1 PROBLEM SHIFTS IN THE STUDY OF THE WELFARE STATE / INEQUALITY LINK Wout Ultee - Radboud...

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PROBLEM SHIFTS IN THE

STUDY OF THE

WELFARE STATE / INEQUALITY

LINK

Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Presentation at the meeting of ISA-RC28 in Oslo, Norway, May 5-8, 2005

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THREE POSSIBLE TYPES OF OVERVIEWS:

•AN INVENTORY OF FINDINGS,

•A LIST OF ACCEPTED HYPOTHESES

(BUT WHY DON’T OLD SOLDIERS FADE AWAY?),

•A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WITH PROGRESSIVE RATHER THAN

RETROGRESSIVE PROBLEM SHIFTS.

THIS REVIEW IS OF THE LAST TYPE.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A STATE HAVING A WELFARE

REGIME AND LIMITED INEQUALITY AMONG THE

INHABITANTS OF THAT STATE,

IS ALMOST TAUTOLOGICAL.

IF NOT, IT IS A QUALIFIED ONE.

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MERTON 1959: QUESTIONS WORTHY OF ATTENTION INVOLVE SOME

CONTRADICTION.

LENSKI 1966: BREAK QUESTIONS DOWN INTO CONSTITUENTS.

DUNCAN 1967: SOME QUESTIONS POSE THE ISSUE POORLY.

ULTEE 2001: A METHODOLOGY OF QUESTIONS.

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WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION?

A STATE IS A CORPORATE ACTOR,

AND LIKE ANY ACTOR IT USES ITS RESOURCES IN SUCH A WAY THAT

IT REACHES ITS GOALS OPTIMALLY.

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WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION?

ALTHOUGH A STATE BY WEBERS 1921

DEFINITION HAS THE MONOPOLY ON THE MEANS OF VIOLENCE, A

STATE NEVER IS ALL-POWERFUL:

ONE CAN DO ANYTHING WITH WEAPONS, EXCEPT SIT ON THEM.

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WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION?

ACCORDING TO ELIAS` 1939 AMENDS,

A STATE HAS THE MONOPOLY OF TAXATION, GIVING A STATE

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES.

A PERSON`S INCOME IS TAXED.

A NAPOLEONTIC STATE LEVIES FEES FOR EXTRACTING MINERALS

FROM THE SOIL.

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WHY A CONDITIONAL RELATION?

EQUALITY IS AN INDETERMINATE GOAL:

THE RICH CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF THE

POOR,

AND THE POOR CAN BE LIFTED UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE RICH.

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SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

DID NOT AIM FOR A STATE WITH FULLY EQUAL

OUTCOMES,

BUT SOUGHT TO BUILD SAFETY NETS AND RAISE A

SOCIETY`S LOWER STRATA.

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COALITIONS OF A SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC PARTY WITH

OTHER PARTIES,

CAN`T ONLY WATER DOWN THE IDEA OF A WELFARE

STATE,

COALITIONS CAN GIVE IT ALSO MORE IMPETUS.

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INEQUALITY AS A COMPOUND QUESTION:

TO AVOID CONFUSION, SPECIFY

BETWEEN WHO AND WHO OCCURS IN WHICH RESPECT SOME

INEQUALITY?MORE RESOURCES MAKE FOR BETTER LIFE CHANCES.

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LENSKI 1966 POWER AND PRIVILEGE

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE WOULD MAKE FOR

ACCUMULATION OF RESOURCES,

BUT INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES SHOW LESS INCOME

INEQUALITY THAN AGRARIAN SOCIETIES.

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LATER LENSKI RESOURCES AND LIFE CHANCES

THE CONTRADICTION FOR THE TECHNOLOGY THESIS OVERCOME BY THE IDEOLOGY THESIS:

ACTIVIST IDEOLOGIES PROVIDE FREE SCHOOLING AND OTHER

CITIZEN RIGHTS,

AND THESE RESOURCES MAKE FOR SMALLER INEQUALITIES IN

LIFE CHANCES.

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HEWITT 1977: WHY DO INCOME DISPARITIES DIFFER BETWEEN

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL STATES?

IS THE SHARE OF THE RICHEST 5%, 10%, 20% LOWER AFTER

PROLONGED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT?

A MORE ATTUNED MEASUREMENT WOULD BE PROGRESSIVE TAXATION.

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FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: IS THE SHARE OF THE POOREST 10%, 20% HIGHER

AFTER PROLONGED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT?

THE SHARE OF THE POOREST 10%, 20% HARDLY DEPENDS UPON

GOVERNMENT!

FINDING ASCRIBED TO ERRORS IN MEASUREMENTS. IT RESULTS

FROM COALITION BUILDING.

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HEWITT’S MOST PERTINENT INEQUALITY QUESTION:

DOES PROLONGED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE MAKE FOR

HIGHER SOCIAL EXPENDITURES?

KORPI 1989: DID SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS INTRODUCE AND

RAISE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, DISABILITY BENEFITS

AND OLD-AGE BENEFITS?

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KORPI & PALME 2003: HAVE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980 LOWERED VARIOUS

BENEFITS LESS THAN OTHER GOVERNMENTS?

THIS IS A DEFENSIVE QUESTION: WHY LOWER BENEFITS

UNDER SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TOO?

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KORPI & PALME’S 2003 OFFENSIVE QUESTION:

DOES SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE HAVE SMALLER EFFECTS

IN MORE OPEN ECONOMIES?

APPARENT ASSUMPTION ABOUT STATE RESOURCES:

IN A MORE OPEN ECONOMY, STATE INCOME THROUGH TAXATION IS

LOWER AND MORE VOLATILE.

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ALTERNATIVE QUESTION:

HOW ABOUT (POST)INDUSTRIAL SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES, SUCH AS HYDRO-ELECTRICITY AND OIL?

DO NOT FORGET: WE ARE COMPARING (POST)INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES.

THEIR PRIME SOURCE OF ENERGY IS FOSSILE OR INANIMATE.

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KORPI & PALME 2003: HAVE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980 LOWERED VARIOUS

BENEFITS LESS THAN OTHER ONES?

NEGLECTED FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: DID SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE

INCREASE SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS MORE THAN

OTHER GOVERNMENTS?

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SOLIDARITY QUESTIONS ARE COMPOUNDS TOO:

BENEFITS MAY GO DOWN WHILE CONTRIBUTIONS GO UP:

SOLIDARITY OF WHO WITH WHOM?OTHER POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS:

DO SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS MAKE FOR FEWER UNEMPLOYED PERSONS, DISABLED

PERSONS AND OLD PERSONS?

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HERE IT BECOMES CLEAR WHY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE

MIGHT MAKE FOR HIGH CONTRIBUTIONS:

IT INTRODUCED COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE, LEADING

TO MORE OLD PERSONS.

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A STATE THAT AIMS TO LOWER UNEMPLOYMENT RATES,

REDUCE INCOME DISPARITIES AND INCREASE UPWARD

MOBILITY,

MAY BE CALLED AN INTERVENTION STATE, AND IF

SUCCESSFUL A WELFARE STATE.

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DOES A SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT

ALWAYS MAKE FOR A WELFARE STATE,

OR DOES IT SOMETIMES NEED OUTSIDE HELP, HELP WITHIN PARLIAMENT, AND DOES THE

OPPOSITION NEVER DO A THING?

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OUTSIDE HELP: CORPORATISM THESIS.

INSIDE HELP: BALDWIN THESIS (COMMUNIST, FARMERS PARTY).

OTHER PARTIES AND OTHER WELFARE REGIMES:

ESPING-ANDERSEN’S THREE WORLD OF WELFARE CAPITALISM.

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TESTING THE BALDWIN THESIS BY RAISING FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS:

IF COALITIONS ARE THAT IMPORTANT, MIGHT IT BE THAT

REDISTRIBUTIVE MEASURES TAKE FROM THE HIGHEST

DECILES WHILE GIVING LESS TO THE LOWEST DECILES?

TULLOCK’S THESIS OF THE STRETEGIC MIDDLE.

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THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE ARE MORE WELFARE

REGIMES THAN THE SCANDINAVIAN ONE, POSES THE

ISSUE POORLY.

RESEARCH INDICATES MORE THAN THREE WELFARE REGIMES, STILL

SOME COUNTRIES DON’T FIT.EXISTENCE QUESTIONS ARE SUB-STANDARD.

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BUT THE NEW AND DETAILED QUESTION BEHIND THE FALSE AND DISTRACTING QUESTION IS:

DOES A STATE PROVIDE BENEFITS TO A PERSON

IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSONS PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSON’S

CHILDREN OR PARENTS, AND IRRESPECTIVE OF A PERSON’S

SPOUSE OR PARTNER?

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DETAILED FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS: DOES SOCIALIST RULE PROVIDE

UNCONDITIONAL WELFARE?

DOES CHRISTIAN RULE PROVIDE CHILD BENEFITS?

DOES LIBERAL RULE PROVIDE WELFARE AFTER TAKING PAST AND

SPOUSE INTO ACCOUNT?

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THE DUTCH FOLLOW-UP QUESTION:

WHY DID THE TAKE-OFF OF THE WELFARE STATE TAKE SO LONG IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THEN

SHOW EXPLOSIVE GROWTH?

SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS AND CATHOLICS LOG-ROLLED: OLD-

AGE PENSION WAS TRADED AGAINST CHILD BENEFITS.

DE SWAAN 1988 MISSED THIS ANSWER.

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FROM DISPARITIES QUESTIONS TO MOBILITIES QUESTIONS:

SINCE LIPSET & BENDIX 1959: ARE ABSOLUTE MOBILITY

RATES FOR ALL (POST)INDUSTRIAL

COUNTRIES SIMILAR?

SINCE FEATHERMAN, HAUSER & JONES 1978:

ARE RELATIVE MOBILITY RATES SIMILAR?

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FOLLOW-UP QUESTION:

BUT WHY WOULD PROLONGED SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RULE MAKE FOR MORE RELATIVE MOBILITY?

IT INTERVENES BY WAY OF STIPENDS TO INCREASE UPWARD MOBILITY,

BUT IS ITS GOAL TO INCREASE DOWNWARD MOBILITY?

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NEXT TO QUESTIONS ABOUT INTRAGENERATIONAL

INCOME MOBILITY AND INTERNEGERATIONAL

CLASS MOBILITY,

STAND MORE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT

INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY.

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IF STIPENDS ARE AWARDED IRRESPECTIVE OF

PARENTAL INCOME, STIPENDS MAKE FOR LESS

DOWNWARD EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY,

NOT ONLY FOR MEDIOCRE SONS BUT ALSO FOR CLEVER FEMALES.

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BOURDIEU 1972 ON COMPENSATORY STRATEGIES AND HOUT & RAFTERY 1981 ON MAXIMALLY

MAINTAINED INEQUALITY:

SOLIDARITY OF RICH PARENTS WITH THEIR CHILDREN,

SEEKS TO CANCEL EFFECTS OF MORE UPWARD EDUCATIONAL

MOBILITY.

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WHETHER RULED BY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OR NOT, EUROPE`S CORE COUNTRIES HAVE MORE THAN 10%

UNEMPLOYMENT AND IN THAT SENSE ARE NOT WELFARE STATES (ANYMORE).

NEXT TO QUESTIONS ON INTERGENERATIONAL

EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY, STAND QUESTIONS ON

INTRAGENERATIONAL (UN)EMPLOYMENT MOBILITY.

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THE GALLIE & PAUGAM 2000 QUESTION: ARE THE UNEMPLOYED TRAPPED IN A

GENEROUS STATE SAFETY NET,

OR DO LOWER AND SHORTER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS MAKE

FOR MORE MOBILITY FROM UNEMPLOYMENT,

AND WHAT DO ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES DO?

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THE MAYER-MÜLLER QUESTION:

DOES VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN TIMES OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT GIVE SCHOOL LEAVERS

BETTER CHANCES OF FINDING A JOB?

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LINKING THE (UN)EMPLOYMENT INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY QUESTION TO THE INTERGENERATIONAL

CLASS MOBILITY QUESTION:

DOES UNEMPLOYMENT AS A YOUTH AND DOES A HIGHER

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WHEN COMPULSORY SCHOOLING ENDS

MAKE FOR A WORSE JOB IN LATER LIFE?

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This presentation may be viewed in full on my website

under the heading foreign presentations.

www.socsci.ru.nl/maw.sociologie/ultee/

Or just type in google: wout ultee

It is the first hit.