteamdisin-fectorsandportableshower-bathsthatarrivedinthezone,thelicemenacewasrapidlyreduced.By31May1919,theliceinfestationratewasdowntolessthan1percent.
TheThirdArmyalsobeganaprogramofschoolstotrainthedoughboysinmilitaryandciviliansubjects.Soontherewereunit-levelanddivision-levelschoolsinanumberoflocations.The33dDivision,stillinLuxembourg,evenfoundtimetosendallofitscooksandmesspersonnelbacktoclassforrefreshertraininginmesshalloperations.
AmericanForcesingermanyInJuly1919,theThirdArmyfurleditsflagandwas
replacedbytheAmericanForcesinGermany(AFG).MajorGeneralHenryT.Allen,theAFGcommander,wasafirmbelieverinbothfieldtrainingandclass-roomtraining,andunderhisguidance,theschoolsys-temsflourishedevenmore.Heestablishedaregimeninwhichclassattendancewasexpected,ratherthanjustencouraged.
TheschoolsystemsoonincludedaMechanicalSchoolfeaturingformalinstructioninautomobileand
motorcyclerepair,blacksmithing,welding,anddriving.TheQuartermaster’sSchooltaughtcooking,baking,andshoerepair.TheOrdnanceSchoolfocusedonweaponandgeneralequipmentrepairatthecompanyorbatterylevel.TheSignalCorpsandEngineerCorpsalsoranschoolsthattaughteverythingfromradiooperationandrepairtomapmakingandmechanicaldrafting.EventheAFG’s“provisional”cavalrysquadronranaschooltoteachstableoperationsandsaddlerepair.
ThecrownjeweloftheArmyschoolsystemwasasmallfarmthattheAFGquartermasterssetupnearMülheim.Usedasateachinglaboratoryforagriculturalsciences,itprovidedclassesonsuchtopicsasanimalhusbandry,gardening,andgeneralagriculture.Usingstudentlabor,thefarmprovidedfreshmeat,vegetables,eggs,milk,andflowersfortheSoldiersanddependentfamiliesofAFG.BecauseofthescarcityofgoodmilkintheU.S.zone,thefarmbecamethesourceforallthemilkusedforpatientsinthelocalArmyhospitals.ThequartermasterfarmalsoprovidedmilkforthechildrenofU.S.servicemenassignedtoAFG.
The Army authorized unit shoulder patches just before the World War I armistice. In this example from the occupation, a doughboy has sewn a small Third Army patch into the center of his 4th Division patch. After General Allen assumed command, only the Third Army patch was authorized for wear by Soldiers in Coblenz. (Photo courtesy of Alison Hutton)
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AFgDrawdownIntheUnitedStates,the1920swerestartingto
“roar,”andwiththepost-wareconomicboomandthegrowingsenseofisolationism,noonereallycaredmuchabouttheGermanRhineland.TheU.S.congres-sionalenthusiasmtomaintainaforceontheRhinedwindledwithtime,causingthesizeoftheAFGtoshrinkastheoccupationranitscourse.
Withthecontinueddrawdown,everymonthbroughtmoresalesofexcessequipmentnolongerneededbytheAFG.AllAFGaviationactivitiesshutdowninApril1922,andallaviationequipment,including24Dehavi-landDH–4aircraft,severalbrandnewLibertyengines,andothersparepartsattheairfieldnearWeissenthurm,wassold.AlsoincludedintheauctionwereallofthegardeningtoolsandlivestockthattheAirServicedoughboyshadaccumulatedtosupplementtheirdietandasapastimefortheiroff-dutyhoursattheairfield.
InJanuary1923,withitsstrengthdownto1,000men,theAFGreceivedorderstofolditsflagandreturnhome.Faithfultotheveryendtothecauseofinnovationandself-sufficiency,allmaterielthatcouldnotbecarriedawaywasdisposedofthroughlocalauc-tionsandsales.EventheAFG’sunofficialnewspaper,supportedcompletelybylocalsubscriptionsandadver-tising,soldoffallitsofficeequipmentanddonatedtheproceedstobuymilkforthechildrenofpoorGermanfamiliesinCoblenz.
ByFebruary1923,alloftheU.S.forcesweregoneandtheFrenchArmyhadmovedintoCoblenztomain-taintheoccupation.WhocouldhaveknownthenthattheU.S.ArmywouldreturninforceagaintothispartofGermanyinMarch1945?ThecaptureoftheLudendorff
RailroadBridgeatRemagen,theverysamebridgeonceproudlyguardedbytheSoldiersandMarinesofthe2dDivisionafterWorldWarI,wouldsignalthattheendofWorldWarIIinEuropewasnearandthesecondoccu-pationofGermanywouldsoonbegin.
Inretrospect,thereisalottobeadmiredabouttheArmy’s“firstsustainmentcenterofexcellence”atCoblenz.Thoughtheywouldnotrecognizethatname,thelogisticiansoftheThirdArmyandAFGcertainlyearnedthetitle.Providingsupportunderunusualconditionsinaforeignland,theyshowedacreativestreakthatensuredthattheUnitedStateshadaviableforcetomeetavariedmission.Whiledoingso,thoselogisticiansalsomanagedtorunavarietyofschoolandtrainingsitesthatpreparedthedoughboysnotonlytobebetterSoldiersbutalso,inmanycases,preparedthemforcivilianoccupationsaftertheirser-vicewascomplete.
Whethersupportingthe250,000menoftheThirdArmyin1918orthelast1,000doughboysoftheAFGin1923,theassignedlogisticianscertainlyearnedaplaceofhonoraspartofthefirstU.S.“watchontheRhine.”GeneralPershingputitmoresimply:Theywerepartof“thebestunitintheArmy.”
alexanDer f. BarneS iS a loGiSticS ManaGeMent SUperviSor for the enterpriSe SySteMS Directorate of the arMy coMBineD arMS SUpport coMManD. he iS a forMer enliSteD Marine anD arMy warrant officer. he holDS a Bachelor’S DeGree in anthropoloGy froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at cortlanD anD a MaSter’S DeGree in archeoloGy froM the State UniverSity of new yorK at BinGhaMton.
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CombinedArmsSupportCommand(CASCOM),isfortheofficertothinkofhimselffirstandforemostasamultifunctionallogistician.ToquoteGeneralStevenson,whoisnowtheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,DepartmentoftheArmy(DA),“Otherwise,whywouldwehavebotheredtogothroughallofwhatwewentthrough?”
Thechallengeisthatwealsohaveanobligationasaunifiedcorpstonourishandsustainourindividualareasoffunctionalexpertise.Futuredivisiontrans-portationofficers,chiefsoftheOfficeoftheQuar-termasterGeneral,andchiefsofordnancehavetobedeveloped.
LogisticsofficersarestronglyencouragedtoreadDAPamphlet600−3,CommissionedOfficerProfessionalDevelopmentandCareerManagement,andbecomeacquaintedwithrecentupdates,includinganexpandedlistofkeydevelopmentalpositionsformajorsandanupdatedcareerpathchart.Ifofficershavefurtherques-
tions,theyshouldtalktotheirsustainmentchainofcommand,humanresourcesmanagers,orthechiefoftheLogisticsBranchProponencyofficeatCASCOM.
ThebottomlineisthatasanLGofficer,onemustbereadytodoitall—fight,support,andsurvive.TheLGofficermustbebothafunctionalexpertandcompletelyfamiliarwithmultifunctionalsustainment.Ifitwereeasy,theywouldnotcallitlogistics.
lieUtenant colonel MarShall n. raMSey iS cUrrently ServinG aS the chief of Staff for the arMy coMBineD arMS SUpport coMManD anD SUStainMent center of excellence at fort lee, virGinia. he previoUSly ServeD aS the chief of the loGiSticS Branch proponency office anD aS coMManDer of the 842D tranSportation Battalion, Military SUrface DeployMent anD DiS triBUtion coMManD.
lieUtenant colonel tiM Gilhool iS en roUte to Be the coMManDer of the 782D BriGaDe SUpport Batta lion, 4th BriGaDe coMBat teaM, 82nD air Borne DiviSion, at fort BraGG, north carolina. he recently ServeD aS the coMManDer of the 71St StUDent Battalion at the arMy loGiSticS UniverSity at fort lee.
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T heUH−60BlackHawkhelicopterisfamiliar totheAmericanpublic,butfewoutsidethe U.S.Governmenthavethoughtmuchaboutwhatitcosts.SikorskyAircraftCorporationsellstheBlackHawktotheArmyatanaveragecostofapproxi-mately$14million(includingplatformprocurementandinitialspares).Thefleetcurrentlyconsistsofabout1,800BlackHawks,eachwithanaveragelifespanof25years.Duringeveryyearofitslife,aBlackHawkrequiresabout$800,000ofrepairandsparepartspur-chases.Thesepurchasesfallintothecategoryofsus-tainment.
Whileattentionistypicallyfocusedontheinitialcostofprocuringaweaponsystem,sustainmentspend-ingactuallyaccountsformostofthetotallifetimecostofownership.Sustainmentiscriticalfromamissionandreadinessperspective.Whensustainmentisopti-mized,weaponsystemsperformbetter,spendlesstimeunderrepair,andremaininuselonger,thusdelayingtheneedfortheirreplacement.Foreveryadditionalyearthatahelicopterremainsinuse,theArmysavesover$4million.
Atatimeofdefensecost-cutting,acquisitiontrans-formation,andemphasisonresponsibleuseoftax-payerdollars,abipartisanperceptionhasgrownthattheFederalprocurementsystemhasproblemsbuy-ingandmaintainingbig-ticketweaponsystemsfromtheaerospaceanddefenseindustry.Thecurrentwayofdoingbusinessintheweaponsystemsmarketisprimedforamajoroverhaul.GiventhattheDepart-mentofDefense(DOD)budgets60percentmoreforoperationandmaintenancethanforprocurement,theUnitedStatesfacesanopportunitytoimprovehowitacquiresweaponsystemsustainment.
Thisarticleoutlinesamajorparadigmshifttowardamorecollaborativemanagementapproach:aligninglogisticsandacquisitionactivityamongthemilitaryservices,theDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),andprivateindustry.Intheidealfuturestate,DODwouldbridgethegapbetweensupplychainandprocurementmanagementthroughadisci-plinedoperationalstrategyofcollaborativemanage-ment.Thisstrategywouldincludecollaboration
COMMENTARY
CollaborativeManagementWillImproveWeaponSystemSustainment
withinbothindividualandjointweaponsystemportfolios,providingseamlessintegrationofsupplychainmanagement(includingsourcing)bytheser-vices,DLA,andindustry.
ANewEnvironmentCallsforChangeWeaponsystemsustainmenttodayfailstotake
advantageofopportunitiesforgeneratingefficien-ciesandsavings.LegacypracticeshavepreventedDODfromoptimizinglifecyclecosts.Theservicesbuyindividuallyfromthesamesuppliersand,insomecases,purchaseidenticalsystems,parts,andservices.
Furthermore,theseparationofsupplychainandacquisitionactivitiesmeansthattotalsystemportfoliocostsarehardtocapture.Keydecisionsaremadeinisolation,resultinginsignificantsustainmentcostandreadinessimpactsthatshouldhavebeenaddressedinacquisition.Theservicesalsohavebeenunabletopartnereffectivelywithindustrytoensuretop-notchservice.
Weaponsystemsustainmentiscurrentlyundergo-ingrapidchange.Whileseveraleffortsareunder-waytoimprovesustainmentthroughoutDOD,theenvironmentsurroundingsustainmentisrapidlyandfundamentallychanging.Inordertomakelastingimprovements,wemustfirstunderstandthesechangesandtheirimplications.
AnEmphasisonPrecisionOverBruteForceTheDODmissionisshiftingfrombruteforce
topersistentprecision.DOD’smissioncontinuestoevolvefromtheColdWargarrisonmodeltoonethatcanconducttheGlobalWaronTerrorismwithasmall-er,moreprecise,moreresponsive,andmorepersistentfootprint.DODforcesandtheirsupportingsupplychainsmustbeabletodeploy,reconstitute,andrede-ployonamoment’snotice.Weaponsystemsmustbeabletomoveandmaintainreadinessinthisrapid-fireenvironment.Thesedemandsleavelittleroomforpro-cessinefficiencies,especiallythosethataffectsupplychainperformance,byeitherDODoritssustainmentprovidersinindustry.
by riCK ConLin and jiM MCintosh
The environment in which weapon system sustainment takes place is changing fundamentally. The authors believe these changes will require the Department of Defense and industry to transform the way they do business.
T
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InternalDODChangesAffectSustainmentTheapproachtosustainmentreflectsinternalDOD
changes.JustasDOD’smissionhasshifted,thefunda-mentalapproachtosustainmentsourcinghasadaptedtokeychangeswithinDOD,includingbaseclosureandrealignment(BRAC),DLA’sevolvingrole,andseveralOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)-ledinitiatives.
BRAClegislationhasforcedDODtofurtherrethinkthemanagementofinventoryandsupplychains.DODischangingthecurrentdistributionchannelsforparts,commercializingsignificantpiecesofthedefensesup-plychain,andbringingDLAintoorganicdepotopera-tions.OneparticularlyimportantDODimperativedealswithlogistics—inparticular,sustainmentsourc-ingwithcommercialproviders.ThiscurrentBRACimperativehasraisedconcernamongtheservicesthatsustainmentsourcingwillhaveaneffectonoverallmissionperformance.Whensustainmentsourcingisdonewell,commerciallogisticsofferingsproperlyalignwithDODproducts,services,assets,andcapa-bilities.Whensustainmentisdonepoorly,ithampersDOD’squick-strikecapability.
DLA,incoordinationwiththeU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM),OSD,andtheservices,hasbeenavocalleaderinthetransitiontoanenterprisesupplychain.DLAhasimplementedmanystrategicsourcinginitiativesthatrelatedirectlytoweaponsys-temsustainment.Theagencycreatedmultifunctionalstrategicsourcingmaterialgroupswithinitseightcross-servicesupplychains(aviation,land,maritime,constructionandequipment,clothingandtextile,med-ical,subsistence,andenergy).
ThisexpandedDLArolehasproducedabroadersourcingportfoliothatincludesclassIX(repairparts)andcross-servicepartneringintireacquisition(amongtheArmy,Navy,andAirForce),theIndus-trialPrimeVendorprogram,andtheFleetAutomo-tiveSupportInitiative.However,thereisstillroomforsignificantimprovementnotonlywithinDLAbutalsothroughoutDOD.
ThetransitiontothinkingjointlyacrossDODisstillfarfromcomplete.Theservicesanddefenselogisticsprovidersunderstandtheclearneedforajointsupplychainapproach.Theyknowthattheyusemanycom-monparts,components,subsystems,platforms,andrepaircapabilitiesandhaveintegratedsomelow-levelareasofcommonsupply.However,themajorweaponsystemsandplatformspresentasignificantchallenge.Theservicesfearthatindiscriminateleveragingwilloverlooktheuniqueserviceandproductneedsofcom-plexweaponsystemsorplatforms,andtheymaintainastrongdesiretoretainownershipofsustainment.
Tomoveforwardcomfortably,theservicesmustfeelconfidentthataweaponsystemsustainmentportfoliohasclearlyarticulatedbusinessandper-formancerequirements tailored to their own needs
thatcanbeforwardedtoindustry,bidon,andexe-cuted.However,atthispointtheservicesrecognizethattheydonotfullyunderstandwhatisuniqueabouttheirrequirementsversuswhatelementsarecommontoalltheservices.Itisabsolutelyessentialthattheservicesbeabletocommunicatewhatdifferentiatestheirownmajorweaponsystems.Otherwise,theycannotmakeeducateddecisionsonwhattokeepinhouseandwhattoshare.
HiddenOwnershipCostsSeparatingsupplychainandacquisitionactivities
hidestotalownershipcosts.Historically,inventoryprocurement,commercialrepair,andorganicrepairforweaponsystemshavebeencontractedseparately,sub-jecttotheuncoordinatedinvolvementofprogramman-agementofficers,line-itemmanagers,andcontractingofficers.Asaresult,itisdifficulttounderstandandquantifytheportfolioofsparepartsandrepairrequirementsforagivennationalstocknumber.Thischallengehasbecomemoreprofoundwiththeexpand-ingroleofDLA.Moreimportantly,thiscomplexitytranslatesintolimitedvisibilityofpurchasingacrosstheseactivities,atremendouspotentialforredundancywithinanenterpriseportfolio,andlostopportunitiestoleveragebuyingpowertoreducecosts.
IndustryPartnershipsAreEvolvingIndustrypartnerships,whileanimportantelement
ofDOD’stransformation,arealsokeyelementsoftheunderlyingchallengeofsustainingweaponsys-tems.Whilemanyapproacheshavebeentriedwithvaryingdegreesofsuccess,thebestmodelforthesepartnershipshasyettobedefined.Overthepastsev-eralyears,thenumberofindustrypartnershipshasincreaseddramatically;DODrepairdepotsalonehave348.Althoughthenatureoftheagreementshasalsoevolvedaspartnershipshavebecomebroaderandmorecomplexinscope,depotpartnershipsarestillprimarilyfocusedonblue-collaractivitiesandhavenotencour-agedsubstantialinvestmentfromtheindustrialbase.
UsingPerformance-BasedAgreementsUseofperformance-basedlogistics(PBL)agree-
mentsisgrowing.Aparticularlysuccessfulformofindustrypartnership,PBLisasustainmentsupportstrategythatalignsincentivesforlogisticsperformancewiththedesiredoutcomesforweaponsystemperfor-mance.WhilePBLhasbeenimplementedsuccessfullywithindustrialsuppliers,DODisexploringopportuni-tiestoapplyitwithintheorganicrepaircommunity.
PBLagreementsusuallyincludesomelevelofbaseline,award,orpenaltypaymentsassociatedwithprenegotiatedsupplychainorweaponsystemper-formancemetrics,suchason-timedelivery,materielavailability,orsystemuptime.Moreimportantly,PBL
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agreementscreateincentivesforsustainmentproviderstocontinuouslyimprovetheirlogisticsefficiencyandperformance,resultinginimprovedweaponsystemperformanceatlowersupportcosts.
Themostprogressive(orinclusive)PBLsoutsourcesignificantelementsoftheDODweaponsystemsup-plychain,suchasdistribution,maintenance,andinventorymanagementorownership.Theleastpro-gressivePBLssimplyoutsourceasinglefunction,suchasdistributionorsupply.
DOD’sexperiencewithPBLshasshownthatcertainperformance-basedapproachesaremoreappropriateinspecificsituations.Platform-levelprograms,suchastheAirForce’sC−17transport,alignallaspectsofsustain-menttotheoverallgoalofplatformreadiness.However,commonsubsystems,suchasauxiliarypowerunitsandaircraftengines,areusedjointlyandacrossplatforms.Inthosecases,thekeyperformanceobjectiveissimplytheavailabilityofthesubsystem.Similarly,commod-itypartsprovidershaveenteredintoPBLagreementsfocusedprimarilyonpartsavailabilityanddeliveryper-formance.ThePBLcontractforNavyaircrafttiresisaleadingexampleofacommodity-levelPBLagreement.
ThecriticalfactorforPBLeffectivenessisbalanc-ingtheamountofriskthatDODwilltransfertoanindustrypartneragainsttheamountoffinancialliabil-itythattheindustrypartneriswillingtoaccept.Failuretoachievethisbalancetranslatesintoinadequateandcostlysupplychainperformanceorfinancialdam-agetothecompanyenteringintothePBL.Thesearrangementsmustbe“win-win”scenariosthatdeliverrequiredperformanceatacceptablecosttotheGovern-mentandensurethatthecommercialpartnercanmeettheperformancerequirementprofitably.
Withexperience,DODisgettingbetteratdraftingPBLagreements.InrecentPBLprogramsandsecond-generationnegotiations,DODisaskingindustrytodeterminethecostsoftheircontractedperformancelev-els.DODisalsoaskingindustrytomeetperformancetargetsbymakingrepairsratherthanpurchasingexces-siveinventory.ThisapproachreducestheGovernment’slevelofinventoryownershipandrisk.Someprogramshavetransferredasignificantportionofinventoryown-ershiptoindustryproviders,encouragingindustrytobalanceinvestmentsininventorywithinvestmentsinoptimalinventoryplanning,systemdesign,andcom-ponentquality.Suchinvestmentsleadtoloweroverallcosts,asmallerlogisticsfootprint,andgreaterreliability.
DLAisbecomingalargerplayerinweaponsystemsustainmentandindustrypartnershipswithmajortier-1vendors.DLAhaslongmanagedtheacquisitionofconsumables.Itsexpansionintomanagingcontractsfordepot-levelreparableshasforcedprogramman-agementoffices(whichmaintainlogisticsandsupplychainrequirements)tocoordinatetheirsustainmentbuyingrequirementswithbothservice-ownedand
DLAcontractingofficesaswellasindustrialsuppliers.Nowthatindustryhasshiftedtowardcomplexcontrac-tualsustainmentrelationships(whichincludespares,repair,andothersupplychainoutsourcingelements),suppliers,DLA,andDODarenowintegralsustain-mentplayersandpartners.
Inrecentyears,anumberofPBLagreements,manyofwhichdealonlywithpartsdistributionandareapplicableacrossplatforms,havebeentransitionedfromtheservicestoDLA.Theservicestendtokeepatightergrasponmoreprogressiveweaponsystemagreements.Infact,PBLinclusivenessisthedefactoboundarylinefordecidingwhichcontractsaretransi-tionedtoDLAmanagement.Thispracticehasledto“inclusivenessinflation.”Somelargeweaponsystemsustainmentcontractshavebecomeunnecessarilyinclusive,withtheresultthattheservicesretaincontrolofmanysustainmentfunctions.Thedownsideislostopportunitiestobenefitfromcross-serviceandcross-platformsupplychainmanagement.
TheFuture:CollaborativeManagementAgainstabackgroundoffragmentedprocessesand
soloorganizations,weaponsystemsustainmentwillevolvetowardatightlymanaged,integratedsupplychain.Itshouldbegovernedunderjointmanagementthatseamlesslyintegratestheservices,DODlogisticsproviderssuchasDLAandTRANSCOM,andindus-try.Thesustainmentportfoliomustbetightlycon-trolledbytheservices’programmanagementoffices.
Atthetacticallevel,contractingofficersmustbeabletotranslatelogisticsrequirementsintocontractswithcommercialvendorsthatdelivertopsupplychainandcostperformanceacrosstheentireportfolio.Contractingofficersthereforemustfullyunderstandallaspectsofasystem’ssustainmentportfolio.Businessrequirementsmustbeappropriatelydrafted,negotiated,executed,andmanagedbyacohesiveDODcontractingteam.Finally,industryandGovernmentmustestablishwin-winrela-tionshipsforlogisticsandcontractmanagementandforsupportingadynamicanddemandingcustomerbase.
Currently,theGovernmenthasbegunintegratingtheprimaryplayers,butthatintegrationisfarfromfinished.DLAmustcementtheboundariesofsustain-mentcontrolinthefaceofconsiderableuncertainty.ShouldDLAownPBLagreements?ShouldDLAbeintherepairbusiness?Substantialworkbylogisticsandacquisitionpersonnelwillbeneededtohammeroutthebestcontractualrelationshipbetweencostandperformance.TheservicesandDLAmustfirstbuildaneffectiveintegratedrelationshipandthenworkwithindustrytoformawell-functioningteam.
Byfullyadoptingthefollowingcompetenciesandpractices,DODanditssupplierscandramaticallytransformthewaytheyinteractandcollaborativelymanagetheirrelationships.
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58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
UseEnd-to-EndSupplyChainManagementBeforespendingmoneyonweaponsystemsustain-
ment,particularlyinafixed-priceenvironment,theGovernmentmustfirstunderstandexactlywhattheend-to-endsupplychainisexpectedtodoandhowitshouldperform.Eachsystem’ssupplychainisunique,asareitsperformancemetrics.OnceDODidentifiestheappropriateperformancecategories,itcanthendeterminetheoptimallevelsofperformance.
Forexample,ifDODdecidesthatsystemuptimeiscriti-cal,thenextquestionishowmuchuptimeisoptimal.Thisprocessinvolvescombiningadeepunderstandingofthesystemsupplychainwithbenchmarkedanalyticsforthechosenmetricsthatcarefullybalanceperformanceandcost.
ArticulateUniqueSustainmentRequirementsOnceweaponsystemperformanceoutcomesare
set,theymustbetranslatedintouniquesustainmentrequirements.Programmanagementofficesmustcare-fullystatesustainmentrequirementstocontractingofficerssotheycanappropriatelybidandawardthework.Programmanagementofficesneedtoknownotonlywhatperformancelevelsarerequiredbutalsohowthoselevelscanbeachieved.
Forexample,systemuptimecanbeachievedthroughrepairturnaroundorinventoryprocurement.Aclearlyarticulatedbusinessrequirementwouldpre-scribeuptimelevelsandspecifyhowthecontractormustachievethatmetric.Anexamplewouldbe,“Iwanttoachieve95-percentuptimebymaintainingnomorethan75inventorydaysofsupplyandnomorethana7-dayrepairturnaroundtimeoncriticalitems.”
EngageCustomersDLAandtheserviceshavealreadydefinedthe
distinctivesupplychainsandbegunintegrationacrosstheircustomers.Toachieveoptimallystructuredsupplychains,theymustengagecustomersincollaboratingtoeliminatestovepipethinking.DespiteDOD’smandatetodriveintegration,thedifferentservicesandevenindividualcommandscanpresentobstacles.DrivingchangerequiresconvincingDODclientsoftheneedforchangeandofDOD’scompetencetoleadthatchange.Akeyelementofchangemanagementwillbelisteningcloselytofullyunderstandthecustomers’perspectivesandthendemonstratingthattheproposedstrategieswilladdresstheirneedsandconcerns.
ModelLifecycleCostsDOD’sabilitytomodellifecyclecostsshouldhelp
convincecustomersoftheneedtochange.Typically,customerssimplycannotseeallelementsofthesupplychainacrossDOD,andtheirdecisionssolelyreflecttheirowninterests.Withitsanalyticalcapabilitiesandviewoftheentiresupplychain,DODcanbringaholistic,fact-basedperspectivetotheconversation.The
servicesandDLAhavealreadytransitionedfrommea-suringcosttomeasuringservice.Thelogicalnextstepinvolvesunderstandingthestrategictradeoffsbetweencostandservicebasedonrigorousanalysis.
MaketheMostofWhatIsinHandAweaponsystem’send-to-endsupplychaincontains
millionsofdollars’worthofinventory.Whetherthesesparepartsinventoriesareatthedepotorforward-deployedinthefield,theycontainthepiecesandpartsthatoftendictatehowfastadownedsystemwillbereadytouseagain.Historically,DODhasreliedonmountainsofinventorytomaintainreadiness.Withincreasedinterestincostreductionandtheleanerandmoreprecisemissionrequirementsoftoday’swars,DODmustsustainitssystemswithlessinventory.
Programmanagerswillultimatelyhavetorelyheav-ilyonrepairtoreplenishdepletedinventory.Theywillalsoneedtounderstandexactlywhereinthesupplychainrepairdecisionsmustbemade.Industry,whichmayownprogressivelylargerpartsofsustainmentsup-plychains,mustbeequallysavvy.Themorevendorsdelivercontractedperformancelevelsthroughrepair-ingratherthanpurchasing,thebettertheirbottom-linemarginswilllook.
BuildIndustryPartnershipsDOD’sshiftfrommanaginginventoriesinternallyto
relyingmorebroadlyonindustryhaslaidthefoundationforthenextshift:abalancedpartnershipwithindustry.WhiletheJapanesemodelofsupplierpartnershipscanremoveuntoldwaste,DODmustbuildpartnershipsthatbalanceacommitmenttocooperativerelationshipswithacommitmenttocompetitivepricing.
Manycommercialorganizationshavefoundthem-selvesrelyingon“partnersuppliers,”onlytodiscoverthatthesupplierwascapturingmostofthevaluefromtherelationship.EmergingdisciplineswithinDOD,suchassupplierrelationshipmanagement(SRM),helptoalleviatetheseconcerns.UndertheSRMframe-work,industrybestpractices,suchasdemandforecast-ing,assetvisibility,andtotallifecyclemanagement,areintegratedseamlesslywithinDODpartners.Thesetypesofpartnershipsarebuilttoevolveovertimeandcreatelong-termvalueforbothparties.
DifferentiateSupplierRelationshipsBuildingonthefoundationofthestrategicsupplier
alliancesandtheSupplyChainAlliancemodelshouldresultinabroaderarrayofdifferentiatedrelation-ships.Bylookingatneedsholistically,theservicesandDLAcancreatethemostadvantageoussupplierrelationshipsratherthanfocusingonthelargestDODsuppliers.
Insomecases,theoriginalequipmentmanufacturerwilltakeonalargerroleinmanagingthetotalsupply
58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 59
chainfromdevelopmenttosustainmentandevendis-posalofaweaponsystem.Butinothercases,thesup-plychainwillbebrokendownintoitspartsandrolesassignedalongdifferentdimensions,suchasgeogra-phyoractivity.Thesedifferentiatedroleswillhelptoclarifyprioritiesandaccountabilities.
MaximizeLeverageWithSuppliersTheroleofindustrywillonlygrowlargerinfuture
weaponsystemsustainment.DODwillrepeatedlybuyfromthesameprimaryvendorsforbothrepairandspares(particularlyforjointweaponsystems).Thismassivelevelofspendingcanbeleveragedformaxi-mumcostdiscountsandperformancelevelswhencon-tractsareawardedincombinationwithmultiserviceandinterservicebuys.Withstreamlined,multifunction-alcontractsformultiserviceorinterserviceprograms,vendorscanstreamlineinventory,distribution,andrepaircapacity.
MaximizeOrganicCapabilityBRACisalreadyreconfiguringorganiccapability
andcapacity.DOD’sorganiccapacitythroughoutthecountryisshiftingdramaticallythroughtheclosingofsomedepotsandtheexpansionofothers.DODmustperformabalancingactbyselectingindustrialsuppli-erswhilemaintainingitsownproductionandrepaircapacitiesinaccordancewithTitle10(whichmandatesa50−50commercial-to-organicworkload).Inthisrealignment,itisimportanttounderstandwhatcapa-bilitiesshouldbepreservedinhouseandwhatshouldbecontracted.Collectively,theportfolioofdepotworkshouldmakemaximumuseofdepotcapabilities.
ReduceRedundancyWithsomuchspendingbeingdistributedamong
bothcommercialvendorsanddepots,thepotentialforcapabilityredundancyissignificant.Whilesomeredundancyensuresbandwidthandscalabilitywhendemandishigh,toomuchredundancycancreatemajorcostandperformanceinefficiencies.TheGov-ernmentoftendouble-buys:Itpaysindustrytoperformworkorbuyinventory,butitcontinuestoactaswell.DODshouldreduceredundancywhilemaximizingitsorganiccapability.
TheBenefitsofCollaborativeManagementAglimpseintothefutureshowsnumerousbenefits
fromcollaborativemanagement.Nolongerwillessen-tialknowledgeandbusinessrequirementsforapur-chasegetlostintransitionbetweenfunctions.Contractingcentersofexcellencewillprovidebestpracticesandintellectualcapitaltohelpcontractingofficerscreatemoreadvantageouscontracts.Abet-termanagementphilosophywillalleviateinefficien-ciesandmaketheprocesseasierbyautomatically
buildingthemostcriticalsupplychainbusinessandperformancerequirementsintobest-in-class,lifecycle-focusedcontracts.
Furthermore,thesecontractualagreementswillrelieveovertaxedGovernmentresourcesoftheburdenofintensivecostandperformancemanage-ment.Managementwillplaceskilledpeoplewheretheyarerequiredandmakefulluseoftheirexper-tise.Thisisnottosaythatroleswillremainstatic:Today’srolesmaycallforadditionalskills,andnewrolesmaywellbeinstituted.ThevisionisoneofsmoothlymeshinggearsamongpartnerswithinandoutsideGovernment.
Althoughinstillingthedisciplineandrequiredcompetenciesofcollaborativemanagementintoweaponsystemsustainmentisalong-termprocess,DODisbeginningthejourney.Programmanagementoffices,includingthatoftheBlackHawkhelicopter,arealreadybuildingthefoundationforcollaborativemanagement.AstheBlackHawkprogrammanage-mentofficerationalizesitsvendorbase,itisalsoestablishingmoreprogressivecompetenciesoutlinedinthisarticle:formalizedSRMprogramswithstrate-gicvendors,progressiveperformance-basedcontractdevelopment,collaborativedepotpartnershipsbetweentheGovernmentandindustry,andcontinuedcoordina-tionwithDLA,OSD,andtheservicesinthedesignofajointsupplychainarchitecture.Muchworkremainstobedone.Nonetheless,BlackHawksustainmentisamongmanyexamplesthatshowthatDODrecognizestheimportanceofweaponsystemsustainmentandthecollaborativemanagementpracticesthatoptimizeit.
Thefuturestateofweaponsystemsustainmentwillultimatelydependonhowtheprogressiontowardcollaborationcontinues.Collaborativemanagementinsustainmentwillemergethroughcarefulplanningandexecutiongroundedinrigorousduediligenceandtacticaldiscipline,oftenonaplatform-by-platformorsystem-by-systembasis.Thoughtheprocessmaylackdrama,thefuturestateseemsworththeeffort.Itwillonedayclosethegapamongacquisition,logistics,andcommercialindustryleaderssothatallpartiescanworktogethertosupportthewarfighterinacombatenvironmentthatisdemanding,dynamic,andhistori-callyunique.
ricK conlin iS a Senior aSSociate at cenSeo conSUltinG GroUp. a forMer naval SUpply corpS officer, he iS a GraDUate of the UniteD StateS naval acaDeMy anD holDS an M.B.a. DeGree anD an M.S. DeGree in ManaGeMent froM the UniverSity of MarylanD.
jiM McintoSh iS a Director at cenSeo conSUltinG GroUp. he holDS a B.S. DeGree in coMpUter Science froM harvarD UniverSity anD an M.B.a. DeGree froM the MaSSachUSettS inStitUte of technoloGy.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 59
60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
heUnitedStatescontinuestoconductoperationsintwomajortheaterswhilesimul-taneouslyengagingincontingencyoperationsaroundtheworldandtrainingtheremaining,undeployedforcesforsubsequentoperations.Inlightofthischallengingenvi-ronment,PresidentGeorgeW.Bushin2007requestedandreceivedanauthorizationfromCon-gresstoincreasetheArmybyapproximately75,000Soldiers.1Thisgrowth,coupledwiththecontinuedhighoperatingtempooftheoperationalforce,requiresadditionalresources.Attheheartoftheseincreasingrequirementsaresmall-armsmunitions.
ThispaperexaminestheUnitedStates’small-armsammunitionacquisitionstrategyformeetingtheArmy’scurrentoperationalandtrainingrequirements,aswellasfortheincreaseinthefutureforcestructure.Itcomparesthecurrentoperationalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionwithpresentproductioncapabilitiesandlimitationsinordertodetermineifthedefenseindustrialbaseneedstomakechangestotheacquisitionstrategy.
LakeCity:ProductionandSourcesTheacquisitionstrategyforsmall-armsammunitionisbasedontheGovernment-owned,
contractor-operated(GOCO)ammunitionplantatLakeCity,Missouri.AlliantTechsystems,Inc.(ATK),operatesthisGOCOfacilityfortheGovernment.AsaGOCO,thefacilityiscommandedbyanArmylieutenantcolonel,butATKisresponsibleforproductionoperationsandoutputcapa-bilities.ThisrelationshipallowstheGovernmenttoreduceitsmanpowercostsandinviteprivate-sectorbusinessinitiativestopromoteefficiencyandimproveproduction.2
Over99percentofallsmall-armsbullets(5.56-millimeter[mm],7.62-mmand.50-caliber)consumedbytheArmyunderitsTitle10responsibilitytosupplyandequipitsforcesaremanu-facturedattheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant.Productiondemandisdrivenbycurrentopera-tionalrequirements;anyproductionshortfallsatLakeCityareoutsourcedtoprivatecompanieswithintheUnitedStates.3Logisticianswillarguethatthisstrategylacksadequateredundancyandresponsiveness,especiallywhenoneconsidersthattheLakeCityfacilitywasbuiltin1941.
TheArmy’ssmall-armsammunitionproductionisaffectedbymorethantheoutputoftheLakeCityfacility.Aswithanymanufacturingsystem,thesupplychainisanintegralpieceinthepro-ductionoutputprocess.Eachsmall-arms-ammunitioncartridge(singleround)containsseveralcomponents.ThemainammunitionusedbyvirtuallyeverySoldierandMarineisthe5.56-mmcartridge.Itsdesignincludesthecartridgecase,thebulletorshot,propellant,andprimer.Eachofthesecomponentsisfabricatedfromdifferentcommodities.TheArmyrequiresATKtomaintainaminimumofthreesuppliersforeachofthecomponents.4
Theleadandsteelforthebullet’spenetratorareobtainedfromsourceslocatedintheUnitedStates.5Thebrassforthecartridgecaseisprimarilysuppliedfromcompanieswithinthecontinen-talUnitedStates(CONUS).LakeCitypurchasesbrassintheformofbrasscasecupsandbulletjacketcupsfromaU.S.-basedsource.Duringthemanufacturingprocess,thesecupsarepulledfromtheiroriginalconfigurationandreconfiguredintotheappropriatesmall-armsammunition
Small-ArmsAmmunitionProductionandAcquisition:TooManyEggsinOneBasket?
by Major MarK w. sieKMan, usar,dr. david a. anderson, and aLLan s. boyCe
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
T
1Grow The Army,DepartmentoftheArmy,Washington,DC,2007,www.army.mil/growthearmy,accessed4May2009.2Ibid.3RichardG.Palaschak,DirectorofOperationsfortheMunitionsIndustrialBaseTaskForce,beforetheHouseArmedServicesSubcommitteeon
TacticalAirandLandForces,24June2004.4Ibid.5Ibid.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 61
cartridgetype.Alternativesuppliershavebeenidentified;however,theyaccountforlessthan5percentofthetotalpurchased.6LakeCityhastakentheinitiativetorecycleunusedandwastebrassduringthemanufacturingprocesstoreducecosts.
Themainingredientusedinallsmall-armsammunitionpropellantsisnitrocellulose.TheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantinVirginiaisthesoleproducerofthisessentialingredientforallpropellantsusedthroughouttheArmy’sammuni-tionindustrialbase.Radfordhasanacid-concentratorfacilitythatproducesthenitricandsulphuricacidsthat,whencombinedwithcellulose,makenitrocellulose.Ninety-ninepercentofallsmall-armsammunitionusedinAfghanistanandIraqcontainsnitrocelluloseproducedatthisfacility.
Finally,theprimerinmostcartridgesismadefromover13differentchemicals,whicharemixedattheLakeCityplant.LakeCitymanufacturestheprimersforallsmall-armsammunitionproducedatitsfacility.ATKcon-tinuestoseekadditionalsourcesofsupplyfortheprimermixchemicals.AllsuppliersarebasedintheUnitedStates.However,theU.S.suppliersobtainthesechemi-calsfromCanada,Europe,Mexico,India,Brazil,andChinaaswellastheUnitedStates.7
Onefinalcomponentuniquetomachinegunammuni-tionislinkagebelts.BeforeOperationIraqiFreedom,LakeCityreliedonsuppliersforlinkagebeltsusing5.56-mm,7.62-mm,and.50-caliberammunition.Becauseofthelargeincreaseindemandforthisammunition,theplantinvestedinupgradingitsfacilitiesandmanufacturingequipment.Thisincludedpurchasing,moving,andinstall-ingthesolesurvivingproductionlineforlinkagebeltsfor5.56-mm,7.62-mm,and.50-calibermachineguns.
ProductionCapabilitiesandRequirementsThechartaboveshowsthelevelsofproductionbythe
LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantoverthelastdecade.TheArmyalmostdoubleditstotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionfrom2003to2004.TheresultingincreaseinLakeCity’sproductionrequirementscaused
ATKandtheArmytoinitiateamodernizationandpro-cessimprovementprogramtoincreaseefficiencyandproductioncapabilities.8
Initially,theneedforgreateroutputwasaddressedbyincreasingtheoperatinghoursoftheplantandaddinganotherworkshiftforproduction.ATKnowusesaprocessimprovementmanagementtechniquemodeledafterwhattheToyotaCorporationuses.9Despitethecurrentmodern-izationandprocessimprovementeffortsbytheArmyandATK,theplant’sproductioncapabilityisphysicallylimitedto1.6billionsmall-armsammunitionroundsannually.10
ThreeScenariosforAnalysisCanthedefenseindustrialbasesupportsmall-arms
ammunitionproductionforcurrentandfutureoperations,aswellastheincreaseintheArmy’sforcestructure?Inordertoanswerthisquestion,weappliedgapanalysistotheArmy’ssmall-armsammunitionrequirementsanditsproductioncapabilities.
Wefirstidentifiedthetotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionasdeterminedbytheJointMunitionsCommand.Therequirementsdepictedrepresentarangeofthreeexistingandpossiblesituations.Next,thecurrentdefenseindustrialbase’ssmall-armsammunitionproduc-tioncapabilitywascomparedtothedifferingsituationalrequirements.Finally,theLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant’ssupplychainwasanalyzedtodeterminepotentialpointsoffailureandpossibleshortfalls.Theinterpreta-tionandimplicationsoftheseresultsareofferedattheendofthisarticle.
Thechartonpage62summarizesthetotalsmall-armsammunitionrequiredbytheArmyforthethreeexistingandpossiblesituations.Thefirstsituationrepresentsrequirementsforpeacetimeoperationsandtrainingoccur-
349232
588
375559
1192 12691348 1375
1262
273205
532
316
463
1035 1048 1093 1098956
63 23 38 46 70 120 168 198 217 243
13 4 18 13 26 37 53 57 60 630
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Mill
ion
ro
un
ds
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
.50-c aliber 7.62-millimeter 5.56-millimeter Total
Levels of production by the Lake City Army Am mu nition Plant in Missouri.
Note that the Army almost doubled its total requirements for smallarms
am munition from 2003 to 2004. (Source: Thomas Blose, Production
Base Realities, Briefing, Joint Muni-tions Command, Picatinny Arsenal,
New Jersey, 13 Febru ary 2002.)
6Ibid.7Ibid.8LieutenantColonelChristopherDay,LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantcommander.BriefingtoauthorduringLakeCitytours,MayandOctober2009.9Ibid.10Ibid.
62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
ringaftertheendoftheColdWarandbeforetheterroristattacksof11September2001.Thistimeperiodreflectsaforcestructuresimilartotoday’sArmy,butduringaperiodinwhichnomajorcombatoperationsoccurred.
Thesecondsituationisfiscalyear2005,whichrepre-sentsrequirementsbasedonthe“1−4−2−1forcesizingconstruct”andthe“simultaneitystack”developedaspartoftheTotalArmyAnalysis(TAA).TheTAAisabiennialprocessthatdeterminestheforcesneededtoexecutethenationalstrategybasedonhigher-levelplanningguidanceliketheQuadrennialDefenseReview.Underthe1−4−2−1force-sizingconstruct,theUnitedStatesplanstodefendtheNation(“1”);maintainforcesthatcanfightinfourcrit-icalregions(“4”);maintaintheabilitytodefeatopponentsintworegionssimultaneously(“2”);anddecisivelywinoneofthoseconflictsattheU.S.initiative(“1”).
The1−4−2−1force-sizingconstructproducedasimul-taneitystack(resourcingpriorities)insixmajorcatego-ries:homelandsecurity,deteraggression,majorcombatoperations,small-scalecontingencies(non-critical),trans-formation,andgeneratingforcestructure.11
Fiscalyear2005wasselectedfortworeasons.First,webelieveitprovidesavalidrepresentationofcurrent,andlikelyfuture,operationssincefiscalyear2005requiredthemostsmall-armsammunitionunderthecurrentforce-sizingconstruct.Second,currentsmall-armsammunitionrequirementscouldnotbereleasedbytheJointMunitionsCommandbecauseoftheirsensitivity.ThisbaselineisalsopredicatedontheassumptionthatArmyrequirementsfortwomajorcombatoperationswillremainconstantdespitetheannounceddrawdownofforcesinIraq.
Thethirdsituationselectedisthesmall-armsammuni-tionrequirementsduringWorldWarII.
Thetotalrequirementsforsmall-armsammunitionrepresentedbythesethreetimeperiodsclearlyreflectthe
typesofoperationsoccurringateachtime.Thefirsttimeperiod,pre-11September2001,reflectsthe“peacedivi-dend”broughtaboutbytheendoftheColdWarandthereductioninforcesfollowingtheGulfWar.U.S.militaryleadersandpolicymakersclearlybelievedinasmaller,moretechnologicallyadvancedforcethatcouldendcon-flictsrapidly.Therequirementfortheproductionoflargeamountsofsmall-armsammunitionnolongerseemedtobegreat.
However,thesimultaneousoperationsinAfghanistanandIraq,classifiedintheforce-sizingconstructastwosimultaneousmajorcombatoperations,changedtherequirementsforammunition.Althoughthedatadonotreflecttheuseofeachtypeofsmall-armsammunition,muchofitwasusedintrainingbeforedeploymentstoAfghanistanandIraq.Sofiscalyear2005wasusedtorepresentthehighestannualrequirementunderthecur-rentforce-sizingconstruct.
WechosetorepresentdatafromWorldWarIItohigh-lightworst-casescenariorequirements.Thesedatarepre-senttotalmobilizationoftheforceduringwar.Althoughthis“blackswan”12isnotnecessarilyprobablebasedonthecurrentthreatpicture,webelieveitisvalidtocom-pareitsdemandsagainstsmall-armsammunitionproduc-tioncapabilities.
SourcesofSupplyTheproductioncapabilityrepresentedonlyaccounts
forthesoleGOCOfacilityattheLakeCityArmyAmmu-nitionPlant.Itdoesnotrepresentoutsidecontractedsourcesofproduction.Thesecontractedsourcesaccountforapproximately300millionroundsannually.TheJointMunitionsCommandhasawardedcontractstoGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemsasthesecondsourcesupplier.13GeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTactical
This chart shows the total smallarms ammunition required by the Army for three existing and possi ble situations: for peacetime operations and training after the Cold War and before the terror ist attacks of 11 September 2001, during fiscal year 2005, and during the “total war” scenario of World War II. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Al liant Techsys-tems Purchasing De partment, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)
Ammunition TypePre-11
September 2001 Annual Requirements
Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Requirements
World War II Annual Requirements
5.56-millimeter 626.2 million rounds 1.353 billion rounds n/a
7.62-millimeter linked 47.2 million rounds 282 million rounds n/a
.50-caliber linked 20.4 million rounds 74 million rounds n/a
Total 693.8 million rounds 1.709 billion rounds 21.6 billion rounds
11Total Army Analysis (TAA) Primer 2009,ArmyForceManagementSchool,FortBelvoir,VA,www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/pages/primers/TAAPrimer24April2009.pdf,accessed16December2009.
12Theterm“blackswan”representsaworst-casescenarioinwhichthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesauthorizestotalmobilizationofthemilitary,includemobilizationoftheindustrialbase.
13LaurieVanBrocklin,General Dynamics Awarded Small Arms Ammunition Contract,www.pressmediawire.com/article/Investor_Relations/Contracts/General_Dynamics_Award-ed_109_Million_by_US_Army_for_SmallCaliber_Ammunition/18371,accessed22October2009.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 63
Systemshasprocuredcontractsthroughvarioussources,includingOlinCorporation’sWinchesterDivision.
Beforethecurrentcontract,theJointMunitionsCom-mandhadacquiredsmall-armsammunitionfromforeignsources,suchasIsraelMilitaryIndustriesLtd.,forsimi-laramountsin2005.14Membersoftheacquisitioncom-munity,alongwithATK,areactivelypursuingastrategyinvolving100-percentcontractedsourcesforsmall-armsammunition.15ThiswasreinforcedwhentheDeputySec-retaryofDefenseorderedthat“tothemaximumextentfeasible,[theArmywill]transitionGovernment-ownedammunitionproductionassetstotheprivatesector.”16
TheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantiscurrentlyoperatingatmaximumproductioncapacityandcannotsignificantlyincreasemunitionsproduction,evenafterthecurrentmodernizationeffortendsinfiscalyear2011.Thechartbelowdepicts,byammunitiontype,LakeCity’stotalproductioncapability.
LakeCitycannotsignificantlyincreaseitsproductionofanammunitiontypebyrefittinganotherammunitiontype’sproductionline.Forexample,theplantcannotshutdownthe7.62-mmproductionline,reconfigureittoproduce5.56-mmammunition,andthenproduce230millionadditional5.56-mmrounds.Theonlyoptiontosignificantlyincreasingsmall-armsammunitionproduc-tionatLakeCitywouldbetoconstructadditionalfacili-tiesandproductionlines.17However,nocurrentorfutureplansexisttoconstructadditionalfacilitiesatLakeCity,oranywhereelseforthatmatter.
WealsoanalyzedLakeCity’ssupplychainforeachsmall-armsammunitioncartridgetype.Eachcomponentusesthesamekeycommodities,butdifferentsourcesofsupplyareusedforeachofthesecommoditiesforeachcartridgetype.Thechartonpage64depictseachkeyinputcommodityinvolvedinmanufacturingthecar-tridgecomponentsandthesourcesofsupplyusedbyATKatLakeCity.
Eachsmall-armsammunitiontypeusesbrassforthecartridgecasing.ATKpurchasesover95percentofitscasingbrassfromtheOlinBrassCompanyintheformofbrasscasecupsandbulletjacketcups.Thispurchaseisafixed-price,fixed-timeagreement.OlinBrassalsosuppliesU.S.-basedcommercial
ammunitionmanufacturerswithbrasssheetmetalforcartridgecasings.18Duringthefiscalyear2005produc-tionsurge,OlinBrassmettheincreaseddemandswithoutcausinganydisruptionofsmall-armsammunitionpro-ductionatLakeCity.
ATKalsopurchasesthebrassfortwocartridgetypesfromNDPressTecGmBH,whichislocatedinGermany.AnotheralternatesupplierforbrassisLuvataBuffalo,Inc.,inNewYork.ATKrecentlysolicitedLuvatafora4-yearproposal,butLuvatadidnotbid.19ResearchonthiscommoditydidnotfindanyissueswithsupplyingATKwiththematerielneededtoproducethecasecom-ponentforeachsmall-armsammunitioncartridgetype.
ATKidentifiesSt.MarksPowder,Inc.,astheprimarysourceofsupplyforthepropellantusedineachtypeofsmall-armsammunition.BasedinCrawfordville,Florida,thisdivisionofGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemsisthesinglesourceofpropellantforLakeCity.ATKcontinuestoseekalternativesuppliers,butithasyettofindaqualifiedsourcingcandidatebecauseofU.S.Governmentriskmitigationpoliciesandproductionqual-ityandquantitystandards.
Researchdataonpropellantdidrevealanissuewithoneofthekeycommoditiesanditssourceofsupply.Thiscommodityisnitrocellulose,anditisfoundineverypropellantandexplosiveusedbytheU.S.military,fromsmall-armsammunitiontobombs.Asnotedbefore,theonlymanufacturercapableofproducingthequantityandqualityofnitrocelluloserequiredbythemilitaryistheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantinVirginia.Radfordisconstructinganewacidconcentratorandnitrocellulosefacilityin2011to2013toreplacetheexistingfacil-ity,whichwasbuiltin1941.20Thenewfacilitywillnotexpandtheproductioncapacityfornitrocellulose.
Thenextkeycommodityforeachcartridgeistheleadusedinmanufacturingthebullet.ATKidentifiestwosuppliersoflead,bothofwhicharelocatedinCONUS.Theprimarysupplierusesaproprietarytech-niquetoextractleadfromusedvehiclebatteriesandthenreformulatesittobesold.Theleadispurchasediningots
14AndrewBuncombe,The Independent,2005,www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0925-02.htm,accessed21October2009.15Day.16DepartmentofDefenseDirective5160.65,SingleManagerforConventionalAmmunition(SMCA),1August2008,p.4.17Day.18LarrySmith,LakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlantpurchasingmanager(ATK).BriefingtoauthorduringLakeCitytour,October2009.19Ibid.20JustineBarati,“RadfordLookstoNewPlant,”www.army.mil/-news/2009/01/22/15990-radford-looks-to-new-plant,accessed4September2009.
Ammunition TypeTotal Annual
Requirements (Fiscal Year 2005)
Maximum Government- Owned Contractor-
Operated Annual Production
5.56-millimeter 1.353 billion rounds 1.2 billion rounds
7.62-millimeter linked 282 million rounds 230 million rounds
.50-caliber linked 74 million rounds 85 million rounds
Total 1.709 billion rounds 1.515 billion rounds
The total production capability of Lake City Army Ammunition Plant by ammunition type. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Alliant Tech systems
Purchasing Department, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)
64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
thatareconfiguredatLakeCityforeachcartridge.Nosupplyissuesexistinthepurchasingofleadforthebulletcartridgecomponent.
Anotherkeycommodityforthebulletisthesteelpenetratorforeachcartridgetype.ATKhasidentifiedthreeprimaryU.S.sourcesofsupplyforthiskeycom-modity.Thesesuppliersacquiresteelfromvariousloca-tionsaroundtheworld.ThisparticularcommoditydoesnotpresentasupplyissueforLakeCity.However,ATKhasidentifiedothersourcesofsupplyforthesteelpen-etratorifneeded.21
Thefinalkeycommoditiesinmanufacturingcar-tridgesaretheprimerandtheprimermix.Allsmall-armsammunitionmanufacturedattheLakeCityArmyAmmu-nitionPlantreceivesprimersfromanon-sitemanufactur-ingfacility.Over40ATKfacilitiescanprovideprimerstotheLakeCityplant.
Thechartonpage65identifiestheprimermixchemi-cals,thesupplierstoATK,andthecountryoforigin.All13chemicalsforprimermixareformulatedbyU.S.-basedcommercialcompanies,but10chemicalshaveoriginsoutsideoftheUnitedStates.Ofthese10identi-fiedchemicals,4haveoriginssolelyinChina,2othersareonlyfoundinMexico,and1isonlyfoundinBrazil.ThreeotherchemicalsshareoriginsamongtheUnitedStates,Europeancountries,India,China,andMexico.
DespitethechemicalshavingoriginsoutsideofCONUS,ATKhasnotidentifiedanyofthesechemicalsaspresentingasupplyproblemfortheformulator.22How-ever,wefindpotentialissueswiththecountriesoforiginforsomeoftheidentifiedchemicals.Thesepotentialissuesareprimarilypoliticalinnature.AlthoughtradeagreementsdoexistwithChina,India,andBrazil,thesecountriesmaybecometradeadversariesinthefuture.
AnadversarialrelationshipmayverywellbecomearealityinlightofthegrowingprotectionistpoliciesenactedbyCongress.Recently,aminortradedisagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinabeganoveranincreaseinthetariffontiresimportedfromChina.23AlthoughthismeasurebytheOfficeoftheUnitedStatesTradeRepresenta-tivewasmeanttoprotecttheU.S.
tireindustry,itpushedChinatoreciprocatetariffaction.Furthermore,obtainingthechemicalsfoundinMexicomaybecomeproblematicasthegovernmentofMexicostruggleswithnativeindigenousgroups,drugcartels,anddisillusionedcitizens.
ChallengesandVulnerabilitiesSo,canthedefenseindustrialbasesupportsmall-arms
ammunitionproductionforcurrentandfutureoperationsaswellasanincreaseintheArmy’sforcestructure?Theanswertothisquestionis,yes.However,thesmall-armsammunitionrequirementsfortheArmyexceedthecapac-ityofproductionattheLakeCityArmyAmmunitionPlant.Government-ownedcapacitywaslostthroughthesystematicdeactivationofmunitionsplantsthatbeganshortlyafterWorldWarII.AlthoughamodernizationprogramhasbeenimplementedatLakeCity,itwillnotincreasetheplant’sproductioncapacityenoughtomeetArmyrequirements,leavingtheUnitedStatesvulnerabletoa“blackswan”total-wartypeofscenario.AndthisdoesnotevenaccountfortheMarineCorps’ammunitionrequirementsmetbyLakeCity.
ShortfallsinproductioncapabilityhaveforcedtheJointMunitionsCommandtoawardadditionalsourcingcontractstoGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystems.Despitetheeffortsofthecommand,LakeCityandthecontractwithGeneralDynamicsOrdnanceandTacticalSystemswillnotbesufficienttodeliverenoughsmall-armsammunitiontomeetaworst-casetotalwarscenario.Iftotalwarweretooccur,theUnitedStateswouldbevulnerableifithadtodependonforeignsourc-estomakeupthetotalmunitionsshortfall.
TheresearchonATK’ssupplychainoperationsatLakeCityshowsastrongandstablesupplyofmost
Component Commodity
Primary Source of Supply
Alternate Source
wof Supply
Alternate Source of Supply
Casing brass Olin Brass ND PressTec Luvata Buffalo
Propellant St. Marks Powder n/a n/a
Bullet leadMetalico-
Granite CityGopher Resource
CorporationExide
Technologies
Bullet steel penetrator
Michigan Rod Products
G.G. Greene n/a
PrimerAlliant
Techsystemsn/a n/a
Primer mixThere are 17 chemicals involved in the primer mix,
all of which have different suppliers.
The key commodities involved in manufacturing cartridge components and the sources of supply used by ATK at Lake City Army Ammunition Plant. (Source: Created by authors based on data from Al liant Techsystems Purchasing Department, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)
21Ibid.22Ibid.23DouglasA.McIntyre,“USImposesBigTariffsonChineseTires,Beijing,”Daily Finance,12September2009,www.dailyfinance.com/story/us-imposes-big-tarriffs-on-chinese-
tires/19159125,accessed2November2009.
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 65
commoditiesneededforthemanufacturingofeachtypeofsmall-armsammunition.However,afewkeycartridgecommoditieshavesourcingvulnerabilities.Sole-sourceprovidersofnecessarychemicalmaterialsfromcountriessuchasChina,India,andMexicomayproveproblematic.Thesmall-armsammunitionsupplychaindoesnothavealternativesforthesekeychemicals.Anydisruptionofsupply,whetherinducedbyeconom-ics,politics,orphysicaldislocations,wouldhaveasignificantadverseeffectontheabilityofLakeCitytoproducesmall-armsammunition.
Thedefenseindustrialbasemustprepareforapos-sibledisruptioninthesupplychainbyeitherstockpiling
theidentifiedkeychemicalsorbydesigningacartridgethatdoesnotrelyonchemicalsfoundoutsidetheUnitedStates.ATKshouldalsorequireitssupplierstoidentifytheirtotaldedicateddemand-surgecapacity.ThiswouldindicateinadvancethepotentialbottleneckstoLakeCityreachingitsfullproductioncapability.
OffurtherconcernisthefactthatallammunitionroadsleadthroughtheRadfordArmyAmmunitionPlantbecauseitisthesoleGovernment-gradeproducerofnitro-cellulose.Althoughmodernizationprogramswillsupplanttheagingfacilitycurrentlyusedthere,theArmyanditssisterservicescannotaffordtolosethisplant’sabilitytoproducenitrocellulose.
Inapaperhedeliveredin2009attheDefenseAcquisitionUniversity,ColonelJohnFerrarifocusedonreversingthetrendtowardprivatizationbasedonhistoricalprivate-sectorbehaviorindecliningindus-tries.24Hearguedthatthemunitionsindustrialbasefitsthedefinitionofadecliningindustryinthatrevenueshavedeclinedbyalmost80percentandmorethan70percentofthecompaniesdisappearedfrom1985through2001.25Althoughrevenueshavetemporarilygrownbecauseofcurrentoperations,thisincreaseisonlytemporary.Sincethisdecliningindustryissubjecttonationalpolicythatblocksoverseasoutsourcing,themilitary’stotalrelianceontheprivatesectorishighlyproblematicanddangerous.26
Webelievethatthecurrentammunitionproductionandacquisitionstrategyhasplacedtoomany“eggsintoonebasket.”Thedefenseindustrialbasemustenhanceitsownproductionandsupplychaincapacityinordertocircum-ventforeigndependenceandensureagainstanyproductiondegradationatLakeCity.OnlybytakingthesestepswilltheArmyensurethatitcanprovidealltherequiredammu-nitiontowarfightersnowandinthefuture.
Major MarK w. SieKMan, USar, iS an active GUarD/reServe officer aSSiGneD aS a planner in the SUpport operationS office of the 310th expeDitionary SUStainMent coMManD. he holDS a B.S. DeGree froM Ball State UniverSity anD an M.M.a.S. DeGree froM the arMy coM ManD anD General Staff colleGe.
Dr. DaviD a. anDerSon iS a retireD Marine corpS loGiSticS officer. he iS a profeSSor of StrateGic StUDieS at the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe anD an aDjUnct profeS Sor at weBSter UniverSity.
allan S. Boyce iS an aSSiStant profeSSor of loGiSticS anD reSoUrce operationS at the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe. a re tireD arMy lieUtenant colonel, he holDS an M.S. DeGree in loGiSticS ManaGeMent froM floriDa inStitUte of technoloGy anD an M.S. DeGree in pUBlic aDMiniStration froM central MichiGan UniverSity. he iS a GraDUate of the arMy coMManD anD General Staff colleGe.
The primer mix chemicals, the suppliers of those chemicals to ATK, and the country of origin of the chemicals. All 13 chemicals for primer mix are for mulated by U.S.based commercial companies, but 10 chemicals are imported from outside of the United States (Source: Created by authors based on data from Alliant Techsystems Purchasing De part ment, Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Missouri.)
24ColonelJohnFerrari,“TransferringConventionalMunitionsIndustrialBaseCapabilitiestothePublicSector,”DefenseAcquisitionUniversity,2009.25Ibid.26Ibid.
Chemical Supplier Country of Origin
Barium nitrateBarium and Chemicals
China
Calcium silicide Perkins Rouge Brazil
Magnesium oxide Matrixchem Mexico
Calcium resinate-fused
Barium and Chemicals
United States/China/ Europe/India
Potassium perchlorate
Hummel Crouton China
Strontium nitrateBarium and Chemicals
China
Strontium oxalateBarium and Chemicals
United States/China/ Europe/India
Strontium peroxide Hummel CroutonMexico/
United States
Magnesium aluminum alloy
Reade Manufacturing United States
Calcium resinate- peripiated
Hummel Crouton Mexico
Magnesium carbonate
Matrixchem United States
Barium nitrateBarium and Chemicals
China
Ammonium nitrate Dyno Nobel United States
66 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
SPECTRUMREADING & REVIEWS
HEADLINES
WRITING FOR ARMY SUSTAINMENT
COMMENTARY
FOCUS
SustainmentSymposiumHighlightsChangestoArmySupplyStrategiesandPriorities
TheAssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy,Insti-tuteofLandWarfare,helditsArmySustainmentSymposiumandExpositionfrom22to24JuneattheGreaterRichmondConventionCenterinRichmond,Virginia.Thisyear’seventcameinthemidstofthedrawdownoftroopsandequipmentinIraqandthebuildupofresourcesinAfghanistan.Sustainmentleadershigh-lightedtheimpactthesechangesarehav-ingonArmysustainment.
LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,DeputyChiefofStaff,G–4,DepartmentoftheArmy,notedareaswherethesustainmentcommunityisstrug-gling—specificallypropertyaccountabilityandassetvisibility.GeneralStevensonsaidthatbecausetheArmyhasbeensobusy,keyaccountabilityconceptshavebeenshovedaside.
Assetvisibilityisanotherissue,especiallywithnewequipment.GeneralStevensonnotedthat,inAfghani-stan,1,700mine-resistantambush-protectedall-terrainvehicleshavebeenissued,butonly1,020havebeenrecordedintheStandardArmyMaintenanceSystem(SAMS).TheG–4ishopingthatupcomingchangestotheGlobalCombatSupportSystem-Armywill
improvemanagementbytransferringpropertybookdatadirectlyintoSAMS.
TheG–4alsonotedthattheArmyisworkingonmodifyingLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgram(LOGCAP)policy.LOGCAPhascosttheArmyapproximately$37billionsince2001.“Inthecourseofthoselast9years,wehavelearnedalotofles-sons,”saidtheG–4.“Thatoughttotranslateitselfintoourpolicy.”
GeneralAnnE.Dunwoody,commandinggeneraloftheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC),saidthatGeneralRaymondT.Ordieno,commanderofU.S.Forces-Iraq,wascomplimentaryofthe“LogNation”and“itsincrediblemissionofdrawingdown”anArmythathasbeeninIraqfornearly8years.Gen-eralDunwoodynotedthattheworkoflogisticianshas“enabledandallowedhim[GeneralOrdieno]tomeetthePresidentialmandate”todrawdownto50,000troopsbySeptember2010.
“ItisabusytimeforourArmy,”saidGeneralDun-woody.“[These]nextcoupleofyears[are]goingtobeequally,ifnotmore,challenging.”PartofthechallengeisthebuildupinAfghanistan,whichreceived40per-centofitssurgeequipmentoutofIraq.“ThatisprettyincredibleifyouthinkbacktoDesertStorm/DesertShield,withtheironmountainswherewedidnotknowwhereeverythingwas,”saidGeneralDunwoody.“NowwehaveassetvisibilitytoseethestuffthatisinIraq,moveittoAfghanistan,whichmeanswearenotgoingtoshipitagain,wearenotgoingtobuyitagain,andwehavebeenabletosupportthesurge.”
GeneralDunwoodypraisedtheresilienceofthesustainmentforceforalsoservinginhumanitarianassistancemissionsduringthistime.“WewereabletosetupcontractingandLOGCAPwithin72hoursofarrival,”shenotedofOperationUnifiedResponseinHaiti.“Theentire‘LogNation’strategicpartnershelpedsortoutandprovidereliefandthenstartedredeploying.”Dunwoodysaidthatthoughthemis-sioninHaitiiswrappingup,contractingsupportassetsarestillhelpinginChile,whichsufferedamassiveearthquakeinFebruary.
“Ontopofeverythingelsethatisgoingon,ourArmyisinmotionthroughBRAC[baseclosureandrealign-ment],”saidDunwoody.Allfourmajorheadquarters—ArmyForcesCommand,ArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommand,AMC,andArmyInstallationManagementCommand—willbemovinginfiscalyear2011.
AlongwiththeorganizationalchangesofBRAC,GeneralDunwoodyisplanninglife-cyclemanagementimprovement.“Wehavemultipleowners,andthatcre-atesseamsinthiswholelife-cyclemanagementpiece,”saidGeneralDunwoody.“Itcreatesalackofaccount-abilityandresponsibility,andthatiswhatwearetry-ingtogetourarmsaround.”
ArmyOperationsResearchSymposiumTheCenterforArmyAnalysiswillhosttheArmy
OperationsResearchSymposium2010from13to14OctoberattheArmyLogisticsUniversityatFortLee,Virginia.Thisyear’sthemeis“FullSpectrumOperationsinaComplexEnvironment.”Anyoneinterestedinattendingmustpreregisterbefore24September.Formoreinformationortopreregister,gotothewebsite,www.alu.army.mil/AORS/aorshome.htm.
MilitaryLogisticsSummit2010TheInstituteforDefenseandGovernment
Advancement(IDGA)willholdMilitaryLogisticsSummit2010from13to16SeptemberinVienna,Virginia.Thesummitwillbringtogetherleadersanddecisionmakersfromthelogisticscommunitytodiscussthelatestinitiativesandimplementationstrategiesthatensurefuturemilitaryflexibilityandpreparedness.Thesummitwillfeatureinformationonsupportingmajordeployment,redeployment,anddistributionoperationsbasedonupdatedDepartmentofDefensemissionpriorities.Formoreinformationortoregister,visitthefollowingwebsite:www.MilitaryLogisticsSummit.com.
UpCOMING EVENTS
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 67
GeneralDunwoodysaidthatwhiletheArmyhasgot-tengoodatbuyinganddeliveringequipment,75percentoflife-cyclecostsresideinthesustainment,mainte-nance,andeventualdisposalofequipment.“Wearepayingstoragecosts,wearepayingmaintenancecosts,andwehavegottogetafterthetailendofthelife-cycle....WiththehelpoftheDepartment[ofDefense],we’reidentifyingequipmentasexcessdefensearticles,whichmakesitavailableforForeignMilitarySales.”
GeneralDunwoodylaidoutthreechangesthatwillimproveAMC’sservicetofutureoperations.First,AMCwillattempttomanagematerielsourcesofrepairbytakingoperationalcontrolofdirectoratesoflogistics(DOLs)tomanagetheirworkloads.Accord-ingtoLieutenantGeneralJamesH.Pillsbury,deputycommandinggeneralandchiefofstaffofAMC,the77DOLsintheArmyhad83contractswithmorethan40differentcontractors.“Nobadactors,butyoucanseetheinefficienciesinthat,”saidGeneralPills-bury.“Ithinkthatyouwillseesomegreatefficienciescomedownthispathintheyearstocome.”
Second,AMCplanstooptimizethewayitman-agesmaterielbyactingasthecentralmanagerforallArmymateriel.Apilot,beginninginJuly2010,istestingtheconceptofusingtheArmySustainmentCommandasthecentralmanagerofallstakeholders’materielinsupportoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycle.
Third,AMCwantstomanagethepilesofequip-ment—theater-providedequipment,theatersustain-mentstocks,prepare-to-deploytrainingpiles,andleft-behindequipment—thathaveaccumulatedovertime.GeneralDunwoodynotedthatmanyofthesepilesdidnotexistbefore11September2001.Nowitneedstobedecidedwhowillmanagethisequip-mentinsupportofARFORGEN.
17thFiresBrigadeDrawsDownEquipmentAsU.S.forcesredeployinaccordancewiththe
securityofforcesagreementwiththeIraqigovern-ment,the17thFiresBrigade,basedoutofJointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington,isdrawingdownequip-mentthatwillnotbeneededbytheunitsreplacingit.
ThebrigadedeployedinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedominJuly2009andhasmaintainedalargefootprintinBasraprovincewiththehelpofmilitarytransitionteamsandothersmallerunitsattachedtothebrigade.Theseunitshavereliedonthe17thFiresBri-gadetosupportthemlogisticallyastheyhaveconducted
operationsaroundBasra.Thebrigadealsoisresponsibefortrackingtheexcessequipment,includingvehicles,computers,andradios,theunitshaveastheydrawclos-ertotheSeptemberdeadline.
SincebrigadesdesignatedtoadviseandassisttheIraqiSecurityForceswillhavesignificantlylessper-sonnelthantheunitstheyreplace,thedrawdownto50,000U.S.troopsintheIraqby1Septemberulti-matelyrequiresequipmenttobeturnedinformainte-nanceandreallocation.
Overthepast7years,U.S.forceshaveestablishedbasesinsupportofOperationIraqiFreedom.Thesebasesarehometobillionsofdollars’worthofequip-mentthatnowneedstobereturnedtotheUnitedStatesorreallocatedtoothertheaters.
WhilegeneralequipmentispulledoutofbaseshandedovertotheIraqiArmy,basiclifesupportequipment,suchasshowers,tents,andfurniture,willremaintosupporttheirsecuritymission.
PentagonExhibitShowsSustainersatWorkInApril,theOfficeoftheDeputyChiefofStaff,
G–4,DepartmentoftheArmy,unveiled“ArmyLogisticsAroundtheWorld”atthePentagon.ThedisplayhonorsArmylogisticiansworkingworldwidebyshowcasingvideoclipsandphotosofcurrentsustainmentoperationsoversixlargevideomonitors.Thedisplaycanbefoundonthe1stfloor,inthe4thcorridoroftheAring.
TheDeputyChiefofStaff,G–4,LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson,isencouragingunitstosubmitvideosandphotosofSoldiersperformingsustainmentmissionstotheG–4staffforthedisplay.
In March, Soldiers from the 1314th Civil Affairs Company conducted a final inspection of radio
and camera equipment at Contingency Operating Base Basra, Iraq, before turning it in as part of the responsible drawdown. (Photo by SPC
Maurice A. Galloway, 17th Fires Brigade PAO).
68 ARMY SUSTAINMENT
Photosshouldbesubmittedinastandardfileformat,suchas.jpg.Theyshouldbelargerthan720by480pixelsandatleast72dotsperinch.Thephotosmustnotbeeditedoraltered,andnocaptionsortextshouldbeembeddedwiththephotos.However,submittersshouldincludeadescriptionoftheactioninthephotointhefile’smetadataorinaseparateMicrosoftWorddocument.Thiscaptionshouldincludethephoto’s“who,what,when,andwhere.”
Acceptablevideofilesincludehighresolutionfilesina.wmv,.mov,or.mpegformat.Ifthevideohasnonarration,itshouldincludeadescriptivecaptionliketheonedescribedforphotos.Thecaptionsubmissionsguidelinesforvideosarealsothesameasguidelinesforphotos—theyshouldbeinthemetafileorinaseparateMicrosoftWorddocument.Allphotos,videosandcaptionsneedtobeapprovedforpublicreleasebythesecurityofficeofthesubmitter’sunitororganization.
Furtherguidelinesandanupdatescheduleforthedisplaycanbereceivedbysendinganemailtodevon.hylander@us.army.mil.
ChiefofStaffHonorsLogisticsProfessionalsTheChiefofStaffoftheArmypresentedthe2010
CombinedLogisticsExcellenceAwards,honoring82Armyunitsfortheiraccomplishmentsinsupply,main-tenance,anddeploymentlogistics,ataceremonyon24JuneinRichmond,Virginia.
TheDeployment Excellence Awardwinnersare—Operational Deployment
Small Category. 66thEngineerCompany,2dStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam,25thInfantryDivision,SchofieldBarracks,Hawaii.
Large Category. 72dInfantryBrigadeCombatTeam,TXARNG,Spring,Texas.
All Army InstallationFortHood,Texas.
Active ArmySmall Category.HeadquartersandHeadquarters
Company,391stCombatSustainmentSupportBattal-ion,Bamberg,Germany.
Large Category.72dExpeditionarySignalBattal-ion,Mannheim,Germany.
Supporting Category.39thTransportationBattalion(MovementControl),Kaiserslautern,Germany.
Army National GuardSmall Category.BCompany,3dBattalion,20th
SpecialForcesGroup(Airborne),RoanokeRapids,NorthCarolina.
Large Category.1stBattalion,125thInfantryRegi-ment,Flint,Michigan.
Supporting Category.FortSillMobilizationandDeploymentBrigade,FortSill,Oklahoma.
Army ReserveSmall Category.Detachment2,304thSustainment
Brigade,Riverside,California.Large Category.1184thDeploymentandDistribu-
tionSupportBattalion,Mobile,Alabama.Supporting Category.FortSillMobilizationand
DeploymentBrigade,FortSill,Oklahoma.
TheMaintenance Excellence Awardwinnersare—Active Army
Small Category Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).BCompany,307thBri-gadeSupportBattalion,AlAsadAirBase,Iraq.
Small Category Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).BusanStorageCenter,U.S.ArmyMate-rielSupportCenter-Korea,Busan,Korea.
Medium Category MTOE.528thQuartermasterCompany,JointBaseLewis-McChord,Washington.
Medium Category TDA.HeadquartersandHead-quartersCompany,206thMilitaryIntelligenceBattal-ion,FortGordon,Georgia.
Large Category MTOE.BCompany,615thAviationSupportBattalion,FortHood,Texas.
Large Category TDA.U.S.ArmyMaterielSupportCenter-Korea,CampCarroll,Korea.
Army National GuardSmall Category MTOE.BCompany,634thBase
SupportBattalion,Champaign,Illinois.Small Category TDA.FieldMaintenanceShop6,
Evansville,Indiana.Medium Category MTOE.3622dMaintenance
ComponentRepairCompany,FortIndiantownGap,Pennsylvania.
Medium Category TDA.ManeuverAreaTrainingEquipmentSite-NewYork,FortDrum,NewYork.
Army ReserveSmall Category MTOE.ForwardSupportCompany,
321stEngineerBattalion,Boise,Idaho.
The new Pentagon exhibit, “Logistics Around the World,” honors logisticians at work through photos and videos of them on the job. (Photo by Leroy Council, Jr., Army Multimedia and Visual Information Directorate, HQDA).
SEpTEMBER–OCTOBER 2010 69
Small Category TDA.AreaMaintenanceSupportActivity57(Ground),NewCentury,Kansas.
Medium Category MTOE.238thMaintenanceCompany,SanAntonio,Texas.
DepotLetterkennyArmyDepot,Chambersburg,Pennsylvania.
Army Installation Management CommandSmall Category.U.S.ArmyGarrison-Benelux,
Chievres,Belgium.Medium Category.InstallationMaterielMainte-
nanceActivity,FortMcCoy,Wisconsin.Large Category.MaterielMaintenanceDivision,
DirectorateofLogistics,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.
TheSupply Excellence Awardwinnersare—Active Army
Unit Level MTOE.Headquarters,ADetachment,176thFinanceManagementCompany,Yongsan,Korea.
Unit Level TDA.7thArmyNoncommissionedOffi-cerAcademy,Grafenwoehr,Germany.
Property Book Level MTOE.69thAirDefenseArtilleryBrigade,FortHood,Texas.
Property Book Level TDA.WomackArmyMedicalCenter,FortBragg,NorthCarolina.
Parent Level MTOE.30thSignalBattalion,Wheel-erArmyAirfield,Hawaii.
Parent Level TDA.7thArmyJointMultinationalTrainingCenter,Hohenfels,Germany.
Supply Support Activity MTOE.5thBattalion,7thAirDefenseArtilleryRegiment,Kaiserslautern,Germany.
Supply Support Activity TDA.498thCombatSus-tainmentSupportBattalion,SupplyPoint60,CampCarroll,Korea.
Army National GuardUnit Level MTOE.BBattery,1stBattalion,148th
FieldArtilleryRegiment,Rexburg,Idaho.Unit Level TDA.Headquarters,209thRegional
TrainingInstitute,Ashland,Nebraska.Property Book Level MTOE.347thRegionalSup-
portGroup,Roseville,Minnesota.Property Book Level TDA.771stTroopCommand,
Charleston,WestVirginia.Parent Level MTOE.Headquarters,1stBattalion,
201stFieldArtilleryRegiment,Fairmont,WestVirginia.Parent Level TDA.JointForcesHeadquarters,Mad-
ison,Wisconsin.Supply Support Activity TDA.U.S.Propertyand
FiscalOffice,Indianapolis,Indiana.Army Reserve
Unit Level TDA.Headquarters,108thTrainingCommand,Charlotte,NorthCarolina.
Property Book Level TDA.SoutheastMedicalAreaReadinessSupportGroup,Nashville,Tennessee.
Supply Support Activity MTOE.Headquarters,RegionalSupportCommand,StandardArmyRetailSupplySystem-1Site,FortMcCoy,Wisconsin.
Training Circular (TC) 4–11.46, Convoy Protection Platform Gunnery,waspublishedinApril2010andprovidesthefirstArmy-widestandardizedtableforgunnerytraininginsustainmentunits.Thecircu-larwasdevelopedinresponsetotherecognitionthattoday’ssustainmentunitsarelikelytodefendthem-selves,theirconvoys,andtheirsustainmentbasesbyengagingopposingforceswithdirectfire.
TC4–11.46providestheguidanceforcom-mandersofsustainmentunitsontraininganddeployingconvoyprotectionplatformsandconvoyescortteams.Italsoprovidesguidancetosustain-mentelementsattached,assigned,orundertheoperationalcontroloftheatersustainmentcom-mands,expeditionarysustainmentcommands,andsustainmentbrigades.ThisTCisalsoapplicabletobasesupportbattalionsandforwardsupportcom-paniesorganictofires,combataviation,maneuverenhancement,andbattlefieldsurveillancesupportbrigadesforthepurposesoftrainingseniorgun-ners,vehicleguncrews,andvehiclecrewevalu-atorsontheemploymentofcrew-servedweaponsinoperations.Thetasksoutlinedinthemanualshouldbeusedtoevaluatetheproficiencyofvehi-cleguncrews.
ThesupportingtrainingammunitionstrategyforTC4–11.46hasbeenapprovedbytheArmymuni-tionsrequirementscouncilofcolonelsandwillavailableintheupcomingversionofDepartmentoftheArmyPamphlet350–38,StandardsinTrainingCommission.
Field Manual (FM) 3–35, Army Deployment and Redeployment,publishedinApril2010,com-binesdoctrinepreviouslypublishedin5differentFMstoalignArmydeploymentdoctrinewithjointdeploymentdoctrine.ThenewFMistheArmy’snewdoctrineforplanning,organizing,executing,andsup-portingdeploymentandredeployment.Includedinthedoctrinearesectionsonforceprotectionandthedeploymentprocess,activitiesunitsengageinpriortoalertofdeployment,andproceduresforthemove-mentofunitsandreception,staging,onwardmove-ment,andintegration.
Newappendiceshavebeenaddedcoveringinstal-lationsupport,unitmovementplans,thedutiesofthemobilityofficerandtheunitmovementofficer,andtheinfluenceofseniorleadersondeployment.Additionalappendicesaddressspecialcargo(suchashazardousmaterial,ammunition,andclassifiedandsensitiveshipments),automaticidentificationtech-nology,andautomatedmobilitysystems.
RECENTLY pUBLISHED
PERIODICALS POSTAGEAND FEES PAIDAT PETERSBURG VIRGINIAAND ADDITIONAL CITIES
ISSN 2153–5973DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYARMY SUSTAINMENTUS ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY2401 QUARTERS ROADFORT LEE VIRGINIA 23801–1705
Official Business
o LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctionalMedicalBattaliono TheCurrentBurdensomePayProcesso ContractOversightintheOperationalEnvironmento SustainingtheBCTinSouthernIraqo NaturalFire10:U.S.ArmyAfrica’sFirstMajorExerciseo NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCantheAFSBDoforMe?o PreparingtheIraqiFederalPoliceSustainmentBrigadeo WhyLogisticiansFailatKnowledgeManagemento AdvicetoaNewSustainmentPlannerattheBCPo AfghanSupplyDistributiono TerrainAnalysisfortheNon-Engineer
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