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Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992
Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western
Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,
1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built
Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of
them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC
for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-
qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the
bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been
awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by
law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818.
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There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president
of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees ascan be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had
been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the
funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations
Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree
as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as
regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, et.al. vs. MANUEL ALBA, et.al.
GR No. L-57883 12 March 1982
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin
the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from
taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in
this case?
RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is
the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there
is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
De la Llana vs. Alba
[GR 57883, 12 March 1982]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs with condition, 7 concur in separate opinions, 1 dissents in
separate opinion
Facts: De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition (considered by this
Court as an action for prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the
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judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.
Issue: Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by
incumbent Justices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Held: The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in
the process to abolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary
consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a
power that is now vested in the Supreme Court. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the
Supreme Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not
render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction
would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one whichwould save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an
obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid
any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is
precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been
well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime
that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it
does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the
language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of
tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the
failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the
administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts
except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust
reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the
appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary
is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental
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principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in
their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as
expressed in the Constitution.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected byPresidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan
Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, therebyresulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a
public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the
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movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree
No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewedvideo tapes containingpornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to
engage inbusiness."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. 17122
Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing
the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation
for this purpose".
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning
of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the
sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30,
1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law wasfirst published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the
20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid.
Held:
By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature
cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative
authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and
clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
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That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that
it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall
be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was
not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a
crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a cr ime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words,
the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not
"any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold,
without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and
whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the
proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged
sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant ischarged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of
rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is
unconstitutional and void.
Ynot vs IAC -
RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos
Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of
Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents
Type of petition filed: petition FOR CERTIORARI
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
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Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court
sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, asraised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed
4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.
ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.
HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify
the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require theirinstant destrcution
3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was
immedeiately condemned and punish
YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-
A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the
exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting
the transferof carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef,
after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
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Police PowerNot Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but
as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authorityprovided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The
lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Marcos,petitionerVS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non- violent people
power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return tothe Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup5. Communist insurgency movements6. secessionist movements in Mindanao7. devastated economy because of1. accumulated foreign debt2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their
travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
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According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which
according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President mayprohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines posesa serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article
it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of
the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Th eyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that officeto safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that
happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not onabstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, its the executivesresponsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcoswish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a rightguaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
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2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos return would pose a threat to national security.Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powersbut the executives powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos right to return to thePhilippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. Itsw/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands
that such be restricted. It cant be absolute & unlimited all the time. It cant be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears arespeculative & military admits that its under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos
return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. Presidents determination that Marcos return would threaten national security should be agreedupon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
Marcos,petitionerVS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition,
after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will
take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of
the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country ofbirth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised itarbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines
be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of
merit.
Ratio:
1.
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to thegovernment, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have
not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino illegal claiming that it
is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations aremerely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general
grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton).
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden
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by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6
expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers.
4. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound tocomply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos petitions the SC for mandamus and prohibition asking to order
respondents to issue travel documents to him and his immediate family and to enjoin the implementation
of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issue: WON the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise of
the powers granted in her by the Constitution.
Ruling: Affirmative. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive
power. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. Even the members of the Legislature has recognized that indeed Mrs. Aquino has the
power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning, as per House Resolution No. 1342.
Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.
Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.
Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of
the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had
acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not
enjoin the implementation of this decision.
Carino v. CHR 204 SCRA 546
Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of
public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from theirclasses, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of
Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively
charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced.
An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
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dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the
meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to
due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the
respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while
they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier,
upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the strikingteachers were denied due process of law;they should not have
been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their
civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appealsor modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative
or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or inextending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
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"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function,
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: .
. . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the
DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the
Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted bylaw; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of
theteachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the
Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in
disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for
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reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may
be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
Carino vs CHR
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage
rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from
work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the
dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to
the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari
regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial
and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as
the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms
of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on
the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA
G.R. Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995
Hermosisima Jr., J.
Facts:
RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was
supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plans
and policies for social and economic development.
PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and
prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like.
To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927
further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the
issues in this case are the following provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of
all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like.
SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the
use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation,
and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and
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the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary,
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in
the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of
LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the LagunaLake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35
percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to
the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by
LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds
and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1234.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the
provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or
charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing
privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion
to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated
fishpens and fishcages occupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area,
increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 ha in
1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in
violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna
Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served
notice to the general public that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de BayRegion, which were not registered or to which no application for registration
and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of
March 31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegalshall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential
Task Force for illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared asillegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally
charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by
P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a
penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five
Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures declared as
illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before
27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
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One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the
cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of
preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fishpens andsimilar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The
CA dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with
quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as
fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of
1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local
government units concerned.
Issue:
Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Held:
LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically
provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for
any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang
Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus
fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the
latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of
the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made
clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general
law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general
law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a
special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where
there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is
because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are enviromental
protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
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We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single
body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major river
tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or watershed
transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of
attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-whichrequires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological
integrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy
geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region
with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth.
The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law
designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore
cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government
units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a
cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve,
protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."
The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This
is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under
the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna
de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers
including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise
of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing
of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our
holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court
of Appeals, there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial
body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on matters affecting
the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The
Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against
it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the
resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and
the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
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Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
Facts:The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order toexecute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to acceleratethe development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that thelake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined andenlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local GovernmentCode of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges
thereforeBig fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages tothe consternation of the LLDA.The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fishpen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & otheraqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those
declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of
RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegallyconstructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned?2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted
to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The
provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water
rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute , latter should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute . The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion . Implied
repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the
power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control
and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable
and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
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LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended.Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna
de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are
by its charter vested on it.
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73140 May 29, 1987
Facts:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire
Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a
regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a
permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office
Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his posit ion-designation,
he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980,
he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus
cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other
benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the
grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Laborand Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter
Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the
National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-
32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing petitioners appeal on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice
thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
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The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April
11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of
the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its
resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations
and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration,
137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG 56 PHIL 234
Ostrand, J
Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)
FACTS:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and
for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present
prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit
prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of thepetitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent as cause of action
HELD:
Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the
development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.
The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was
promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded
its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon
constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that
might have been adopted.
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in
rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who
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should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be
demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
GR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957
Felix, J.
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of
Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of
trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San
Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the
operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to
a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during
the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive
order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by
legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that
the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 802. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated
to the President
HELD:
1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishingfrom all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the
President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66
and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law.
YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that
could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessaryin order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of
the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of
trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for
the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which
were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN 79 SCRA 250
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Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of thelaw, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
itsgeneral provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot beextended. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizeselectro fishing in freshwater fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On
appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD: NO.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the
authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
People vs. Maceren
G.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977
Aquino J.
Facts:
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo
Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any
aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal
court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held:
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No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, inpenalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute.
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Issue: Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy
crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps),
and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties
for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners
brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of
due process. The resps. denied the petitioner''''s allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a
request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser Jeep. The
enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge
the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face.
It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is
unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the
presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing
the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3)
Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs
the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid.
The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo.
Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps.
would be ultra vires.
Bautista vs. Juinio
GR L-50908, 31 January 1984
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruc
Recommended